安全工程专业外语翻译
英语 安全工程专业翻译
Unit1Safety Management Systems1. Accident Causation ModelsThe most important aim of safety management is to maintain and promote workers' health and safety at work. Understanding why and how accidents and other unwanted events develop is important when preventive activities are planned. Accident theories aim to clarify the accident phenomena，and to explain the mechanisms that lead to accidents. All modem theories are based on accident causation models which try to explain the sequence of events that finally produce the loss. In ancient times, accidents were seen as an act of God and very little could be done to prevent them. In the beginning of the 20th century，it was believed that the poor physical conditions are the root causes of accidents. Safety practitioners concentrated on improving machine guarding, housekeeping and inspections. In most cases an accident is the result of two things ：The human act, and the condition of the physical or social environmentPetersen extended the causation theory from the individual acts and local conditions to the management system. He concluded that unsafe acts, unsafe conditions，and accidents are all symptoms of something wrong in the organizational management system. Furthermore, he stated that it is the top management who is responsible for building up such a system that can effectively control the hazards associated to the organization’soperation. The errors done by a single person can be intentional or unintentional. Rasmussen and Jensen have presented a three-level skill-rule-knowledge model for describing the origins of the different types of human errors. Nowadays，this model is one of the standard methods in the examination of human errors at work.Accident-proneness models suggest that some people are more likely to suffer anaccident than others. The first model was created in 1919，based on statistical examinations in a mumilions factory. This model dominated the safety thinking and research for almost 50 years, and it is still used in some organizations. As a result of this thinking, accident was blamed solely on employees rather than the work process or poor management practices. Since investigations to discover the underlying causal factors were felt unnecessary and/or too costly, a little attention was paid to how accidents actually happened. Employees* attitudes towards risks and risk taking have been studied, e. g. by Sulzer-Azaroff. According to her, employees often behave unsafely, even when they are fully aware of the risks involved. Many research results also show that the traditional promotion methods like campaigns, posters and safety slogans have seldom increased the use of safe work practices. When backed up by other activities such as training, these measures have been somewhat more effective. Experiences on some successful methods to change employee behavior and attitudes have been reported. One well-known method is a small-group process used forimproving housekeeping in industrial workplaces. A comprehensive model of accident causation has been presented by Reason who introduced the concept of organizational error. He stated that corporate culture is the starting-point of the accident sequence. Local conditions and human behavior are only contributing factors in the build-up of the undesired event. The latent organizational failures lead to accidents and incidents when penetrating system’s defenses and barriers. Gmoeneweg has developed Reason’s model by classifying the typical latent error types. His TRIPOD mode! calls the different errors as General Failure Types ( CFTs). The concept of organizational error is in conjunction with the fact that some organizations behave more safely than others. It is often said that these organizations have good safety culture. After the Chernobyl accident，this term became well-known also to the public.Loss prevention is a concept that is often used in the context of hazard control in process industry. Lees has pointed out that loss prevention differs from traditional safety approach in several ways. For example, there is more emphasis on foreseeing hazards and taking actions before accidents occur. Also, there is more emphasis on a systematic rather than a trial and error approach. This is also natural, since accidents in process industry can have catastrophic consequences. Besides the injuries to people, I he damage to plant and loss of profit are major concerns in loss prevention. The future research on the ultimate causes of accidents seems to focus onthe functioning and management of the organization. The strategic management, leadership, motivation, and the personnel's visible and hidden values are some issues that are now under intensive study.2. Safety Management as an Organizational ActivitySafety management is one of the management activities of a company. Different companies have different management practices，and also different ways to control health and safety hazards. Organizational culture is a major component affecting organizational performance and behavior. One comprehensive definition for an organizational culture has been presented by Schein who has said that organizational culture is “a pattern of basic assumptions—invented，discovered, or developed by a given group as it leans to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration—that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems". The concept of safety culture is today under intensive study in industrialized countries. Booth & Lee have stated that an organization's safety culture is a subset of the overall organizational culture. This argument, in fact, suggests that a company’s organizational culture also determines the maximum level of safety the company can reach. The safety culture of an organization is the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style andproficiency of, an organization’s health and saf ety management. Furthermore, organizations with a positive safety culture are characterized by communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of safety, and by confidence in the efficacy of preventive measures. There have been many attempts to develop methods for measuring safety culture. Williamson el al. have summarized some of the factors that the various studies have shown to influence organization's safety culture. These include ：organizational responsibility for safety, management attitudes towards safety, management activity in responding to health and safety problems, safety training and promotion，level of risk at the workplace，workers' involvement in safety，and status of the safety officer and the safety committee.Organizations behave differently in the different parts of the world. This causes visible differences also in safety activities, both in employee level and in the management level. Reasons for these differences are discussed in the following. The studies of Wobbe reveal that shop-floor workers in the USA are, in general, less trained and less adaptable than those in Germany or Japan. Wobbe claims that one reason for this is that, in the USA, companies providing further training for their staff can expect to lose these people to the competitors. This is not so common in Europe or in Japan. Furthermore ，for unionized companies in the USA，seniority is valued very highly，while training or individual’s skills andqualifications do not effect job security，employment, and wage levels very much. Oxenburgh has studied the total costs of absence from work, and found that local culture and legislation has a strong effect on absenteeism rates. For example, the national systems for paying and receiving compensation explain the differences to some extent. Oxenburgh mentions Sweden as a high absenteeism country, and Australia as a low absenteeism country. In Sweden injuries and illnesses are paid by the state social security system, while in Australia, the employer pays all these costs, including illnesses not related to work. Comparison of accident statistics reveals that there are great national differences in accident frequencies and in the accident related absenteeism from work. Some of the differences can be explained by the different accident reporting systems. For example, in some countries only absenteeism lasting more than three working days is included in the statistics. The frequency of minor accidents varies a lot according to the possibility to arrange substitutive work to the injured worker. Placing the injured worker to another job or to training is a common practice for example in the USA and in the UK, while in the Scandinavian countries this is a rarely used procedureSome organizations are more aware of the importance of health and safety at work than others. Clear development stages can be found in the process of improving the management of safety. Waring has divided organizations to three classes according to their maturity and ability to create aneffective safety management system. Waring calls the three organizational models as the mechanical model, the socio-technical model, and the human activity system approach. In the mechanical model, the structures and processes of an organization are well-defined and logical, but people as individuals, groups, and the whole organizations are not considered. The socio-technical model is an approach to work design which recognizes the interaction of technology' and people，and which produces work systems that are technically effective and have characters that lead to high job satisfaction. A positive dimension in this model is that human factors are seen important, for example, in communication, training and emergency responses. The last model, the human activity system approach focuses on people, and points out the complexity of organizations. The strength of this approach is that both formal (or technical) paradigms and human aspects like motivation, learning, culture, and power relations are considered. Waring points out that although the human activity approach does not automatically guarantee success, it has proven to be beneficial to organizations in the long run.3. Safety Policy and PlanningA status review is the basis for a safety policy and the planning of safety activities. According to BS 8800 a status review should compare the company’s existing arrangements with the applicable legal requirements, organization's current safety guidelines, best practices in theindustry’s branch，and the existing resources directed to safety activities. A thorough review ensures that the safety policy and the activities are developed specifically according to the needs of the company.A safety policy is the management’s expression of the direction to be followed in the organization. According to Petersen, a safety policy should commit the management at all levels and it should indicate which tasks, responsibilities and decisions are left to lower-level management. Booth and Lee have stated that a safety policy should also include safety goals as well as quantified objectives and priorities. The standard BS 8800 suggests that in the safety policy，management should show commitment to the following subjects ：Health and safety are recognized as an integral part of business performance ；A high level of health and safety performance is a goal which is achieved by using the legal requirements as the minimum, and where the continual cost- effective improvement of performance is the way to do things；Adequate and appropriate resources are provided to implement the safety policy；The health and safety objectives are set and published at least by internal notification ；The management of health and safety is a prime responsibility of the management ，from the most senior executive to the supervisory level ；The policy is understood, implemented, and maintained at all levels in the organization ；Employees are involved and consulted in order to gain commitment to the policy and its implementation;The policy and the management system are reviewed periodically, and the compliance of the policy is audited on a regular basis;It is ensured that employees receive appropriate training，and are competent to carry out their duties and responsibilities.Some companies have developed so-called “safety principles’which cover the key areas of the company’s safety policy. These principles are utilized as safety guidelines hat are easy to remember, and which are often placed on wall-boards and other public areas in the company. As an example, the DuPont company's safety principles are the following：All injuries and occupational illnesses can be prevented. Management is responsible for safely. Safety is an individual’s responsibility and a condition of employment. Training is an essential element for safe workplaces. Audits must be conducted. All deficiencies must be corrected promptly.It is essential to investigate all injuries and incidents with injury potential. Off-the-job safety is an important part of the safety effort. It is good business to prevent injuries and illnesses.People are the most important element of the safety and occupational health program.The safety policy should be put into practice through careful planning ofthe safety activities. Planning means determination of the safety objectives and priorities, and preparation of the working program to achieve the goals. A company can have different objectives and priorities according to the nature of the typical hazards, and the current status of hazard control. However, some common elements to a safety activity planning can be found. According to BS 8800，the plan should include ：appropriate and adequately resourced arrangements, competent personnel who have defined responsibilities, and effective channels of communication；procedures to set objectives, device and implement plans to meet the objectives ,and to monitor both the implementation and effectiveness of the plans;description of the hazard identification and assessment activities; methods and techniques for measuring safety performance, and in such way that absence of hazardous events is not seen as evidence that all is well. In the Member States of the European Union, the “framework” Directive 89/391 / EEC obligates the employer to prepare a safety program that defines how the effects of technology, work methods, working conditions, social relationships and work environment are controlled. According lo Walters, this directive was originally passed to harmonize the overall safety strategies within the Member States, and to establish a common approach to the management and organization of safety at work. Planning of the safety activities is often done within the framework of quality and environmentalmanagement systems.一单元安全管理体系1、事故致因模型安全管理的最重要的目的是维护和促进工人的健康和安全工作。
资料《安全工程专业英语部分翻译》
Ｕnｉt 1safeｔy manaｇement ｓyｓtemＡcciｄent ｃａｕｓatｉon ｍoｄels ﻩ事故致因理论Ｓafety managemeｎt 安全管理Phｙsｉｃａｌｃonditions ﻩ物质条件Mａcｈinｅguａrdinｇﻩ机械保护装置Ｈouse—keepiｎｇ工作场所管理Ｔｏｐmanagement 高层管理人员Ｈuman ｅｒrorｓ人因失误Aｃcidenｔ-pｒonenｅss ｍｏdels 事故倾向模型Muniｔｉoｎs faｃtｏrｙﻩ军工厂Causal fａctorsﻩ起因Rｉskinｇtakiｎgﻩ冒险行为Coｒpｏraｔｅｃｕlture 企业文化Ｌosｓprevention 损失预防Prｏcess indusｔryﻩ制造工业Haｚard coｎtrol 危险控制Intensｉve ｓtudｙ广泛研究Orgａniｚationaｌperｆｏrmａnce 企业绩效Mｕtual trust 相互信任Sａfｅｔｙoffiｃerﻩ安全官员Ｓafeｔy commｉttee 安全委员会Ｓhop-fｌｏｏrﻩ生产区Unioniｚed company 集团公司Seｎioｒitｙﻩ资历、工龄Local ｃuｌturｅ当地文化Absenｔeｅiｓm rａｔｅﻩ缺勤率Power reｌａtioｎｓﻩ权力关系Stａtus review 状态审查Lower—ｌevel managemenｔ低层管理者Business pｅrformanceﻩ组织绩效Ｍｏst seniｏｒexｅcｕtiｖe 高级主管Superｖisory levｅl监督层Ｓａfety pｒincipｌeﻩ安全规则Waｌl—boarｄﻩ公告栏Imｐlement planﻩ执行计划Ｈazarｄidenｔificａtion 危险辨识Ｓａfeｔy pｅrfｏｒmance 安全性能One comｐrｅｈensｉve definition fｏr an orgaｎｉzatｉonａl cｕｌture ｈas been presentｅdｂｙＳｃhein wｈo has said thｅorganｉｚatiｏnal culturｅiｓ“a patteｒn ｏf baｓic asｓumptionｓ–inveｎｔed, dｉｓcovere ｄ，or deveｌoｐｅｄby ａgiven gｒｏup as iｔlearns to cope with iｔs pｒｏbｌｅms of exｔｅrnal adaｐｔａｔiｏn and inｔernal integratioｎ– that h ａs ｗorked weｌl enouｇｈto be consiｄereｄｖａliｄand,tｈｅrｅｆore, to beｔａught to new memｂeｒｓas the corrｅｃt way to peｒcｅive, thin ｋ,and feel in rｅlatiｏn to ｔhosｅｐrobｌemｓ”译文:Scheｉｎ给出了组织文化的广泛定义，他认为组织文化是由若干基本假设组成的一种模式,这些假设是由某个特定团体在处理外部适应问题与内部整合问题的过程中发明、发现或完善的.由于以这种模式工作的有效性得到了认可,因此将它作为一种正确的方法传授给新成员,让他们以此来认识、思考和解决问题[指适应外部与整合内部的过程中的问题]。
安全工程专业英语汉译英1-8
Unit One安全管理safety management 事故致因accident causation 不安全行为unsafe acts不安全状态unsafe conditions企业安全文化corporate safety culture安全政策safety policyUnit Two系统安全工程system safety engineering 危险辩识hazard identification/identified危险控制hazard control 安全评价safety evaluation危险分析hazard analysis安全准则safety criteria Unit Three安全人机工程safety ergonomics 工作效率work efficiency工作压力job stressors伤害率injury rate人机过程ergonomics process职业伤残work injuryUnit Four工伤保险injury insurance 人因失误human error风险评估risk assessment人机系统ergonomics system工业事故industrial system事故类型accident types Unit Five职业安全健康occupational health and safety职业安全健康管理体系occupational health and safety management system危险源分析hazard analysis 事故分析accident analysis风险管理risk management职业伤害occupational injury Unit Six工业卫生industrial hygiene 物理危害physical hazards 化学危害chemical hazards非电离辐射non-ionizing radiation生物危害biological hazards职业病occupational diseaseUnit Seven安全文化safety culture企业文化corporate culture 高危行业high-risk industry事故率accident rate应急预案emergency plan安全评审safety review Unit Eight安全激励safety motivation 自我激励self-motivation个人需求individual demand 社会需求social needs安全氛围safety atmosphere 生理需求physiological needs。
安全工程专业英语
一、专业词汇翻译mine n. 矿山，矿井。
v. 采矿colliery n. 矿井coal mining 采煤coalfield n. 煤田strike n. 走向dip n. 倾向roadway n. 巷道mining district 采区coalface n. 采煤面working face工作面ventilation n. 通风bolt v. 打锚杆；n. 锚杆immediate roof 直接顶；floor 底板；gas，methane 瓦斯outcrop 露头，露出地面的岩层fault n. 断层occurrence 赋存coalfield 煤田air shaft风井surrounding rock 围岩Mine ventilation 矿山通风internal combustion engine 内燃机dilute冲淡, 变淡, 变弱, 稀释contaminant 污染物noxious 有害的exhaust shaft 出风井colliery 煤矿trap door 通风门moisture content 湿度rank 品级bituminous 烟煤anthracite 无烟煤igneous[地]火成的natural fracture原生裂隙cleat【地质】割理porosity 多孔性sorptive吸附的Permeability渗透性free gas游离状态瓦斯adsorbed gas吸附状态瓦斯voidage孔隙度adsorption isotherm吸附等温线Methane drainage 瓦斯抽放Borehole 钻孔★Accident Causation Models：事故致因模型★System safety：系统安全★Hazard analysis：危害分析★Hazard identification：危险源辨识★Ergonomics process 人机工程过程★Hazard Identification 危险源辨识★safety culture 安全文化★corporate culture 企业文化★Accident Investigation：事故调查★mine fire 矿井火灾二、句型翻译★1、Rasmussen and Jensen have presented a three-level skill-rule-knowledge model for describing the origins of the different types of human errors.Rasmussen和Jensen提出了一种技能—规范—知识的三级模型，用来描述不同类型的人为失误的来源。
安全工程专业外语翻译
The major contributors in component technology have been the semi-conductor components．（译为“起主要作用”，不译“主要贡献者”。
）There are three steps which must be taken before we graduate from the integrated circuit technology.（译为“完全掌握”，不译“毕业于”。
）The purpose of a driller is to holes.（译为“钻孔”）A single-point cutting tool is used to cut threads on engine lathes.（译为“车”）The major contributors in component technology have been the semi-conductor components．（译为“起主要作用”，不译“主要贡献者”。
）There are three steps which must be taken before we graduate from the integrated circuit technology.（译为“完全掌握”，不译“毕业于”。
）The iron ore used to make steel comes from open-pit and underground mines.（译为“炼钢”，不译“制造刚”。
）An insulator offers a very high resistance to the passage through which electric current goes.（译为“很大阻力”，不译“高阻力”）Mater can be changed into energy, and energy into mater.物质可以转换为能，能也可以转化为物质。
安全工程专业英语
区别于其他文体的标志。例如It---that---结构句型；被动 态结构句型；分词短语结构句型，省略句结构句型等。
It is evident that a well lubricated bearing turns more
easily than a dry one .
显然，润滑好的轴承，比不润滑的轴承容易转动。
form of energy.
直到十九世纪人们才认识到热是能量的一种形式。
Electromagnetic waves travel at the same speed as light . 电磁波传送的速度和光速相同。（省略句型） In water sound travels nearly five times as fast as in air . 声音在水中的传播速度几乎是在空气中传播速度的五倍。
科技英语中的谓语至少三分之一是被动态。因为科技文章侧重叙事推
理，强调客观准确。第一、二人称使用过多，会造成主观臆断的印象。 因此尽量使用第三人称叙述，采用被动语态。
此外，科技文章将主要信息前置，放在主语部份。这也是广泛使用被
动态的主要原因。
常用句型
科技文章中经常使用若干特定的句型，从而形成科技文体
五、常用句型
Ice keeps the same temperature while melting. 冰在溶化时，其温度保持不变。
An object, once in motion, will keep on moving because of its
inertia. 物体一旦运动，就会因惯性而持续运动。
Safety management 安全管理学 Safety principle 安全学原理
资料：《安全工程专业英语(部分翻译)》
Unit 1 safety man ageme nt system Accide nt causatio n models 事故致因理论Safety man ageme nt 安全管理Physical conditions 物质条件Machi ne guard机械保护装置ingHouse-keep ing 工作场所管理Top man ageme高层管理人员ntHuma n errors 人因失误Accide nt-pro nen ess models 事故倾向模型Mun iti ons factory 军工厂Causal factors 起因Risk ing tak ing 冒险行为Corporate culture 企业文化Loss preve nti on 损失预防Process industry 制造工业Hazard con trol 危险控制Inten sive study 广泛研究Organi zati onal performa nee 企业绩效Mutual trust 相互信任Safety officer 安全官员Shop-floor 生产区Seni ority资历、工龄Local culture 当地文化Abse nteeism rate 缺勤率Power relatio ns 权力关系Status review 状态审查Lower-level man ageme nt 低层管理者Busin ess performa nee 组织绩效Most senior executive 高级主管Supervisory level 监督层Safety prin eiple 安全规则Wall-board 公告栏Impleme nt pla n 执行计戈UHazard ide ntificati on 危险辨识Safety performa nee 安全性能译文：Schein给出了组织文化的广泛定义，他认为组织文化是由若干基本假设组成的一种模式，这些假设是由某个特定团体在处理外部适应问题与内部整合问题的过程中发明、发现或完善的。
安全工程专业外语翻译
Unit 1Safety Management Systems安全管理体系1.Accident Causation Models1.事故致因理论The most important aim of safety management is to maintain and promote workers' health and safety at work. Understanding why and how accidents and other unwanted events develop is important when preventive activities are planned. Accident theories aim to clarify the accident phenomena，and to explain the mechanisms that lead to accidents. All modem theories are based on accident causation models which try to explain the sequence of events that finally produce the loss. In ancient times, accidents were seen as an act of God and very little could be done to prevent them. In the beginning of the 20th century，it was believed that the poor physical conditions are the root causes of accidents. Safety practitioners concentrated on improving machine guarding, housekeeping and inspections. In most cases an accident is the result of two things ：The human act, and the condition of the physical or social environment.安全管理系统最重要的目的是维护和促进工人们在工作时的健康和安全。
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Unit 1Safety Management Systems安全管理体系1.Accident Causation Models1.事故致因理论The most important aim of safety management is to maintain and promote workers' health and safety at work. Understanding why and how accidents and other unwanted events develop is important when preventive activities are planned. Accident theories aim to clarify the accident phenomena，and to explain the mechanisms that lead to accidents. All modem theories are based on accident causation models which try to explain the sequence of events that finally produce the loss. In ancient times, accidents were seen as an act of God and very little could be done to prevent them. In the beginning of the 20th century，it was believed that the poor physical conditions are the root causes of accidents. Safety practitioners concentrated on improving machine guarding, housekeeping and inspections. In most cases an accident is the result of two things ：The human act, and the condition of the physical or social environment.安全管理系统最重要的目的是维护和促进工人们在工作时的健康和安全。
在制定预防性计划时，了解为什么、怎样做和其他意外事故的发展是十分重要的。
事故致因理论旨在阐明事故现象，和解释事故的机理。
所有现代理论都是基于试图解释事件发生、发展过程和最终引起损失的事故致因理论。
在古老的时期，事故被看做是上帝的行为并且几乎没有预防的方法去阻止他们。
在20世纪开始的时候，人们开始相信差的物理条件是事故发生的根源。
安全从业人员集中注意力在提高机器监护、维护和清理上。
在大多数情况下，一件事故的发生主要有两个原因：人类的行为和物理或者社会环境。
Petersen extended the causation theory from the individual acts and local conditions to the management system. He concluded that unsafe acts, unsafe conditions，and accidents are all symptoms of something wrong in the organizational management system. Furthermore, he stated that it is the top management who is responsible for building up such a system that can effectively control the hazards associated to the organization’s operation. The errors done by a single person can be intentional or unintentional. Rasmussen and Jensen have presented a three-level skill-rule-knowledge model for describing the origins of the different types of human errors. Nowadays，this model is one of the standard methods in the examination of human errors at work.彼得森根据管理体系中个人的行为结合当地的环境扩充了事故致因理论。
他的结论是像不安全行为、不安全情况是一些错误的组织管理系统导致事故的征兆。
另外，他指出，高层管理人员负责建立一个能够有效控制危险源有关组织。
一个人出现的错误可能是有意的或者是无意的。
拉斯姆森和杰森已经提出了三个层次的技能规则知识模型来描述不同种类的人错误的起源。
如今，这种模式已经成为在工作中检验人的错误的标准之一。
Accident-proneness models suggest that some people are more likely to suffer anaccident than others. The first model was created in 1919，based on statistical examinations in a mumilions factory. This model dominated the safety thinking and research for almost 50 years, and it is still used in some organizations. As a result of this thinking, accident was blamed solelyon employees rather than the work process or poor management practices. Since investigations to discover the underlying causal factors were felt unnecessary and/or too costly, a little attention was paid to how accidents actually happened. Employ ees’ attitudes towards risks and risk taking have been studied, e. g. by Sulzer-Azaroff. According to her, employees often behave unsafely, even when they are fully aware of the risks involved. Many research results also show that the traditional promotion methods like campaigns, posters and safety slogans have seldom increased the use of safe work practices. When backed up by other activities such as training, these measures have been somewhat more effective. Experiences on some successful methods to change employee behavior and attitudes have been reported. One well-known method is a small-group process used for improving housekeeping in industrial workplaces. A comprehensive model of accident causation has been presented by Reason who introduced the concept of organizational error. He stated that corporate culture is the starting-point of the accident sequence. Local conditions and human behavior are only contributing factors in the build-up of the undesired event. The latent organizational failures lead t o accidents and incidents when penetrating system’s defenses and barriers. Gmoeneweg has developed Reason’s model by classifying the typical latent error types. His TRIPOD mode! calls the different errors as General Failure Types ( CFTs). The concept of organizational error is in conjunction with the fact that some organizations behave more safely than others. It is often said that these organizations have good safety culture. After the Chernobyl accident，this term became well-known also to the public.事故的倾向性模型表示有些人比其他人更容易引起事故。
第一种模型建立在1919年来源于军工厂的统计检查。
这种模式占据了人们在安全思考和研究的时间将近50年，并且仍然被一些组织使用，这种思维所造成的结果是，发生事故的责任仅仅在于员工而不是工作过程和较差的管理实践。