WTO争端解决加拿大期刊案剖析
WTO加拿大小麦出口和进口谷物处理措施案法律问题分析
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WTO争端解决机制的缺陷与完善.
ＷＴＯ争端解决机制的缺陷与完善.一、论文报告一、WTO争端解决机制的概述二、WTO争端解决机制的缺陷1. 某些成员国在案件中缺乏透明度和公正性；2. 贫困国家在理论上缺乏平等的机会；3. 案件处理速度较慢；4. 没有达成强制性裁决的机制；5. 没有有效的执行机制。
三、WTO争端解决机制的完善1. 增加案件处理速度和效率；2. 通过改善讨论和协商的方式来协调争端；3. 强化透明度、公正和平等性原则；4. 加强执行机构的监管和其他合适机制的监督；5. 在解决争端的方式上尽量避免单向偏见和阻碍。
二、案例分析一、美国对钢铁的关税限制案美国在2002年对从欧盟、加拿大和一些亚洲国家进口的钢铁实施了高额的关税限制。
欧盟等国家将此作出严正的抗议。
这场争端引用了WTO的争端解决机制，并且在2003年6月WTO终审判定美国的决定违反国际贸易规则。
法官认为美国的措施侵犯了WTO规则，制定了许多特殊条款和引导性政策。
二、中国抗衡美国对自家铝型材的关税限制恶性循环源自2017年4月18日，美国商务部宣布发起《312调查》，针对美国进口铝产品对美国国家安全构成的潜在威胁进行的全面、高度机密的调查。
在近一年的调查过程中，美国曾两次推迟最后期限。
2018年4月24日，美国政府终于宣布对全球进口铝产品征收10%的新关税。
WTO在报告中强调，美国方面的做法有损于贸易自由，违反了WTO有关原则，为其他成员国的贸易作出了负面榜样。
三、欧盟和日本针对韩国船舶出口的补贴欧盟和日本起诉韩国政府在其国家活动中向船舶出口行业提供不公平补贴，这一争端很快就升级为法庭上的官司。
欧盟和日本指责韩国的最终结果是，韩国已经确定了将于2017年被削减100亿韩元的五年计划。
该计划涉及布局开展直至2020年的实施优惠贷款等35个项目。
WTO说，目前尚不清楚任何国家是否在未来将继续提供该支持。
四、中国诉韩国对多管运输税发布反悔声明中国2014年10月在WTO提交了一份控告韩国的申述，称韩方通过征税出口多管发动机和薄钢板虚假声明等措施不公平地限制了中国的出口。
WTO案例DS48
WTO案例分析之DS321Summary of the dispute to date back to topThe summary below was up-to-date at 3 November 2011See also:One-page summary of key findings of this disputeConsultationsComplaint by Canada. (See also DS26 and DS321)On 28 June 1996, Canada requested consultations with the European Communities regarding the importation of livestock and meat from livestock that have been treated with certain substances having a hormonal action under Article XXII of the GATT 1994 and the corresponding provisions in the SPS Agreement, TBT Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture. Canada alleges violation of Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the SPS Agreement; Article III or XI of the GATT 1994 ; Article 2 of the TBT Agreement; and Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture.On 16 September 1996, Canada requested the establishment of a panel. At its meeting on 27 September 1996, the DSB deferred the establishment of a panel.Panel and Appellate Body proceedingsFurther to a second request to establish a panel by Canada, the DSBestablished a panel at its meeting on 16 October 1996. On 4 November 1996, the panel was composed.On 18 August 1997, the panel report was circulated to Members. The panel found that the European Communities' ban on imports of meat and meat products from cattle treated with any of six specific hormones for growth promotion purposes was inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 5.1 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement.On 24 September 1997, the European Communities notified its intention to appeal certain issues of law and legal interpretations developed by the panel. The Appellate Body examined this appeal with that of DS26. The Appellate Body report was circulated to Members on 16 January 1998. The Appellate Body upheld the panel’s finding that the EC import prohibition was inconsistent with Articles 3.3 and 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, but reversed the panel’s finding that the EC import prohibition was inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement. On the general and procedural issues, the Appellate Body upheld most of the findings and conclusions of the panel, except with respect to the burden of proof in proceedings under the SPS Agreement.At its meeting on 13 February 1998, the DSB adopted the Appellate Body report and the panel report, as modified by the Appellate Body. Reasonable period of timeOn 8 April 1998, Canada requested that the “reasonable period of time” for implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB be determined by binding arbitration, pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the DSU. The Award of the Arbitrator was circulated to Members on 29 May 1998. The Arbitrator determined that the reasonable period of time for implementation to be 15 months from the date of adoption (i.e. 15 months from 13 February 1998); therefore the European Communities had to comply by 13 May 1999. The European Communities undertook to comply with the recommendations of the DSB within the implementation period. At the DSB meeting on 28 April 1999, the European Communities informed the DSB that it would consider offering compensation in view of the likelihood that it may not be able to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB by the deadline of 13 May 1999.Proceedings under Article 22 of the DSU (remedies)On 3 June 1999, Canada, pursuant to Article 22.2 of the DSU, requested authorization from the DSB for the suspension of concessions to the European Communities in the amount of CAD 75 million. The European Communities, pursuant to Article 22.6 of the DSU, requested arbitration on the level of suspension of concessions requested by Canada. The DSB referred the issue of the level of suspension to the original panel for arbitration.The Decision of the Arbitrators was circulated to Members on 12 July 1999. The Arbitrators determined the level of nullification suffered by Canada to be equal to CAD 11.3 million. At its meeting on 26 July 1999, the DSBauthorized the suspension of concessions to the European Communities by Canada in the amount determined by the Arbitrators as being equivalent to the level of nullification suffered by Canada.At the DSB meeting on 7 November 2003, the European Communities stated that following the entering into force of its new Directive (2003/74/EC) regarding the prohibition on the use in stockfarming of certain hormones, there was no legal basis for the continued imposition of retaliatory measures by Canada ; one of the reasons cited by the Appellate Body in its ruling against the European Communities was its failure to carry out a risk assessment within the meaning of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement; and, having commissioned such an assessment to be undertaken on its behalf by an independent scientific committee whose findings indicated that the hormones in question posed a risk for consumers, the European Communities had fulfilled its WTO obligations and was entitled to demand the immediate lifting of the sanctions imposed by Canada in accordance with the provisions of Article 22.8 of the DSU. Canada said that while his country was prepared to discuss this matter further with the European Communitis, it doubted whether the new studies presented any new scientific basis for the ban of hormone-treated beef, and was also not in a position to accede to the request of the European Communities. The European Communities responded that on the basis of the negative position expressed by Canada, it would reflect on the appropriate actions that would be necessary in order to preserve its rights under the WTO agreements.At the DSB meeting on 1 December 2003, the European Communities stated that: in light of the disagreement between the parties to the dispute with regard to the European Communities’ compliance with the DSB’s recommendations, the matter should be referred to the WTO for a multilateral decision; this situation was similar to other cases, which had been resolved in the past through recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU; Canada should initiate multilateral procedures to determine whether or not the European Communities was in compliance; the European Communities stood ready to discuss this matter with Canada. Canada stated that, although at the 7 November DSB meeting, Canada had put forward a suggestion for bilateral discussions concerning the justification for th e European Communities’ position regarding its compliance with the WTO ruling, the European Communities had not responded to this suggestion; it was up to the European Communities to establish that it had complied with the WTO ruling; Canada continued to be open to discussions with the European Communities regarding its justification for its position; at this stage, Canada did not see any basis for removal of its retaliatory measures nor wished to take any other action.On 8 November 2004, the European Communities filed a separate request for consultations with Canada asserting that Canada should have removed its retaliatory measures insofar as the European Communities had removed the measures found to be inconsistent (see DS321).Compliance proceedingsOn 22 December 2008, the European Communities requested consultations under Article 21.5 of the DSU. On 16 January 2009, Australia, New Zealand and the United States requested to join the consultations. Subsequently, Canada informed the DSB that it had accepted the requests of Australia, New Zealand and the United States to join the consultations.Implementation of adopted reportsOn 17 March 2011, the European Union and Canada notified the DSB of a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the importation of beef from animals not treated with certain growth-promoting hormones and increased duties applied by Canada to certain products of the European Union, agreed by the United States and the European Commission on 17 March 2011, in relation to this dispute.。
WTO 框架中贸易争端解决的实例分析
题干材料中，中国、欧盟、加拿大、墨西哥都 对美国采取了报复措施，这些措施取得 WTO 授权 了吗？仅从时间上就可以判断，短短几个月不足以 走完 WTO 复杂的流程。那么这 5 个案件在 DSB 的 诉讼程序中，目前处于什么状态？
WTO争端解决中交叉报复的案例分析
WTO争端解决中交叉报复的案例分析关键词 WTO 争端解决交叉报复《汉漠拉比法典》、《十二铜表法》乃至《圣经》中均有“以牙还牙”、“以眼还眼”等有关报复的记载，强调了报复的对等性和同态性。
在多边贸易体制中，类似“以牙还牙”的对等报复在《关税与贸易总协定》(GATT)时代就有，如在货物贸易领域违法造成损害，可在该领域实施报复。
世界贸易组织(WTO)诞生后消失了一种新的报复形式——“交叉报复”(Cross-Retaliation)，如一成员认为，其在某一协定项下的权利被侵害，可以在另一个协定项下对违背方进行报复。
换言之，假如“以牙还牙”不够，还可以“以眼还牙，以血还牙”。
WTO成立14年来，共做出116项裁决，先后在六个案例里授权报复。
其中，有三个案例涉及交叉报复——厄瓜多尔获准对欧共体实施交叉报复；安提瓜获准对美国进行交叉报复；巴西申请对美国实施交叉报复。
各方对交叉报复的做法褒贬不一。
当时，WTO引入交叉报复机制曾轰动一时，被认为将会使WTO法律的“牙齿”更加“锐利”。
1999年末，厄瓜多尔作为进展中国家首次获得授权对欧共体实施交叉报复，被誉为是WTO的“其次次革命”。
而2022年获准对美实施交叉报复的加勒比小国安提瓜则被誉为“咆哮的老鼠”。
然而，也有观点认为，交叉报复“好看不好用”，迄今授权的报复均未付诸实施。
同时，其副作用也很大，引起的问题比其解决的问题要多得多，对WTO体制构成严峻挑战。
经过14年的实践，无论是发达成员，还是进展中成员，都对交叉报复的本质有了新的熟悉。
在进一步考察交叉报复案例之前，不妨先看一下交叉报复的基本概念。
一、交叉报复的概念在WTO法律条文中，并没有“报复”这个词，更没有“交叉报复”。
这两个词都是人们在实践中的形象化称呼。
根据WTO的规定，报复是在败诉方不执行裁决时，WTO授权胜诉方对败诉方中止减让义务的临时性(自助式)救济。
而交叉报复是指，对于在货物贸易、服务贸易和与贸易有关的学问产权(TRIPS)三大协定的任何一个协定中违法造成的损害，报复将不再局限于违法所涉的协定，而是可以在其他两个协定中进行交叉报复。