经济学人文章翻译Word版

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第19天：经济学人

高斋读书会: 每日一段100字左右外刊经济学人英译汉来源：高斋翻译Joy老师(微博@高斋翻硕)修订后的经济学人译文原文：To implement it he hired Miguel Zugaza, a shrewd manager, as director. Miguel Falomir, who was appointed as Mr Zugaza's successor on March 21st, inherits a Prado that is flourishing. It attracts 3m visitors a year. It has weathered state funding cuts: about 70% of its budget of 45 million euros ($49m) now comes from tickets, merchandising and sponsorship. Above all, the Prado has shed its provincialism. “It was very introverted,” says Mr Falomir, an expert on Titian. It used to mount exhibitions only of Spanish painting. 微博@高斋翻硕高斋翻译Joy老师(微博@高斋翻硕)的修订后的译文：为了实施这项法律/变革，他聘请了精明能干的经理米盖尔·苏加萨(Miguel Zugaza)担任馆长。

米盖尔·弗洛米尔（Miguel Falomir）于3月21日接替苏加萨担任博物馆馆长一职，接手了蓬勃发展的普拉多。

普拉多美术馆每年吸引三百万游客，经受住了国家经费削减的考验：普拉多总预算为4500万欧元（约合4900万美元），其中有70%来自门票和展销收益，以及赞助费。

第62天：经济学人

高斋资料班: 每日一段100字左右外刊经济学人英译汉来源：高斋翻译Joy老师(微博@高斋翻硕)修订后的经济学人译文原文：Livestock is a big and growing business all over east Africa, in considerable part fuelled by the Gulf’s increasing appetite for meat. Live Sudanese animal exports more than trebled to $670m between 2010 and 2013 (the most recent years for which the World Bank has data) . More than 70% were sheep, demand for which surges around the Muslim festival of Eid al-Adha, when they are ceremonially slaughtered. In 2015 Somalia sold 5.3m animals, worth $384m; livestock counts for 40% of that fractured country’s GDP. Other Sudanese may sneer that the Rashaida’s new cars and houses have been bought with the proceeds of people-smuggling. But there is plenty of money to be made in the legitimate business of exporting livestock.微博@高斋翻硕高斋翻译Joy老师(微博@高斋翻硕)的修订后的译文：在整个东非地区，牲畜贸易都是大买卖，而且近年来发展迅速，很大程度上得益于海湾国家对肉类产品不断增长的需求。

2013年9月新经济学人的几篇文章及其翻译

Women managers in Asia.女性高管在亚洲。

Untapped talent.尚待开发的人才。

Sexism is rife in Asia. That creates an opportunity for non-chauvinist firms.性别歧视在亚洲"大行其道"。

这为非大男子主义至上的企业创造了机遇。

IN THE West, women typically make up 10-20% of upper management and company boards. They are relatively lucky. A report from McKinsey, a consultancy, shows that Asian women lag far behind.在西方，女性通常占据10-20%的公司高层和董事会职位。

相比之下，她们是幸运的。

来自麦肯锡咨询机构（McKinsey）的报告显示在此方面，亚洲女性大大落后了。

There are exceptions. In Australia women's share of board and executive-committee jobs is roughly on a par with that in America and parts of Europe. Singapore too has a large number of women in senior management (see chart). But elsewhere the picture is mostly dire, and not necessarily because the countries concerned are poor. In Japan and South Korea, both rich, women are about as likely to sit on boards as men are to serve tea.例外也是有的。

第26天：经济学人

高斋读书会: 每日一段100字左右外刊经济学人英译汉来源：高斋翻译Joy老师(微博@高斋翻硕)修订后的经济学人译文原文：Non-white male workers spend an additional 1.1% of the day not working while on the job, or an extra five minutes per day.微博@高斋翻硕高斋翻译Joy老师(微博@高斋翻硕)的修订后的译文：有色人种的男性员工每天要多花 1.1%的工作时间用于做其他事，或者说每天要多浪费五分钟。

微博@高斋翻硕高斋翻译Joy老师(微博@高斋翻硕)：知识点有色人种一般被西方的种族主义者定义为除白人以外的所有人种，包括黑人、黄种人、拉丁裔，印度人，还有白人与其他种族混血人。

高斋翻译Joy老师(微博@高斋翻硕)的翻译思维：1. 1.1% of the day not working while on the job, or an extra five minutes per day：or连接就是用了不同的衡量数据，一个是百分比，一个是具体的多少minutes，比如我们说$3000 a month, or $100 per day. 翻译的时候需要把重复的还原了再翻译才意思完整：spend an additional an extra five minutes per day not working while on the job每天要多浪费（用浪费这个词就很好了）2. additional一般会翻译为副词，多。

所以整句的翻译还是要看你的汉语水平。

微博@高斋翻硕原文：Assuming their controls are adequate, that would still leave 90% of the wage difference between white workers and ethnic minorities, which was recently estimated to be 14%, unexplained.微博@高斋翻硕高斋翻译Joy老师(微博@高斋翻硕)的修订后的译文：目前，白人员工与少数族裔员工的工资差距估计为14%，假设影响他们收入的因素都差不多，那么二者工资差距其中有90%的原因是无法说清楚的。

经济学人

Welfare reform福利改革Bedrooms and brickbats睡房与碎砖The bedroom tax will probably survive睡房税很可能延续ON A sunny spring morning, a small group ofprotesters wait at the Departme nt of Work and Pensions with a giant card for Iain DuncanSmith. It is his birth day. But the card also marks a year since the introduction of the “bedroomtax ”, as opposition politicians call the welfare secretary's scheme to encourag e people insubsidised social housing to move to smaller properties.“One year on and still causing misery”, it reads.在一个阳光明媚的早晨，一小群人带着巨大的宣传板，上面画着伊安.杜肯.史密斯，来到就业与养老金部大门前。

当日是部长的生日。

此画板标志着“睡房税”已经实行了一年。

这是政治反对派们对史密斯福利计划的戏称。

福利大臣想动员民众从接受补贴的社会房屋搬到小点的房子中。

板上写着“实施一年了，依然生贫致困”。

Since 2010, the coalition has introduced plenty of changes to the welfare syst em. But few areas unpopular as the bedroom tax (officially, the “removal of the spare-room subsidy”).According to Ed Miliband, the Labour leader, it sy mbolises an “out-of-touch, uncaring Torygovernment that stands up for the pr ivileged few”. In February the nationalists in Scotlandtriumphantly scrapped it . The Liberal Democrats are split by it. Yet despite the tide of anger, itwill pro bably survive.2010年以来，执政联盟对福利系统进行了大刀阔斧的改革。

第42天：经济学人

高斋资料班: 每日一段100字左右外刊经济学人英译汉来源：高斋翻译Joy老师(微博@高斋翻硕)修订后的经济学人译文原文：But if Mr Trump is serious about cutting imports, he could get rid of this exemption. It was only last March that Barack Obama increased it to $800 from the previous $200. If it were lowered or eliminated by executive order, logistics-industry people would really panic. They are putting a brave face on things.微博@高斋翻硕高斋翻译Joy老师(微博@高斋翻硕)的修订后的译文：但如果特朗普当真要削减进口，他可能会取消这种免税待遇。

奥巴马去年3月才把之前200美元的进口免税额提高到800美元。

如果特朗普以行政命令降低或取消免税额，物流行业人员真的会惶恐不已。

目前他们都在强作镇定。

微博@高斋翻硕高斋翻译Joy老师(微博@高斋翻硕)：知识点1. be serious about：对…是认真的，认真对待1. executive order：n.美国总统之行政命令2. logistics-美[loˈdʒɪstɪks] ：n.物流;后勤;3. panic：n.恐慌，惊慌;（金融方面）大恐慌;成功;高斋翻译Joy老师(微博@高斋翻硕)的翻译思维：1. It was that是强调句型，这里强调突出的是“去年3月”。

翻译时要把强调句的意味体现出来，翻译为去年3月才。

2. increased it to中的it，根据上一段可知是指exemption，即免税额。

3. 看到被动句，翻译时首先想到的是处理为汉语的主动句。

(完整word版)经济学人经济类文章精选4

InadequateSOMETIMES the only thing people can agree on is a mediocre idea. Ahead of the G20 meeting, some regulators are pushing to introduce dynamic provisioning for banks. Under this system, in boom years banks make provisions against profits which then sit on their balance-sheets as reserves against unspecified potential losses. In the bad years they draw down on these reserves. This smooths banks’ profits over the cycle, making their capital positions “counter-cyclical”. Supporters point to Spain, which uses this approach and whose lenders are in relatively good nick.Banks should be encouraged to save more for a rainy day. But the importance of Spain’s system has been oversold. Going into the credit crisis, its two big banks had an extra buffer equivalent to about 1.5% of risk-weighted assets. Banks like UBS or Citigroup have had write-offs far beyond this, equivalent to 8-15% of risk-weighted assets. Whether dynamic provisions influenced managers’ behaviour is also questionable. Spain’s BBV A was run us ing an economic-capital model that, according to its 2007 annual report, explicitly replaced the generic provision in its income statement with its “best estimate of the real risk incurred”.Accounting standard-setters, meanwhile, are not amused. They support the objective of counter-cyclical capital rules but think dynamic provisioning is a bad way to achieve this. Why not simply require banks to run with higher capital ratios, rather than go through a circuitous route by smoothing profits, which investors tend to dislike? Accountants worry their standards are being fiddled with needlessly, after a decades-long fight to have them independently set to provide accurate data to investors.Is there a solution? If anything, the crisis shows that accounting and supervision should be further separated to break the mechanistic link between mark-to-market losses and capital. Investors should get the information they want. Supervisors should make a judgment about the likelihood of losses and set the required capital level accordingly. Warren Buffett, an astute investor, has endorsed this approach.Sadly, bank supervision is as dysfunctional as the banks. The Basel 2 accords took five years to negotiate. Local regulators interpreted them differently and many failed to enforce them. Confidence in their integrity is now so low that many investors and some banks and regulators have abandoned Basel as their main test of capital. Given this mess, it is easy to see why policymakers might view tweaking accounting standards as an attractive short cut: with some arm-twisting, the rules can be changed quickly and are legally enforceable. But this is a matter where short cuts are not good enough.Unsavoury spreadTEN years ago Warren Buffett and Jack Welch were among the most admired businessmen in the world. Emerging markets were seen as risky, to be avoided by the cautious. But now the credit-default swaps market indicates that Berkshire Hathaway, run by Mr Buffett, is more likely to default on its debt than Vietnam. GE Capital, the finance arm of the group formerly run by Mr Welch, is a worse credit risk than Russia and on March 12th Standard & Poor's downgraded its debt—the first time GE and its subsidiaries have lost their AAA rating in over five decades.The contrast highlights the sorry state of the corporate-bond market. A turn-of-the-year rally was founded on hopes that spreads (the excess of corporate-bond yields over risk-free rates) more than compensated investors for the economic outlook. That has now petered out.The weakness has been much greater in speculative, or high-yield, bonds than in theinvestment-grade part of the market. This is hardly surprising. First, economic prospects are so dire that companies already in trouble will have difficulty surviving. Banks are trying to preserve their own capital and do not need to own any more toxic debt. Even if refinancing were available for endangered firms, it would be prohibitively dear. It is only a matter of time before some go under. Moody’s cites 283 companies at greate st risk of default, including well-known outfits like Blockbuster, a video-rental chain, and MGM Mirage, a casino group. A year ago just 157 companies made the list. Standard & Poor’s says 35 have defaulted this year, against 12 in the same period in 2008. That translates into a default rate over the past 12 months of just 3.8%.The rate is likely to increase sharply. Charles Himmelberg, a credit strategist at Goldman Sachs, forecasts that 14% of high-yield bonds will default this year, with the same proportion going phut in 2010. Worse, creditors will get back only about 12.5 cents on the dollar. All told, Goldman thinks the combination of defaults and low recovery rates will cost bondholders 37 cents on the dollar in the next five years.A second problem for the corporate-bond market is that optimism about the scope for an imminent end to the financial crisis has dissipated. “People have given up hope that the new [Obama] administration will be able to do anything to make things better quickly,” says Willem Sels, a credit strategist at Dresdner Kleinwort.Banks are still the subject of heightened concern. Credit Derivatives Research has devised a counterparty-risk index, based on the cost of insuring against default of 15 large banks; the index is now higher than it was after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Jeff Rosenberg, head of credit strategy at Bank of America Securities Merrill Lynch, says investors are uncertain about the impact of government intervention in banks. Each successive rescue, from Bear Stearns to Citigroup, has affected different parts of the capital structure in different ways.A third problem for the high-yield market is that plans for quantitative easing (purchases by the central bank of government and private-sector debt) are focused on investment-grade bonds. As well as reviving the economy, governments are concerned about protecting taxpayers’ money, and so will not want to buy bonds at high risk of default. If the government is going to support the investment-grade market, investors have an incentive to steer their portfolios in that direction.The relative strength of the investment-grade market even permitted the issuance of around $300 billion of bonds in the first two months of the year, albeit largely for companies in safe industries such as pharmaceuticals. Circumstances suited all the market participants. “Spreads were wide, which attracted investors, but absolute levels of interest rates were low, which suited issuers,” says Mr Rosenberg.Although the Dow Jones Industrial Average jumped by nearly 6% on March 10th, it is hard to see how the equity market can enjoy a sustained rebound while corporate-bond spreads are still widening. Bondholders have a prior claim on a company’s assets; if they are not going to be paid in full, then shareholders will not get a look-in. However, credit investors say their market often takes its lead from equities. If each is following the other, that hints at a worrying downward spiral.A PlanB for global financeIn a guest article, Dani Rodrik argues for stronger national regulation, not the global sort THE clarion call for a global system of financial regulation can be heard everywhere. From Angela Merkel to Gordon Brown, from Jean-Claude Trichet to Ben Bernanke, from sober economists tocountless newspaper editorials; everyone, it seems, is asking for it regardless of political complexion.That is not surprising, perhaps, in light of the convulsions the world economy is going through. If we have learnt anything from the crisis it is that financial regulation and supervision need to be tightened and their scope broadened. It seems only a small step to the idea that we need much stronger global regulation as well: a global college of regulators, say; a binding code of international conduct; or even an international financial regulator.Yet the logic of global financial regulation is flawed. The world economy will be far more stable and prosperous with a thin veneer of international co-operation superimposed on strong national regulations than with attempts to construct a bold global regulatory and supervisory framework. The risk we run is that pursuing an ambitious goal will detract us from something that is more desirable and more easily attained.One problem with the global strategy is that it presumes we can get leading countries to surrender significant sovereignty to international agencies. It is hard to imagine that America’s Congress would ever sign off on the kind of intrusive international oversight of domestic lending practices that might have prevented the subprime-mortgage meltdown, let alone avert future crises. Nor is it likely that the IMF will be allowed to turn itself into a true global lender of last resort. The far more likely outcome is that the mismatch between the reach of markets and the scope of governance will prevail, leaving global finance as unsafe as ever. That certainly was the outcome the last time we tried an international college of regulators, in the ill-fated case of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International.A second problem is that even if the leading nations were to agree, they might end up converging on the wrong set of regulations. This is not just a hypothetical possibility. The Basel process, viewed until recently as the apogee of international financial co-operation, has been compromised by the inadequacies of the bank-capital agreements it has produced. Basel 1 ended up encouraging risky short-term borrowing, whereas Basel 2’s reliance on credit ratings and banks’ own models to generate risk weights for capital requirements is clearly inappropriate in light of recent experience. By neglecting the macro-prudential aspect of regulation—the possibility that individual banks may appear sound while the system as a whole is unsafe—these agreements have, if anything, magnified systemic risks. Given the risk of converging on the wrong solutions yet again, it would be better to let a variety of regulatory models flourish.Who says one size fits all?But the most fundamental objection to global regulation lies elsewhere. Desirable forms of financial regulation differ across countries depending on their preferences and levels of development. Financial regulation entails trade-offs along many dimensions. The more you valuefinancial stability, the more you have to sacrifice financial innovation. The more fine-tuned and complex the regulation, the more you need skilled regulators to implement it. The more widespread the financial-market failures, the larger the potential role of directed credit and state banks. Different n ations will want to sit on different points along their “efficient frontiers”. There is nothing wrong with France, say, wanting to purchase more financial stability than America—and having tighter regulations—at the price of giving up some financial innovations. Nor with Brazil giving its state-owned development bank special regulatory treatment, if the country wishes, so that it can fill in for missing long-term credit markets.In short, global financial regulation is neither feasible, nor prudent, nor desirable. What finance needs instead are some sensible traffic rules that will allow nations (and in some cases regions) to implement their own regulations while preventing adverse spillovers. If you want an analogy, think of a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade for world finance rather than a World Trade Organisation. The genius of the GA TT regime was that it left room for governments to craft their own social and economic policies as long as they did not follow blatantly protectionist policies and did not discriminate among their trade partners.Fortify the home front firstSimilarly, a new financial order can be constructed on the back of a minimal set of international guidelines. The new arrangements would certainly involve an improved IMF with better representation and increased resources. It might also require an international financial charter with limited aims, focused on financial transparency, consultation among national regulators, and limits on jurisdictions (such as offshore centres) that export financial instability. But the responsibility for regulating leverage, setting capital standards, and supervising financial markets would rest squarely at the national level. Domestic regulators and supervisors would no longer hide behind international codes. Just as an exporter of widgets has to abide by product-safety standards in all its markets, global financial firms would have to comply with regulatory requirements that may differ across host countries.The main challenge facing such a regime would be the incentive for regulatory arbitrage. So the rules would recognise governments’ right to intervene in cross-border financial transactions—but only in so far as the intent is to prevent competition from less-strict jurisdictions from undermining domestic regulations.Of course, like-minded countries that want to go into deeper financial integration and harmonise their regulations would be free to do so, provided (as in the GA TT) they do not use this as an excuse for financial protectionism. One can imagine the euro zone eventually taking this route and opting for a common regulator. The Chiang Mai initiative in Asia may ultimately also produce a regional zone of deep integration around an Asian monetary fund. But the rest of the world would have to live with a certain amount of financial segmentation—the necessary counterpart toregulatory fragmentation.If this leaves you worried, turn again to the Bretton Woods experience. Despite limited liberalisation, that system produced huge increases in cross-border trade and investment. The reason is simple and remains relevant as ever: an architecture that respects national diversity does more to advance the cause of globalisation than ambitious plans that assume it away.One crunch after anotherCALLS for co-ordinated fiscal stimulus to lift the world out of recession were joined at the weekend by Larry Summers, Barack Obama’s top economic adviser. Such co-ordination has been absent up to now, though that could change at the meeting of G20 leaders in London in early April. But there has been plenty of fiscal stimulus, led by America’s $787 billion package, as many governments seek to offset a collapse in private demand. There are worries not only about how much these measures cost up front but their longer-term effects on government finances.The direct costs of such packages are indeed large. The IMF reckons that for G20 countries stimulus packages will add up to 1.5% of GDP in 2009 (calculated as a weighted average using purchasing power parity). Together with the huge sums used to bail out firms in the financial sector (3.5% of GDP and counting in America, for example), these are immediate ways in which the crisis is affecting public finances across the world. But they are not the only ones.A downturn affects government finances in other ways. Shares in most rich countries have plummeted. The MSCI developed-world index, which tracks stocks in 23 rich countries, has lost more than half its value since the beginning of 2008. Falling share prices hit government revenues as capital-gains tax takes decline. Similarly, taxes on financial-sector profits, a significant part of government revenue in many countries, have evaporated. And expenditures onautomatic stabilisers such as unemployment insurance rise in a recession. All this widens budget deficits.Direct stimulus measures also push up government deficits and debt, although the type of intervention affects how long-lasting its effects are. Most expenditure, such as infrastructure spending, is temporary (although it affects debt permanently). Revenue measures, such as tax cuts, are politically difficult to reverse. The question is whether this threatens the solvency of governments.A paper on the state of the world’s public finances issued by the IMF in the run-up to the G20 meetings takes a stab at identifying and measuring the fiscal implications of the crisis for both rich and developing countries. Its conclusions are sobering. For rich G20 countries, fiscal balances will worsen by 6% of GDP between 2007 and 2009. Government debt will come off worse. Between 2007 and 2009, the debt-to-GDP ratio of rich countries is projected to rise by 14.5 percentage points. In the medium term, the outlook is even more worrying. Government debt for the average rich country will be more than 100% of GDP by 2014 compared with 70% in 2000 and 40% in 1980.A great deal of uncertainty surrounds these estimates because so much depends on guesswork. Economic recovery, for example, could be slower than the IMF’s current projections: g rowth forecasts were revised down several times in 2008. Governments may also have to shoulder more burdens—private pension plans, which have been hammered by the crisis, may require government support. And the eventual cost of financial-sector bailouts will depend on how quickly and at whatlevel prices stabilise of the assets governments have taken on. Past experience suggests that there is enormous scope for variation. Sweden had a recovery rate of 94% five years after its crisis in 1991; Japan had recovered only 1% of assets in the five years after its troubles of 1997.The IMF points out that debt levels, while high, are not unprecedented by historical standards. But the worry is that primary fiscal balances in four-fifths of the rich countries studied by the IMF will be too high even in 2012 to allow debt to be stabilised, or brought down to 60% of GDP (which is the IMF benchmark for debt levels), even though revenues will recover as countries emerge from the crisis. What this implies is that, over time, fiscal deficits will have to be trimmed. And therein lies the rub.Most rich countries have rapidly ageing populations. Unless entitlement systems are reformed (by reducing benefits) or tax bases broadened, fiscal deficits will rise still further. Some of the IMF’s ideas about how to do this will seem unpalatable: it argues that health systems, for example, will have to become less generous. But rich countries were always going to have to come to terms with the fiscal consequences of demographic pressures on existing welfare systems sooner or later. The crisis will bring this problem more urgently to the fore.Inadequate有时人们只能在普普通通的事情上取的一致意见。

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很多女性在交谈中告诉我，她们喜欢从事自己能胜任或做得完美的职业或职位。这也不足为奇。
女孩从小就被教导要避免失败，规避风险。要微笑得体，谨慎行事，门门优秀。而在另一方面，男孩却被教导要玩得粗野，荡到高空，爬上猴架顶端，再纵身跃下。
当他们成年之时，男性习惯于不断冒险，无论是要求加薪还是约某人出去，他们的冒险也时常得到回报。在硅谷人们常说倘若没经过两次创业的失败，没人会把你当回事。换言之，我们教育女孩要完美无缺，而教导男孩学会勇敢。
So many women that I talk to tell me that theygravitatetowards careers or positions that they know they’re going to be great in, that they know they’re going to be perfect in. And it’s no wonder why.
Most girls are taught to avoid failure and risk. To smile pretty,play it safe, get all A’s. Boys, on the other hand, are taught to play rough, swing high, crawl to the top of the monkey bars and then jump off head first.
有人担忧我们的联邦赤字，但我却忧心我们的勇气赤字。正因为我们没有教导女孩们学会勇敢，我们的经济，我们的社会才会不景气。我们的勇气赤字是导致在科学技术与工程数学领域，在高层管理人士中，在会议室里，在国会里，乃至任何所见之处都缺乏女性的原因。
Some people worry about our federal deficit. But I worry about our bravery deficit. Our ecing out because we’re not raising our girls to be brave. The bravery deficit is the reason why women are underrepresented in STEM, in C-suites, in boardrooms, in Congress, and pretty much everywhere you look.
By the time they’re adults and whether they’re negotiating a raise or even asking someone out on a date, men are habituated to take risk after risk. They’re rewarded for it. It’s often said inSilicon Valleythat no one even takes you seriously unless you’ve had two failed startups. In other words,we’re raising our girls to be perfect and we’re raising our boys to be brave.