融资过程外文翻译外文文献英文文献融资过程中啄食顺序理论的一个
资本结构中英文对照外文翻译文献
中英文对照外文翻译(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)The effect of capital structure on profitability : an empirical analysis of listed firms in Ghana IntroductionThe capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on a firm’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. The capital structure of a firm is actually a mix of different securities. In general, a firm can choose among many alternative capital structures. It can issue a large amount of debt or very little debt. It can arrange lease financing, use warrants, issue convertible bonds, sign forward contracts or trade bond swaps. It can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations; however, it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes its overall market value.A number of theories have been advanced in explaining the capital structure of firms. Despite the theoretical appeal of capital structure, researchers in financial management have not found the optimal capital structure. The best that academics and practitioners have been able to achieve are prescriptions that satisfy short-term goals. For example, the lack of a consensus about what would qualify as optimal capital structure has necessitated the need for this research. A better understanding of the issues at hand requires a look at the concept of capital structure and its effect on firm profitability. This paper examines the relationship between capital structure and profitability of companies listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange during the period 1998-2002. The effect of capital structure on the profitability of listed firms in Ghana is a scientific area that has not yet been explored in Ghanaian finance literature.The paper is organized as follows. The following section gives a review of the extant literature on the subject. The next section describes the data and justifies the choice of the variables used in the analysis. The model used in the analysis is then estimated. The subsequent section presents and discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, the last section summarizes the findings of the research and also concludes the discussion.Literature on capital structureThe relationship between capital structure and firm value has been the subject of considerable debate. Throughout the literature, debate has centered on whether there is an optimal capital structure for an individual firm or whether the proportion of debt usage is irrelevant to the individual firm’s value. The capital structure of a firm concerns the mix of debt and equity the firm uses in its operation. Brealey and Myers (2003) contend that the choice of capital structure is fundamentally a marketing problem. They state that the firm can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations, but it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes market value. According to Weston and Brigham (1992), the optimal capital structure is the one that maximizes the market value of the firm’s outstanding shares.Fama and French (1998), analyzing the relationship among taxes, financing decisions, and the firm’s value, concluded that the debt does not concede tax b enefits. Besides, the high leverage degree generates agency problems among shareholders and creditors that predict negative relationships between leverage and profitability. Therefore, negative information relating debt and profitability obscures the tax benefit of the debt. Booth et al. (2001) developed a study attempting to relate the capital structure of several companies in countries with extremely different financial markets. They concluded thatthe variables that affect the choice of the capital structure of the companies are similar, in spite of the great differences presented by the financial markets. Besides, they concluded that profitability has an inverse relationship with debt level and size of the firm. Graham (2000) concluded in his work that big and profitable companies present a low debt rate. Mesquita and Lara (2003) found in their study that the relationship between rates of return and debt indicates a negative relationship for long-term financing. However, they found a positive relationship for short-term financing and equity.Hadlock and James (2002) concluded that companies prefer loan (debt) financing because they anticipate a higher return. Taub (1975) also found significant positive coefficients for four measures of profitability in a regression of these measures against debt ratio. Petersen and Rajan (1994) identified the same association, but for industries. Baker (1973), who worked with a simultaneous equations model, and Nerlove (1968) also found the same type of association for industries. Roden and Lewellen (1995) found a significant positive association between profitability and total debt as a percentage of the total buyout-financing package in their study on leveraged buyouts. Champion (1999) suggested that the use of leverage was one way to improve the performance of an organization.In summary, there is no universal theory of the debt-equity choice. Different views have been put forward regarding the financing choice. The present study investigates the effect of capital structure on profitability of listed firms on the GSE.MethodologyThis study sampled all firms that have been listed on the GSE over a five-year period (1998-2002). Twenty-two firms qualified to be included in the study sample. Variables used for the analysis include profitability and leverage ratios. Profitability is operationalized using a commonly used accounting-based measure: the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to equity. The leverage ratios used include:. short-term debt to the total capital;. long-term debt to total capital;. total debt to total capital.Firm size and sales growth are also included as control variables.The panel character of the data allows for the use of panel data methodology. Panel data involves the pooling of observations on a cross-section of units over several time periods and provides results that are simply not detectable in pure cross-sections or pure time-series studies. A general model for panel data that allows the researcher to estimate panel data with great flexibility and formulate the differences in the behavior of thecross-section elements is adopted. The relationship between debt and profitability is thus estimated in the following regression models:ROE i,t =β0 +β1SDA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (1) ROE i,t=β0 +β1LDA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (2) ROE i,t=β0 +β1DA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (3)where:. ROE i,t is EBIT divided by equity for firm i in time t;. SDA i,t is short-term debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. LDA i,t is long-term debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. DA i,t is total debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. SIZE i,t is the log of sales for firm i in time t;. SG i,t is sales growth for firm i in time t; and. ëi,t is the error term.Empirical resultsTable I provides a summary of the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables for the sample of firms. This shows the average indicators of variables computed from the financial statements. The return rate measured by return on equity (ROE) reveals an average of 36.94 percent with median 28.4 percent. This picture suggests a good performance during the period under study. The ROE measures the contribution of net income per cedi (local currency) invested by the firms’ stockholders; a measure of the efficiency of the owners’ invested capital. The variable SDA measures the ratio of short-term debt to total capital. The average value of this variable is 0.4876 with median 0.4547. The value 0.4547 indicates that approximately 45 percent of total assets are represented by short-term debts, attesting to the fact that Ghanaian firms largely depend on short-term debt for financing their operations due to the difficulty in accessing long-term credit from financial institutions. Another reason is due to the under-developed nature of the Ghanaian long-term debt market. The ratio of total long-term debt to total assets (LDA) also stands on average at 0.0985. Total debt to total capital ratio(DA) presents a mean of 0.5861. This suggests that about 58 percent of total assets are financed by debt capital. The above position reveals that the companies are financially leveraged with a large percentage of total debt being short-term.Table I.Descriptive statisticsMean SD Minimum Median Maximum━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ROE 0.3694 0.5186 -1.0433 0.2836 3.8300SDA 0.4876 0.2296 0.0934 0.4547 1.1018LDA 0.0985 0.1803 0.0000 0.0186 0.7665DA 0.5861 0.2032 0.2054 0.5571 1.1018SIZE 18.2124 1.6495 14.1875 18.2361 22.0995SG 0.3288 0.3457 20.7500 0.2561 1.3597━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Regression analysis is used to investigate the relationship between capital structure and profitability measured by ROE. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results are presented in Table II. The results from the regression models (1), (2), and (3) denote that the independent variables explain the debt ratio determinations of the firms at 68.3, 39.7, and 86.4 percent, respectively. The F-statistics prove the validity of the estimated models. Also, the coefficients are statistically significant in level of confidence of 99 percent.The results in regression (1) reveal a significantly positive relationship between SDA and profitability. This suggests that short-term debt tends to be less expensive, and therefore increasing short-term debt with a relatively low interest rate will lead to an increase in profit levels. The results also show that profitability increases with the control variables (size and sales growth). Regression (2) shows a significantly negative association between LDA and profitability. This implies that an increase in the long-term debt position is associated with a decrease in profitability. This is explained by the fact that long-term debts are relatively more expensive, and therefore employing high proportions of them could lead to low profitability. The results support earlier findings by Miller (1977), Fama and French (1998), Graham (2000) and Booth et al. (2001). Firm size and sales growth are again positively related to profitability.The results from regression (3) indicate a significantly positive association between DA and profitability. The significantly positive regression coefficient for total debt implies that an increase in the debt position is associated with an increase in profitability: thus, the higher the debt, the higher the profitability. Again, this suggests that profitable firms depend more on debt as their main financing option. This supports the findings of Hadlock and James (2002), Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Roden and Lewellen (1995) that profitable firms use more debt. In the Ghanaian case, a high proportion (85 percent)of debt is represented by short-term debt. The results also show positive relationships between the control variables (firm size and sale growth) and profitability.Table II.Regression model results━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Profitability (EBIT/equity)Ordinary least squares━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Variable 1 2 3SIZE 0.0038 (0.0000) 0.0500 (0.0000) 0.0411 (0.0000)SG 0.1314 (0.0000) 0.1316 (0.0000) 0.1413 (0.0000)SDA 0.8025 (0.0000)LDA -0.3722(0.0000)DA -0.7609(0.0000)R²0.6825 0.3968 0.8639SE 0.4365 0.4961 0.4735Prob. (F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ConclusionsThe capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on an organization’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. This present study evaluated the relationship between capital structure and profitability of listed firms on the GSE during a five-year period (1998-2002). The results revealed significantly positive relation between SDA and ROE, suggesting that profitable firms use more short-term debt to finance their operation. Short-term debt is an important component or source of financing for Ghanaian firms, representing 85 percent of total debt financing. However, the results showed a negative relationship between LDA and ROE. With regard to the relationship between total debt and profitability, the regression results showed a significantly positive association between DA and ROE. This suggests that profitable firms depend more on debt as their main financing option. In the Ghanaian case, a high proportion (85 percent) of the debt is represented in short-term debt.译文加纳上市公司资本结构对盈利能力的实证研究论文简介资本结构决策对于任何商业组织都是至关重要的。
融资外文翻译
融资外文翻译————————————————————————————————作者：————————————————————————————————日期：第1页1新兴公司融资威廉·B·加特纳克莱姆森大学斯皮罗创业领导力研究院346 Sirrine厅克莱姆森，SC 29634-1305电话：864.656.0825传真：864.656.7237gartner@凯西J.福雷德克莱姆森大学斯皮罗创业领导力研究院346 Sirrine厅克莱姆森，SC 29634-1305电话：864.650.8800传真：864.656.7237caseyf@约翰·C·亚历山大克莱姆森大学财务部314 Sirrine厅克莱姆森，SC 29634-1323电话：864.656.0547传真：864.656.3748alexanj@本文已提交的版本在巴布森学院的创业研究会议上，教堂山，北卡罗来纳，6月，2008年5日面板上的研究的年度研讨会创业动力，格林维尔，SC，2008年11月。
第2页2新兴公司融资抽象本研究探讨了1214名新生的企业家的融资选择，在教育局常任秘书长II数据集参与的过程中，开始新业务。
资金来源分为两大类：个人和外部。
我们开发了一套假设有关的各种公司和新生的企业家的特点，将有可能影响哪些类别的金融资源的使用，以及所收购的金额。
的大多数新兴企业的融资（所有资金的57％）来自个人捐款它的创始人，谁贡献了每个受访者的中位数为5,500元。
的企业预计将有较高的收入水平，注册成立，并依法登记注册明显更容易获得外部资金。
新生的企业家具有较高的教育和净值水平显着更有可能获得外部资金。
从分析的结果进行介绍和讨论。
我们的研究结果的影响和建议，为今后的研究提供。
关键词：新生的企业家，资本结构，财务，启动，教育局常任秘书长介绍我们企业家参与的过程中，开始探索融资选择新业务。
于创业的过程中，几乎所有的研究获得金融资本都集中在新的公司，而不是新兴的企业（Astebro及哈特，2003年Chaganti等人，1995;区海恩斯，2006年; Verheul Thurik，2001）。
外文文献
融资理论是企业制定融资政策的理论基础。
自20世纪50年代以来,在解释企业融资决策行为的动机及其所秉承的理论基础时,主要存在着两大理论,一是权衡融资理论;二是优序融资理论。
权衡融资理论认为,企业在构造长期资本来源的组合时,存在着一个最佳的资本结构,企业将按照事先测算的最佳资本结构来选择资金来源及配置各种不同性质的资金。
优序融资理论最早是Modigoliani和Miller(1958)提出的。
理论指出在完善的资本市场中,如果不存在税收、破产成本以及代理成本的影响,那么,企业市场价值将与其资本结构无关。
Myers和Majluf(1984)在《企业知道投资人所不知道信息时的融资和投资决策》一文中,以信息不对称理论为基础,提出企业融资存在一种“啄食顺序原则”。
认为由于所有权和经营权的分离而产生委托代理关系,因为利益不同,内部经营者和股东之间的信息不对称原因,企业的融资顺序上就形成了一个优序策略。
即首先为内部融资,也就是企业的留存收益;其次是长期借款和长期债券;再次是发行优先股融资;最后是发行普通股融资。
此外,1989年Baskin以交易成本、个人所得税和控制权的研究角度对优序融资理论作出了解释,指出由于留存收益提供的内部资金不必承担发行成本,也避免了个人所得税,因此内部资金要优于外部资金。
与权益性资金相比较,负债融资由于具有节税效应,发行成本低,又不会稀释公司的控制权,所以对外融资来说负债融资又优于权益性融资。
Claggett(1991)利用交叉分类法以验证权衡融资理论和优序融资理论在实践中是否存在。
结果发现这两种理论都成立,但优序理论的显著性高于权衡融资理论。
因此,Claggett认为无论是权衡理论还是优序理论都过于简化,实际的操作是介于两者之间,故应称为混合理论。
在国内,也有一些学者在专题研究融资理论及其实践效应。
有的通过实证研究认为我国企业偏好于股权融资,有的认为我国企业融资秩序与优序融资理论的主张正好相反。
企业融资决策中英文对照外文翻译文献
企业融资决策中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)译文：中小型企业融资决策企业的产生、生存及发展均离不开投资与融资活动。
随着我国加入WTO 组织，市场经济体制的逐步完善，金融市场的快速发展，投资与融资效率也越来越成为企业发展的关键。
对于中小型企业而言，应要根据自身发展需求，认真考虑如何选择自己需要和适合自己发展阶段的融资方式以及各种融资方式的利用时机、条件、成本和风险，确定合适的融资规模以及制定最佳融资期限等问题。
要解决这些问题，需要中小型企业制定适当的融资策略，以作出最优化的融资决策。
一、企业融资决策概述(一)企业融资决策概述企业融资决策，是企业根据其价值创造目标需要，利用一定时机与渠道，采取经济有效的融资工具，为公司筹集所需资金的一种市场行为。
它不仅改变了公司的资产负债结构，而且影响了企业内部管理、经营业绩、可持续发展及价值增长。
典型的融资决策包括出售何种债务和股权（融资方式）、如何确定所要出售债务和股权的价值（融资成本）、何时出售些债务和股权（融资时机）等等。
而其中最主要的包括融资规模的决策和融资方式的决策。
融资规模应为企业完成资金使用目的的最低需要量。
而企业的融资方式则多种多样，常见的以下几种：1.财政融资。
财政融资方式从融出的角度来讲，可分为：预算内拨款、财政贷款、通过授权机构的国有资产投资、政策性银行贷款、预算外专项建设基金、财政补贴。
2.银行融资。
从资金融出角度即银行的资金运用来说，主要是各种代款，例如：信用贷款、抵押贷款、担保贷款、贴现贷款、融资租凭、证券投资。
3.商业融资。
其方式也是多种多样，主要包括商品交易过程中各企业间发生的赊购商品、预收货款等形式。
4.政券融资。
该方式主要包括股标融资和债券融资两大类。
(二)融资决策过程企业制定融资决策的过程，也即确定最优资本结构的过程。
具体决策程序是：首先，当一家企业为筹措一笔资金面临几种融资方案时，企业可以分别计算出各个融资方案的加权平均资本成本率，然后选择其中加权平均资本成本率最低的一种。
外文翻译---融资过程中啄食顺序理论的一个合理证明
外文原文Management Research News，Volume 25 Number 12，2002A Rational Justification of the Pecking Order Hypothesis to theChoice of Sources of FinancingBy Vuong Duc Hoang Quan外文翻译原文来自：Management Research News，Volume 25 Number 12，2002：74-90融资过程中啄食顺序理论的一个合理证明Vuong Duc Hoang Quan摘要自从被Stewart Myers (1984)发展以来，啄食顺序理论在近期把研究重心从传统静态权衡理论转移到其他理论的研究的趋势中成为了一道亮点，它试图为公司资本结构的行为寻求一个合理的解释。
这篇文章通过建立啄食顺序理论和与之有明显对立的MM定理1之间的关系，提出了啄食顺序理论的一个合理证明。
为支持我们的解释，在推论过程中，我们采用各种各样现有的理论，包括税盾理论、破产成本理论、代理理论、信号理论和管理风险厌恶理论等，这些证明啄食顺序理论的论据，其内涵也被简要地讨论了。
关键词：公司融资；资本结构；啄食顺序理论介绍企业怎样选择资本结构及其影响因素是公司财务上一个很有争议的根本问题。
传统上，资本结构的形成被认为是有利税率之间静态权衡的结果。
税收优势提倡增加债务，它与破产风险相对，破产风险更偏好于股权融资的使用。
尽管如此，近期的研究已经呈现出了从静态权衡理论为焦点到其他理论的研究的转移，从而试图寻找出一个对资本结构行为更进一步的解释。
Myers (1984)谈到的啄食顺序理论最早是由Donaldson (1961)始创的，是用来描述企业管理者为减轻不对称信息引起的投资不足问题的缺陷而优先采取的融资方式的选择这一融资实际。
因此相对于外源融资，任何类型的企业更倾向于内源融资。
中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献
中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：The areas of SME financing channels: an overview 1.IntroductionIn all countries, SMEs are an important source of economic growth and create jobs. In addition, these companies through their dynamism and flexibility, the power of innovation and development.The research method is to start from the literature to highlight the importance of the theme of our research. This paper analyzes the data and statistics based on mainly by the World Bank survey, small and medium-sized private enterprises in Romania by some empirical research. According to the method used, and pointed out the importance of financing of SMEs and enhance the public bodies concerned about, especially the measures taken to improve financial development.2.the literature on SMEs financing channelsA popular academic literature on the financing channels of SMEs, has witnessed a lot of research to solve this problem.Countless research studies have indicated that financing channels is a critical obstacle in the growth and development process, especially in small and medium enterprises.Through Baker Dumont reggae - Ke Lute, Ivan, and Marca Smokin Popovich (2004) research, reflecting the fundamental factors of 10 000 enterprises from 80 countries mainly depend on the financing of enterprises. Therefore, the relationship between the study highlights the corporate finance and its characteristics such as age, size and structure of property rights. From this perspective, the authors found that the small size of the young company, and face greater obstacles when they seek financial resources.The iResearch Dick Mei Leke and Salta (2011) analysis of macroeconomic and institutional factors affecting SME financing loans through the statistical data found. In other similar studies, the authors found a positive correlation between the overall economic development (a measure of per capita income) and financial development (measured by private lending ratio of gross domestic product), on the other hand, the level of SME financing is the opposite. In addition, the authors show that the level of financing for SMEs depends on the legal structure and overall business environment.3.in the process of SME financing in the general obstaclesIn general, access to financial products or financial services or financial inclusion assumes that there is no trade barriers to the use of financial products or services, regardless of whether these barriers or non-related pricing (Dumont reggae - Ke Lute, Baker, and Honorine root 2008:2). Therefore, to improve this means of access means increasing the degree of financial products or financial services at a fair price toeveryone.Enterprise does not use financial products or services can be divided into several categories, their identification is necessary, in order to take the necessary measures to improve their financing channels. Therefore, on the one hand, enterprises obtain financing, the financial products and services, but do not use them because they do not have a viable investment projects. On the other hand, it can distinguish between non-voluntary refuse corporate Although these business needs, but not have access to financial services. The status of independent corporate finance or financial services in some companies do not earn enough money or safeguards required by financing institutions and therefore have higher credit risk. At the same time, when some companies in need of funding, financial and banking institutions involved too costly and can not agree to financing. Finally, in the context of the enterprise refused to appear over-priced financial products or services and financial products or services that meet their requirements.Financing channels for enterprise development and the efficient allocation of funds essential. However, compared with large enterprises, SMEs seeking finance is facing many difficulties, because of several reasons, including: the judicial and legislative structure of the instability and imperfect, it does not support the enterprises in need of financing and funding the relationship between; part of the funding and corporate information is incomplete or even lack of information, which hinders the normal and efficient development of relations between enterprises and providers of finance; especially in the young company, the lack of credit history and guarantees the creditors, and sometimes limits the range of financial products that can be used.The number of surveys, especially the World Bank stressed that the financing is one of the biggest obstacle to good development and growth of the SME. For example, the World Bank in the 2006-2009 survey foundthat 31% of the worldwide study of corporate finance is a major obstacle to the current implementation, and even higher proportion of young company in the 40% of cases up to three years of experience (Chavez, kt Boer and Ireland 2010:1). In addition, a series of global surveys, including the information provided by the World Business Environment Survey show that SME financing transaction costs is the main obstacle to enterprise development.4.SME bank financing difficulties and support measuresIn most countries, especially in countries with bank-oriented financial system, the main source of external financing for SMEs by bank loans. Therefore, this type of loan is crucial to the development of SMEs. However, the survey showed, compared to the SMEs and large enterprises are using the new investment in the small extent of bank financing.As we mentioned, the use of financial products is determined by supply and demand. It is therefore important to understand why the SMEs use bank financing to a small extent only. In this regard, some studies (Banerjee and Duflo: 2004) has shown that the main reason for the supply, because every time when SMEs are able to obtain loans, they use it to increase production. This behavior is more proof of financing is an important factor in the development of enterprises. In addition, in the context of the current global financial crisis, the declining availability of bank loans and limited financing opportunities for SMEs. Therefore, it is the main problem facing small and medium enterprises.October 29, 2010, this survey of SMEs in Romania highlights the main problems faced by SMEs and banks. Therefore, 82% of the interviewed entrepreneurs obtain bank financing is very difficult, mainly because of excessive bureaucracy, unreasonable high demand, high interest rates, rigid bank credit indicators, as well as many types of commission and expenses. In addition, more than 61% of SMEentrepreneurs and managers reporting banks lack of transparency (hidden costs, lack of communication channels, etc.), there is no real consultation (using the standard contract, the bank refused to modify or complete the credit contract, etc.) and banks do not legitimate or misuse of the terms of the contract (for example, perform the unauthorized transaction accounts or bank fraud). Understanding this knowledge to take measures to support and promote SME financing.Improve SME financing is still cause for concern, but also national, European and international facing a challenge. For example, in the EU, through the implementation of the new measures established by the Small Business Administration for Europe to improve the financing channels for SMEs, by reducing the return of the structural funds requirements to promote the access of small and medium enterprises, the establishment of the Credit Ombudsman to promote small and medium-sized enterprises and dialogue between the credit institutions, to avoid the double taxation of the tax legislation, which will hinder the international venture capital plays an important role.In particular, empirical research, emphasizing the impact of the degree of financial development of a country is essential that the level of development of the SME financing. Therefore, a series of measures to support SMEs to obtain financing, to ensure the efficient development of the country's financial, which will ensure greater availability of corporate finance. Specifically, the authorities should take measures commonly used to measure the degree of financial development in the seven pillars, namely, the institutional environment, business environment, financial stability, banking and financial services, non-bank financial services, financial markets and access to finance.5 .ConclusionEffective financing for SMEs to create new business is of great significance, and existing growth and development of enterprises, whilepromoting the country's economic and social development. In addition, in the case of the economic crisis, SMEs contribute to restoring the national economy, so it is particularly important to support SME financing. However, most of the survey report stressed, always the financing channels of SMEs is one of the most important factor to affect its operation and development.SMEs trying to get the necessary financial resources to face difficulties related to the entrepreneurs and the economic environment of each country, as well as existing legal and institutional structure. To alleviate these difficulties, the measures taken by public authorities should focus on improving the financial development and to ensure that the corporate finance and economic growth, greater effectiveness.In various countries, including Romania, the decline on the availability of SME financing, or even the lack of statistical data, we believe that policy makers need to focus on and monitor a series of important indicators, depending on the size of the SMEs, experience and industry events share of its loans, which will benefit the public authorities, creditors and investors.原文来自罗马·安吉拉中小企业的融资渠道的领域:概述（奥拉迪亚大学：经济科学，2011年第一卷第一期，431-437）摘要通过中小企业在创造附加值和新的就业岗位中的贡献,使它在国家的经济和社会发展中拥有一个显著的角色。
中国上市公司股权融资偏好研究
内容摘要优序融资理论（Pecking Order Theory）提出公司在融资时应该首先选择内部融资、然后是债权融资、末尾就要考虑的是股权融资方式了。
但针对中国上市企业融资行为进行分析之后发现中国的上市企业在融资的先后选择与该观点相背离—出现很清晰的偏好股权融资这种方式从而忽视了债权融资方式的现象。
根据这个现象，本文归纳了形成这一融资特征的原因及其影响，并对此融资现象带来的不良影响提出了若干建议。
关键词：上市企业融资偏好证券市场资本构架AbstractOn the basis of Pecking order theory, when corporate financed, they will obey the rule that the first internal financing, then debt financing, finally equity financing.But after analyzing the financing activities of Chinese listed companies, I find the phenomenon that listed companies in China prefer equity financing when they choose the way to finance. But the conclusion isn’t the same as Pecking order theory. Therefore, I summarize the reasons and influence of these financing characteristics in my paper. Finally I put forward some Suggestions how we can reduce the bad influence of the phenomenon.Key words：Listed company Financing preference The securities marketThe capital structure目录一、研究背景及意义 (1)（一）研究背景 (1)（二）研究意义 (1)（三）研究现状 (2)二、文献综述 (2)（一）股权融资偏好原因研究 (3)（二）债务融资偏好原因研究 (4)三、中国上市企业融资偏好特征 (5)四、我国上市企业存在股权融资偏好的原因 (6)（一）“内部人控制”现象 (6)（二）股权融资的低成本 (6)（三）债券市场发展滞后 (6)五、我国上市企业融资偏好的影响分析 (7)（一）导致资金使用效率不高 (7)（二）不利于公司资本结构的优化 (7)（三）加剧公司治理结构的失衡 (8)六、建议 (8)（一）从企业自身出发 (8)（二）从政府角度出发 (9)参考文献 (10)致谢 (11)中国上市企业股权融资偏好研究一、研究背景及现状（一）研究背景自上世纪90年代中国证券交易所成立之后，经过二十多年的迅猛发展产生的进步，中国的证券行业的改变可谓日新月异，上市企业如雨后春笋般出现，证券行业的不断做大。
优序融资理论外文文献翻译
文献信息：文献标题：Financing Preferences of Spanish Firms: Evidence on the Pecking Order Theory（西班牙企业的融资偏好：优序融资理论的实证研究）国外作者：Javier Sánchez-Vidal，Juan Francisco Martín-Ugedo文献出处：《Review of Quantitative Finance & Accounting》, 2005, 25(4):341-355字数统计：英文2111单词，11535字符；中文3840汉字外文文献：Financing Preferences of Spanish Firms: Evidence on thePecking Order TheoryAbstract This paper analyses some of the empirical implications of the pecking order theory in the Spanish market using a panel data analysis of 1,566 firms over 1994–2000. The results show that the pecking order theory holds for most subsamples analyzed, particularly for the small and medium-sized enterprises and for the high-growth and highly leveraged companies. It is also shown that both the more and the less leveraged firms tend to converge towards more balanced capital structures. Finally, we observe that firms finance their funds flow deficits with long term debt.Keywords:capital structure, pecking order theoryIntroductionA prime contribution on information asymmetry in capital structure theory is the Myers and Majluf (1984) model. Myers and Majluf observe that the empirical evidence is not consistent with a financial policy that is determined by a trade-off of the advantages and disadvantages of market imperfections, mainly taxes, costs offinancial distress, and agency costs. Rather, companies’ financial policies seem to be better explained by the behaviour described by Donaldson (1961).He establishes a hierarchy described by company preference for internal funds over external funds; in the case of external funds, a company prefers debt first, then hybrid instruments like convertible bonds, and finally equity issues. This hierarchy, broadly characterized as pecking order theory, indicates that companies do not make financing decisions with the aim of achieving optimal leverage.Although they tend to be taken as the same thing, the pecking order theory and the Myers and Majluf (1984) model are not strictly speaking the same. The pecking order theory i s merely a description of companies’ financing policy, while the Myers and Majluf work represents the first model that attempts to describe this behaviour from a theoretical point of view, based on the presence of information asymmetry. Moreover, the Myers and Majluf (1984)model assumes listed companies and markets where equity is issued through firm commitments, such as the American market, not for markets where the predominant flotation method is rights offerings, such as Spain and most other countries.The aim of this paper is to provide evidence on the pecking order theory in the Spanish market. The analysis takes two directions. First, we examine the evolution of the three largest accounting sources of funding for a company—retained earnings, equity issues and debt—using a model based on Watson and Wilson (2002).Second, we study the role of long-term debt in making up financing deficits, following the flow of funds deficit equation of Shyam-Sunder and Myers(1999).There are several features which distinguish the Spanish financial system from the American one. Probably the main difference affecting the pecking order is the flotation method in equity issues. Equity securities are issued in a wide variety of ways, mainly firm commitments underwritten offers and rights issues. The relative importance of these methods depends on the issuing firm’s country. In the United States rights offerings have declined in frequency, having virtually disappeared by 1980.In Spain, rights prevail. This difference may play an important role in the hierarchy described by the pecking order theory. In addition: (a)debt financing isprimarily raised privately in Spanish firms, thus banks play a very important role; and(b)the Spanish capital market is less developed than the American securities market, having lower capitalization and smaller transaction volumes. Although several papers have already examined the capital structure of Spanish firms, most of them have analyzed the effect of different variables on leverage. However, there is little evidence focusing on pecking order and no study employing the Watson and Wilson (2002) methodology.The results show that small and medium-sized companies behave consistently with predictions of the pecking order theory. When we divide the sample into subsamples on the basis of growth and the level of leverage, we see that high-growth companies base their growth on retained earnings, and firms with very high and very low debt ratios tend to converge towards more moderate debt ratios. Estimation of the flow of funds deficit equation shows that fund deficits are met by the use of long-term debt.The pecking order theory: Theoretical base and empirical evidence The pecking order theory describes a hierarchy in companies’ financial policy as follows: (1)Firms prefer to finance their investments with funds internally generated, namely, retained earnings and depreciation expenses; (2)firms base the dividend payout ratios on the future investment opportunity set and their expected cash flows;(3)payout ratios tend to be sticky in the short term, so in some years internally generated flows will be enough for financing company needs and in some years not;(4)funds obtained in years of financial surpluses, after payment of dividends and financing, are directed to finance short-term financial investments or to reduce debt. When there is a financial deficit, firms will seek external finance: first debt, then hybrid securities like convertible bonds, and finally equity issues.To explain this behaviour Myers and Majluf (1984) construct a model of information asymmetry assuming that firm managers act on behalf of current shareholders. If companies have enough financial slack, they will carry out allinvestments that have a positive net present value. If external funds are needed to finance new investments, the market will interpret equity issues as evidence that company shares are overvalued and thus issue announcement will have a negative impact on the share price.Thus, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that, if the company does not have enough funds to finance new investments, it will issue equity only when there are very profitable investments that can neither be postponed nor financed through debt, or when managers believe that the stock is overvalued enough that shareholders will be disposed to tolerate the market penalty. The information asymmetry may cause current shareholders to renounce positive net present value investment projects in order to avoid a drop in share price due to the issue of equity, thereby creating an underinvestment problem. To avoid these results, it seems reasonable that companies will implement financing policies that allow them the capacity to finance investments and avoid external financing.However, the Myers and Majluf model (1984) has some limitations. The first is that it applies to markets like the American market where shares are offered mainly through firm commitment underwritings and not through rights issues, which is the flotation method that prevails in most other markets. In an underwritten firm commitment, shares are offered simultaneously to the public at large. Thus, if shares are overvalued, there will be a wealth transfer from new to current shareholders. In rights offerings, current shareholders enjoy priority in the purchase of new shares, which minimizes the possibility of wealth transfers. Therefore, the Myers and Majluf (1984) argument that equity issue is the last choice in firms’ financing policies has little currency in markets where rights issues are the prevalent method of equity issue.Another limitation of the Myers and Majluf (1984) model is that it is generally intended to describe listed companies, leaving the rest, mainly the small and medium-sized enterprises(SME),out of the explanation. Because of this, authors since then have tried to explain the pecking order theory using alternative arguments appropriate to non-listed SME companies.A major problem in SME financing, especially in non-Anglo-Saxon countries, islimited access to capital markets (a finance gap) (Holmes and Kent,1991).Financing choices for SME are thus usually reduced to retained earnings and bank loans. This finance gap can be divided into two components: a supply gap, because of limited availability of funds or higher cost, and a knowledge gap, because of limited knowledge about all the possibilities of external finance and a lack of awareness of the advantages and disadvantages of debt. As a consequence of these two components of the finance gap, the main long-term source of finance will be internal financing and, if necessary, bank loans.Another factor that may play a part in the hierarchy of firm choices is the motivation to retain control of the firm (Holmes and Kent, 1991; Hamilton and Fox, 1998).As we have noted, in a firm commitment offering stock is sold at one time to the general public; thus, current shareholders’ relative ownership of firm, as well as their control of the company may be diminished with new share offerings. Such a control problem may arise also in rights issues, but to a lesser extent, because current shareholders may have limited funds to invest in the first place or may want to diversify their investments, so they might not purchase additional shares to maintain their ownership percentage. As a result of all of this, the current shareholders would also be reluctant to issue equity.These factors mentioned above imply a similar hierarchy to the one described by Myers and Majluf (1984); that is, the company would make use of retained earnings in the first place, then debt (bank loans) and, finally, equity issues.Various authors have tried to test the empirical implications of the pecking order theory. Next, we briefly summarize some of them. Watson and Wilson(2002)use a descriptive model in the British market and confirm the pecking order theory, especially for closely-held companies(companies whose ownership is very concentrated and whose manager is usually the main owner).Shyam-Sunder and Myers(1999)and Frank and Goyal(2003)study the way companies finance their flow of funds deficits. The former authors find evidence to support the pecking order theory; the latter find evidence of a target debt ratio. Mato(1990),in the Spanish market, studies financing flow of fund deficits, using anaccounting identity that includes share issues. He finds that companies tend not to use equity issues, but finance their needs primarily with debt. He also observes that debt and internal finance are mutually substitutable.Fama and French(2002)use structural equations that regress leverage and dividend payout as dependent variables on several explanatory variables from the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory. They find no conclusive evidence in support of one specific theory.Lo′pez-Gracia and Aybar-Arias(2000)use Manova analysis to examine the relationship between variables proposed by the pecking order theory and financial constraints in the Spanish market. They find that the significance of internal finance varies according to company size. Saa′-Requejo(1996)uses a nested model with binary variables for Spanish companies to test the choice between internal or external finance and between equity and debt. He finds that companies care about whether the funds are raised publicly or privately and suffer from similar financial constraints, whether they are holding companies or not.Finally, Holmes and Kent(1991)and Ang and Jung(1992)use mail surveys to try to discern typical company financing policies. Both authors find that company managers follow a hierarchy of funding choices similar to the one described by the pecking order theory. Holmes and Kent(1991)find a stricter pecking order in place at SME than at larger companies.In short, many authors have tried to test the pecking order theory, but the evidence is not conclusive.ConclusionsWe have examined several empirical implications of the pecking order theory for a sample of 1,566 Spanish companies partitioned by size, growth, and previous debt level over 1994–2000.The pecking order theory states that firms follow a hierarchy when financing investments. Companies prefer internal funds to external funds; in case of externalfunds firms prefer debt first, with equity issues being their last choice. Given that Myers and Majluf’s (1984) argument is not valid in explaining this h ierarchy in markets like the Spanish where rights issues prevail, a finance gap and the motivation to retain control could help to explain such a hierarchy in these markets.For the whole sample, we find that retained earnings and debt have similar coefficients, higher than the equity issues coefficient, providing evidence of the duality of retained earnings and debt noted by Holmes and Kent(1991).In the case of different subsamples, small and medium-sized firms do seem to follow the pecking order predictions; the retained earnings coefficient exceeds the debt coefficient, which in turn exceeds the equity issues coefficient. Such results could be explained by a finance gap or by the motivation to retain control.Analysis of subsamples based on firms’ growth and previous debt level shows that these factors are very important in determining companies’ financing policies. High-growth companies resort to retained earnings, and then to debt, and finally to equity issues. That is, these firms follow the pecking order theory. Low-growth firms by contrast take a more balanced approach to financing. Analysis of high-leverage and low-leverage firms indicates these companies move towards more moderate debt levels.Finally, estimation of a flow of funds deficit equation reveals that companies tend to fund their financing deficits mainly with long-term debt.中文译文：西班牙企业的融资偏好：优序融资理论的实证研究摘要本文通过使用1994年—2000年西班牙市场的的1566家企业的固定样本数据分析优序融资理论的实证影响。
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外文原文Management Research News，Volume 25 Number 12，2002A Rational Justification of the Pecking Order Hypothesis to theChoice of Sources of FinancingBy Vuong Duc Hoang Quan外文翻译原文来自：Management Research News，Volume 25 Number 12，2002：74-90融资过程中啄食顺序理论的一个合理证明Vuong Duc Hoang Quan摘要自从被Stewart Myers (1984)发展以来，啄食顺序理论在近期把研究重心从传统静态权衡理论转移到其他理论的研究的趋势中成为了一道亮点，它试图为公司资本结构的行为寻求一个合理的解释。
这篇文章通过建立啄食顺序理论和与之有明显对立的MM定理1之间的关系，提出了啄食顺序理论的一个合理证明。
为支持我们的解释，在推论过程中，我们采用各种各样现有的理论，包括税盾理论、破产成本理论、代理理论、信号理论和管理风险厌恶理论等，这些证明啄食顺序理论的论据，其内涵也被简要地讨论了。
关键词：公司融资；资本结构；啄食顺序理论介绍企业怎样选择资本结构及其影响因素是公司财务上一个很有争议的根本问题。
传统上，资本结构的形成被认为是有利税率之间静态权衡的结果。
税收优势提倡增加债务，它与破产风险相对，破产风险更偏好于股权融资的使用。
尽管如此，近期的研究已经呈现出了从静态权衡理论为焦点到其他理论的研究的转移，从而试图寻找出一个对资本结构行为更进一步的解释。
Myers (1984)谈到的啄食顺序理论最早是由Donaldson (1961)始创的，是用来描述企业管理者为减轻不对称信息引起的投资不足问题的缺陷而优先采取的融资方式的选择这一融资实际。
因此相对于外源融资，任何类型的企业更倾向于内源融资。
如果企业必须获得外部资金时，他们倾向于选择债务融资。
Myers and Majluf (1984)讨论到，如果公司没有发行新的证券，并且只采取他们可利用的留存收益为投资机会提供资金，那么就不存在信息不对称问题。
根据他们的说法，公司应该保留充足的财政松动—现金、有价证券和未使用的无风险债务容量-以便在资金需求的情况下能够提供经费。
这个理论最重要的内涵是介入了“为什么增发新股和债转股计划等降低杠杆作用的行为总是伴随着公司的股票价格下跌”这一现象的有力解释。
一般来说，公司只有不得不这样做时才会做出降低杠杆作用水平的举措。
当公司被发现是发行债务比发行股票更频繁时，这一现实似乎与这个预言相符。
Pratt (1995)指出，在美国证券上市公司中，1994年度与1993年度，股权分别只占4.22%和3.88%。
更有甚者，一份增长杠杆作用的计划表明，管理者对公司的未来前景很有信心，他们很想发出一个关于他们对市场的积极信念的信号。
这说明了为什么公布一件杠杆作用增长的事件将被作为好消息被市场所接受的原因。
啄食顺序理论的另一个内涵关系到金融中介机构在减少信息不对称程度中的角色。
伴随着他们的专业技能，金融中介机构如投资银行能通过多次与公司联系，甚至通过拥有公司的所有权进入公司的财务报表和经营计划来成为公司的内部人。
通过授予资金信托，甚至是股权投资（在法律上被允许），中介机构结果是处于监视公司的表现和直接干预他们的决定的位置上。
在公司财政与银行相连模式的国家中的公司倾向于较高的市场价值，而其他公司严格的依靠资本市场来获得外源融资。
啄食顺序理论的评论家无法解释税收、破产成本、完全发行费用和其他譬如公司投资机会的集合等因素怎样对资本选择产生冲击力。
啄食顺序理论也被认为是忽略了代理问题。
这些代理问题是由各个公司价值的请诉人的利益冲突造成的。
所以尽管有杠杆作用水平改变与公司融资方式选择的优先权的预言之间的关系而产生的直觉的呼吁，啄食顺序理论仍然缺乏令人信服的理由。
因此，它在财政学术界仍然存在被采纳的局限性(Baskin,1989)。
根据MM定理1和其他现有的理论假说，当公司需要外部资金时，公司决策偏向于债务，本文研究的目的就是为这一预言提供合理的证明。
这篇文章被划分为三部分：第一部分介绍并明确地指出本文的目的；第二部分放松完全资本市场的假设条件，从而提供了啄食顺序理论的合理的证明；第三部分提出了本文的讨论和结论。
MM定理1和啄食顺序理论资本结构的研究一般被认为是从1958年Modigliani 和Miller发表的重要论文开始的。
作者通过套利理论讨论“市场价值与资本结构是不相关的”，这就是我们熟知的MM定理1。
在完善市场的假定下，虽然这种陈述不去否决公司所有人偏好某种融资手段的可能性，但是它断言了融资手段与公司价值的不相关性。
尽管如此，对于Modigliani 和Miller提出的完善的市场这一不切实际的假设，财政学术界对此表示怀疑。
观察表明，明显存在一种最优的资本结构。
公司都倾向于他们偏好的特定债务股权比例的杠杆作用范围(Fischer, Heinkel, 和 Zechner, 1989)。
更特别的是，为实施新项目而筹集资金或是作为抵制敌意接管的一种手段，企业采取了更多的债务，从而被迫偏离了他们偏好的杠杆作用水平，这种现象显示了一种支付债务的优先权，从而可以返回到可察觉的更加可接受的债务与产权的混合方式(Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1990)。
放松了由Modigliani和米勒明确或含蓄地提出的假设，并利用各种各样的当前的理论假说, 这项研究试图为啄食顺序假说提供合理的背景,就像Baskin (1989)提出的评论：总是“经验动机的”，但是“缺少强制合理的理论证明”。
我们必须从企业是“契约与个人之间的联结”这一基本假设开始研究，这样外部来源的政策制定可以由公司通过各种力量的贸易过程获得，这是依赖于契约关系的。
此外，虽然公司倾向于进行直接的股权和债务来为自己筹集资金，他们的资产负债表可能包括其他类型的意外索赔。
这项研究还假设企业的资金来源来自两个根本财源—债务和股权。
这个假定是由Fama 和Jensen (1982)提出的。
作者的讨论是通过把公司资金索取人分为两类：相对的低风险债务，与之相反的是相对的高风险产权。
这个被用来监视请诉人的合同履行程度的费用，可以从债务囤户到股东的单程监视中减少。
假使上述假定，作为设法满足它为新投资提供经费的欲望，一个理智的公司必须在各种各样的诱因中进行交易，这种现象已经在MM定理1 的发展中脱离开来了。
一些诱因倾向于主张提高债务的使用，而其他诱因则更偏好提高股权的使用。
更特别的是，由于公司必须面对资金的需要，以下详述的7种诱因被假定是对公司资金来源的决定有重大影响：1．债务的税收鼓励Modigliani 和 Miller (1963)在他们原始的模型上提出了修正。
在这个资本结构模型的新理论中，他们把企业所得税的影响引入到原来的分析之中。
现在假定其他条件仍然没有改变，负债公司的价值V是债券市场价值β的函数，随着Lβ的最大化V也不断增大。
理论上，当企业100%债务融资时，负债公司的市场L价值达到最大，这也意味着企业融资时可以使用尽可能多的债务融资。
在上述模型中，Miller（1977）引入了除公司税外的个人所得税，试图放宽Modligiani-Miller的假设，但是他仍然假定所有的公司具有相同有效的税率。
他表明在债券上相对更高的个人所得税意味着由公司支付的税前利率必须比债券持有人必须支付的利润收入高，否则没有人会想去持有债券。
所以在均衡状态下（即企业免税优惠的纳税节约高于债权投资者的纳税损失），举债投资对公司的好处是微乎其微的。
针对不同的企业间存在不完全相同的边际税率，并且税盾项目与利润津贴对资产负债表的冲击力不一样，DeAngelo 和 Masulis (1980)进一步扩大Miller 的工作。
就资本结构而论，DeAngelo 和 Masulis的讨论有两种涵义。
首先，在均衡状态下，企业作为借方，如果他比少量的企业有高税收率，由于他们支付的是低的税前利率，则企业将从杠杆作用中获利。
作者把这从杠杆作用中获得的直接的利益称为“生产商的节余”。
而且某些资产负债表项目，譬如贬值，津贴透支和投资税款信托实际上都是非现金费用。
因此，他们提供非债务税盾。
DeAngelo 和 Masulis预言，企业的债务水平对它的有效税率有积极关系，并且对相当数量的可利用的非债务税盾有消极的关系。
上述关于资本结构与企业价值理论的发展可以比喻为钟摆的摆动。
它反映了关于资本结构的不稳定性问题。
企业的价值也许是也许不是他的资本结构在起作用，然而如果Modigliani –Miller和DeAngelo –Masulis是正确的，则企业的价值是依赖于资本结构的，并且税收补贴会带来更有价值的产权。
2．破产成本缓和激励破产成本指伴随着破产和财政危机而产生的一种特定花费。
Baxter (1967)大概是第一个提出与破产相关的“坏帐损失”会使破产企业的价值小于预期经营现金流的贴现值，这个事实可以解释最优资本结构的存在。
Stiglitz (1969)在一篇著作里支持了这一关于破产成本的评论。
他表示，即使在一个完善的市场其它情况仍然保持的环境下，充足地大破产成本能显著降低企业举债融资的动机。
Kraus 、 Litzenberger (1973), 和Kim (1978)对这一可能性进行了更进一步的支持和研究。
3．源于不对称信息的信号激励作为熟知公司是否赢利的真实信息的内部人，经理人了解公司预期的现金流动，但是外部投资者必须通过自己观察公司赢利的输出信息来评价公司的市场价值，而且公司赢利风险对外部投资者来说是未知的。
他们被迫依赖喧闹的信号譬如公司的杠杆作用水平来确定他们的投资风险。
因此公司可以通过某些方式改变外部投资者的观念，如改变对整个市场期望的未来远景这一清晰信号。
就如Ross (1977)讨论的，企业把发行越多的债务作为企业价值高的一个信号，这样可以把企业价值低的公司区分开。
此外，除非信号的代价太高以致不能被模仿，并且企业的经理有足够的动机去讲述关于公司未来的真实期望，否则在任何债务水平下，低质量公司模仿高质量的企业，伪装成高质量企业将带来更高期望破产成本。
换句话说，我们可以预料到，公司大体上倾向于采取能帮助把高质量企业区分开，同时使低质量企业伪装成高质量企业的举债融资。
4．源于不对称信息的投资不足和过度投资的缓和激励Myers和Majluf(1984)意识到由于外部投资者比经理人和当前股东更不熟悉公司的状况，因此在市场中，对于公司价值可能其价格与实际上并不相符。