青年黑格尔派的名词解释
西方文论
老年黑格尔派与青年黑格尔派的区别黑格尔学派之所以分为老年黑格尔学派与青年黑格尔学派，实际上是由黑格尔的辩证“扬弃”基本上的歧义所得出的，对于辩证的扬弃既可以做出保守的解释，也可以做出革命的解释。
施特劳斯最早通过政治的和宗教的差异对黑格尔学派做出区分，在形式上，源自法国议会的政治划分，在内容上，源自在基督学问题上的不同观点。
后来这一观点被密什莱继续彻底贯彻了下去，自此以后得到了保持。
一、老年黑格尔派老年黑格尔派又被称作黑格尔右派，他们依据黑格尔依据内容和形式对基督教做出的区分，在概念上肯定性的接受了内容。
传统意义上的老年黑格尔派代表人物有亨宁、霍托、弗尔斯特、道布等，他们对于黑格尔的哲学思想逐字逐句坚持并且将其贯彻于自身的历史哲学研究当中，但是并未能超出黑格尔的亲身影响，不能以自己的方式将其阐释发展扩散出去。
现在大部分人认为罗森克兰资、海姆、埃德曼、费舍他们即使都不具有彻底的革新思想与倾向，但是他们是黑格尔和尼采之间黑格尔哲学的真正维护。
罗森克兰资在1875年的《论新近德国哲学、特别是黑格尔哲学的历史》中提到：我们今天的人似乎是那些在18世纪下半叶出生、在19世纪上半叶去世的哲学家的“掘墓人和立碑人”。
“我们能够在这个世纪的下半叶同样提供一个圣洁的思想家团队吗？在我们的年轻人中间，有人的心灵为的热情和亚里士多德的工作乐趣所激励，做出思辨的不朽努力吗？我们的年轻人也许梦想着别的花环……他们很快就耗光了自己，在一些给人以希望的兴盛后就变得一事无成，开始复制、重复自己，在克服了较不自由、不完善、片面的、暴躁的青春尝试之后接踵而至的才是猛烈的、聚精会神地活动的时期。
他一方面折射出了青年黑格尔派的革新，另一方面从自己“世界异化”走出，而扩展和改变了自己与现实的关系。
但是，后一方面依旧在黑格尔本身的哲学体系之中，即是理论与实践、概念与实在的统一之中，因此即使有所改变，但是并未对黑格尔哲学具备彻底的革新思想。
海姆对黑格尔批判的、历史的阐述也超越倾覆的时代，对黑格尔哲学做出了进一步的维护与改造。
青年黑格尔派,蒲鲁东主义与马克思主义
青年黑格尔派，蒲鲁东主义与马克思主义青年黑格尔派也称黑格尔左派，是德国的一个唯心主义哲学派别，产生于19世纪30—40年代，是当时德国资产阶级激进派的思想代表。
青年黑格尔派相信理性是连续不断的展开过程，并把他们的任何看作是它的传达者。
他们主张，哲学体系化没有在黑格尔那里终结，反思的精神在它的连续发展中超越任何固定的思想体系，包括黑格尔本人的体系。
他们对黑格尔采取批判的态度，认为他们能克服或扬弃黑格尔，发展超越黑格匀的黑格尔主义。
青年黑格尔学派在政治上和宗教观点上是激进的，并把他们的兴趣集中于黑格尔思想的人本主义和历史方面。
青年黑格尔派坚持辩证法的否定原则，青年黑格尔派用历史发展的眼光看待一切，但把历史归结为观念史、思想史，青年黑格尔派由主观唯心论回复倾向，他们强调的不是绝对的客观的精神，而是人类的自我意识，青年黑格尔派的宗教观有无神论倾向。
蒲鲁东主义是以法国无政府主义者皮〃约〃蒲鲁东为代表的小资产阶级社会主义流派，产生于19世纪40年代。
蒲鲁东主义认为共产主义和资本主义都有弊病，都不合乎理性，以“个人占有”为基础的“互助制”社会是最好的社会模式；主张建立以无息贷款为基础的“人民银行”作为改造资本主义制度、实现“互助制”社会的根本途径；宣扬阶级调和与和平革命，反对暴力革命和无产阶级专政；鼓吹个人绝对自由，反对任何国家和政府，反对一切权威。
蒲鲁东主义的核心，是幻想通过和平改良的办法，建立小手工业生产制，实现小资产阶级的社会主义。
同时，还主张建立一种契约制度代替政府。
他认为，凡是一切都处于相互契约关系中的地方，根本不需要警察执行一切监督、保护的职务，人们也不再需要国家和政府干预他们的事务。
他从对自然法权观念的分析入手，指出资产阶级启蒙思想家提出的人生而平等的原则，实际上只是一种抽象的法权设定，因为它恰恰是以“财富和等级上的不平等为前提”的。
蒲鲁东揭露了古典政治经济学的自相矛盾。
他对“所有权的来源是劳动”这一观点提出了挑战。
马克思对青年黑格尔派“观念论”的批判
马克思对青年黑格尔派“观念论”的批判【摘要】马克思对青年黑格尔派的“观念论”进行了深刻的批判。
他指出他们的唯心主义观点缺乏物质基础，只是虚无缥缈的理论构想；形而上学观念脱离实践，无法解决现实问题；他们的“观念论”缺乏经验基础，只是空洞的抽象概念；历史发展理论缺乏阶级斗争的分析，忽略了社会矛盾的根源；政治立场缺乏阶级立场，对社会现实的变革缺乏具体措施。
马克思认为青年黑格尔派的“观念论”是空洞的、脱离现实的，缺乏对社会问题的深刻分析和实践指导。
这种观念论只会束缚人的思维，阻碍社会的发展进步。
【关键词】马克思, 青年黑格尔派, 观念论, 唯心主义, 形而上学, 历史发展理论, 政治立场, 批判, 总结, 结论1. 引言1.1 马克思对青年黑格尔派“观念论”的批判在19世纪初期，德国的青年黑格尔派以黑格尔的哲学观念为基础，形成了一系列唯心主义观点，其中包括形而上学观念、观念论、历史发展理论和政治立场。
马克思对这些观点提出了批判，认为它们在实践和现实中存在着严重的缺陷和错误。
马克思对青年黑格尔派的唯心主义观点进行批判。
他指出他们过于强调意识和观念的作用，忽视了物质基础对意识和观念的制约和决定。
马克思认为，唯心主义观点只是片面地看待世界和人类社会的本质，无法解释社会的历史发展和变革。
马克思批判了青年黑格尔派的形而上学观念。
他指出他们将观念和理念抽象化，脱离了社会和历史的具体条件，导致了对实践和现实的忽视和误解。
马克思认为，形而上学观念只会让人们迷失在虚幻的世界中，无法理解和改变现实社会的问题。
马克思对青年黑格尔派的“观念论”进行了全面批判，揭示了其在认识论、形而上学、历史和政治等方面的种种错误。
通过对这些错误的批判，马克思试图为建立一种更科学、更客观的社会理论和改变世界的实践提供理论基础和指导。
2. 正文2.1 对青年黑格尔派的唯心主义观点进行批判青年黑格尔派的唯心主义观点认为意识和思维是世界的决定性力量，物质只是意识的产物，而且认为存在的只是思维中的事物，因此否认了客观存在的独立性，把世界的存在归因于思维和概念的作用。
【笔记】西方哲学（第六卷）黑格尔学派
【笔记】西方哲学（第六卷）黑格尔学派在黑格尔生前，就在他周围聚集起一群人，这就形成了所谓的黑格尔学派。
黑格尔一死，这帮人就开始互相争论，都认为自己才是真正的黑格尔的继承人。
这就形成了老年黑格尔派和青年黑格尔派。
老年黑格尔派，在政治上偏向于保守的右翼，他们的不少成员认为，现在普鲁士的政治是符合黑格尔的理性，并且对于基督教文化，他们也尽力维护。
所以凡是现实的就是合理的（尽管这句话的原意不是这个意思），他们认为哲学家不应该做改革家和预言家。
而青年黑格尔派，就比较偏向于左翼，他们对于基督教进行批判，并且对于政治制度都进行批判。
他们认为，哲学不应该仅仅静观，还应该行动起来。
自然还有一些人，处于中庸和暧昧的状态，难以被归于左还是右。
1、大卫施特劳斯、鲍威尔兄弟与施蒂纳大卫斯特劳斯写作了一本《耶稣传》，他试图用黑格尔的思想对《福音书》进行重构。
试图通过对于基督教的批判来推进德国的宗教改革和德国的文化政治的进步。
因为德意志受到宗教的影响太深了，只有通过宗教改革，才能进而推进其他改革。
在这本书里，首先就是对于耶稣的形象。
正统派认为，福音书所记载的耶稣就是耶稣的真实记载。
大卫斯特劳斯反对这种说法，他认为耶稣确有其人，但是附会在他身上的神迹，只不过是犹太人把弥赛亚的希望给予了耶稣。
所以耶稣实际上是被犹太人的集体无意识所创造出来的。
他和真实的耶稣并不相同。
他认为耶稣和门徒的关系，如同苏格拉底和弟子的关系。
施特劳斯主要就是揭示《新约》的虚假和迷信。
很显然，这种观点一出现，就遭到了极大的反弹，施特劳斯就被贴上了无神论的名声。
那么，这部著作到底内涵着什么意思呢？一方面，黑格尔认为普鲁士的君主政体和耶稣基督的完美性是相符的，如果耶稣仅仅是一个历史人物，那么耶稣就不具备神性了，普鲁士的神学基础也就解体了。
另一方面，施特劳斯认为自己是黑格尔思想的延续，这样一来，就把黑格尔思想之中的潜在危险揭示出来，导致老年黑格尔派对他的抨击。
这里的代表人物，就是鲍威尔。
青年黑格尔派思想简介
青年黑格尔派思想简介第一篇：青年黑格尔派思想简介青年黑格尔派，young Hegelians，19世纪30年代黑格尔哲学解体过程中产生的激进派。
当时还有老年黑格尔派也称“黑格尔右派”。
19世纪30年代黑格尔学派解体过程中产生的右翼思想家集团、德国资产阶级保守派的...在哲学上,他们顽固坚持黑格尔的唯心主义体系,继续用黑格尔的“绝对精神”解释一切,认为“绝对精神”是一切事物存在亦称黑格尔左派。
活动中心在柏林。
主要成员有：D.F.施特劳斯(1808～1874)、B.鲍威尔（1809－1882）、E.鲍威尔、A.卢格、M.赫斯、M.施蒂纳等，L.费尔巴哈（1804年7月28日－1872年4月13日），马克思和恩格斯也曾参加过青年黑格尔派的活动。
起初，他们把注意力完全放在对宗教问题的探讨上，书报检查制度，因为这在当时是唯一可能进行相对自由探讨的领域。
青年黑格尔派一直不可能展开真正的政治讨论，直到1840年弗雷德里克·威廉四世即位为止，因为这时候新闻检查制度有所放松，使报纸一时得以自行进行宣传。
不过，大概过了3年以后，1843年，政府又重新实行了管制，这种宣传运动也就宣告结束。
发展历程宗教批判——人本主义批判——政治批判——社会批判1835年施特劳斯的《耶稣传》促进了青年黑格尔运动的兴起。
青年黑格尔派反对黑格尔体系的保守倾向，力图从它的辩证方法中引出革命的和无神论的结论。
在30年代，他们主要从事对宗教，特别是对福音书的批判性研究。
施特劳斯认为，福音故事是象神话那样不自觉地发生的，其中客观的精神实体起了决定性的作用；鲍威尔是马克思的老师，则认为它出自福音书作者的有意虚构，起决定作用的是自我意识，因而只有自我意识才能把人类从宗教异化下解放出来。
否认福音故事的可靠性以及耶稣其人的存在。
将黑格尔的自我意识解释为同自然相脱离的绝对实在，并用它来代替黑格尔的“绝对观念”，宣称“自我意识”是最强大的历史创造力，马克思和恩格斯在《神圣家族》一书中对此予以严厉批判。
麦克斯·施蒂纳:最后的青年黑格尔派
麦克斯施蒂纳：最后的青年黑格尔派张剑抒;林钊【摘要】麦克斯·施蒂纳是著名的青年黑格尔派成员,但他与黑格尔哲学的关系却晦而不明.在《唯一者及其所有物》中,到处展现着施蒂纳运用辩证法的痕迹.但他并非简单地重复黑格尔,他的“唯一者”的形象乃是现象学中精神运动达到最后阶段的自我意识的现实化身.就此而言,他促成了黑格尔哲学逻辑的完成,成为名副其实的“最后的黑格尔主义者”.【期刊名称】《学术研究》【年(卷),期】2013(000)007【总页数】5页(P21-25)【关键词】施蒂纳;黑格尔主义;唯一者;精神现象学【作者】张剑抒;林钊【作者单位】广东外语外贸大学思想政治理论学院广东广州,510420;中山大学社会科学教育学院广东广州,510275【正文语种】中文【中图分类】B516.39卡尔·洛维特揭示了黑格尔哲学的最终命运：“由马克思把黑格尔的绝对精神改造为马克思主义，基尔克果则将其改造为存在主义。
”[1]不管黑格尔哲学转向何方，施蒂纳都是不可忽略的一个环节，因为他既帮助马克思告别唯心主义开辟崭新的历史观，又被认为是比基尔克果更早的存在主义的源头。
要理解黑格尔之后哲学的发展，就必须梳理施蒂纳与黑格尔主义的关系。
一、施蒂纳与黑格尔主义的接触与其他青年黑格尔派的成员相比，施蒂纳与黑格尔主义以及黑格尔本人都有着更加直接的接触。
他的中学校长便是黑格尔的大弟子加布勒（Gabler），正是这个加布勒日后接替了黑格尔在柏林大学的教席。
施蒂纳在柏林大学亲身聆听了黑格尔的宗教哲学、哲学史、精神哲学等课程，青年黑格尔派中能有此经历的只有他和费尔巴哈。
此外，施蒂纳还先后修习过马尔海内克（Marheineike）、尼安德（Neander）、密什莱（Michelet）等正统黑格尔派知名学者的课程。
大学毕业后，施蒂纳与青年黑格尔派交往甚密，结交了鲍威尔兄弟和恩格斯等左派人士，成为“自由人”圈子的核心成员，还与马克思一起为《莱茵报》撰稿。
青年黑格尔派与马克思的哲学革命
青年黑格尔派与马克思的哲学革命一、本文概述《青年黑格尔派与马克思的哲学革命》一文旨在深入探讨和分析19世纪早期德国哲学界的重要变革，特别是青年黑格尔派的思想发展与马克思哲学革命之间的关系。
本文将首先概述青年黑格尔派的主要理论观点和哲学思想，分析其在德国哲学史上的地位和影响。
随后，文章将重点分析马克思如何批判和超越青年黑格尔派的哲学，从而开创自己的哲学体系，实现哲学革命。
在此基础上，本文将进一步探讨马克思哲学革命对后世哲学、社会科学以及政治理论的重要影响，揭示其在人类思想史上的重要地位。
通过深入研究青年黑格尔派与马克思的哲学革命，本文旨在深化对19世纪德国哲学思想发展历程的理解，揭示哲学思想与社会变革之间的紧密联系。
二、青年黑格尔派的主要观点青年黑格尔派，又被称为“左派黑格尔主义”或“新黑格尔主义”，是19世纪30至40年代德国的一个哲学流派。
这一流派的成员主要是柏林大学的一群青年学者，他们深受黑格尔哲学的影响，并试图在黑格尔的哲学体系中寻找改造现实社会的思想武器。
他们强调自我意识的重要性，认为自我意识是推动历史发展的决定性力量。
这一观点是对黑格尔哲学中“绝对精神”概念的进一步发挥，他们将其解读为个体和社会的自我意识和自我实现。
青年黑格尔派批判了现实社会的种种不合理现象，认为这些现象是“异化”的表现。
他们认为，个体在现实社会中往往被束缚在固定的社会角色和关系中，无法实现真正的自我。
因此，他们主张通过“自我意识”的觉醒和革命来消除这种异化，实现个体的自由和解放。
再次，青年黑格尔派强调理论与实践的统一。
他们认为，哲学不仅仅是理论上的探讨，更是改造现实社会的实践工具。
因此，他们致力于将哲学理论应用于社会政治实践，希望通过革命的方式实现社会的根本变革。
然而，青年黑格尔派在理论上也存在一些局限性。
他们虽然批判了现实社会，但却没有提出一套完整的理论体系来指导革命实践。
他们对黑格尔哲学的过度解读和依赖也限制了他们的思想视野。
施蒂纳、费尔巴哈、马克思和青年黑格尔派——大卫·麦克莱伦
Stirner, Feurbach, Marx and the Young Hegelians - David McLellanSubmitted by Ret Marut on Feb 27 2009 00:21tags: Germany Karl Marx Ludwig Feuerbach Max Stirner anarchism Marxism philosophyA summary of Stirner's ideas and their strong impact on his fellow Young Hegelians. McLellan asserts that Stirner's influence on Marx has been under-estimated and that he "played a very important role in the development of Marx's thought by detaching him from the influence of Feuerbach", his static materialism and his abstract humanism. Stirner's critique of communism (which Marx considered a caricature) also obliged Marx to refine his own definition. Stirner's concept of the "creative ego" is also said to have influenced Marx's concept of "praxis".Source; originally a chapter in The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx; David McLellan, MacMillan Press, UK, 1980.MAX STIRNER1. STIRNER'S LIFE AND WORKSMAX STIRNER - whose real name was Kaspar Schmidt - was an only son of Protestant parents, his father being a Bayreuth flutemaker who earned a comfortable living. He died, however, two years after Stirner was born in 1806, his wife remarried a dentist and the family moved to west Prussia. When Stirner was aged twelve he was sent back to Bayreuth and lived there for the next six years while attending the grammar schoool. He went to the University of Berlin at the age of twenty and entered the philosophical faculty where he attended, among others, the lectures of Hegel. He stayed there two years, spent the next year at the University of Erlangen and then interrupted his studies to stay at home for some time, possibly owing to the incipient madness of his mother.By 1832 he was back at the University of Berlin, but two years later he only obtained a limited facultas docendi and, when after further studies he failed to get a post in a state school, Stirner started teaching in a private girls' school where he remained until he gave up the job in 1844 just before the publication of his book.In 1837 Stirner had married the niece of his landlady, but she died a year later in childbirth, and in 1843 Stirner married again, this time Marie Dahnhardt to whom he dedicated Der Einzige. She was comparatively wealthy, but the money was lost when the creamery that Stirner had bought with it in 1845 failed the year after, and she left him the same year. Stirner worked as a hack translator of Jean Baptiste Say and Adam Smith, but he was twice imprisoned for debt and died destitute in 1856.Stirner is a man of a single book, Der Einzige and sein Eigentum, and the whole of Stirner's productive period is contained in the years 1842-4. Being a teacher and not immediately connected with the university Stirner did not come into contact with the Young Hegelians until quite late. What inspired him to his brief spell of creation was the group of young radical intellectuals formed in Berlin after Bruno Bauer's dismissal from his post and known as the Freien. They used to meet almost nightly in a wineshop belonging to a certain Hippel, and Engels in his comic poem Der Triumph des Glaubens gives this description of Stirner as he appeared at these gatherings :'For the time being he is still drinking beer,Soon he will drink blood as if it were water;As soon as the rest cry savagely "Down with kings!"Stirner immediately goes the whole hog: "Down with laws too!"'Stirner cannot have joined the group before the end of 1841 as this was the time that Marx, who apparently never met Stirner, left Berlin. During this period Stirner wrote several short articles for newspapers, among which a very laudatory review of Bruno Bauer's Posaune, and also two longer articles published in the supplement to the Rheinische Zeitung, one on education as the development of the self and the second, in which the influence of Feuerbach is evident, on the very Hegelian subject of the relation between art and religion. Stirner also published two articles a little later in the Berliner Monatsschrift, a review edited by one of the Freien, the first rejecting any ideas of the state, while in the second, a commentary of Eugene Sue's popular novel Les Mysteres de Paris, Stirner elevates the self at the expense of any fixed moral norms.Stirner spent most of 1843 writing Der Einzige und sein Eigentum. It was finished by April 1844 and published in November of that year. For all its apparent eccentricities the book is very obviously a product of its time and of the Young Hegelian movement in particular. The form of the book, dialectical and divided into triads, is Hegelian, as is also the careful attention paid to language and the roots of words. Inside the Young Hegelian movement itself, Stirner carried to an extreme their rejection of anything religious and their opposition to any 'system'. The familiar accusation of still thinking in a 'theological' manner, that is in an abstract manner which still left some ideas or principles outside, and in some way opposed to, the minds of men, and the accusation of lack of consequence and perseverance in drawing the full conclusion from premises both reach their culmination in Stirner who sees all his fellow-thinkers as `spiritual' and`religious' as compared to himself.Stirner can thus be seen as the last of the Hegelians, last perhaps because he was the most logical, not attempting to replace Hegel's `conerete universal' by any `humanity' or `classless' society since he had no universal, only the individual, all-powerful ego. Stirner took Hegel's views as his basis and then worked out his own philosophy by criticising everything that was positive in Hegel's critics, Bauer,Feuerbach and Marx - whose criticisms, according to Stirner, were never pushed far enough. Hegelianism was thus at an end : Stirner only used the form not the content of the Hegelian system and, like all the Young Hegelians, was most fascinated by the dialectic. But even this was only an outer shell, for Stirner was very weak on history as he had no room to allow for a historical development whether of the world spirit, selfconsciousness or the class struggle. Stirner was indeed a solipsist and a nihilist but, for all his criticism of Feuerbach, he was still influenced by his naturalistic viewpoint. For Stirner's individualism left no room for any sort of morality, which had been on the side of freedom in Hegel. Since the ethical sphere was left empty it is not surprising that Stirner sometimes lapsed into a Feuerbachian naturalism based on natural values and needs.Stirner's book is a difficult one because there is no rectilinear development and it often presents the appearance of notes taken at random and put down with no attempt at co-ordination. For example, at the beginning of the book we are offered two entirely different schemata of world history. Also Stirner's attitude to Bruno Bauer changes considerably in the course of the book, but no attempt is made to reconcile the two views. Indeed, what Stirner himself says on this point probably applies to most of the book: `The foregoing review of "free human criticism" was written bit by bit immediately after the appearance of the books in question, as was also that which elsewhere refers to the writings of this tendency, and I did little more than bring together the fragments'.(1) The development is nevertheless progressive as the same points are returned to later and treated at greater length. A second factor complicating Stirner's exposition is his treatment of language. He tries continually to obtain new effects by translating foreign words into German, by giving their original meaning to words in current use and by etymological investigations into the roots of words. Of course, all this makes translation difficult.The basic message of the book, as well as the style in which it is written, is best shown by quoting the first and last paragraphs of the preface:What is not supposed to be my concern? First and foremost the good cause, then God's cause, then the cause of mankind, of truth, freedom, humanity, justice ... finally, even the cause of mind and a thousand other causes. Only my cause is never to be my concern. Shame on the egoist who thinks only of himself.(2)And the last paragraph reads :The divine is God's concern; the human, man's. My concern is neither the divine nor the human, not the good, true, just, free, etc., but solely what is mine, and it is not a general one, but is - unique, as I am unique.(3)The layout of the book is clearly modelled on Feuerbach's Das Wesen des Christentums, being divided into two parts entitled `man' and `myself', which correspond to thetwo parts of Feuerbach's work that dealt respectively with God and man. The first chapter of Der Einzige describes a human life in a triadic form:The child was realistic, taken up with the things of this world, till little by little he succeeded in getting at what was at the back of these things; the youth was idealistic, inspired by thoughts, till the stage where he became the man, the egoistic man who deals with things and thoughts according to his heart's pleasure, and sets his personal interest above everything. Finally the old man? `When I become one, there will be time enough to speak of that'.(4)Stirner then goes on to apply this to human history: antiquity was the childhood of the human race, the modern age adolescence and its maturity will be that immediate future of which Stirner's book is a precursor. The view of history as a gradual progress of philosophical thought is Hegelian, but in place of the reign of spirit, Stirner puts the supremacy of the self and its property. His analysis of the modern age is a sort of demonology of the spirits to which humanity has been successively enslaved.Since Stirner's ideas can best be understood by comparing them with those of his contemporaries, the most revealing part of the book is his attitude to his fellow Young Hegelians. After dealing with antiquity, in which nature and her laws were regarded as a reality more powerful than man, Stirner describes at greater length the modern, the Christian world, the kingdom of pure spirituality, whether in religion or philosophy, the latest manifestation of which - the philosophy of Feuerbach - is still `thoroughly theological'.According to Stirner, Feuerbach has merely changed the Christian conception of grace into his idea of a human species and religious commands into moral ones. But the Christian dualisin between what is essential and what is non-essential in man remains; indeed, the situation is even worse than before for this dualism, since it has been brought down from heaven to earth, has thereby become even more inescapable: if Feuerbach destroys the heavenly dwelling of the `spirit of God' and forces it to move to earth bag and baggage, then we, its earthly apartments, will be badly overcrowded. 'Feuerbach', says Stirner, `thinks that if lie humanises the divine he has found the truth. No; if God has given us pain, "man" is capable of pinching us still inure torturingly'.(5) Men are still bound by ideals that stand above and separate from them. The humanist religion of Feuerbach is only the last metamorphosis of the Christian religion: `Now that liberalism has proclaimed "man" we can now declare openly that herewith was only completed the consistent carrying out of Christianity and that in truth Christianity set itself no other task from the start than to realise "man", the "true" man'.(6) The only solution is therefore to do away with the divinity once and for all in any shape or form: `Can the man-God really die if only the God in him dies?'(7) For a genuine liberation, we must not only kill God, but man, too. Stirner here, in a typically Young Hegelian manner, takes up Feuerbach's own starting point and turns it against its author who is accused ofnot having followed it through to its proper end. All philosophy for Stirner, as for Marx too, was idealism, but whereas for Marx the basis to which philosophy had to be reduced was socio-economic, for Stirner it was the ego.Stirner now goes on to deal with the `most modern among the moderns' - the Freien or Liberals, whom he divides into three classes : political, social and humane.Stirner begins the first section with a characterisation of the changes that came over the political scene in the eighteenth century:After the chalice of the so-called monarchy had been drained down to the dregs, in the eighteenth century people became aware that their drink did not taste human - too clearly aware not to begin to crave a different cup. Since our fathers were human beings after all, they at last desired also to be regarded as such.(8)The new idea that gained ground at this time was that `in our being together as a nation or state we are human beings. How we act in other respects as individuals and what self-seeking im pulses we may there succumb to, belongs solely to our private life; our public or state life is a purely human one'.(9) The bourgeoisie developed itself in the struggle against the privileged classes by whom it was cavalierly treated as the third estate and confounded with the canaille. But now that the idea of the quality of man spread, the situation, as with Feuerbach's critique of religion, became much worse. For just as Feuerbach, by transferring the centre of religion from heaven to earth, had rendered its effects more immediate and obvious, so democracy renders more obvious the evils of politics. Stirner quotes Mirabeau's exclamation: `Is not the people the source of all power?' He goes on: `The monarch in the person of the "royal master" had been a paltry monarch compared with this new one, the "sovereign nation". This monarchy was a thousand times stricter, severer and more consistent.'(10) This liberation, the second phase of protestantism, was inaugurated by the bourgeoisie and its watchword was rationalism. But this merely means the independence of persons, liberalism for the liberals and a replacing of personal power by one that is impersonal. It is no longer any individual, but the state itself and its laws that are the despots. Laws and decrees multiply and all thought and action become regulated. In return for this slavery the liberal state guarantees our life and property, but this free competition means merely that everyone can push forward, assert himself and fight one against another. The bourgeoisie also has a morality closely bound up with its essence, one that emphasises solid business, honourable trade and a moral life, disregarding all the time that the practice of this rests on the foundation of the exploitation of labour.Under the heading of `Social Liberalism' Stirner next deals with the doctrines of the communists. Whereas through the Revolution the bourgeoisie had become omnipotent and everyone was raised (or degraded) to the dignity of `citizen', communism or social liberalism responds :Our dignity and essence consist not in our being all equal children of our mother, the state, but in our all existing each for the other ... that each exists only through the other who, while caring for my wants, at the same time sees his own satisfied by me. It is labour that constitutes our dignity and our equality.(11)Stirner's summary of the socialist doctrine is: all must have nothing, so that all may have. Under liberalism it is what he `has' that makes the man and in `having' people are unequal. But this society where we are all to become members of the Lumpenproletariat is even worse than the previous ones, for here `neither command nor property is left to the individual; the state took the former, society the latter'.(12) The communist ideas show the same faults as those already criticised. They, too, have a dualistic view of man:That the communist sees in you the man, the brother, is only the Sunday side of communism. According to the workday side he does not take you as man simply, but as human labourer or labouring man. The first view has in it the liberal principle; in the second illiberality is concealed. If you were lazy, he would certainly not fail to recognise the man in you, but would endeavour to cleanse him as a `lazy man' from laziness and to convert him to the `faith' that labour is man's destiny and calling'.(13)Thus in the communists' glorification of society we merely have another in the line of deities that have tyrannised over mankind: `Society, which is the source of all we have, is a new master, a new spook, a new "supreme being", which "takes us into its service and allegiance".(14)The criticism of communism advanced by the humanist liberal, or disciple of Bruno Bauer, to whom Stirner next passes, is that if society prescribes to the individual his work, then even this does not necessarily make it a purely human activity. For to be this it must be the work of a`man' and that requires that he who labours should know the human object of his labour and he can have this consciousness only when he knows himself as man, the crucial condition is self-consciousness - the very watchword of Bruno Bauer and his School. `Humanist liberalism says: "You want labour; all right, we want it likewise, but we want it in the fullest measure. We want it, not that we may gain spare time, but that we may find all satisfaction in labour itself. We want labour because it is our self-development" .'(15) In short, man can only be truly himself in human, self-conscious labour. According to Stirner this view seems to say that one cannot be more than man. He would sooner say that one cannot be less: `It is not man that makes up your greatness, but you create it, because you are more than man and mightier than other - men'.(16) Stirner concedes that among social theories, Bauer's ideas are certainly the most complete for they remove everything that separates man from man. It is in Bauer's criticism, reminiscent of Feuerbach, that Stirner finds the `purest fulfilment of the love principle of Christianity, the true social principle', which he rejects with the question: `How can you be truly single so long as even one connection exists between you and othermen?(17) These are the same objections as Stirner brought against Feuerbach. For Bauer shares Feuerbach's humanism and sacrifices the individual man to the idea of humanity by maintaining that his vocation is to realise the human essence through the development of freeself-consciousness.Nevertheless, Stirner does admire Bruno Bauer with his extreme dialectic and proclamation of the perpetual dissolution of ideas. In fact, Stirner thinks that this must finally end up in his own position:It is precisely the keenest critic who is hit the hardest by the curse of his principle. Putting from him one exclusive thing after another ... at last, when all ties are undone, he stands alone. He, of all men, must exclude anything that has anything exclusive or private; and when you get to the bottom, what can be more exclusive than the exclusive, unique person himself?(18)Bauer does, indeed, in later numbers of his Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung reject this Feuerbachian humanism in favour of a`pure criticism', and Stirner adds to this section a postscript in which he deals with Bauer's change of position as not going nearly far enough:[Bauer] is saying too much when he speaks of `criticising criticism itself'. It, or rather he, has only criticised its oversight and cleared it of its inconsistencies. If he really wanted to criticise criticism he would have to look and see whether there was anything in its pre-supposition.(19)It still remains true that Stirner found himself closer in outlook to Bauer than to any other of the Young Hegelians and this feeling was reciprocated : Bauer was the only one, apart from Buhl, to attend Stirner's funeral and pay him this last mark of respect.After thus dismissing the wiles of religion, philosophy and liberalism in their efforts to subdue the self, Stirner shows in the second part of the book the way to its complete liberation. It is not through attachment to other eternal ideas or values that the self is liberated, but by elevating itself above all the toils and snares of these ideas. My self is my own creation and my own property, its power is without limits and it belongs wholly to me. It is only in my own self that this liberation can be found, as Stirner points out, again in oppostion to Feuerbach :Feuerbach in his `Grundsatze' is always harping on `being'. In this he, too, for all his antagonism to Hegel and the absolute philosophy, is stuck fast in abstraction; for `being' is an abstraction as is also `the I'. Only I am not an abstraction: I am all in all, consequently even abstraction or nothing; I am not a mere thought, but at the same time I am full of thoughts, a thought-world.(20)This is a complete inversion of Hegel. What in Hegel was attributed to the general is here applied to the individual. Stirner, too, could have claimed to have stood Hegel on his head. Later Stirner explicitly compares the ego to God, whom `names cannot name'. But this liberty needs to be supplemented by property. The only thing that really belongs to me is my self: this, too, is the only thing that is really free. Any lesser freedom is really useless, for it always carries with it the implication of a future enslavement, as Stirner has shown in dealing with the different liberal doctrines. The only reason that men do not grasp their liberty is that they have been taught to mistrust themselves and depend on priests, parents or law-givers. But if they are sincere with themselves they will admit that even so their actions are governed by self-love. Dare therefore to free yourself from all that is not your self. In place of `deny yourself' the slogan of the egoist is `return to yourself'. In the past people have been shame-faced egoists, now they should come out into the open and grasp for themselves what before they thought to acquire by persuasion, prayer and hypocrisy. Liberty is not something that can be granted - it has to be seized.The liberal state sees me simply as a member of the human race and it does not interest itself in my peculiarities: it merely demands that I subordinate my individual interests to those of society in general. But human society and the rights of Man mean nothing to me: I seem to have many similarities with my fellows, but at the bottom I am incomparable. My flesh is not their flesh and my mind is not their mind.I refuse to forget myself for the benefit of others. Others - nations, society, state - are nothing but a means which I use. I convert them into my property and my creatures, I put in their place the association of egoists, that is to say, an association of selves of flesh and blood preferring themselves to everything else and having no inclination to sacrifice themselves to this species-man that is the ideal of liberalism. This species-man is plainly nothing but a concept, an idea, a ghost : the true self is without species, without norm, without model, without laws, without duty, without rights.Law, too, is something that is offered me from the outside. But I am sole judge of what my rights are : they are co-terminous with my `power', for `only "your might", "your power", gives you the right'.(21) The only thing that I have not got the right to do is what I have not authorised myself. The only law for me is that which exists in and through my self.The worst enemy of the self is thus the state, for it is continually opposed to the will of particular persons : I can never alienate my will to the state, as my will is something continually changing. Even the best type of state is one where I am a slave to myself. Did I but realise it, my will is something that no force can break. This does not mean, however, that there will be complete chaos and each man will be able to do as he pleases. For if all men act as egoists and defend themselves, then nothing untoward will happen to them. Marx's view was too cosmopolitan for Stirner whose one passion was the individual person. Stirner considered that it wasno use bettering the universal, the state, law, society. Progress was inductive, from below, from individuals. Although he shared with Marx the same criticisms of the Prussian state, the principles upon which these were based were different: Marx was a violent critic of any kind of atomism, from Epicurus's onwards. Stirner on the other hand wanted the state to dissolve into atoms.The liberal state's aim is to guarantee a little piece of property to everyone. But in fact property falls a prey to the big owners and the proletariat increases and the attacks of the communists are justified. Stirner's criticism of the liberal state here was quite probably influenced by Marx's article 'Zur Judenfrage'; both have the same views on the dualism of the private and political spheres, the difference between corporations and free competition, and the essential features of the Christian state. The solution lies in the formation of an association of people who remain their particular selves, an association which would dispossess the proprietors and organise their wealth in common, each man bringing as much as he can conquer. By all means have associations to reduce the amount of labour needed but let the self and its unique power always have first priority. The supreme law quoted at all those who try to free themselves is that of love: `every man must have something that is more to him than himself'. This love is not to be a free gift, but is an injunction laid upon us. Certainly I may sacrifice all sorts of things for others, but I cannot sacrifice myself. The egoist loves others because this love makes him happy and has its basis in his egoism.As an egoist I enjoy all those possessions that my liberation has granted me; they are my property and I dispose of them as I wish. I am even master of my ideas and change them as so many suits of clothes. But this does not mean that I am solitary and isolated. For man is by nature social. Family, friends, political party, state, all these are natural associations, so many chains that the egoist breaks in order to form a`free association' supple and changeable according to varying interests. Stirner admits that this `association of egoists' must be based on a principle of love, but it is an egoistic love - my love. The association is my own creation and I enter and leave when I please. I am the only person who attaches myself to the association.The aim of the association is not revolution, but revolt, not to create new institutions, but to institute themselves. Stirner realised the self-contradictory notion of his `association of egoists' and in his replies to the critics of his book the element of association is minimised. The book ends, as it began, with an assertion of the uniqueness of the individual:I am the owner of my might, and I am so when I know myself as unique. In the unique one the owner himself returns into his creative void out of which he was born. Every higher essence above me, be it God, be it man, weakens the feeling of my uniqueness and pales only before the sun of my consciousness of this fact. If I concern myselfwith myself, the unique one, then my concern is limited to its transitory, mortal creator which constitutes myself, and I can say: All things are nothing to me!(22)2. STIRNER VERSUS FEUERBACHUnlike Bruno Bauer, Feuerbach and Hess, Stirner had no positive doctrine to offer Marx: but he nevertheless played a very important role in the development of Marx's thought by detaching him from the influence of Feuerbach. This role of Stirner in detaching Marx from Feuerbach can best be made clear by showing firstly that Marx at the time of the publication of Der Einzige und sein Eigentum was, and (more important) was regarded as being, a disciple of Feuerbach, secondly that Stirner's book was regarded as important and that his criticism of Feuerbach had wide influence and thirdly that the Deutsche Ideologie was composed in the context of this debate and comprises a criticism of Feuerbach which borrows elements from Stirner and a criticism of Stirner which tacitly admits the validity of his attack on Feuerbach but maintains that it no longer applies.As regards the first point, there are many facts showing that Marx was regarded in late 1844 as being a disciple of Feuerbach.This was certainly so in the eyes of Stirner: the only reference to Marx in Der Einzige is to his use of the term Gattungswesen in his essay 'Zur Judenfrage', and this term is one borrowed from Feuerbach (first chapter of Das Wesen des Christentums).Feuerbach is referred to as a communist in Der Einzige.(23) The use of this word was at that time very loose and many did not distinguish it from socialism, but when in 1843 the Young Hegelian movement split, Feuerbach, at the height of his influence then and in the subsequent year, came to be regarded as the inspirer of the materialist wing in the same way as Bruno Bauer of the idealists.In 1845 there appeared an article by G. Julius, former editor of the Leipziger Allgemeine Zeitung and friend of Bruno Bauer, entitled 'Kritik der Kritik der kritischen Kritik', in which Marx is treated simply as a disciple of Feuerbach. `In his construction of human nature', says Julius `Marx by no means does away with dualism: all he does is to transpose this dualism into the real material world in which he follows Feuerbach exactly'.Bruno Bauer, too, in his reply to Stirner, entitled 'Charakteristik Feuerbachs', tries to show that Stirner is a refutation ofFeuerbachianism as expounded by his disciples Marx, Engels and Hess, but that both are dogmatisms which must in turn be overcome by `pure criticism'.Hess, in particular in his essays in 21 Bogen aus der Schweiz, made great use of the Feuerbachian idea of alienation and viewed his `true socialism' as the。
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青年黑格尔派的名词解释
青年黑格尔派，是19世纪德国的一群具有革命主义思想的年轻哲学家和政治
评论家，他们受到德国哲学家黑格尔哲学体系的影响，将黑格尔的观念与社会变革和政治革命相结合。
本文将对青年黑格尔派这一概念进行深入解释，以及阐述他们的核心思想和对后世的影响。
一、青年黑格尔派的背景
19世纪初，欧洲正处于社会变革和政治动荡之中。
工业革命推动了经济的发展，同时也加深了社会阶级的矛盾。
青年黑格尔派的形成正是在这个时期，他们成长于这个经历动荡不安的时代。
黑格尔是德国哲学史上的重要人物，他的哲学体系对19世纪的青年哲学家产
生了巨大影响。
黑格尔的哲学核心思想是辩证唯心主义，主张世界的发展是由矛盾的对立统一推动的。
这一思想为青年黑格尔派提供了哲学基础和思考框架。
二、青年黑格尔派的核心思想
1. 精神的自由与政治革命的关系
青年黑格尔派看到了黑格尔哲学中关于精神的自由的核心概念。
对他们而言，
个体的自由是实现真正的人类解放的关键所在。
然而，他们认为这种个体的自由只能通过政治革命来实现。
2. 自由与平等的统一
青年黑格尔派认为自由和平等是不可分割的。
在资本主义社会中，只有实现了
平等，人们才能真正地享受到自由。
因此，他们主张通过政治的改革和社会的改造来实现社会的平等。
3. 革命的必要性
青年黑格尔派相信，只有通过革命，才能真正地转变社会结构，打破旧的束缚和不平等的关系。
他们批判了旧有的社会秩序，主张通过暴力手段来推翻旧的统治阶级，建立起新的公正社会。
三、青年黑格尔派的影响
1. 政治革命的催化剂
青年黑格尔派的思想对于19世纪欧洲的政治革命起到了催化剂的作用。
他们的批判精神和对社会不公的敏感意识激发了更多人对于社会变革的渴望，推动了1848年欧洲的革命浪潮。
2. 影响马克思主义的形成
青年黑格尔派的思想为后来的马克思主义奠定了理论基础。
马克思深受青年黑格尔派的影响，将黑格尔的历史唯心主义转化为历史唯物主义，提出了无产阶级社会主义革命的理论框架。
3. 对后世哲学思潮的影响
青年黑格尔派的思想对后世的哲学思潮产生了重要影响。
他们的批判精神和对社会现实的关注引发了不少后来哲学家的思想启示。
他们的反抗精神和对传统秩序的质疑，为后世不同流派的哲学思想提供了启迪。
四、结语
青年黑格尔派作为19世纪德国的一群年轻政治哲学家，通过将黑格尔的哲学理论与社会变革相结合，成为了那个时代精神解放的先驱者。
他们对政治革命的渴求和对社会不平等的批判，为后世哲学思潮的发展带来了新的启示。
尽管他们的所作所为并未导致直接的改变，但他们为世界带来的思想冲击依然影响广泛，对于我们理解历史和思考未来仍有着重要的意义。