民事判决书范本中英文对照

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各种法律类文书、公文翻译（中-英文版）

举证通知书(English V ersion)-法律英语翻译-法律文书翻译The People’s Republic of ChinaHefei Intermediate People’s Court of Anhui ProvinceNotice to Produce EvidenceNo. XXXTo: AAAAccording to the Civil Procedural Law of the People’s Republic of China and the Severa l Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Evidences for Civil Actions, you are responsible for producing evidences to prove the facts on which your claims are based or the facts on which the claims of the other party are rebutted.1. Y ou shall, as required by the Instructions for Producing Evidences of this Court submit evidence materials to this Court within thirty (30) days after the day of the receiving this notice.2. Evidences submitted by the parties to the people’s court shall be the origina ls, or copies or replicas checked and found in conformity with the originals by the people’s court. The submitted evidence materials shall be classified and numbered one by one. It is required to briefly describe the sources, facts to be proved and contents of the evidence materials. Copies shall be provided according to the number of the parties of the opposing side.3. Where it is really difficult for you to submit evidence materials within the evidence producing term, you may apply with this Court for extension before its expiration.4. Y our failure to submit evidence materials within the evidence producing term shall be deemed as waiver of the right to produce evidences. For the evidence materials not submitted on time, the people’s court won’t arra nge cross examination during trial, unless the other party agrees to cross examination.5. Where you intend to apply for authentication, increase or variation of the claims or file a counterclaim, you shall do the same prior to the expiration of the evidence producing term.6. Where you apply for appearance of a witness to testify, you shall file an application with this Court ten (10) days before expiration of the evidence producing term.7. Where an evidence provided by you has come into being outsi de the territory of the People’s Republic of China, such evidence shall be certified by a notarial authority of the country in which such evidence has come into being and certified by an embassy or consulate of the People’s Republic of China in that country, or it is required to perform the certifying procedures prescribed by related treaties between the People’s Republic of China and that country.Where an evidence provided by you has come into being in the region of Hong Kong, Macau or Taiwan, related certifying procedures shall be performed.Hefei Intermediate People’s Court of Anhui Province (seal)Date:举证通知书(中文版)×××人民法院举证通知书（××××）×××字第××号×××：根据《中华人民共和国民事诉讼法》和最高人民法院《关于民事诉讼证据的若干规定》，现将有关举证事项通知如下：一、当事人应当对自己提出的诉讼请求所依据的事实或者反驳对方诉讼请求所依?据的事实承担举证责任。

民事诉讼法英文对照

Civil Procedure LawChapter I General ProvisionsArticle 1 This Law is formulated in accordance with the Constitution with a view to safeguarding the lawful rights and interests of citizens, legal persons and other organizations, and maintaining social and economic order, promoting the development of socialist democracy and building a socialist country under the rule of law.Article 2 For the purposes of this Law, a civil lawsuit includes all litigation activities conducted in accordance with the law to resolve disputes over civil rights and interests.Article 3 A civil lawsuit shall be guided by the principles of fairness, voluntariness, protection of rights, immediacy, effectiveness, and integrity.Article 4 People’s courts shall independently exercise their judicial power in accordance with the law, and no organization or individual may interfere with a court in its exercise of such power.Chapter II JurisdictionArticle 5 People’s courts at various levels shall have jurisdiction over civil cases according to the jurisdictional rules provided for by law.Article 6 The jurisdiction over a civil case shall be determined in accordance with the place where the defendant is domiciled or the place where the contract is performed, or where the property is located, based on the nature of the case and the relevant provisions of laws and regulations.Article 7 People’s courts shall have jurisdiction over civil cases involving foreign elements in accordance with the provisions of laws and relevant international treaties concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republi c of China.Chapter III Parties and Their RepresentativesArticle 8 In a civil lawsuit, the parties shall exercise their litigation rights and perform their litigation obligations independently.Article 9 The parties to a civil lawsuit shall have the right to engage lawyers to act as their representatives, and may also appoint close relatives or other persons as their representatives.Article 10 When a person becomes a party to a civil lawsuit, he/she shall have the right to know the facts of the case, present evidence, debate, apply for withdrawal, appeal or proceed with execution, and enjoy other litigation rights.Chapter IV EvidenceArticle 11 The burden of proof in a civil lawsuit shall be borne by the party that raises the claims. When the party claims for legal rights or interests, it shall provide evidence to support the claims.Article 12 The parties shall present evidence that they possess and are responsible for. The court shall inform the parties to present evidence they possess, as well as investigate and collect evidence necessary for the case.Article 13 The court shall examine the admissibility, authenticity, relevance, and legality of the evidence presented by the parties. The parties shall have the right to express their opinions on the evidence and provide explanations or cross-examination.Chapter V Mediation and WithdrawalArticle 14 In order to promote the amicable settlement of civil disputes, people’s courts shall actively encourage mediation between the parties. The parties may apply for mediation at any time during the trial process.Article 15 When the parties reach a mediation agreement, the people’s court shall render a mediation statement, which shall have the same effect as a legally effective judgment.Article 16 The parties may apply for withdrawal of a lawsuit before the conclusion of the trial. If the withdrawal is agreed upon by the other party and the people’s court finds it lawful, it shall allow the withdrawal.Chapter VI Judgment and RulingArticle 17 The people’s court sha ll render a judgment based on the facts ascertained from the evidence and the application of laws.Article 18 The people’s court shall make a determination on the facts and the application of laws separately and clearly in its judgment.Article 19 The peop le’s court shall render a judgment in a public hearing, except for cases involving state secrets or personal privacy of the parties.Chapter VII EnforcementArticle 20 During the trial or after a judgment is rendered, the parties may apply to the people’s court for enforcement if the other party refuses to fulfil its obligations as stipulated in the judgment.Article 21 The people’s court shall promptly execute the judgment once it becomes enforceable. If the party against whom enforcement is sought refuses to comply, the court shall take enforcement measures in accordance with the law.Chapter VIII Supplementary ProvisionsArticle 22 This Law shall come into effect on the date of its promulgation. At the same time, the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, which was adopted on April 9, 1991, is repealed.。

民事判决书中英文对照

中华人民共和国吉林省高级人民法院民事判决书（2003）吉民三终字第20号上诉人（原审被告）：诸暨市飞达实业有限公司（原浙江省诸暨市飞达实业公司）。

住所：浙江省诸暨市城关镇浣东北路60号。

法定代表人：宗光培，该公司总经理。

委托代理人：田大原，吉林衡丰律师事务所律师。

被上诉人（原审原告）：珲春江南实业有限公司清算小组。

住所：珲春市。

代表人：金龙华，该清算小组组长。

被上诉人（原审原告）：韩国KOMARA农产会社。

住所：韩国釜山广城市莲提区莲山千洞586－15.法定代表人：姜大建，该社社长。

委托代理人：王文君，吉林由正律师事务所律师。

上诉人诸暨市飞达实业有限公司（以下简称飞达公司）与被上诉人珲春江南实业有限公司清算小组（以下简称清算组）、韩国KOMARA农产会社（以下简称农产会社）购销手套机合同纠纷一案，不服中华人民共和国吉林省延边朝鲜族自治州中级人民法院（2000）延州经初字第63号民事判决，向本院提起上诉。

本院受理后，依法组成合议庭，公开开庭进行了审理。

上诉人飞达公司委托代理人田大原，被上诉人清算组代表人金龙华，农产会社委托代理人王文君到庭参加诉讼。

本案现已审理终结。

原审法院查明：（一）1999年7月5日，珲春江南实业有限公司（以下简称江南公司）因未参加年检被珲春市工商行政管理局吊销营业执照，并被告知企业的债权债务由企业自行处理。

珲春市边境经济合作区经济发展局于2001年6月1日下发珲经发（2001）53号文件，决定江南公司成立清算小组。

珲春市公安局治安科出具证明：证明清算组的公章已依法备案。

江南公司原法定代表人姜南春于2000年6月8日出具书面说明：1、江南公司由其提议并同意成立清算小组，其委托宋明男为清算小组组长，金龙华任副组长，吕相基、李顺子、金昌浩为成员；2、其同意由金龙华负责清算工作及一切法律实施事宜。

因此，清算组成立的程序合法，应负责江南公司的债权债务清理工作，具有作为诉讼原告的主体资格。

英文判决书模板

中正法律英语翻译网收集和整理：Case No:CH/2004/APP/0271 Neutral Citation Number:[2004]EWHC2248(Ch)IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICECHANCERY DIVISIONDate:Friday,8th October2004 Before:THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE PARK---------------------Between:Usetech Limited Appellant-and-Graeme Young(HM Inspector of Taxes)------------------------------------------Simon Devonshire(instructed by Nelsons)for the AppellantAkash Nawbatt(instructed by the Solicitor of Inland Revenue)for the Respondent---------------------Approved JudgmentI direct that pursuant to CPR PD39A para6.1no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and thatcopies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic..............................Mr Justice ParkMr Justice Park:Abbreviations,dramatis personae,etc1.These are as follows.ABB ABB Vetco Gray(UK)Limited,the‘end user’of the services of MrHood;a company which provided a range of equipment to the oil andgas industry.Mr Devonshire Simon Devonshire,counsel for Usetech.EAT Employment Appeal Tribunal.Hood,Mr William Hood,specialist in a software system used by ABB,calledPro-Engineer;shareholder in and director of Usetech.IR35The reference number of an Inland Revenue Press Release of2000,which led to the enactment of the legislative provisions which are inpoint in this case.Nawbatt,Mr Akash Nawbatt,counsel for the Inspector of Taxes,the respondent tothis appeal.NES NES International Limited,a company described as an agencycompany which provided technical recruitment services.NICs National Insurance ContributionsUsetech Usetech Limited,the appellant on this appeal;‘one man company’owned by Mr Hood,which provided his services to end users.Overview2.3.This is a tax and NICs appeal by the taxpayer,Usetech,against a decision of a Special Commissioner,Mr Colin Bishopp,dated12March2004.The decision determined a question of principle concerning the liability to tax and NICs of Usetech and its principal shareholder and director,Mr etech was a ‘one man company’whose business consisted of making the services of Mr Hood available to third party users.By transactions entered into in May2000Mr Hood’s services were made available to ABB,and he worked in the business of ABB for about17months from1June2000.The transactions involved not only Mr Hood,Usetech and ABB,but also,in a manner which I will describe later,another company, NES.Mr Hood had no beneficial interest in NES.The question of principle is whether the transactions attracted the operation of provisions introduced,both for tax and for NICs,in2000and commonlyreferred to as the IR35legislation.IR35was the reference number of an Inland Revenue Press Release which had foreshadowed the legislation.4.If the IR35legislation applied its effect would be to treat payments received by Usetech for the provisionby it of Mr Hood’s services(the payments being received,not from ABB directly,but from NES)as if they had been personal income of Mr Hood from an employment with ABB.For income tax they would be treated as emoluments taxable under Schedule E,rather than as receipts of Usetech’s trade which would be taken into account in computing its profits liable to corporation tax.For NICs they would be treated in a similar way as employment income of Mr Hood.The liabilities both to income tax and to NICs would fall to be met by Usetech,not by Mr Hood.Thus it is Usetech which is the appellant taxpayer.5.The Inland Revenue issued formal decisions that the IR35provisions applied,and Usetech appealed tothe Special Commissioners.In form there were two decisions and two appeals,one for tax and one for NICs,but they turned on two sets of almost identical legislation and stood or fell together.The appeals were heard by Mr Bishopp on22January2004,and by a reserved decision dated12March2004he dismissed the appeals,thus affirming the decisions which the Inland Revenue had etech now appeals to me.It is clear that an appeal can only succeed if the decision was wrong in law.There is no appeal on a question of fact:see s.56A(1)and(4)of the Taxes Management Act1970.6.Mr Devonshire,who appears for Usetech,has helpfully limited his submissions to two specific respectsin which he says that the Special Commissioner erred in law.I will describe them fully later in this judgment.The first respect involves an argument that the IR35legislation cannot apply because of a contractual provision between Usetech and NES(not between Usetech and ABB or between NES and ABB),which Mr Devonshire submits must be taken into account,entitling Usetech to provide the services of a substitute in place of Mr Hood.I will refer to this as the right of substitution argument.The second respect in which Mr Devonshire says that the Special Commissioner erred involves an argument that ABB was not obliged to provide work for Mr Hood to do(although in fact it did do so).Therefore,it is argued that,even after applying the hypotheses required by the IR35provisions,there was insufficient mutuality of obligation for an employer/employee relationship to exist,with the result that the provisions did not apply.I will refer to this as the want of mutuality argument.7.I have considered Mr Devonshire’s arguments carefully,but my conclusion is that I cannot accept eitherof them.The issues are too complex for me to encapsulate the essence of my reasoning in this overview at the beginning of my judgment.I shall explain it as the judgment progresses.The result is that I respectfully agree with the decision of the Special Commissioner.Therefore I shall dismiss the appeal.The IR35legislation8.9.For income tax and corporation tax(income tax so far as concerns Mr Hood and corporation tax so faras concerns Usetech)the legislation is contained in section60of and Schedule12to the Finance Act 2000.The critical provisions are those which identify the cases to which Schedule12applies.If the Schedule applies there is not,if I understand correctly,any dispute as the consequences.The dispute is whether it applies at all.The case revolves around provisions in paragraph1of the Schedule.I will now set out the relevant parts of the paragraph,interpolating in italicised square brackets the actual identities in this case of the parties referred to in general terms in the paragraph.1(1)This Schedule applies where–(a)an individual(‘the worker’)[Mr Hood]personallyperforms,or is under an obligation personally to perform,services for the purposes of a business carried on byanother person(‘the client’)[ABB],(b)the services are provided not under a contract directlybetween the client[ABB]and the worker[Mr Hood]butunder arrangements involving a third party(‘theintermediary’)[Usetech],and(c)the circumstances are such that,if the services wereprovided under a contract directly between the client[ABB]and the worker[Mr Hood],the worker would be regardedfor income tax purposes as an employee of the client[ABB].(2),(3)…(4)The circumstances referred to in sub-paragraph(1)(c)include the terms on which the services are provided,having regardto the terms of the contracts forming part of the arrangements underwhich the services are provided.10.11.In the quotation of sub-paragraph(1)(b)above I have identified‘the intermediary’in this case as beingUsetech.As I will explain later,on the facts NES might also be regarded as an intermediary in the general sense of the word,but it is clear from paragraph3of Schedule12,which I need not set out verbatim,that only Usetech counts as an intermediary for the purposes of paragraph1.However,the ‘arrangements involving…the intermediary’(referred to in sub-paragraph(1)(b))may involve other persons as well as the intermediary.If they do the respects in which the other persons are also involved may affect the application or non-application of paragraph1.In the present case this could be relevant to the participation of NES in the entire transaction:NES was neither‘the worker’nor‘the client’nor‘the intermediary’,but it was involved in the arrangements in which‘the intermediary’(Usetech)was involved,so its part in those arrangements falls to be taken into account as well as Usetech’s part in them.12.A more general point of construction is worth spelling out at this stage.The conditions of sub-paragraphs(a)and(b)involve an analysis of the actual facts and legal relationships,but when that analysis showsthat those two sub-paragraphs are satisfied sub-paragraph(c)involves an exercise of constructing a hypothetical contract which did not in fact exist,and then enquiring what the consequences would have been if it had existed.There may be room in some cases for dispute about what the hypothetical contract would contain,and in the present case there is.The dispute arises in connection with the right of substitution argument which is advanced by Mr Devonshire on behalf of Usetech.I will explain how precisely the issue arises at a later stage in this judgment.13.The comparable provisions for NICs are contained in regulation6of the Social Security Contributions(Intermediaries)Regulations2000.They are not quite identical to the provisions in the Finance Act2000, but they are similar in all relevant respects.For completeness I will set out the specific wording.6(1)These Regulations apply where–(a)an individual(the worker)[Mr Hood]personally performs,or isunder an obligation personally to perform,services for the purposesof a business carried on by another person(the client)[ABB],(b)the performance of those services by the worker[Mr Hood]iscarried out,not under a contract directly between the worker[MrHood]and the client[ABB],but under arrangements involving anintermediary[Usetech],and(c)the circumstances are such that,had the arrangements taken theform of a contract between the worker[Mr Hood]and the client[ABB]the worker[Mr Hood]would be regarded for the purposes ofParts I to V of the Contributions and Benefits Act as employed inemployed earner’s employment by the client[ABB].As in the Finance Act2000there is a provision(regulation5)under which‘the intermediary’is,so far as this case is concerned,Usetech(and not NES).However,the same point applies in that,to the extent that NES was involved in the arrangements,its participation may have to be taken into account in determining whether regulation6applies notwithstanding that it was none of the parties(‘the worker’,‘the client’,or‘the intermediary’)specifically identified in the regulation.Curiously regulation6does not contain a provision like paragraph1(4)of Schedule12to the Finance Act2000,expanding on what is covered by‘the circumstances’referred to in sub-paragraph(c)of regulation6(1).However,no-one has suggested to me,nor do I consider,that that or the other minor differences between the two statutory provisions affects this case or opens a possibility of the case being decided one way for NICs and another way for income tax and corporation tax.The facts14.15.Mr Hood has now retired but at the time when this case arose he worked in connection with theproduction of design drawings of oil wells,rigs and similar equipment.He was a specialist in the use ofa software product called Pro-Engineer,which produced3-D models of such equipment.He started tooperate through his one man company,Usetech,in May1996.There was no evidence before the Special Commissioner about his arrangements before then,so the Commissioner inevitably decided the case on the basis of the Usetech arrangements alone,uninfluenced by what Mr Hood’s tax and national insurance status may have been in earlier years.etech had several engagements for the provision of Mr Hood’s services to‘end users’over its tradinglife from1996to May2003(when Mr Hood was obliged to retire by reason of ill health).Some of the engagements were pursuant to direct contracts between Usetech and the end users,but engagements with ABB were not,since,as I explain in more detail in the next paragraph,NES was interposed between Usetech and ABB(the end user).There were three different periods when Mr Hood was working in the business of ABB at its premises in Aberdeen.The present case is specifically about the period of17 months beginning in June2000.(In fact the Special Commissioner was only strictly concerned with the period from1June2000to31March2001,but I assume that that was for some procedural reason to do with tax years or companies’accounting periods or something of that nature.The Commissioner’s decision would undoubtedly govern the whole period of the engagement for Mr Hood to work in the business of ABB.)17.ABB is a United Kingdom subsidiary of a world-wide group which provides a range of equipment to theoil and gas industry.It has a core staff of750to850permanent employees,but it supplements them when demand requires by taking on what its Human Resources Manager described as‘sub-contract employees’.This was done by means of companies described as‘agencies’,of which NES was one.There was no evidence from NES,but on its letter heading it describes itself as‘Europe’s largest technical recruitment agency’.As will appear,NES sometimes acted contractually as a principal rather than as an agent in the strict legal sense.18.The way in which Mr Hood was engaged to work in the business of ABB,which I assume was typical ofhow ABB and NES operated,was as follows.Management within ABB identified that ABB had a need for another specialist in Pro-Engineer,but did not wish to have another permanent employee recruited.The Human Resources manager contacted agencies,including NES.NES knew about Mr Hood,and contacted him,or more strictly contacted his personal company,Usetech.Mr Hood was obviouslywilling to go and work in Aberdeen in ABB’s business,because the matter proceeded.If ABB had not already known Mr Hood it would have required to interview him first,and had in fact done so for the earlier occasion when he had been provided to it through NES.However,since it already knew him it did not require an interview on this occasion.Two contracts were entered into,one between Usetech and NES and one between NES and ABB.Each contract appears to have been made on22May2000,to commence on1June2000,although the documents which were before the Special Commissioner are a little confusing about this.The system of having two contracts is quite common(or so I understand),and contracts of these kinds are sometimes referred to as‘the lower level contract’and‘the upper level contract’.However,I will refer to them in this judgment as‘the Usetech/NES contract’(the lower level) and‘the NES/ABB contract’(the upper level).There must also have been a contractual relationship(at the lowest level)between Mr Hood and Usetech,but it appears that there was no written contract of service.At least no such written contract was produced in evidence.19.As regards the Usetech/NES contract(the lower level contract)there appear to have been two contractualdocuments:a one page letter of offer by NES signed by way of acceptance by Mr Hood on behalf of Usetech,and a longer set of‘Terms and Conditions’in standard form.A complication here is that the documents before the Special Commissioner appear to have included three versions of the first document and three of the second.This may have had something to do with variations in the anticipated duration of the engagement,but there are aspects of the duplication or triplication of documents which puzzle me.However,I do not think that they are fundamental to the issues in the case.20.The first of the three offer letters is dated22May2000.It is from NES and is addressed to Usetech at MrHood’s home address.It includes the following:‘We are pleased to offer you a contract to supply contract staff in a position as Pro-Engineer Designer in accordance with the following:NAME(S)OF CONTRACT STAFF:WILLIAM HOOD.CLIENT:ABB VECTO GRAY.’21.Certain brief other details follow,covering such matters as the hourly rate of payment,thecommencement date,and the notice period.Mr Hood signed to indicate acceptance.For completeness I mention that the other two offer letters have slightly different periods of service,do not mention Mr Hood personally and are not signed by him by way of acceptance.I do not follow what their relevance to the appeal is or what their function was,and I have concentrated on the letter dated22May2000.22.I turn to the longer form document,the standard form headed‘Terms and Conditions for the supply ofservices to NES International Ltd(performed by a limited company sub-contractor’.23.There are three versions of this document in the documents which were before the SpecialCommissioner and which are now before me.None of them mentions Usetech(or any other specific sub-contractor for that matter),and none of them is signed by or on behalf of either NES or Usetech(or any other person).The evidential status of the three documents in the bundle is not clear to me,but I will assume that at least one of them was supplied by NES to Usetech(in common,I assume,with all other subcontractor companies which had similar relationships with NES),and that it did in general regulate the contractual relationship between the two companies.The Special Commissioner said,and I agree, that although the three versions of the Terms and Conditions are not quite identical,the differences between them do not appear to be material to this case.24.The Terms and Conditions are quite long documents.They are in no sense tailor-made for the particularrelationship being entered into between Mr Hood,Usetech,NES and ABB.They are standard form documents plainly intended to be used by NES across the spread of arrangements which it makes with companies like Usetech to enable the services of employees of such companies to be provided to outside clients like ABB.It would be disproportionate for me to set out one of the documents in this judgment or to attempt a full summary of it.In the broadest of terms it provides for‘the sub-contractor’(in this case Usetech)to agree with NES that it will provide‘the Services’to the reasonable satisfaction of‘the client’, that is the end user,being ABB in this case.The agreement which the sub-contractor has,however,is between it and NES,not between it and the end user.‘The Services’(which Usetech agreed with NES to provide to the reasonable satisfaction of ABB)are defined as‘the work or project identified in the contract letter and/or notified to the sub-contractor by the Client’.25.I assume that the contract letter referred to is the letter of22May2000(or possibly all three letters)bywhich NES offered the engagement to Usetech and Usetech accepted it.On that basis it appears that(in so far as the matter is affected by the22May2000letter,which was the only document which appears to have signed on behalf of Usetech by way of acceptance)‘the Services’were the services of Mr Hood as Pro-Engineer Designer.26.The Terms and Conditions cover a range of matters which I need not describe in this judgment.Theyinclude matters such as payments of fees(to be made to Usetech by NES,not by ABB),use of motor vehicles,trade secrets,and non-competition by the sub-contractor with the end user(NES’s‘client’).There is,however,one provision which I should set out in full,since it provides the basis for Mr Devonshire’s right of substitution argument.The final clause is headed‘General’,and contains a number of different provisions.One of them reads as follows:The Sub-Contractor shall be entitled to substitute the named Personnel for analternative,with the prior written consent of the Company–such consent notto be withheld if the proposed replacement has the appropriate skills,qualifications and abilities in the reasonable opinion of the Client.I specifically point out that‘the Company’,which can give prior written consent to a substitution,is NES,and is not‘the Client’:in this case it is not ABB.Further,the only parties to this agreement are the sub-contractor(Usetech in this case)and NES.The client(e.g.ABB)is not a party.I will examine the argument which Mr Devonshire bases on this provision at a later stage in this judgment.27.28.So much for the contractual relationship between Usetech and NES.There was also a contractualrelationship between NES and ABB.I should state at the outset that Usetech and Mr Hood did not know the detailed content of that relationship.If they thought about the matter they must obviously and correctly have assumed that there would be a contract of some sort between NES and ABB,that it would provide for NES in some way to cause Usetech to provide the services of Mr Hood to ABB,and that ABB would make payments to NES for the services.But I doubt that Usetech and Mr Hood would have known or assumed anything more detailed about the NES/ABB contractual relationship.29.There was indeed an NES/ABB contract(an upper level contract),and it was placed before the SpecialCommissioner.I understand that the copy of it was obtained from ABB.It takes the form of a letter agreement,signed on behalf of both parties,dated22May2000,which was also the date of the offer letter made by NES to Usetech and signed by way of acceptance by Mr Hood.The letter which constitutes the NES/ABB contract is from NES to ABB.It is headed:‘Sub-Contractor–Usetech Ltd.Contract Staff–Mr William Hood.’It begins:‘We confirm that the above Contract Staff supplied by the above sub-contractor will be available to commence work on30th May2000to perform the services of Pro-Engineer Designer.’30.A number of other detailed matters were covered,including the hourly rate payable by ABB to NESfor the services(a little higher,as one would expect,than the hourly rate payable onward by NES to Usetech),a seven days notice period,and a minimum number of weekly hours(37.5hours).Two pages of detailed Terms and Conditions are attached,but they do not appear to me to add anything relevant (except for condition3.2,to which I refer in paragraph63below).31.There is nothing in the NES/ABB contract about the provision of a substitute for Mr Hood,and in myview that contract is solely one for the provision of his services,not one for the provision of the services of him or a substitute who is reasonably acceptable to ABB.32.Moving on from the contracts as such,there are some other factual points which might have a bearing onthe right of substitution argument and which I ought therefore to mention.The question of a substitute for Mr Hood never arose.For the17months of the engagement which began on30May(or1June)2000 the services were provided entirely by Mr Hood himself.Mr Hood did,however,say in his witness statement that there were other Pro-Engineer specialists whom he knew and whom he could have sent.I should also quote the following findings from paragraph25of the Special Commissioner’s decision.[T]he reality…is that ABB required Mr Hood’s services.It was notcontracting,indirectly,with[Usetech]for the supply of a person competent inPro-Engineer;it required Mr Hood.It would not have accepted a substitute,ifMr Hood had sent one,without interview and certainly not on the basis thatMr Hood or the substitute might attend as[Usetech]elected from day to day.Mr Hunter’s evidence,which I accept,can lead to no other conclusion thanthat the arrangement was personal to Mr Hood.I do not go so far as to saythat the right to substitute was a sham–Mr Hunter agreed that,if Mr Hoodhad become unavailable and suggested someone to continue in his place,thatsuggestion would be given some weight–but Mr Hood and[Usetech]couldnot dictate,at will,who would perform the work:it had to be Mr Hood.In myview,the‘right’of substitution was largely illusory.33.34.So far as the right of substitution argument is concerned I do not think that there are any other specificaspects of the facts which I need to describe.However Mr Devonshire also advances the want of mutuality argument,and there are some other factual points which I ought to mention,since they could be of some relevance to that argument.The Special Commissioner,having heard evidence from Mr Hood and from two witnesses from ABB,found that any temporary member of staff(like Mr Hood)was treated,on a day to day basis,in a manner barely distinguishable from an employee.One of the ABB witnesses said that as a general rule temporary staff were expected to work50hours a week,and Mr Hood did so.Mr Hood’s own evidence was that he typically worked for58hours per week.He also said that,if there was no work for him to do,he could be sent home.He could recall at least three or four occasions when the computer crashed and he was sent home without payment.The Special Commissioner recorded this aspect of Mr Hood’s evidence,but did not make a specific finding of his own on it.I confess that I have some reservations about it,and I will return to this later when I discuss the want of mutuality argument.Commissioner’’s decisionThe Special Commissioner35.36.In a careful and comprehensive reserved decision the Special Commissioner,Mr Bishopp,set out thestatutory provisions and reviewed the facts.He noted that the IR35provisions(both for tax and for NICs) require a notional contract between Mr Hood and ABB to be assumed,and that the critical question was whether that contract would have been a contract of employment.He considered a number of factors which might bear on the question,and in the course of doing so he quoted a well-known passage from the judgment of McKenna J in Ready Mixed Concrete(South East)Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance[1968]2QB497at515:A contract of service exists if these three conditions are fulfilled:(i)Theservant agrees that,in consideration of a wage or other remuneration,he willprovide his own work and skill in the performance of some service for hismaster.(ii)He agrees,expressly or impliedly,that in the performance of thatservice he will be subject to the other’s control to a sufficient degree to makethat other master.(iii)The other provisions of the contract are consistent withits being a contract of service.The Special Commissioner considered condition(iii)first,and concluded that there was nothing in the notional contract which was‘incompatible with the relationship between them[ABB and Mr Hood]of employer and employee’(paragraph24of the decision).It was at this point that he considered the issue of substitution,doing so in the terms which I quoted in paragraph23above and concluding that in his view‘the right of substitution was largely illusory’.(As will appear later I would put the matter rather differently,but I would not change the‘bottom line’conclusion that the provision for substitution in the Usetech/NES contract does not lead to a decision in favour of Usetech.)37.38.Moving on,the Special Commissioner compared Mr Hood with normal employees of ABB who hadsimilar skills to his own,and saw little outward difference.I quote a few extracts from paragraph27of the decision:Mr Hood was expected to undertake the work allocated to him by ABB and todo so in accordance with its directions and at times of its choosing.…In that,too,he was in materially the same position as an employee.…[O]verall itseems to me that there is no difference between the measure of controlexercised over his work by ABB and that it would have exercised over anemployee of his status.39.40.The Special Commissioner considered that,in so far as there was a requirement for mutuality ofobligation to exist for a relationship to be a contract of employment,the requirement was in any event satisfied by the obligation on the one hand to work and on the other to remunerate.(In my view there may be rather more to be said on this point,but as I will explain I do not disagree with the Commissioner’s conclusion.)41.The Commissioner also considered whether Mr Hood or Usetech could realistically be seen to have beenin business on their own account,and was of the opinion that they could not.For that and the other reasons which I have summarised and which he examined more fully he decided:‘The conclusion must be that the notional contract between ABB and Mr Hood was one of service.I can find no factor in the case which is inconsistent with that conclusion.’The appeal to this court42.In the overview at the beginning of this judgment I observed that Mr Devonshire has limited the groundsof appeal to two issues,which I am calling the right of substitution argument and the want of mutuality argument.Points about the right of substitution and points about the alleged want of mutuality were made on behalf of Usetech before the Special Commissioner,but,as it seems to me,they were made not so much as self-contained arguments either of which would be sufficient entirely by itself to conclude the appeal in favour of Usetech,but rather as items in a comprehensive view of the interconnecting relationships between Mr Hood,Usetech,NES and ABB.I think that the Special Commissioner perceived the main case advanced on behalf of Usetech as being one which looked at all aspects of the case together and in the round.Those aspects included the provision in the Usetech/NES contract about substitution and also what was contended to be a want of mutuality between Usetech and ABB.But they also included points made about the degree of control exercised by ABB over the work done by Mr Hood, about alleged differences in practice between Mr Hood’s position in the operations of ABB and the positions of full time employees,about other activities altogether carried on by Mr Hood through Usetech,and so on.。

民事判决书范本中英文对照

民事判决书范本中英文对照xx省xx市xx区人民法院民事判决书(1993）xx民初字第18号原告：金xx，女，1970年4月2日出生，汉族，农民，住xx市xx 区x x镇x村。

委托代理人：杜xx，xx律师事务所律师。

被告：王xx，男，1969年7月19日出生，汉族，农民，住xx市x x区xx镇xx村。

委托代理人：张xx，xx律师事务所律师。

原告金xx诉被告王xx解除非法同居关系纠纷一案，本院受理后，依法组成合议庭，公开开庭进展了审理。

原告金xx及其委托代理人杜xx、被告王xx及其委托代理人张xx到庭参加诉讼。

本案现已审理终结。

原告金xx诉称，要解除与被告王xx的非法同居关系，并分割共同财产。

被告王xx辩称，原告与被告的非法同居关系已经解除，财产也已经分割完毕，原告起诉无理。

经审理查明，1987年3月，原告、被告双方经人介绍相识后，即非法同居。

同居后双方到市里做买卖蔬菜的生意。

1988年12月底，原、被告回到x x村在原告家中居住。

1991年3月到被告家中居住，与被告父母分居生活。

在此期间，原、被告于1989年3月买潍坊产12马力拖拉机一部搞运输。

外欠原、被告运输费800元，后双方将拖拉机卖给关xx，卖价5000元，关xx除付部分款外，尚欠原、被告1700元。

1991年春，原、被告建北屋8间，厕所、厨房、大门各一间，原、被告投资4000元。

建房后，原、被告因家务琐事发生矛盾，原告回到娘家居住。

后经协商，被告给原告自行车一辆，现金2500元，原告收下后，鉴于同居后的共同财产分割不均，故诉至本院。

原、被告双方同居前无任何财产。

同居后共同购置了250型摩托车一辆，方桌一张，椅子两把，石英钟一个，双人床一张，凳子两个，黑白电视机一台，单桦犁一个，被子两床。

本院认为，原、被告未达法定婚龄即同居，其行为是违法的，非法同居关系应予解除。

原告要求分割财产的诉讼恳求应予支持。

原、被告所建房屋，部分费用属被告的父母投资，被告应适当多得。

民事起诉书格式中英文对照

民事起诉书格式中英文对照COMPLAINTTo：________________ People's CourtPlaintiff：Domicile：Legal Representative：Position：Defendant：Domicile：Legal Representative：Position：CLAIMS：1. To order the Defendant to pay to the Plaintiff the due amount of RMB _____ for the dispatched products， plus the interests of RMB ________ thereon， in the aggregate of RMB __________；2.To order the court fees to be borne by the Defendant.FACTS AND REASONS：The Defendant was one of the distributors of the Plaintiff for various kinds of products in theterritory of ___________， China. From September， xx to October， xx， the Plaintiff dispatched various kinds of products in the aggregate values of RMB____________. （see Exhibit I）Each of the said transactions was duly signed and received by the Defendant （see Exhibit II）。

Though the Plaintiff has repeatedly demanded payment， the Defendant fails to liquidate the outstanding debts in due time.It is the Plaintiff's position that the indebtedness arising out of the transactions between the Plaintiff and the Defendant shall be under the jurisdiction of the China's laws. The Defendant's refusal to satisfy the agreed amounts after receipt of the above-mentioned lubricants resulted in tremendous economic losses on the side of the Plaintiff （see Exhibit III）。

【优质文档】英汉对照法律文书(1)word版本 (3页)

本文部分内容来自网络，本司不为其真实性负责，如有异议或侵权请及时联系，本司将予以删除！== 本文为word格式，下载后可随意编辑修改！ ==英汉对照法律文书(1)关于账目的起诉状1.管辖权声明。

2.根据附件中证物A所示的账目，被告应支付原告____________美元。

据此……(同格式1)Form2COMPLAINT ON AN ACCOUNT1.Allegation of jurisdiction.2.Defendant owes plaintiff ___________ dollars according to the account hereto annexed as Exhibit A.Wherefore( etc .as in Form1)格式3关于已出售和交付货物的起诉状1.管辖权声明。

2.在1936年6月1日至1936年12月1日期间，原告出售并交付被告一批货物，应由被告向原千偿付该货物款项_____________美元。

据此……(同格式1)Form3COMPLAINT FOR GOODS SOLD AND DELIVERED1.Allegation of jurisdiction.2.Defendant owes plaintiff _________ dollars for goods sold and delivered by plaintiff to defendant between June 1，1936 and December 1，1936.Wherefore (etc .as in Form1)。

格式4关于金钱借贷的起诉状1.管辖权声明。

2.原告于1936年6月1日借给被告___________美元，被告应予偿还。

据此……(同格式1)Form 4COMPLAINT FOR MONEY LENT1.Allegation of jurisdiction.2.Defendant owes plaintiff ___________ dollars for money lent by plaintiff to defendant on June 1，1936.Wherefore( etc .as in Form1)格式5关于金钱误付的起诉状1.管辖权声明。

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上海法院知识产权裁判文书精选民事判决书范本中英文对照中华人民共和国吉林省高级人民法院民事判决书（2003）吉民三终字第20号上诉人（原审被告）：诸暨市飞达实业有限公司（原浙江省诸暨市飞达实业公司）。

住所：浙江省诸暨市城关镇浣东北路60号。

法定代表人：宗光培，该公司总经理。

委托代理人：田大原，吉林衡丰律师事务所律师。

被上诉人（原审原告）：珲春江南实业有限公司清算小组。

住所：珲春市。

代表人：金龙华，该清算小组组长。

被上诉人（原审原告）：韩国KOMARA农产会社。

住所：韩国釜山广城市莲提区莲山千洞586－15.法定代表人：姜大建，该社社长。

委托代理人：王文君，吉林由正律师事务所律师。

本院受理后，依法组成合议庭，公开开庭进行了审理。

上诉人飞达公司委托代理人田大原，被上诉人清算组代表人金龙华，农产会社委托代理人王文君到庭参加诉讼。

本案现已审理终结。

珲春市边境经济合作区经济发展局于2001年6月1日下发珲经发（2001）53号文件，决定江南公司成立清算小组。

珲春市公安局治安科出具证明：证明清算组的公章已依法备案。

因此，清算组成立的程序合法，应负责江南公司的债权债务清理工作，具有作为诉讼原告的主体资格。

（二）1998年5月6日，江南公司、农产会社共同作为乙方与作为甲方的飞达公司签订了全自动手套机购销合同。

合同约定：甲方向乙方订购日产“松国”牌或“刀金”牌F7型－F10型全自动手套机680台（具体供应计划凭韩方传真件为准）；交货时间从1998年5月8日起至1999年1月8日止；价格按FOB图们火车站交货价每台17，000元人民币；交货地点为图们火车站；付款方式机器运抵图们火车站后付清全部货款；运输方法及费用负担，铁路运费由甲方负担；违约责任，如单方违约，违约方必须向对方赔偿标准为未执行部分合同总额的20％的违约金。

该合同由甲方飞达公司加盖单位公章，法定代表人宗光培签名，乙方江南公司代理人金龙华签名，农产会社加盖单位公章、代表人姜大建签名。

合同签订后，原告方按约定给被告发运了价值为793，573元的全自动手套机及部分配件。

飞达公司陆续给付了原告手套机款471，266元，现尚欠原告方手套机款322，307元未付。

珲春海关进口关税专用缴款书及珲春边境贸易公司代理进口证明能够证明：1998年8月10日，由珲春边境贸易公司代江南公司从韩国进口57台手套编织机，江南公司于1998年8月12日向珲春边境贸易公司交纳了7，700元的进口手套机的代理费、办证费、商检费、口岸费等。

在合同履行期间，飞达公司的法定代表人宗光培与江南公司的委托代理人金龙华的多次往来信件证明，按照上述购销合同，双方已实际履行。

故由二原告与被告签订的此全自动手套机购销合同系双方当事人真实意思表示，该合同为有效合同。

另外，为履行合同，江南公司为飞达公司发运手套编织机已垫付运费4，841.32元。

（三）1998年12月18日，飞达公司作为甲方与作为乙方的江南公司签订和解协议。

协议称：兹有甲方于97年7月24日向乙方购买乙方合资企业使用全套织袜机设备，98年5月6日签订购买乙方与韩国釜山KOMARA农产会社合资经营的进口韩产全自动手套机，两份合同在履行期间，由于种种原因，使合同不能按约履行，双方在有关问题上出现意见分岐，导致乙方向吉林省延边州中级人民法院提起诉讼。

现经双方法人代表友好协商，一致达成和解协议如下：1、袜机总款按935，000元计算，除已付给乙方货款及甲方在销售期间垫付的有关费用外，甲方一次性再付给乙方袜机款18万元；2、手套机、卷边机及配件总额按845，308元计算，除甲方已付给乙方手套机、卷边机及配件款765，308元外，甲方一次性再付给乙方人民币80，000元（捌万元整）；3、以上二项总计甲方需付给乙方一次性人民币贰拾陆万元整（260，000元）；4、乙方在签订本协议时，必须立即办理法院撤诉手续及有关财产解冻手续，同时将吉林省延边州中级人民法院的撤诉裁定书传真给诸暨市人民法院代为送达，并将原件用特快专递邮寄甲方；5、本协议经甲、乙双方法人代表签字即生效，生效后双方都不得用任何理由和借口向对方提出异议，今后双方互不追究任何责任；6、协议签订后，甲方凭延边州中级人民法院撤诉裁定书一次性付给乙方全部货款计260，000元（贰拾陆万元整）。

该协议由飞达公司法定代表人宗光培签名并加盖公章，江南公司法定代表人姜南春签名并加盖公章。

1998年12月22日，姜南春给飞达公司出具收条“今收到飞达公司袜子机及手套机款共计24.5万元，至此与飞达公司的两机款全部收完，合同从此终止，款已结清”，姜南春在收条上签名并加盖了江南公司的公章。

上述协议及收条的形成，没有原手套机购销合同的另一方农产会社的参与，农产会社也不知情，未同意、未授权。

此和解协议及收条系江南公司与飞达公司擅自达成的，侵害了购销合同一方农产会社的利益，故该协议属单方行为，为无效协议。

江南公司因无效协议所取得的24.5万元人民币应返还给飞达公司。

因江南公司与飞达公司对和解协议的达成均存在过错，由此因和解无效存在的损失由协议双方各自承担相应的责任。

（四）因农产会社未发运的40台手套机是农产会社个人行为，与飞达公司不直接发生关系，全自动手套机购销合同中对此也未约定，飞达公司并不知农产会社对手套机进行管理等情况，况且农产会社没有足够的证据证明627，250元人民币损失的由来，故农产会社的此项诉讼请求不予支持。

原审法院认为：二原告与被告所签订的全自动手套机购销合同为有效合同，被告方应给付拖欠的货款并承担违约责任。

二原告要求被告给付322，307元及违约金64，461元，运费4，841.32元的主张本院予以支持；原告农产会社要求被告赔偿627，250元人民币损失的主张无事实依据，本院不予支持。

被告方提出的原告无诉讼主体资格，1998年12月18日双方已达成和解协议对手套机、袜子机款已结清，应驳回原告诉讼请求的主张不成立，不予支持。

依照《中华人民共和国经济合同法》第六条、第二十九条第一款、第三十一条、第三十二条、《中华人民共和国民法通则》第一百零六条、第六十一条第一款之规定，判决：一、飞达公司于本判决生效之日起十日内偿付清算组、农产会社全自动手套编织机及配件款322，307元，运费4，841.32元，并支付违约金64，461元，合计391，609.32元；二、清算组于本判决生效之日起十日内返还飞达公司24.5万元人民币。

案件受理费20，666元，由被告负担8，384元，由原告农产会社负担11，282元。

飞达公司上诉称：1、清算组在一审中始终未提交其依法成立的有效证据，而所谓的珲春市边境经济合作区经济发展局的文件又无法律效力，故清算组作为原告的诉讼主体错误；2、农产会社与飞达公司1998年5月6日签订的全自动手套机购销合同无效。

理由是：（1）根据最高人民法院《关于适用<涉外经济合同法>若干问题的解答》第三条第二款“订立合同的我国当事人未经国家主管机关批准授予对外经营权的，合同无效”的规定，因飞达公司无对外贸易经营权，故该合同无效。

（2）根据《中华人民共和国对外贸易法》第九条的规定，上诉人飞达公司未经国务院对外经济贸易主管部门许可，且无明确的对外贸易经营范围，故双方所签合同因违反国家法律强制性规定而无效。

（3）根据最高人民法院《关于适用<中华人民共和国合同法>若干问题的解释》（一）第十条“当事人超越经营范围订立合同，人民法院不因此认定合同无效。

但违反国家限制经营、特许经营以及法律、行政法规禁止经营规定的除外”的规定，对外贸易属国家授权特许经营，故上诉人与农产会社所签的合同无效。

3、江南公司与飞达公司1998年5月6日签订的全自动手套机购销合同有效，该合同缔约方应排除农产会社，合同项下的内容应该受到法律保护。

4、本案事实上的买卖关系，系江南公司自农产会社买入手套机之后卖给飞达公司，故一审法院在事实认定上是错误的。

5、飞达公司与江南公司签订的和解协议合法有效，飞达公司已因该协议付出了履行此合同的全部对价，付款责任应予解除。

6、原审程序违法，二被上诉人在原审时只是缓交诉讼费，缓交日期截止到2002年11月12日之前，而二被上诉人到目前为止仍未交纳诉讼费，原审法院在没有收到诉讼费的情况下作出的判决是违法的。

7、原审对清算组和农产会社之间的具体权利义务关系没有审理清楚。

8、原审判决对本案争议数额认定不清。

清算组答辩称：1、清算组的成立是经董事会研究决定，以合法的程序向珲春市工商行政管理局外事科、珲春边境经济合作区经济发展局、珲春市公安局治安科申报批准的，目的是清算清理债权债务。

2、根据1998年5月6日三方签订的全自动手套机购销合同第四条、第五条、第六条、第七条的约定，飞达公司不需要外经贸部批准的进、出口营业执照，故1998年5月6日三方签订的合同是一般的国内购销合同，不是进出口购销合同，应认定有效。

3、1998年12月18日，江南公司法人代表姜南春与飞达公司签订的和解协议属无效协议。

农产会社答辩称：一审判决认定事实清楚，适用法律正确，请求二审法院驳回上诉，维持原判。

综合上诉人的上诉及被上诉人的答辩，并征询各方当事人的意见，本案争议的焦点问题是：1、清算组是否具备本案的诉讼主体资格？2、三方当事人在1998年5月6日签订的全自动手套机购销合同是否有效？3、江南公司和飞达公司1998年12月18日签订的和解协议是否有效？4、原审法院是否存在程序违法之处？各方当事人在二审中所举的证据与一审完全相同，均没有新证据提供，故本院二审查明的事实与一审相同。

针对上述焦点问题，本院综合评判如下：（一）清算组是否具备本案的诉讼主体资格？被上诉人清算组认为其成立是合法的，故具备本案的诉讼主体资格，并提供了珲春市边境经济合作区经济发展局珲经发[2001]53号“关于珲春江南实业有限公司成立清算小组的批复”，证明清算组是经过国家对外经济贸易主管部门批准后成立的。

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