灾难性的违约和贷款机构的信用风险外文翻译

灾难性的违约和贷款机构的信用风险外文翻译外文题目: Catastrophic Default and CreditRisk for Lending Institutions出处:Journal of Financial Services Research作者: JAMES B. KAU and DONALD C. KEENAN原文:Catastrophic Default and Credit Risk for Lending InstitutionsIIntroductionCredit risk for a mortgage lender comes into play only when mortgage insurance is absent or inadequate. Mortgage insurance, in fact, insures lenders against most ordinary default: that is, default induced by movements in the overall market for housing although, as will be seen, for entirely explicable reasons, less of this ordinary default is insured than might be supposed. However, private mortgage insurance typically excludes coverage of the truly catastrophic default resulting from such acts of God as the fires, floods, earthquakes, and hurricanes, increasingly familiar in the United States in recent yearsOften, these events affect a substantial portion of the houses within a particular neighborhood or region; and if disaster insurance or government aid is inadequate or nonexistent, default is liable to occur. The most prominent example of a natural disaster leadingto substantial default has been the 1994 Northridge California earthquake, although the 1971 San Fernando earthquake also is of note. Many experts foresee an earthquake similar in magnitude to the 1906 SanFrancisco earthquake occurring in California within the next 20 to 30 years, which may be expected to result in tens of thousands of defaults. Exactly this sort of event, rare but of great magnitude, most lenders would want to insure against but cannot An argument can be made that, if mortgages were resold and sufficiently redistributed, catastrophic default would be of consequence only to the extent that it contributed to the expected cost of defaultHowever, the same reasoning might be applied to ordinary default and so, with such diversification, theentire rationale for mortgage insurance of any kind would disappear. Therefore, the continual expansion of the private mortgage insurance industry speaks against this argument. Indeed, the sad experience of the 1980s Texas real estate bust and the subsequent S&L crisis has amply demonstrated that numerous lending institutions continue to be significantly exposed to catastrophic events of a local character. Given the apparent inability or unwillingness of lenders to correctly value and diversify away their credit risk, there should remain an interest on their part, as well as on the part of researchers, in gaining a firm understanding not only of the expected costs of a mortgage lender’s liability but of the entire distribution of these possible liabilities This paper takes the now widely acceptedview that mortgages are just another financial contract and, so, can be valued by aoptions-pricing methodology. The decision to default is an option available to the borrower and occurs exactly when it is in the borrower’s financial interests. Since valuation drives such models, wenecessarily obtain the market values of default, mortgage insurance, and the lender’s liability that any research adopting the option pricing methodology naturally would report. However,for the reasons just indicated, more insight is to be gained by going beyond these aggregate market valuations and, in a novel manner, generating the distributionsof events that average up to the market cost of the lender’s liability. This involves doing probability calculations not present in the usual valuation calculations of options pricing, although since the correct valuation of a mortgage’s v alue involves endogenously determining the precise circumstances under which a borrower will or won’t default,this information necessarily is available and needs only to be extracted in the course of valuing the mortgage. The procedure for doing so is explained in section II, followed in section III by an analysis of numerical results obtained for a sample mortgage subject to a small chance of a major catastrophic event.II. The modelAThe economic environment with catastrophesWhile we mention all key aspects of the model, considerations ofspace require that we spend less time on features of a mortgage,such as, for example, prepayment, that bear only indirectly on ourcentral concern, catastrophic default. For a more leisurely discussionof the more .The key elements of any fixed rate mortgage FRM are amortization of the loan, together with the options to prepay or default. The first two features are particularly sensitive to the term structure,while the decision to default is particularly dependent on the value of the house, so that we choose the evolving spot interest rate and the house price to represent the uncertain economic environment. In the most conventional of fashions Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross, 1985,the evolution of interest rates is assumed to obey a mean-reverting stochastic process.The regular diffusion portion of the house price also is assumed tobe of the most standard of forms, mainly a proportional-growth lognormal process Merton, 1973.However, to represent the arrival of catastrophic events, ones that occur beyond typical movements in house prices, we also append on a Poisson process Merton, 1976; Cox and Ross, 1976; Jones, 1984; Bates, 1991. This yields a jump-diffusion process of the form.BMortgage valuation with catastrophesAs indicated, the cost of a mortgage to the borrower can be considered the sum of an amortizing loan a call option to prepay, and a default option .they are influenced only by changes in the termstructureandthe house price, any derivative asset such as the mortgage and its components, can be valued by solving this partial differential equation.without the terms containing the Poisson parameter, we have theusual valuation equation for a derivative asset being driven by regular diffusion processes. In addition, however, over any small moment of time, the asset ceases to be of value and jumps down to value; Thecatastrophic payoff varies from asset to asset, but can be figured out easily for any of the mortgages components from the observation that,for the entire mortgage varies from asset to asset, but can be figured out easily for any of the mortgages components from the observation。

合集下载

商业银行风险管理中英文对照外文翻译文献

商业银行风险管理中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)“RISK MANAGEMENT IN COMMERCIAL BANKS”(A CASE STUDY OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR BANKS) - ABSTRACT ONLY1. PREAMBLE:1.1 Risk Management:The future of banking will undoubtedly rest on risk management dynamics. Only those banks that have efficient risk management system will survive in the market in the long run. The effective management of credit risk is a critical component of comprehensive risk management essential for long-term success of a banking institution. Credit risk is the oldest and biggest risk that bank, by virtue of its very nature of business, inherits. This has however, acquired a greater significance in the recent past for various reasons. Foremost among them is the wind of economic liberalization that is blowing across the globe. India is no exception to this swing towards market driven economy. Competition from within and outside the country has intensified. This has resulted in multiplicity of risks both in number and volume resulting in volatile markets. A precursor to successful management of credit risk is a clear understanding about risks involved in lending, quantifications of risks within each item of the portfolio and reaching a conclusion as to the likely composite credit risk profile of a bank.The corner stone of credit risk management is the establishment of a framework that defines corporate priorities, loan approval process, credit risk rating system, risk-adjusted pricing system, loan-review mechanism and comprehensive reporting system.1.2 Significance of the study:The fundamental business of lending has brought trouble to individual banks and entire banking system. It is, therefore, imperative that the banks are adequate systems for credit assessment of individual projects and evaluating risk associated therewith as well as the industry as a whole. Generally, Banks in India evaluate a proposal through the traditional tools of project financing, computing maximum permissible limits, assessing management capabilities and prescribing a ceiling for an industry exposure. As banks move in to a new high powered world of financial operations and trading, with new risks, the need is felt for more sophisticated and versatile instruments for risk assessment, monitoring and controlling risk exposures. It is, therefore, time that banks managements equip themselves fully to grapple with the demands of creating tools and systems capable of assessing, monitoring and controlling risk exposures in a more scientific manner.Credit Risk, that is, default by the borrower to repay lent money, remains the most important risk to manage till date. The predominance of credit risk is even reflected in the composition of economic capital, which banks are required to keep a side for protection against various risks. According to one estimate, Credit Risk takes about 70% and 30%remaining is shared between the other two primary risks, namely Market risk (change in the market price and operational risk i.e., failure of internal controls, etc.). Quality borrowers (Tier-I borrowers) were able to access the capital market directly without going through the debt route. Hence, the credit route is now more open to lesser mortals (Tier-II borrowers).With margin levels going down, banks are unable to absorb the level of loan losses. There has been very little effort to develop a method where risks could be identified and measured. Most of the banks have developed internal rating systems for their borrowers, but there hasbeen very little study to compare such ratings with the final asset classification and also to fine-tune the rating system. Also risks peculiar to each industry are not identified and evaluated openly. Data collection is regular driven. Data on industry-wise, region-wise lending, industry-wise rehabilitated loan, can provide an insight into the future course to be adopted.Better and effective strategic credit risk management process is a better way to Manage portfolio credit risk. The process provides a framework to ensure consistency between strategy and implementation that reduces potential volatility in earnings and maximize shareholders wealth. Beyond and over riding the specifics of risk modeling issues, the challenge is moving towards improved credit risk management lies in addressing banks’readiness and openness to accept change to a more transparent system, to rapidly metamorphosing markets, to more effective and efficient ways of operating and to meet market requirements and increased answerability to stake holders.There is a need for Strategic approach to Credit Risk Management (CRM) in Indian Commercial Banks, particularly in view of;(1) Higher NPAs level in comparison with global benchmark(2) RBI’ s stipulation about dividend distribution by the banks(3) Revised NPAs level and CAR norms(4) New Basel Capital Accord (Basel –II) revolutionAccording to the study conducted by ICRA Limited, the gross NPAs as a proportion of total advances for Indian Banks was 9.40 percent for financial year 2003 and 10.60 percent for financial year 20021. The value of the gross NPAs as ratio for financial year 2003 for the global benchmark banks was as low as 2.26 percent. Net NPAs as a proportion of net advances of Indian banks was 4.33 percent for financial year 2003 and 5.39 percent for financial year 2002. As against this, the value of net NPAs ratio for financial year 2003 for the global benchmark banks was 0.37 percent. Further, it was found that, the total advances of the banking sector to the commercial and agricultural sectors stood at Rs.8,00,000 crore. Of this, Rs.75,000 crore, or 9.40 percent of the total advances is bad and doubtful debt. The size of the NPAs portfolio in the Indian banking industry is close to Rs.1,00,000 crore which is around 6 percent of India’ s GDP2.The RBI has recently announced that the banks should not pay dividends at more than 33.33 percent of their net profit. It has further provided that the banks having NPA levels less than 3 percent and having Capital Adequacy Reserve Ratio (CARR) of more than 11 percent for the last two years will only be eligible to declare dividends without the permission from RBI3. This step is for strengthening the balance sheet of all the banks in the country. The banks should provide sufficient provisions from their profits so as to bring down the net NPAs level to 3 percent of their advances.NPAs are the primary indicators of credit risk. Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) is another measure of credit risk. CAR is supposed to act as a buffer against credit loss, which isset at 9 percent under the RBI stipulation4. With a view to moving towards International best practices and to ensure greater transparency, it has been decided to adopt the ’ 90 days’ ‘ over due’ norm for identification of NPAs from the year ending March 31, 2004.The New Basel Capital Accord is scheduled to be implemented by the end of 2006. All the banking supervisors may have to join the Accord. Even the domestic banks in addition to internationally active banks may have to conform to the Accord principles in the coming decades. The RBI as the regulator of the Indian banking industry has shown keen interest in strengthening the system, and the individual banks have responded in good measure in orienting themselves towards global best practices.1.3 Credit Risk Management(CRM) dynamics:The world over, credit risk has proved to be the most critical of all risks faced by a banking institution. A study of bank failures in New England found that, of the 62 banks in existence before 1984, which failed from 1989 to 1992, in 58 cases it was observed that loans and advances were not being repaid in time 5 . This signifies the role of credit risk management and therefore it forms the basis of present research analysis.Researchers and risk management practitioners have constantly tried to improve on current techniques and in recent years, enormous strides have been made in the art and science of credit risk measurement and management6. Much of the progress in this field has resulted form the limitations of traditional approaches to credit risk management and with the current Bank for International Settlement’ (BIS) regulatory model. Even in banks which regularly fine-tune credit policies and streamline credit processes, it is a real challenge for credit risk managers to correctly identify pockets of risk concentration, quantify extent of risk carried, identify opportunities for diversification and balance the risk-return trade-off in their credit portfolio.The two distinct dimensions of credit risk management can readily be identified as preventive measures and curative measures. Preventive measures include risk assessment, risk measurement and risk pricing, early warning system to pick early signals of future defaults and better credit portfolio diversification. The curative measures, on the other hand, aim at minimizing post-sanction loan losses through such steps as securitization, derivative trading, risk sharing, legal enforcement etc. It is widely believed that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Therefore, the focus of the study is on preventive measures in tune with the norms prescribed by New Basel Capital Accord.The study also intends to throw some light on the two most significant developments impacting the fundamentals of credit risk management practices of banking industry – New Basel Capital Accord and Risk Based Supervision. Apart from highlighting the salient features of credit risk management prescriptions under New Basel Accord, attempts are made to codify the response of Indian banking professionals to various proposals under the accord. Similarly, RBI proposed Risk Based Supervision (RBS) is examined to capture its direction and implementation problems。

商业银行信贷风险管理外文文献翻译中文3000多字

商业银行信贷风险管理外文文献翻译中文3000多字Credit risk management is a XXX business。

financing ns。

payment and settlement。

and other XXX。

credit XXX risk factor for commercial banks。

XXX such as life risk and uncertainty.Effective credit risk management is essential for commercial banks to minimize the impact of credit losses。

This involves identifying and assessing potential risks。

XXX strategies。

XXX。

By doing so。

commercial banks XXX the potential for credit losses.One of the key components of credit risk management iscredit analysis。

This involves evaluating the orthiness of borrowers to determine the likelihood of default。

Credit analysis XXX's financial history。

credit score。

collateral。

XXX credit analysis。

commercial banks can make informed lending ns and minimize the risk of default.Another important aspect of credit risk management is credit XXX can also help commercial banks XXX.In n。

不良贷款管理中英文对照外文翻译文献

不良贷款管理中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)Non-performing Loans Management and RecoveryWilliam J. Bauman and Alan S. BlinderAbstractWith the deepening of China's economic system reform development and continuous improvement of the system of the market economy, banks ' lending business becomes completely open to individuals, personal loans of business growing, continues to expand the scope of business, especially the development of individual housing loan more quickly. Personal housing loan business in China at the time of its development, there are bad credit risks as well as the competitive situation is not optimistic, to a certain extent, hamper the development of individual housing loans, to sustainable development, research management must be strengthened on a number of issues. This article from the current development status of individual housing loan business to start, pointed out that because of the existing problems as well as problems and focus on how to develop personal housing loan bad credit risk reduction, foreign experiences and lessons learned, and thoughts and countermeasures for management, to promote the healthy and rapid development of the business.Key words:Housing loans to individuals; Bad credit risks; present situation; problem; Countermeasure1. IntroductionUnder the five-category loan classification, substandard, doubtful and loss loans are defined as non-performing loans. Because the reasons behind non-performing loans formation are different, credit associates must take effective measures to manage, recover and dispose of these parts of asset according to their different characteristics. The bank should first find out the responsibilities of the guarantor and dispose of the security in time. Only when they confirm that the guarantor has lost the guarantee abilities and the security is not sufficient to pay off the loan, can they begin to dispose of the non-performing loans.2. ReasonsThere are many reasons why banks have poorly performing loan portfolios. Irrespective of these causes, banks have an obligation to shareholders, depositors and creditors to maximize cash flow from assets, the most troublesome aspect of which has been the poor record of banks in recovering loans. It is this factor that has contributed the most to bank insolvency, and liquidity constraints.There are several complementary options available to banks to restructure problem loans and portfolios, including:•Exercise of collateral (liens against property, inventories) through judicial or extra-judicial means.•Out-of-court settlement that may focus exclusively on debt negotiation, restructuring and repayment, or lead to the financial, physical and operational restructuring of the enterprise.•Bankruptcy/liquidation procedures through formal court proceedings. This may involve liquidation, reorganization or privatization of an enterprise to enforce partial or total loan repayment.(Besides the bank itself, sometimes government also leads a restructuring program to help the bank to solve the problem of NPL in order to stabilize the banking industry or the whole economy, for example, Asset Management Company (AMC), a special purpose company, buys or exchanges NPL from bank and disposes of them).3. Work-Out UnitWith aggregate loan portfolios universally troubled by delinquencies and defaults, some banks have opted to develop work-out units to improve loan portfolio quality. When work-out units are established, they are usually set up to deal with most of a bank's problem loans, effectively sectioning off non-performing loans from the broader bank portfolio of performing loans. The benefits expected from work-out units include;•Concentrated focus on the recovery of problem loans;•More developed banking expertise and credit risk evaluation skills;•Improved internal bank system (early warning systems, collateral requirements, credit information needs).Work-out units can make a significant difference in restructuring loan portfolios, particularly when supported by effective technical assistance.4.Loan Restructuring and Loan "Rollover"Case-by-case loan restructuring is common in market-oriented economies, particularlywhen borrowers are unable to meet the original terms of the loan agreement due to external factors. These restructuring invariably changes in the amount, terms and /or schedule of interest rates, principal repayment, and collateral values. Loan covenants ( ratios, report requirements) often change to facilitate compliance. In some cases, radical measures such as replacing management are involved.This approach is similar to what work-out units attempt to do: recover portions of loan portfolios which have deteriorated and are non-performing. However, workout units are often organized on the basis of sector, location or bank exposure. Case-by-case loan restructuring is conducted on an individualized basis. The benefits of individual case-by-case loan restructurings include:•Reinforcement of the bank-client relationship.•Retention of the loan by the bank on its balance sheet, even if provisions are made for possible losses.•Preservation of the firm's relations with other parties (trade creditors, other banks, buyers, employees), thereby maintaining its reputation without embarrassing and costly bankruptcy / liquidation procedures.As with debt-equity swaps, the risk to the bank is that it is overly optimistic about prospects, and that additional resources are committed to the borrower adding to bank losses and reduced loan able funds at a future date. This has occurred frequently in transition economies (such as China, East European countries, former Soviet Union).In transition economy banks, the closest approximation to the Western loan restructuring has been the loan "rollover" which has been a common practice. Rollovers generally involve the following two techniques:•Simple rollover of principal on/before the due date, with the enterprise meeting interest obligations.•Rollover of principal on/before due date, with interest added back to the principal amount (“interest capitalization").The first technique is legitimate and rational unless the enterprise is unable to repay principal, and likely to remain impaired in the future. The second technique often reflects a troubled loan and enterprise, and has been typically practiced in transition economy banking systems. Further more, the latter technique has been accompanied by accounting treatment which mistakenly recognizes these assets as performing loans, artificially inflating income statements and balance sheet book values.5. Debt-equity Swaps and Loan Sales / Asset SwapDebt-equity swap results in bank ownership of enterprises occur with differing frequencies in different countries. In some countries, bank ownership of enterprises is common (German interlocking directorates), while in other countries it is strictly regulated (USA) or strictly prohibited (In China, debt-equity swap is done through asset management company). By swapping NPL for equity, banks can exercise more directcontrol/supervision over enterprise management while the enterprise benefits from increased debt capacity. The risk to bank is excess exposure to a risky investment which may jeopardize deposit safety and bank capital, and demand scarce management time and resources.Debt-equity swap represents nascent venture capital operation. Perhaps only one in 10 of these investments may succeed, but this should be sufficient to cover the risk of the other nine losing investment. Given existing low book values and the currently thin market that is likely to improve in the coming years, banks are prudent to allocate a small percentage of assets to enterprises they believe will generate significant profit at a later date. At that point, banks can sell their shares, and reap significant profit to bolster capital. All of this makes more sense given the current downside risk, which is limited, as most of these transactions are paper transactions that do not further impair bank liquidity.But bank equity swap may be indicative of the failure of banks in some countries to properly define bank's roles as financial intermediaries, streamline their operations, specialize in a few key areas within the limit of their current managerial and staffing capabilities, write down their assets to more accurate values, and progress toward a more stable and prudently managed system devoid of excess risk. Investment in losing enterprises raises the risk of future liquidity being drained to prop up these enterprises in the hope of eventual profitability, which puts depositors and shareholders at risk.In addition to debt-equity swaps, loan sales swaps are an option that could be used to restructure bank balance sheets. However, this option has not been commonly found in transition economy due to absence of secondary market development.6. Securitization of Non-performing LoanNon-performing loan securitization is a pooling of non-performing loans packaged and issued as securities to investors through arrangements of legal structure, cash flow, and credit rating mechanisms. Non-performing Loans are also known as bad loans, overdue loans, receivables under collection, and loans still under normal payment statuses, but with circulating bonds rated lower than CCC level. During the securitization period, the originator (seller) will select the most ideal portfolio based on a set of eligibility criteria, such as debtors' locations, credit period, currency, and overdue ratings from all available non-performing loans.After the screening process, bank will proceed with the risk assessment, cash flow simulation and credit tranche. The securities are then offered to investors after confirmation from credit rating agencies and regulatory approval obtained. The asset management agency is particularly important to a non-performing loan securitization since the asset management agency's expertise is instrumental to increasing collection rates of these non-performing loans. Investors' risks are minimized through credit enhancement techniques; default risks, prepayment risks, etc. are also emphasized to evaluate the risk profile of non-performing loans.7. In-court Bankruptcy / Liquidation ProceedingsResorting to legal procedures to collect the repayment of non-performing loans is the last defense line. In practice, banks should grasp the timing of litigation. Because blind lawsuits will involve banks' time, energy, money and people. In addition, they could have negative impact on the relationship between banks and their clients.Firstly, before litigation, banks should investigate the borrowers' income resources and asset categories and prevent them from hiding or transferring asset in this period of time. Banks can apply to the court for asset preservation. Secondly, banks should try best to correct the deficiencies of credit documents and win themselves advantageous conditions in litigation. Thirdly, banks should also prepare themselves for the results of reconciliation or failure.Bankruptcy/liquidation is an effective complement to out-of-cnurt approaches, and serves as a last stage of debt collection, providing creditors with control over debtors in financial distress and prompting their restructuring. For this reason, many countries (transition economies) have developed and are seeking to expand the use of formal bankruptcy to broaden the array of dispute resolution mechanisms, provide banks with long needed recourse, and instill greater financial discipline on enterprises.8. Exercise of CollateralWhen a debt matures or is going to mature and the debtor has encountered serious operation difficulties, the debtor cannot repay the loan in cash and the guarantor cannot repay the loan in cash either. Maybe after negotiation, the two parties (the bank and the borrower) or three parties (the bank, the borrower and the guarantor) can reach a consensus. In line with the consensus or the ruling by the court, the debtor or the guarantor can make in-kind repayment of debts, which is one of the important means to dispose of non-performing loans.9. Writing-off Bad LoansIn accordance with relevant state rules and regulation, if the principal of a loan is identified as unrecoverable, the bad loan can be written off. Writing-off of bad loans is the internal activity of a bank. So the bank still enjoys the recourse right and should continue to demand the repayment of the fund.10. ConclusionWere analyzed by the non-performing loans management recycling. Bad credit risk management, there are still many problems to be solved, how the lending business in the international financial place needs to be further research and continue to explore. In short,the management of non-performing loans of China's economic development has made a significant contribution, but there are still shortcomings in their own system, the external competitive environment in the development of the personal loan there are many adverse, which requires countries to fully understand individual housing loans an important role on the basis of, for the banks internal management and external risk management and reasonable planning to ongoing development. Personal loans also have to recognize their own position and where to adopt appropriate strategies and market positioning, innovation, adjustment, reform, focusing on risk management in order to more rapidly grow.ReferencesSteven Husted,Michael Melvin, International Economics [M], (the fifth edition), Higher Education Press, 2002Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Maksimovic, V. (2005). Financial and legal constraints to growth: Does firm size matter? The Journal of Finance, 60, 137–177.Peng, Y. (2004). Kinship networks and entrepreneurs in China's transitional economy. American Journal of Sociology, 109,1045–1074Qian, Y. (2000). The process of China’s market transition (1978–1998):The evolutionary, historical, and comparative perspectives. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 156, 151–171.Shane, S., & Cable, D. (2002). Network ties, reputation, and the financing of new ventures. Management Science, 48, 364–381.Newton, K. (2001). Trust, social capital, civil society, and democracy.International Political Science Review, 22, 201–214.Liu, Z. (2003). The economic impact and determinants of investment in human and political capital in China. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 51, 823–850. Birner, R., & Witter, H. (2003). Using social capital to create politicalcapital. In The commons in the New Millennium: Challenges andadaptation (pp. 291–334). Cambridge and London: MIT Press.不良贷款的管理和回收威廉J鲍姆，阿伦S布林德摘要随着我国金融体系建设的进一步发展和市场体制的迅速完善，银行的贷款业务逐渐向个人完全展开，个人贷款的业务种类不断增多，业务范围持续扩大，特别是个人住房贷款业务的发展更为迅猛。

信用担保机构问题研究外文文献翻译最新译文

文献出处：Worthington C. The research of small and medium-sized enterprise credit guarantee agency [J]. International Journal of Business and Management, 2015, 8(5): 35-45.原文The research of small and medium-sized enterprise credit guarantee agencyWorthington CAbstractIntroduced in the process of small and medium-sized enterprise financing, credit guarantee, mortgage can weaken the small and medium-sized enterprises, credit records are congruent caused by financing obstacles, and then improve the small and medium-sized enterprise's credit rating, share the loan risk of financial institutions. In practice, the credit guarantee is also proved to be one of the effective means of government support for the development of small and medium-sized enterprises. Sme credit guarantee institutions in system, management and environment appear a series of problems, and the nature of these problems is small and medium-sized enterprise credit guarantee institutions of sustainable management ability. But few scholars from the view point of sustainable management of small and medium-sized enterprise development of guarantee agencies. So the thesis on the characteristics of small business credit guarantee institutions, influence factors, ability evaluation and path selection are discussed in this paper.Keywords: Credit guarantee institutions; Risk management; Sustainable management1 IntroductionThe role of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMES) in economic and social general has the following aspects: first, the small and medium-sized enterprises to absorb a large number of employment, to realize social full employment huge; Second, the small and medium-sized enterprises in promoting economic growth effect can not be ignored; Third, the small and medium-sized enterprises is the main force of technology innovation; Finally, the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMES) play the role of the unique social stabilizer. Small and medium-sized enterprises in socialproductivity growth, in terms of access to technology and the contribution of technology application, has become the most active in the system of market economy, the most potential enterprise groups. However, in the process of rapid development of small and medium-sized enterprises are faced with the difficult, especially since 2008 is affected by the global financial crisis, financing difficulties more become a common obstacles in the development of small and medium-sized enterprises. The importance of small and medium-sized enterprises has been generally recognized by the world, governments have taken various measures to support the development of small and medium-sized enterprises. At present, the government to support the development of small and medium-sized enterprises at home and abroad practice is the implementation of small and medium-sized enterprises credit guarantee system (project or program).Through the government guidance, a combination of market mechanism and macro-control to establish small and medium-sized enterprises credit guarantee system, and can pass on, lower part of the bank risk, improve the enthusiasm of bank financing for small and medium enterprises, improve the financing environment of small and medium-sized enterprises.2 Literature reviewAlvaro Ruiz (2010) by analyzing the national credit guarantees scheme that although their characteristics and different types, the reason of its existence is the same: to alleviate the difficulty in small and medium-sized enterprises in financing, while ensuring that reduce the bank's loan losses. Him through the comparative analysis of the characteristics of different credit guarantee project case and guarantee the problem of asymmetric information, find out the theoretical foundation of the credit guarantee program, at the same time, for those who either for or against the two researchers provides a new thinking of the plan.Haines, Canada, the United States, were comparatively studied, and the British government's small and medium-sized enterprise credit guarantee project, analysis the default cost and guarantees the project for the benefits of small and medium-sized enterprises; they think that the welfare of the loan guarantee project has a positive effect. Lee (2002) and its background of Southeast Asia financial crisis, analyzes theguarantee amplification mechanism of financial crisis on developing countries. Due to the development of China's household with high government subsidies for high investment and high growth, the growth of the real estate and the price level is often at a higher level, this makes the economy is sensitive to fluctuations in reverse. And reverse wave once appear, in under the action of amplification mechanism, would trigger assets shrink. Sharply and collateral value, the desired secured loan ratio increased rapidly, leading to foreign investment withdraw loans, the economic crisis.Marc and Nick (2009) through the study, driven by the government loan guarantee program in the early 80 s to 90 s of the 20th century was successful, greatly solve the financing problem of small and medium-sized enterprises. Nigrini and Andrie in the study also concluded that a credit guarantee plan although there is a problem, but for the government is still an effective way to reduce the risk of bank lending, and you can use this way to force them to better serve small and medium-sized enterprises.Kang and Almas (2008) through to the "credit guarantee policy impact on South Korea's small and medium-sized enterprise survival and development of" the research suggests that in general, often use credit guarantee makes effective way, and you can use this way to force them to better serve small and medium-sized enterprises to the insured enterprises can achieve good results. As long as the credit guarantee system of reasonable design is based on its national conditions, to solve the difficulty of a country's small and medium-sized enterprise financing credit guarantee can play effective role. As countries in practice, there exists some well-run credit guarantee system, the majority in favor of the view of scholars.To sum up, research mainly from the financing guarantee role in solving the problem of incentive conflict, from the perspective of debt contract, etc, in order to bank financing guarantee problem for mediation. The object of study is mostly mortgage problems, study of credit guarantee. Due to the small and medium-sized enterprise financing problem is mainly set by the government guarantee program, the concrete execution policy guarantee agencies to solve, the commercial guarantee agencies mainly engaged in the financing guarantee business, mutual guaranteeinstitutions is less, which leads to the comparative study of three kinds of guarantee agencies dedicated is less.3 Related theoretical analysis3.1 The asymmetric information theoryClassical economics theory, information symmetry can ensure the price on the market spontaneous adjustment mechanism, financial markets, too. According to the new Keynesian view, due to the unbalance of market information distribution, the achievement of market equilibrium can only be based on the balance of the incomplete information, And points out that because of the spread of information, and receiving is going to cost, plus the limitations of market information system itself and the interference of market participants, these factors have led to the market information is not always effective. In addition, the specialization and division of labor, making the different areas of the economy of the participants on the master information in a different position, because the ability of obtaining information is different between the economic subject and information are not equal. In reality, capital supply and demand both sides of the distribution is often in a state of asymmetric information. In the credit markets, borrowers due to better understand their own reimbursement ability and the risk of project investment, so as to have more information, and lenders are often an information disadvantage. At this time, with the introduction of a third party credit, set up the bridge of information communication, is a way to solve this problem. Credit guarantee agencies to use their information processing and further capital demanders of advantage, can effective questions don't make the right guarantee enterprise, this process also for bank hoof pick the suitable borrowers; Passed the available information about borrowers from the bank, the realization of the creditor's rights guarantee of bank. This process at the same time, improve enterprise credit guarantee agencies corresponding fee, belong to a special kind of credit intermediary service, its produce to a certain extent, information asymmetry problem between fixed borrowing.3.2 The financial intermediary theoryNew financial intermediation theory mainly from the perspective of informationeconomics and transaction cost, the financial intermediary services provided, and the function are analyzed. As the market transaction cost and information cost factors such as the existence of in information acquisition and transaction supervision has a comparative advantage in aspects of financial intermediation is able to produce. Financial intermediation is using its specialization, can achieve economies of scale and scope economy bring beneficial effect, achieve the result of the lower transaction costs; And transaction cost generated from a variety of reasons, including information asymmetry is one of them, the main brought to collect information, supervision and so on various aspects of the cost. Direction of credit guarantee institutions as a third party guarantee for debt creditors to provide credit guarantee, guarantee borrowers would fulfill the responsibility and obligation of contract or other agreement. In the process of financing guarantee business, credit guarantee institutions will be the demand side of funds for credit assessment, using their own professional advantages, through to the information collection and processing, select suitable guarantor. At the same time, the lenders needed to provide your own reference. As a kind of credit intermediary, the existence of credit guarantees to promote the deal.3.3 Risk shifting theoryEconomic activity because of the existence of various uncertainty factors in the economic activity participation main body often face all kinds of uncertainty in the market brings the risk of loss, and this kind of risk is objective existence. In order to control and transfer the risk, economic subject to explore every avenue, hope to be able to put manageable and manage risk, the risk transfer is one of them. Because the risk is objective existence, so the economic subject consciously will risky activities in advance or possible consequences of risk are transferred to other economic subject, through the risk to pass on that might reduce their losses. But that is just convert the risk takers, and did not completely eliminate risk. In the credit guarantee institutions to provide guarantees for bank loans, in the original simple relationship of creditor's rights debt, because of the guaranty contract concluded, introduced the third party guarantor, as sub prime borrowers share the credit risk of the bank. Banks outside of the main debt contract, and obtain the guarantee agencies to compensate the guaranteeof the debt, debt default risk and rearranged distribution between them. Therefore, after the introduction of credit guarantee, financial institutions lending risk transfer, the original risk according to the agreement of guaranty contract ratio between them from the distribution; And guarantee agencies as a specialized management agencies, can further through professional internal control and risk management to diversify its business risk.3.4 Market failure theoryThe existence of information asymmetry and market transaction cost, could affect the play of the role of the market, resulting in the allocation of resources appear defects. Search guarantee object and guarantee agencies to provide credit guarantee is the process of financial resource allocation process. Guarantee agencies with its special ability in information collection, information processing, can choose the suitable guarantees, reduced lending both sides information asymmetry problem, dredge the blocked trade channel. In this process, the credit guarantee institutions not only reflects the role of credit enhancement, and is the key to guarantee object through its further hoof pick, don't to guide credit supply towards to the direction of optimizing the allocation of financial resources, and finally promote the improvement of the social economic benefits.译文中小企业信用担保机构问题研究Worthington C摘要在中小企业融资过程中，引入信用担保，可以弱化中小企业抵押不足、信用记录不全等造成的融资障碍，进而提高中小企业的信用等级，分担金融机构的贷款风险。

信用风险和信贷衍生产品在银行【外文翻译】

外文翻译原文Credit Risk and Credit Derivatives in BankingMaterial Source: http://www.wiwi.uni-augsburg.de/vwl/institut/paper/228.pdfAuthor：Udo BrollUsing the industrial economics approach to the microeconomics of banking we analyze a large bank under credit risk. Our aim is to study how a risky loan portfolio aﬀects optimal bank behavior in the loan and deposit markets, when credit derivatives to hedge credit risk are available. We examine hedging without and with basis risk. In the absence of basis risk the usual separation result is conﬁrmed. In case of basis risk, however, we ﬁnd a weaker notion of separation.1 IntroductionCredit risk is one of the oldest and most important forms of risk faced by banks as ﬁnancial intermediaries. The risk of borrower default —on interest and/or principal —carries the potential of wiping out enough of a bank’s capital to force it into bankruptcy. Managing this kind of risk through selecting and monitoring borrowers and through creating a diversiﬁed loan portfolio has always been one of the predominant challenges in running a bank.Since the 1980s a number of new risk sharing markets and ﬁnancial instruments have become available which make credit risk more manageable (see Neal, and Bank for International Settlements, 2001). Banks can pool assets with credit risk and sell parts of the pool. This asset securitization or creation of asset backed securities has seen considerable growth in areas such as home mortgages or automobile loans, where underlying loan contracts and payment schedules are fairly standardized and risk characteristics are similar. Loan sales play a role, e.g., in takeover ﬁnancing, where a bank originates a loan and sells it in sm aller shares to other banks. More recently, credit derivatives such as credit swaps, credit options, and credit-linked notes have gained importance as instruments to manage risk in situations, where the diversity of loan types and credit risks makes it diﬃcult to securitize loans or sell them individually.In the sequel we will use the term credit derivatives both for securitiesoriginating from loan securitization and for more advanced instruments such as credit options. Our objective is to examine how the possibility to sell part or all of a bank’s uncertain loan portfolio at a deterministic price aﬀects bank behavior in deposit and loan markets.The framework we use for our analysis is sometimes called the industrial organization approach to the microeconomics of banking (for a brief survey see Freixas and Rochet, 1997, chapt. 3). It is focused on t he bank’s role as intermediary, but abstracts from informational aspects of banking — adverse selection and moral hazard —which have dominated banking theory throughout the last two decades. We consider the potential of the industrial organization approach to analyze banking under a variety of market structures ranging from perfect competition to monopoly suﬃciently important to justify the use of this approach. To our knowledge, Wong (1997) was the ﬁrst author to add aspects of uncertainty and risk aversion to the industrial organization approach to the bank. We supplement Wong’s analysis of credit risk by adding a hedging instrument which may or may not carry basis risk. Since the seminal work of Froot et al. (1993) hedging is known to contribute to a ﬁrm’s market value. In our treatment of deposits, we deviate from Wong (1997) by assuming a deterministic deposit rate and modelling an explicit deposit taking decision of the bank.The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the model of a large banking ﬁrm under credit risk, when a credit derivative is available. Section 3 examines loan, deposit and hedging decisions for a credit derivative without basis risk. Section 4 adds basis risk to our analysis. Section 5 concludes the paper.2 The modelConsider a large banking ﬁrm in a one–period framework. The bank is a classical intermediary, taking deposits D and making loans L. By “large” we mean that the bank faces a downward sloping inverse demand rL(L) for loans with rL denoting the interest rate on loans and an upward sloping supply rD(D) of deposits with rD denoting the interest rate on deposits. Both demand for loans and supply of deposits are assumed to be deterministic. The case of perfect competition can easily be considered in this framework. However, by making the assumption of a single large bank we deliberately neglect the strategic interactions among banks under an oligopolistic market structure. An analysis of a banking duopoly with credit uncertainty and hedging will be reserved for future research.The bank is required by regulation to hold a portion α ∈ (0, 1) of its depositsasnon–interest bearing reserves. It faces operational costs C(D, L) with strictly positive marginal costs C’D and C’L. Assumptions on second derivatives of the cost function will be discussed later when they are needed to derive results on optimal behavior. Equity capital, K, of the bank is taken as given. The balance sheet constraint of the bank can be written asM = K + (1 − α)D − L (1) The bank’s interbank market position, M, can take a positive or a negative value, implying lending or borrowing in the interbank market at an interest rate r assumed to be deterministic and given. To motivate the existence of an interbank money market, imagine our bank being one of a large number of local monopolists or a central bank providing liquidity to the banking system at a rate r.The bank faces credit risk in the sense that a stochastic portionθof the loan volume will turn out to be non–performing. The random variableθfollows a distribution function deﬁned on the interval [0, 1]. A loan is deﬁned as non–performing, if the borrower does not pay interest in the period under consideration, i.e., we do not assume that the loan has to be written oﬀ completely, leading also to a loss on the principal. Extending the model to the case of write–oﬀs poses no diﬃculty, but oﬀers no additional insights and leads to some more complicated formal expressions.G iven credit uncertainty, the random proﬁt of the bank is deﬁned asconsists of the uncertain interest earned on loans plus the positive or negative interest on the interbank position minus interest paid on deposits and operational costs.As noted in the introduction, ﬁnancial markets today oﬀer new ﬁnancial instruments which alleviate risk management. The creation of instruments to manage credit risk may be one of the most important steps towards complete risk sharing markets. In the sequel we analyze the impact of credit derivatives on a bank’s optimal deposit and loan decisions and its risk management. We assume the existence of a market for credit derivatives. As noted before, we neglect the huge variety of real–world forms of credit derivatives and model a most simple hedge instrument which corresponds to a total return swap. The credit derivative oﬀers an exchange of an uncertain future cash ﬂow against a certain cash ﬂow. By selling a volume H of the derivativ e the bank agrees to exchange a stochastic claim Hθagainst a deterministic claim Hθat the end of the period.θis the forward rate for one unit ofcredit risk. Seen from the beginning of the period, hedging therefore contributes H(θ-θ) to the bank’s proﬁt. I n this section we assume a perfect negative correlation between credit risk exposure and the gain or loss H(θ−θ) from hedging. This absence of basis risk assures that credit risk can completely be traded away.Substituting the balance constraint (1) for M in (2) and taking account of hedging leads to a modiﬁed proﬁt function of the bank:In (3) we have used t he fact that the bank’s balance sheet constraint has not changed due to participation in the market for derivatives since derivatives contracts only deﬁne payments to be made at the end of the period. Further, notice that the volume H of contracts sold is not constrained. This means for H > 0 the bank sells credit derivatives, whereas in the case of H < 0 it is a buyer of the hedging instrument.The bank’s owners or managers maximize a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function U(Π), U’ > 0, which exhibits risk aversion, i.e., U’’< 0 (for a theoretical basis of the assumption of risk aversion see Froot and Stein, 1998, and —in the framework of the industrial organization approach to banking — Pausch and Welzel, 2002). This leads to the expected utility maximization problemwhere Π is deﬁned by (3) above.3 Hedging without basis riskThe ﬁrst order necessary conditions for (4) are given byExamination of (5), (6) and (7) leads to the followingProposition 1 Given a credit derivative with perfect negative correlation with the bank’s exposure to credit risk, (a) the bank can separate its decision on risk management from its decisions on deposit and loan volumes, (b) the bank fully hedges its credit risk exposure, if the hedge instrument is unbiased.Proof (a) Substituting E[U’(Π˜ )θ] for E[U’(Π˜)θ] from (7) in (5) and (6) yields two deterministic equations in D and L which can be solved for the optimal values D∗and L:(b) If the derivative market is unbiased, i.e.,whichimplies a deterministic Π. This in turn implies that the bank has no exposure to risk, i.e. there is a full hedge H = rLL. q.e.d.Part (a) of the proposition is an example for the well–known separation property in the presence of a hedging instrument without basis risk. As a consequence the bank will choose the same volumes of deposits and loans as in the case of a deterministic rateθ (certainty equivalence).Introducing the elasticity of supply of deposits D = (dD/drD)(rD/D) and the elasticity of loan demand, L = −(dL/drL)(rL/L), (8) and (9) can be re–written asThese are the familiar equalities between a Lerner index (price minus marginal cost divided by price) and an inverse elasticity adapted to the case of banking (cf. Freixas and Rochet, 1997, p. 58). Greater market power in the market for deposits, i.e.,a smaller value of D, implies a higher Lerner index and a higher intermediation margin. For D → ∞ the model leads to the limiting case of perfect competition in the deposits market where the interest margin, (1 − α)r − rD(D), just equals marginal operating costs C’D. This holds analogously for the loan market.4 Hedging with basis riskIn the previous section we considered a market for credit derivatives which permitted the bank to perfectly avoid exposure to risk. In reality selling all credit risk may not be possible. We refer to the non–tradeable risk as basis risk. The most important causes of basis risk discussed in the literature are diﬀerences in the maturities of the hedging instrument and the bank’s risky position, and diﬀerences in the stochastic properties between the underlying of the hedging instrument and the risk the bank faces. In t he case of credit risk the ﬁrst problem arises when the derivatives contract matures at an earlier date than the underlying loan contract. As an example for the second cause of basis risk consider the case of an underlying of the credit derivative which is not perfectly correlated with the credit risk. The latter aspect appears to be of minor importance since credit derivatives are usually traded over the counter which should imply that the contracting parties search for an underlying with a very high correlation to the risk at hand. In addition, we can think of the risk of giving loans in perfect analogy to the risk of holding shares. Part of the risk is systematic (market risk), part of it is unsystematic (idiosyncratic risk) (cf. Diamond, 1984). In the case of a loan, systematic risk is primarily driven bymacroeconomic conditions, whereas unsystematic risk is caused by characteristics of the debtor and his project. Systematic risk is tradeable. It contributes most of the total risk of a loan (cf. Wilson, 1998). Unsystematic risk should be avoided by the bank itself through creating a diversiﬁed loan portfolio. However, banks may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to fully diversify this idiosyncratic risk, because they face institutional constraints, such as credit unions in the U.S. or cooperative banks and savings banks in Germany, or are focused on speciﬁc sectors of the economy. However, this non–diversiﬁable unsystematic risk is also non–tradeable due to the information problems attached to the loan contract: A potential buyer is at an informational disadvantage compared to the bank willing to sell. We conclude from this discussion that non–tradeable credit risk may exist and should therefore be analyzed as basis risk in the framework of our model.Consider a market for total return swaps as described in the previous section. To model basis risk we introduce the following modiﬁcation: The market uses no longer the share of non–performing loansθ, but a share g as underlyin g of the derivatives contract. g can be interpreted as the share of loans non–performing due to systematic risk. From this deﬁnition it is apparent that the two risks are not necessarily independent. We assume regression dependence between the two random variables (cf. Benninga et al., 1984), i.e.,where b ≥ 0, β > 0 and ˜s is a zero mean noise term st ochastically independent from g. For each unit of the credit derivative sold the bank receives a deter ministic payment g in exchange for the stochastic amount g..We assume unbiasedness of the derivatives market, i.e., E(g’) = g, with g denoting the market price of the underlying chosen by the contracting parties. This impliesθ = βg, where we assume b = 0 without loss of generality.The bank’s proﬁt can now be re–written asMaximizing (4), where Π is now given by equation (13), yields (5) and (6) as in the case without basis risk. Condition (7) for the optimal hedge volume, however, isreplaced byInspection of the ﬁrst order conditions leads us toProposition 2 (a) In the presence of basis risk the bank hedges a portion β of the uncertain interest payment rLL(beta–hedge rule). (b) The usual separation propertyno longer exists. Instead, a weaker notion of separation holds. (c) In the absence of economies or diseconomies of scope, the optimal volume of deposits D can be determined as in the case of certainty.Proof (a) Unbiasedness of the derivatives market implies that (14) can be writtenas Cov[U’(Π˜ ), g˜] = 0. Replacing Π˜ by (13) and using (12) yieldsDue to the stochastic independence of ˜s and ˜g this can only be true, if(b) Insert ing (12) and the optimal hedge rule (16) into the ﬁrst order condition (6)for loans shows that L still depends on probabilities and risk preferences, even if D were known. This in turn implies from (5) that D also cannot be determined without knowledge of probabilities and risk preferences. More than market data is required to decide the optimal loan and deposit volumes, which prevents the traditional notion of separation of production and risk management.Notice, however, that the optimal hedge rule derived holds for any pair (D, L). We can therefore imagine a bank choosing loan and deposit volumes randomly and still minimizing its risk exposure by applying the beta–hedge. While the bank may ﬁnd it impossible to determine the optimal values of D and Ln th e presence of basis risk, it can still separate its hedging decision from its production decisions. We call this a weak notion of separation.5 ConclusionUsing the industrial organization approach to the microeconomics of banking, we analyzed the implications of credit risk and credit derivatives without and with basis risk for optimal bank behavior under risk aversion. Under perfect correlation between credit risk and derivative, the familiar separation property was conﬁrmedfor the banking ﬁrm. A full he dge turned out to be optimal, if the market for derivatives is unbiased. The usual separation result no longer holds in the presence of basis risk, i.e., optimal loan and deposit volumes depend on risk preferences, expectations etc. However, the beta–hedge rule derived for this case is optimal irrespectively of the loan and deposit volumes chosen. In this sense, there is still a separation of production decisions and risk management.译文信用风险和信贷衍生产品在银行资料来源:http://www.wiwi.uni-augsburg.de/vwl/institut/paper/228.pdf 作者：乌布·罗尔运用产业经济学的方法，以银行微观经济学分析大型银行的信贷风险。

关于金融危机的英文词汇

次贷危机相关词汇1、次级贷款Subprime mortgage crisis次贷危机也可以用Subprime crisis表示，也可以简略为Subprime, mortgage 是指抵押贷款，与mortgage 相对应的另一个词En-mortgage最近使用频率也很高，如Ex-mortgage broker是指推销抵押贷款的中间人。

2、可调整利率贷款项目Option ARMsARM是adjustable rate mortgage缩写，指可调整利率贷款，美国之所以出现次贷危机，就是由于Option ARMs过于“发达”，使得房地产泡沫越吹越大，最终造成不可避免的金融危机。

3、房地产泡沫real estate bubble房地产泡沫The Housing Bubble房地产泡沫破灭the housing bubble busting，经济衰退economic declining经济危机economic crisis市场疲软market weak注意foreclosure这个词，是指贷方lender没有能力给付月供，银行收回用于出售的房产。

4、信用危机credit risk道德风险Moral Hazard系统风险Systemic Risk信用保险Credit Insurance5、部分金融机构和政府部门中英文对照Lehman Brothers 雷曼兄弟公司Countrywide 美国国家金融服务公司Bear stearns 世界顶级投资银行贝尔斯登AIG 美国国际集团Fed 美国联邦储备委员会住房抵押贷款证券mortgage backed securities 证券和交易委员会Securities and Exchange Commission次贷危机Subprime mortgage crisis美国房地产泡沫US housing bubble流动性liquidity无法偿还房贷和丧失抵押赎回权home-loan defaults and foreclosures发放次贷的出贷方subprime lenders借贷打包证券和银行持有的投资组合loans packaged into securities and held in bank portfolios可调整的贷款利率adjustable-rate mortgages（ARM) 贷款欺诈fraudulent loans信用危机credit risk证券化securitization住房抵押贷款证券mortgage-backed securities（MBS) 抵押债务collateralized debt obligations（CDO) 机构投资者institutional investors杠杆操作leveraged manipulation贬值devaluation市值管理Market Capitalization Management Adjustable-rate Mortgage 可调利率抵押贷款Collateralized Debt Obligation 债务抵押债券Credit Crunch 信用危机Discount Rate and Discount Window贴现率和贴现窗口Equity 资产净值Fed Funds Rate 联邦基金利率Foreclosure 止赎权Investment Bank 投资银行Liquidity 流动性Monoline Insurance 单一险种保险Mora Hazard 道德风险Mortgage-backed Security 抵押担保证券Prepayment Penalty 提前还款罚金Rating Agencies 评级机构Reset 利率重设Risk Premium 风险溢价Securitization 证券化Structured Investment Vehicle 结构化投资工具Systemic Risk 系统风险Term Securities Lending Facility 定期证券借贷工具Transparency 透明度Speculation 投机collateral 抵押品Standard & Poor's 标准普尔Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 房利美和房地美（两大联邦住宅贷款抵押公司）dot-com bubble 网络泡沫Securities and Exchange Commission证券和交易委员会其它金融词汇rating agency 评级机构credit trading 信用secondary listing 第二上市primary market 一级市场secondary market 二级市场financing 融资intermediary 中介机构capital market 资本市场monetary market 货币市场liquidity 流通性hedge fund 对冲基金real estate 房地产share 股票valuation 股价equity market 股市shareholder 股东macroeconomic 宏观经济take a nosedive （股市）大跌tumble 下跌bourse 证交所corporate champion 龙头企业pension fund 养老基金government bond 政府债券budget 预算deficit 赤字mongey-loser 亏损企业traded company,trading enterprise 上市公司transparency 透明度intellectual property 知识产权opportunistic practice 投机行为entrepreneur 企业家cook the book 做假帐money-market 短期资本市场capital-market 长期资本市场volatility 波动option 期权merger 并购arbitrage 套利bad debt 坏帐a store of value 保值forward exchange 期货交易pickup in rice 物价上涨inflation 通货膨胀deflation 通货紧缩tighter credit 紧缩信贷monetary policy 货币政策foreigh exchange 外汇quote 报价contract 合同domestic currency 本币floating rate 浮动利率venture capital 风险资本(VC)job machine 就业市场consolidation 兼并leverage 杠杆file for bankruptcy 申请破产bailout 救助take over 收购on the hook 被套住housing bubble房贷泡沫bubble economy泡沫经济underwriter 保险商valuation 股价government bond 政府债券saving account 储蓄帐户equity market 股市shareholder 股东delist 摘牌mongey-loser 亏损企业inventory 存货traded company,trading enterprise 上市公司stakeholder 利益相关者transparency 透明度market fundamentalist 市场经济基本规则damage-contral machinery 安全顾问efficient market 有效市场intellectual property 知识产权opportunistic practice 投机行为entrepreneur 企业家cook the book 做假帐regulatory system 监管体系portfolio 投资组合money-market 短期资本市场capital-market 长期资本市场volatility 波动diversification 多元化real estate 房地产option 期权call option 看涨期权put option 看跌期权merger 并购arbitrage 套利Securities and Exchange Commission 〈美〉证券交易委员会dollar standard 美元本位制budget 预算deficit 赤字bad debt 坏帐macroeconomic 宏观经济fiscal stimulus 财政刺激a store of value 保值transaction currency 结算货币forward exchange 期货交易intervention currency 干预货币Treasury bond 财政部公债current-account 经常项目pickup in rice 物价上涨Federal Reserve 美联储inflation 通货膨胀deflation 通货紧缩tighter credit 紧缩信贷monetary policy 货币政策foreigh exchange 外汇spot transaction 即期交易forward transaction 远期交易option forward transaction 择期交易swap transaction 调期交易quote 报价settlment and delivery 交割buying rate 买入价selling rate 卖出价spread 差幅contract 合同at par 平价premium 升水discount 贴水direct quoation method 直接报价法indirect quoation method 间接报价法dividend 股息domestic currency 本币floating rate 浮动利率parent company 母公司credit swap 互惠贷款venture capital 风险资本book value 帐面价值physical capital 实际资本IPO(initial public offering) 新股首发；首次公开发行job machine 就业市场welfare capitalism 福利资本主义collective market cap 市场资本总值golbal corporation 跨国公司transnational status 跨国优势transfer price 转让价格consolidation 兼并leverage 杠杆Federal Reserve 美联储financial turmoil/meltdown 金融危机file for bankruptcy 申请破产bailout 救助take over 收购buy out 购买(某人的)产权或全部货物go under 破产take a nosedive （股市）大跌tumble 下跌falter 摇摇欲坠on the hook 被套住shore up confidence 提振市场信心stave off 挡开, 避开,liquidate assets 资产清算at fire sale prices 超低价sell-off 证券的跌价。

十分钟搞懂“次贷危机” The crisis of credit visualized 英汉对照

The crisis of credit visualizedWhat is the credit crisis? It is a worldwide financial fiasco, involving terms you probably heard like, Sub-prime mortgages, collateralized debt obligations, frozen credit markets and credit default swaps.Who is affected? EVERYONE.How did it happen? Here's how. The crisis of credit brings two groups of people together, home owners and investors. Home owners represent their mortgages and investors represent their money.These mortgages represent houses, and these money represent large institutions, like pension funds, insurance companies, sovereign funds, mutual funds etc.These groups are brought together though the financial system, a bunch of banks and brokers commonly known as Wall Street. Although it might not seem like it, these banks on Wall Street are closely connected to these houses on Main Street. To understand how let's start at the beginning. Years ago the investors were sitting on their pile of money, looking for agood investment to turn into more money. Traditionally they go to the USFederal Reserve, where they buy treasury bills believe to be the safest investment. But in the wake of the bust and September 11th,Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan lowers interests rates to only1% to keep the economy strong. One percent is a very low return oninvestment, so the investors say no thanks. On the flip side, this meansbanks on Wall Street can borrow from the Fed for only 1%, add to thosegeneral surpluses from Japan, China and Middle East, and there is anabundance of cheap credit. This makes borrowing money easy for banksand causes them to go crazy with LEVERAGE.LEVERAGE is borrowing money to amplify the outcome of a deal. Hereis how it works: in a normal deal, someone with 10 thousand dollars buysa box for 10,000 dollars, he then sells it to someone else for 11,000dollars, for a 1000 dollars profit, a good deal. But using leverage,someone with 10,000 dollar would go borrow 990,000 more dollars,giving him one million dollars in hand, and then he goes and buys 100boxes with his one million dollars, and sells them to someone else for1100,000 dollars. Then he pays back his 990,000 plus 10,000 in interest,and after his initial 10, 000, he is left with 90,000 dollar profit, versus theother guys 1000. Leverage turns good deals into great deals; this is amajor way banks make their money. So Wall Street takes out a ton ofcredit, makes great deals and grows tremendously rich, and then pays it back. The investors see this and want a piece of action, and this gives Wall Street an idea, they can connect the investors to the home owners through mortgages. Here is how it works: a family wants a house, so they save for a down payment and contact a mortgage broker, mortgage broker connects the family to a lender, who gives them a mortgage. The broker makes a nice commission; the family buys a house and becomes home owners. This is great for them because housing prices have been rising practically forever. Everything works out nicely.One day, the lender gets a call from an investment banker, who wants to buy the mortgage. The lender sells it to him for a very nice fee; the investment banker then borrows millions of dollars and buys thousands more mortgages, and puts them into a nice little box. This means that every month he gets the payments from the home owners of all the mortgages in the box, and then he sets his banker wizards on it to work their financial magic, which is basically cutting it into three slices: safe, okay and risky. They pack the slices back up in the box and call it a Collateralized Debt Obligation, or CDO.A CDO works like three cascading trays. As money comes in, the top tray fills first, then spills over into the middle, and whatever is left into thebottom. The money comes from home owners paying off their mortgages. If some owners don't pay and default on their mortgage, less money comes in and the bottom tray may not get filled, this makes the bottom tray riskier and the top tray safer to compensate for the higher risk. The bottom tray receives a higher rate of return, while the top receives a lower but still nice return. To make the top even safer, the banks will ensure it for a small fee called a Credit Default Swap. The banks do all of this work so that credit rating agencies will stamp the top slice as a safe, triple a rated investment, the highest safest rating there is. The okay slice is triple Bastille pretty good, and they don't bother to rate the risky slice.Because of the triple a rating, the investment banker can sell the safe slice to the investors who only want safe investments. He sells the okay slice to other bankers, and the risky slices to hedge funds and other risk takers. The investment banker makes millions, he then repays his loans.Finally, the investors have found a good investment for their money, much better than the 1% treasury bills, they are so pleases, and they want more CDO slices. So the investment banker calls up the lender, wanting more mortgages. The lender calls up the broker for more home owners, but the broker can't find anyone, everyone that qualifies for a mortgage already has one. But they have an idea: when home owners default on their mortgage, the lender gets the house and house are always increasing in value, since they're covered if the home owners default. Lender can start adding risk to new mortgages, not requiring down payments, no proof of income, no documents at all. And that's exactly what they did. So, instead of lending to responsible home owners called Prime Mortgages, they started to get some that were... well, less responsible. These are Sub-Prime Mortgages, this is the turning point. So, just like always the mortgage broker connects the family with a lender and a mortgage, making his commission, the family buys a big house. The lender sells the mortgage to the investment banker, who turns it into a Codman sells slices to the investors and others, this actually works out nicely for everyone and makes them all rich! No one was worried because as soon they sold the mortgage to the next guy. It was his problem, if the home owners were to default, they didn't care. They were selling out their risk to the next guy making millions, like playing hot-potato with a time bomb. Not surprisingly, the home owners default on their mortgage, which at this moment is owned by the banker. This means he forecloses, and one of his monthly payments turns into a house no big deal, he puts it up for sell, but more and more of his monthlypayments turn into houses. Now there are so many houses for sell on the market, creating more supply than there is demand, and housing prices are not rising any more. In fact, they plummet. This creates an interesting problem for the home owners still paying their mortgages. As all the houses in the neighborhood go upfor sale, the value of their house goes down, and they start to wonder why they are paying back their 3000,000 dollars mortgage, when the house is now worth only 90,000 dollars. They decide that it does not make sense to continue paying, even though they can afford to, and they walk away from their house, default rates sweep the country and prices plummet. Now the investment banker is basically holding a box full of worthless houses. He calls up his buddy the investor to sell his Cobnut the investor isn't stupid and says "no, thanks", he knows that the stream of money isn't even a dribble any more. The banker tries to sell to everyone, but nobody wants to buy his bomb. He is freaking out because he borrowed million, sometimes billions of dollars to buy this bomb and he can't pay it back. Whatever he tries, he can't get rid of it. But he is not the only one; the investors have already bought thousands of these bombs. The lender calls up to try and sell his mortgage, but the banker won't buy it, and the broker is out of work. The whole financial system is frozen and things get dark. Everybody starts going bankrupt, but that is not all. The investor calls up the home owner and tells him that his investments are worthless, and you can begin to see how the crisis flows in a cycleWelcome to the crisis of credit.十分钟搞懂“次贷危机”次贷危机是什么？是一次全球性的金融溃败。

灾难性的违约和贷款机构的信用风险外文翻译

贷款与风险【外文翻译】

外文翻译原文loans and risksMaterial Source: An Introduction to the Mathematics of MoneyAuthor: David Lovelock, Marilou Mendel and A. Larry Wright Many students obtain student loans. These loans may be issued by individuals, businesses (as part of an employee’s benefit program), or by the government. A common type of student loan is a Stafford loan, which is guaranteed by the federal government. Typical conditions for a Stafford loan are that the repayment period of the loan is at most 10 years, the minimum monthly payment is $50, and there is no prepayment penalty (this last condition is important because many real estate loans, for example, charge a very high penalty for paying off the loan early). These loans are currently at a fixed rate, and there is a late fee for late payments. An important feature of these loans is that the student does not begin to repay the loan until 6 months after completing the academic program or leaving school.Home loans are available through banks, savings and loans, and mortgage brokers. Home loans can be at a fixed or adjustable rate.• An fixed rate loans are usually given for terms of 15 or 30 years. Usually, the interest rate for a 30-year loan is higher than that for a 15-year loan. In this case the borrower pays an added premium (a higher interest rate) for the privilege of paying off the loan over a longer period of time.• An adjustable rate loan offers a fixed rate for an initial period of time (typically 1 to 5 years). At the end of this initial period the rate may be adjusted, usually in relation to some government index, such as the Treasury bill rate. Generally, the initial rate for an adjustable rate loan is lower than the comparable rate for a fixed rate loan. The borrower is given this consideration to compensate for the uncertainty of future rates. At the end of the initial period, periodic reviews of the loan are made, and the rate is adjusted according to the index being used. Usually there is a cap—a maximum amount that the rate may be increased at any time.Home loans often carry a prepayment penalty. If homeowners wish to pay off their loans early in order to refinance at a lower rate, then a prepayment penalty maymake this a bad decision. A prepayment penalty may be as much as six months interest on 80% of the remaining balance.Business loans are available from many banks, individuals, and local, state, or federal government agencies. In many cases the seller of a business may “carry back” a loan to the buyer. In these cases there may be great flexibility in the structure of the loan. For example, a common practice is to defer payment of the principal and interest until the new owner has been in business for a fixed period of time. This is an example of a concession by the owner. In other cases there may be a “balloon” payment. In these cases the buyer makes periodic payments until a fixed date, at which time the remainder of the principal is due. This is an example of a concession by the buyer.Borrowers often have many choices when deciding how to finance purchases. The choices vary with respect to the term of the loan, the interest rate charged for the loan, whether or not payments include principal, and whether or not the loan is secured. For example, business loans tend to have higher rates than home loans, real estate loans for non-owner-occupied properties generally have higher interest rates than for owner-occupied properties, and fixed rate loans generally have higher initial interest rates than adjustable rate loans. The differences in choices are associated with differences in the associated risks. In this and other financial contexts, the term risk is synonymous with uncertainty.One source of risk is interest rate risk. The more quickly a loan is repaid, the lower the impact of unexpected increases in interest rates on the lender. Therefore, short-term loans and loans that include principal repayments are less risky than long-term loans and loans that do not include principal repayments.Another source of risk is default risk. Default risk is the risk that a borrower fails to make interest or principal payments when promised. Again, the more quickly a loan is repaid, the less risky the loan for the lender; if a borrower defaults on a loan, then the amount of the outstanding principal is lower for short-term loans that include principal repayments. Also, secured loans are less risky than unsecured loans. If a borrower fails to repay a loan that is secured by collateral, then the lender can take possession of the collateral.However, this is not the case with unsecured loans. These differences in risk result in differences in the rates charged for the various loans; higher rates are charged for riskier loans. However, even loans with the same interest rate don’t necessarily have the same total interest. We now look at four different ways ofrepaying a loan, all based on the fact that we borrow the same amount at the same interest rate.Loan 1: Consider an annuity in which we pay $1,000 at the end of each year for 5 years. Current interest rates are 8%. Table 5.1 shows the details of this loan repayment.The total interest paid is $1,007.29. This is typical of an amortization. An amortized loan is one for which constant principal and interest payments are made at regular intervals until the loan is repaid.Loan 2: Another institution offers to lend us the same $3,992.71 at 8% over five years, but we are only required to pay the interest at the end of each year and the original principal at the end of the fifth year. Table 5.2 shows the details of this loan repayment.The total interest paid is $1,597.08. This is typical of bonds. A bond is a loanthat an investor makes to a governmental agency or corporation for which the borrower pays the lender a fixed amount at regular intervals until the last payment, at which time the principal is repaid.Loan 3: Another institution offers to lend us the same $3,992.71 at 8% over five years, but we are only required to pay the principal and interest at the end of the fifth year. Table 5.3 shows the details of this loan repayment.Table 5.3. Zero Coupon BondNote that for example, the remaining principal at the start of year 3 ($4,657.10) includes the remaining principal at the start of year 2 ($4,312.13) plus the interest accrued during that year ($344.97). The interest for year 3 is calculated from the remaining principal at the start of that year ($4,657.10).Thus, interest is computed upon interest.The total interest paid is $1,873.89. This is typical of zero coupon bonds, which are discussed in Chap. 8. A zero coupon bond is a bond for which there are no regular payments. Thus, the only payment made is a lump sum payment at the end of the loan period.译文贷款与风险资料来源:货币数学运算的介绍作者：大卫·埃索；马里拉·孟德尔；赖瑞·怀特现在，许多学生获得了助学贷款。

信贷基本词汇英汉对照

信贷基本词汇英汉对照信贷基本词汇英汉对照2M method 2M法3M method 3M法A scores A值Accounting convention 会计惯例Accounting for acquisitions 购并的会计处理Accounting for debtors 应收账款核算Accounting for depreciation 折旧核算Accounting for foreign currencies 外汇核算Accounting for goodwill 商誉核算Accounting for stocks 存货核算Accounting policies 会计政策Accounting standards 会计准则Accruals concept 权责发生原则Achieving credit control 实现信用控制Acid test ratio 酸性测试比率Actual cash flow 实际现金流量Adjusting company profits 企业利润调整Advance payment guarantee 提前偿还保金Adverse trading 不利交易Advertising budget 广告预算Advising bank 通告银行Age analysis 账龄分析Aged debtors analysis 逾期账款分析Aged debtors’exception report 逾期应收款的特殊报告Age d debtors’exception report 逾期账款特别报告Aged debtors’report 逾期应收款报告Aged debtors’report 逾期账款报告All—monies clause 全额支付条款Amortization 摊销Analytical questionnaire 调查表分析Analytical skills 分析技巧Analyzing financial risk 财务风险分析Analyzing financial statements 财务报表分析Analyzing liquidity 流动性分析Analyzing profitability 盈利能力分析Analyzing working capital 营运资本分析Annual expenditure 年度支出Anticipating future income 预估未来收入Areas of financial ratios 财务比率分析的对象Articles of incorporation 合并条款Asian crisis 亚洲(金融)危机Assessing companies 企业评估Assessing country risk 国家风险评估Assessing credit risks 信用风险评估Assessing strategic power 战略地位评估Assessment of banks 银行的评估Asset conversion lending 资产转换贷款Asset protection lending 资产担保贷款Asset sale 资产出售Asset turnover 资产周转率Assets 资产Association of British Factors and Discounters 英国代理人与贴现商协会Auditor's report 审计报告Aval 物权担保Bad debt 坏账Bad debt level 坏账等级Bad debt risk 坏账风险Bad debts performance 坏账发生情况Bad loans 坏账Balance sheet 资产负债表Balance sheet structure 资产负债表结构Bank credit 银行信贷Bank failures 银行破产Bank loans．availability 银行贷款的可获得性Bank status reports 银行状况报告Bankruptcy 破产Bankruptcy code 破产法Bankruptcy petition 破产申请书Basle agreement 塞尔协议Basle Agreement 《巴塞尔协议》Behavorial scoring 行为评分Bill of exchange 汇票Bill of lading 提单BIS 国际清算银行BIS agreement 国际清算银行协定Blue chip 蓝筹股Bonds 债券Book receivables 账面应收账款Borrowing money 借人资金Borrowing proposition 借款申请Breakthrough products 创新产品Budgets 预算Building company profiles 勾画企业轮廓Bureaux (信用咨询)公司Business development loan 商业开发贷款Business failure 破产Business plan 经营计划Business risk 经营风险thermocouple pyrometer 热电偶高温计Buyer credits 买方信贷Buyer power 购买方力量Buyer risks 买方风险CAMPARI 优质贷款原则Canons of lending 贷款原则Capex 资本支出Capital adequacy 资本充足性Capital adequacy rules 资本充足性原则Capital commitments 资本承付款项Capital expenditure 资本支出Capital funding 资本融资Capital investment 资本投资Capital strength 资本实力Capital structure 资本结构Capitalization of interest 利息资本化Capitalizing development costs 研发费用资本化Capitalizing development expenditures 研发费用资本化Capitalizing interest costs 利息成本资本化Cascade effect 瀑布效应Cash assets 现金资产Cash collection targets 现金托收目标Cash cycle 现金循环周期Cash cycle ratios 现金循环周期比率Cash cycle times 现金循环周期时间Cash deposit 现金储蓄Cash flow adjustments 现金流调整Cash flow analysis 现金流量分析Cash flow crisis 现金流危机Cash flow cycle 现金流量周期Cash flow forecasts 现金流量预测Cash flow lending 现金流贷出Cash flow profile 现金流概况Cash flow projections 现金流预测Cash flow statements 现金流量表Cash flows 现金流量Cash position 现金头寸Cash positive JE现金流量Cash rich companies 现金充足的企业Cash surplus 现金盈余Cash tank 现金水槽Cash-in-advance 预付现金Categorized cash flow 现金流量分类CE 优质贷款原则CEO 首席执行官Chairman 董事长，总裁Chapter 11 rules 第十一章条款Charge 抵押Charged assets 抵押资产Chief executive officer 首席执行官Collateral security 抵押证券Collecting payments 收取付款Collection activitv 收款活动Collection cycle 收款环节Collection procedures 收款程序Collective credit risks 集合信用风险Comfortable liquidity positi9n 适当的流动性水平Commercial mortgage 商业抵押Commercial paper 商业票据Commission 佣金Commitment fees 承诺费Common stock 普通股Common stockholders 普通股股东Company and its industry 企业与所处行业Company assets 企业资产Company liabilities 企业负债Company loans 企业借款Competitive advantage 竞争优势Competitive forces 竞争力Competitive products 竞争产品Complaint procedures 申诉程序Computerized credit information 计算机化信用信息Computerized diaries 计算机化日志Confirmed letter of credit 承兑信用证Confirmed letters of credit 保兑信用证Confirming bank 确认银行Conservatism concept 谨慎原则Consistency concept 一贯性原则Consolidated accounts 合并报表Consolidated balance sheets 合并资产负债表Contingent liabilities 或有负债Continuing security clause 连续抵押条款Contractual payments 合同规定支出Control limits 控制限度Control of credit activities 信用活动控制Controlling credit 控制信贷Controlling credit risk 控制信用风险Corporate credit analysis 企业信用分析Corporate credit controller 企业信用控制人员Corporate credit risk analysis 企业信用风险分析Corporate customer 企业客户Corporate failure prediction models 企业破产预测模型Corporate lending 企业贷款Cost leadership 成本领先型Cost of sales 销售成本Costs 成本Country limit 国家限额Country risk 国家风险Court judgments 法院判决Covenant 贷款保证契约Covenants 保证契约Creative accounting 寻机性会计Credit analysis 信用分析Credit analysis of customers 客户信用分析Credit analysis of suppliers 供应商的信用分析Credit analysis on banks 银行信用分析Credit analysts 信用分析Credit assessment 信用评估Credit bureau reports 信用咨询公司报告Credit bureaux 信用机构Credit control 信贷控制Credit control activities 信贷控制活动Credit control performance reports 信贷控制绩效报告Credit controllers 信贷控制人员Credit cycle 信用循环Credit decisions 信贷决策Credit deterioration 信用恶化Credit exposure 信用敞口Credit granting process 授信程序Credit information 信用信息Credit information agency 信用信息机构Credit insurance 信贷保险Credit insurance advantages 信贷保险的优势Credit insurance brokers 信贷保险经纪人Credit insurance limitations 信贷保险的局限Credit limits 信贷限额Credit limits for currency blocs 货币集团国家信贷限额Credit limits for individual countries 国家信贷限额Credit management 信贷管理Credit managers 信贷经理Credit monitoring 信贷监控Credit notes 欠款单据Credit period 信用期Credit planning 信用计划Credit policy 信用政策Credit policy issues 信用政策发布Credit proposals 信用申请Credit protection 信贷保护Credit quality 信贷质量Credit rating 信用评级Credit rating agencies 信用评级机构Credit rating process 信用评级程序Credit rating system 信用评级系统Credit reference 信用咨询Credit reference agencies 信用评级机构Credit risk 信用风险Credit risk assessment 信用风险评估Credit risk exposure 信用风险敞口Credit risk insurance 信用风险保险Credit risk．individual customers 个体信用风险Credit risk：bank credit 信用风险：银行信用Credit risk：trade credit 信用风险：商业信用Credit scoring 信用风险评分Credit scoring model 信用评分模型Credit scoring system 信用评分系统Credit squeeze 信贷压缩Credit taken ratio 受信比率Credit terms 信贷条款Credit utilization reports 信贷利用报告Credit vetting 信用审查Credit watch 信用观察Credit worthiness 信誉Creditor days 应付账款天数Cross-default clause 交叉违约条款Currency risk 货币风险Current assets 流动资产Current debts 流动负债Current ratio requirement 流动比率要求Current ratios 流动比率Customer care 客户关注Customer credit ratings 客户信用评级Customer liaison 客户联络Customer risks 客户风险Cut-off scores 及格线Cycle of credit monitoring 信用监督循环Cyclical business 周期性行业Daily operating expenses 经营费用Day’s sales outstanding 收回应收账款的平均天数Debentures 债券Debt capital 债务资本Debt collection agency 债务托收机构Debt issuer 债券发行人Debt protection levels 债券保护级别Debt ratio 负债比率Debt securities 债券Debt service ratio 还债率Debtor days 应收账款天数Debtor's assets 债权人的资产Default 违约Deferred payments 延期付款Definition of leverage 财务杠杆率定义Deposit limits 储蓄限额Depositing money 储蓄资金Depreciation 折旧Depreciation policies 折旧政策Development budget 研发预算Differentiation 差别化Direct loss 直接损失Directors salaries 董事薪酬Discretionary cash flows 自决性现金流量Discretionary outflows 自决性现金流出Distribution costs 分销成本Dividend cover 股息保障倍数Dividend payout ratio 股息支付率Dividends 股利Documentary credit 跟单信用证DSO 应收账款的平均回收期Duration of credit risk 信用风险期Eastern bloc countries 东方集团国家EBITDA 扣除利息、税收、折旧和摊销之前的收益ECGD 出口信贷担保局Economic conditions 经济环境Economic cycles 经济周期Economic depression 经济萧条Economic growth 经济增长Economic risk 经济风险Electronic data interchange(EDI) 电子数据交换Environmental factors 环境因素Equity capital 权益资本Equity finance 权益融资Equity stake 股权EU countries 欧盟国家EU directives 欧盟法规EUlaw 欧盟法律Eurobonds 欧洲债券European parliament 欧洲议会European Union 欧盟Evergreen loan 常年贷款Exceptional item 例外项目Excessive capital commitments 过多的资本承付款项Exchange controls 外汇管制Exchange-control regulations 外汇管制条例Exhaust method 排空法Existing competitors 现有竞争对手Existing debt 未清偿债务Export credit agencies 出口信贷代理机构Export credit insurance 出口信贷保险Export factoring 出口代理Export sales 出口额Exports Credit Guarantee Department 出口信贷担保局Extending credit 信贷展期External agency 外部机构External assessment methods 外部评估方式External assessments 外部评估External information sources 外部信息来源Extraordinary items 非经常性项目Extras 附加条件Facility account 便利账户Factoring 代理Factoring debts 代理收账Factoring discounting 代理折扣Factors Chain International 国际代理连锁Failure prediction scores 财务恶化预测分值FASB (美国)财务会计准则委员会Faulty credit analysis 破产信用分析Fees 费用Finance，new business ventures 为新兴业务融资Finance，repay existing debt 为偿还现有债务融资Finance,working capital 为营运资金融资Financial assessment 财务评估Financial cash flows 融资性现金流量Financial collapse 财务危机Financial flexibility 财务弹性Financial forecast 财务预测Financial instability 财务的不稳定性Financial rating analysis 财务评级分析Financial ratios 财务比率Financial risk 财务风险Financial risk ratios 财务风险比率Fitch IBCA 惠誉评级Fitch IBCA ratings 惠誉评级Fixed assets 固定资产Fixed charge 固定费用Fixed charge cover 固定费用保障倍数Fixed costs 固定成本Floating assets 浮动资产Floating charge 浮动抵押Floor planning 底价协议Focus 聚焦Forced sale risk 强制出售风险Foreign exchange markets 外汇市场Forfaiting 福费廷Formal credit rating 正式信用评级Forward rate agreements 远期利率协议FRAs 远期利率协议Fund managers 基金经理FX transaction 外汇交易GAAP 公认会计准则Gearing 财务杠杆率Geographical spread of markets 市场的地理扩展Global target 全球目标Going concern concept 持续经营原则Good lending 优质贷款Good times 良好时期Government agencies 政府机构Government interference 政府干预Gross income 总收入Guarantee of payment 支付担保Guaranteed loans 担保贷款Guarantees 担保High credit quality 高信贷质量High credit risks 高信贷风险High default risk 高违约风险High interest rates 高利率High risk regions 高风险区域Highly speculative 高度投机High-risk loan 高风险贷款High-value loan 高价值贷款Historical accounting 历史会计处理Historical cost 历史成本IAS 国际会计准则IASC 国际会计准则委员会IBTT 息税前利润ICE 优质贷款原则Idealliquidity ratios 理想的流动性比率Implied debt rating 隐含债务评级Importance of credit control 信贷控制的重要性Improved products 改进的产品 IImproving reported asset values 改善资产账面价值In house assessment 内部评估In house credit analysis 内部信用分析In house credit assessments 内部信用评估In house credit ratings 内部信用评级Income bonds 收入债券Income statement 损益表Increasing profits 提高利润Increasing reported profits 提高账面利润Indemnity clause 赔偿条款Indicators of credit deterioration 信用恶化征兆Indirect loss 间接损失Individual credit transactions 个人信用交易Individual rating 个体评级Industrial reports 行业报告Industrial unrest 行业动荡Industry limit 行业限额Industry risk 行业风险Industry risk analysis 行业风险分析Inflow 现金流入Information in financial statements 财务报表中的信息In-house credit ratings 内部信用评级Initial payment 初始支付Insolvencies 破产Institutional investors 机构投资者Insured debt 投保债务Intangible fixed asset 无形固定资产Inter-company comparisons 企业间比较Inter-company loans 企业间借款Interest 利息Interest cost 利息成本Interest cover ratio 利息保障倍数Interest cover test 利息保障倍数测试Interest holiday 免息期Interest payments 利息支付Interest rates 利率Interim statements 中报(中期报表)Internal assessment methods 内部评估方法Internal financing ratio 内部融资率Internal Revenue Service 美国国税局International Accounting Standards Committee 国际会计准则委员会International Accounting Standards(IAS) 国际会计准则International Chamber of Commerce 国际商会International credit ratings 国际信用评级International Factoring Association 国际代理商协会International settlements 国际结算Inventory 存货Inverse of current ratio 反转流动比率Investment analysts 投资分析人员Investment policy 投资政策Investment risk 投资风险Investment spending 投资支出Invoice discounting 发票贴现Issue of bonds 债券的发行Issued debt capital 发行债务资本Junk bond status 垃圾债券状况Just-in-time system(JIT) 适时系统Key cash flow ratios 主要现金流量指标Labor unrest 劳动力市场动荡Large．scale borrower 大额借贷者Legal guarantee 法律担保Legal insolvency 法律破产Lending agreements 贷款合约Lending covenants 贷款保证契约Lending decisions 贷款决策Lending proposals 贷款申请Lending proposition 贷款申请Lending transactions 贷款交易Letters of credit 信用证Leverage 财务杠杆率LIBOR 伦敦同业拆借利率Lien 留置Liquid assets 速动资产Liquidation 清算Liquidation expenses 清算费Liquidity 流动性Liquidity and working capital 流动性与营运资金Liquidity ratios 流动比率Liquidity run 流动性危机Liquidity shortage 流动性短缺Loan covenants 贷款合约Loan guarantees 贷款担保Loan principal 贷款本金Loan principal repayments 贷款本金偿还Loan review 贷款审查London Inter-bank Offered Rate 伦敦同业拆借利率Long’term debt 长期负债Long-term funding 长期融资Long-term risk 长期风险Management 管理层Marginal lending 边际贷款Marginal trade credit 边际交易信贷Market surveys 市场调查Marketing 市场营销Markets 市场Matching concept 配比原则Material adverse-change clause 重大不利变动条款Maximum leverage level 最高财务杠杆率限制Measurement and judgment 计量与判断Measuring risk 风险计量Medium-term loan 中期贷款Microcomputer modelling 计算机建模Minimum current ratio requirement 最低流动比率要求Minimum leverage ratio 最低举债比率Minimum net worth 最低净值Minimum net-worth requirement 最低净值要求Minimum risk asset ratio 最低风险资产比率thermocouple pyrometer 热电偶高温计Monitoring activity 监管活动Monitoring credit 信用监控Monitoring customer credit limits 监管客户信贷限额Monitoring risks 监管风险Monitoring total credit limits 监管全部信贷限额Monthly reports 月报Moody's debt rating 穆迪债券评级Mortgage 抵押mpr’oving balance sheet 改善资产负债表Multiple discriminate analysis 多元分析National debt 国家债务NCI 无信贷间隔天数Near-cash assets 近似于现金的资产Negative cash flow 负现金流量Negative net cash flow 负净现金流量Negative operational cash flows 负的经营性现金流量Negative pledge 限制抵押Net book value 净账面价值Net cash flow 净现金流量Net worth test 净值测试New entrants 新的市场进人者No credit interval 无信贷间隔天数Non-cash items 非现金项目Non-core business 非核心业务Non-operational items 非经营性项目Obtaining payment 获得支付One-man rule 一人原则Open account terms 无担保条款Operating leases 经营租赁Operating profit 营业利润Operational cash flow 营性现金流量Operational flexibility ~营弹性Optimal credit 最佳信贷Order cycle 订货环节Ordinary dividend payments 普通股股利支付Organization of credit activities 信贷活动的组织Overdue payments 逾期支付Over-trading 过度交易Overview of accounts 财务报表概览·Parent company 母公司PAT 税后利润Payment in advance 提前付款Payment obligations 付款义务Payment records 付款记录Payment score 还款评分PBIT 息税前利润PBT 息后税前利润Percentage change 百分比变动Performance bonds 履约保证Personal guarantees 个人担保Planning systems 计划系统Pledge 典押Points-scoring system 评分系统Policy setting 政策制定Political risk 政治风险Potential bad debt 潜在坏账Potential credit risk 潜在信用风险Potential value 潜在价值Predicting corporate failures 企业破产预测Preference dividends 优先股股息Preferred stockholders 优先股股东Preliminary assessment 预备评估Premiums 溢价Primary ratios 基础比率Prior charge capital 优先偿付资本Priority cash flows 优先性现金流量Priority for creditors 债权人的清偿顺序Priority payments 优先支付Product life cycle 产品生命周期Product market analysis 产品市场分析Product range 产品范围Products 产品Professional fees 专业费用Profit 利润Profit and loss account 损益账户Profit margin 利润率Profitability 盈利能力Profitability management 盈利能力管理Profitability ratios 盈利能力比率Promissory notes 本票Property values 所有权价值Providers of credit 授信者Provision accounting 准备金会计处理Prudence concept 谨慎原则Public information 公共信息Public relations 公共关系Purpose of credit ratings 信用评级的目的Purpose of ratios 计算比率的目的Qualitative covenants 定性条款Quantitative covenants 定量条款Query control 质疑控制Quick ratio 速动比率Rating exercise 评级实践Rating process for a company 企业评级程序Ratio analysis 比率分析Ratio analyst weaknesses ~L率分析的缺陷Real insolvency 真实破产Real sales growth 实际销售收入增长率Realization concept 实现原则Receivables 应收账款Recession 衰退Reducing debtors 冲减应收账款Reducing profits 冲减利润Reducing provisions 冲减准备金Reducing reported profits 冲减账面利润Reducing stocks 减少存货Registrar of Companies 企业监管局Regulatory risk 监管风险Releasing provisions 冲回准备金Relocation expenses 费用再分配Reminder letters 催缴单Repayment on demand clause 即期偿还条款Replacement of principal 偿还本金Report of chairman 总裁／董事长报告Reserve accounting 准备金核算Residual cash flows 剩余现金流量Restricting bad debts 限制坏账Restrictions on secured borrowing 担保借款限制Retention-of-title clauses 所有权保留条款Revenues 总收入Risk analysis reports 风险分析报告Risk and banks 风险与银行Risk and companies 风险与企业Risk and Return 风险与回报Risk capital 风险资本Risk-reward 风险回报Risk-weighted assets 风险加权资产ROCE 资本收益率Romapla clauses “一手交钱一手交货”条款Sales 销售额Secondary ratios 分解比率Secure methods of payment 付款的担保方式Secured assets 担保资产Secured creditors 有担保债权人Secured loans 担保贷款Securities and Exchange Commission (美国)证券交易委员会Security guarantees 抵押担保Security of payment 付款担保Security general principles 担保的一般原则Segmentation 细分Setting and policing credit limits 信用限额的设定与政策制定Settlement discount (提前)结算折扣Settlement terms 结算条款Share price 股价Short-term borrowing 短期借款Short-term creditors 短期负债Short-term liabilities 短期债务Short-termism 短期化SIC 常务诠释委员会Significance of working capital 营运资金的重要性Single credit customer 单一信用客户Single ratio analysis 单一比率分析Size of credit risk 信用风险的大小Slow stock turnover 较低的存货周转率Sources of assessments 评估信息来源Sources of credit information 信用信息来源Sources of risk 风险来源Sovereign rating 主权评级Specialist agencies 专业机构Specific debt issue 特别债券发行Speculative 投机性Speculative grades 投机性评级Split rating 分割评级Spot rate 现价(即期比率)Spreadsheets 电子数据表Staff redundancies 员工遣散费Standard and Poor 标准普尔Standard security clauses 标准担保条款Standard&Poor's 标准普尔Standby credits 备用信用证Standing Interpretations Committee 证券交易委员会Standing starting credit limits 持续更新信用限额Statistical analysis 统计分析Statistical techniques 统计技巧Status reports (企业)状况报告Stock valuations 存货核算Stocks 股票Straight line depreciation method 直线折旧法Strategic positioning 战略定位Suplus assets 盈余资产Suplus rating 盈余评级Supplier power 供应商的力量Supply chain 供应链Support rating 支持评级Swap agreement 换合约Swaps 互换SWOT analysis SWOT分析Symptoms of failure questionnaires 企业破产征兆调查表Takeovers 收购Tax payments 税务支付Technical insolvency 技术破产Technology and change 技术进步Term loan 定期贷款Term of borrowing 借款期限Third party guarantees 第三方担保Tier 1 capital 一类资本Tier 2 capital 二类资本Total credit limit 整体信用限额Total current assets 流动资产总额Trade companies 贸易企业Trade credit 商业信用Trade creditors 应付账款Trade cycle 商业循环Trade cycle times 商业循环周期Trade debt 应收账款Trade debtors 贸易债权人Trade Indemnity 贸易赔偿Trade references 贸易参考Trade-off 协定Trading outlook 交易概况Trading profit 营业利润Traditional cash flow 传统现金流量Triple A 三AUCP 跟单信用证统一惯例Uncovered dividend 未保障的股利Uniform Customs&Practice 跟单信用证统一惯例Unpaid invoices 未付款发票Unsecured creditors 未担保的债权人Usefulness of liquidity ratios 流动性比率的作用Uses of cash 现金的使用Using bank risk information 使用银行风险信息Using financial assessments 使用财务评估thermocouple pyrometer 热电偶高温计Using ratios 财务比率的运用Using retention-of-title clauses 使用所有权保留条款Value chain 价值链Value of Z scores Z值模型的价值Variable costs 变动成本Variable interest 可变利息Variety of financial ratios 财务比率的种类Vetting procedures 审查程序Volatitle revenue dynamic 收益波动Volume of sales 销售量Warning signs of credit risk 信用风险的警示Working assets 营运资产working capital 营运资本Working capital changes 营运资本变化额Working capital management 营运资本管理working capitalratios 营运资本比率Write-downs 资产减值Write-offs 勾销Z score assessments Z值评估z score models z值模型Z scores z值Z scoring Z值评分系统。

1、下载文档前请自行甄别文档内容的完整性，平台不提供额外的编辑、内容补充、找答案等附加服务。
2、"仅部分预览"的文档,不可在线预览部分如存在完整性等问题,可反馈申请退款(可完整预览的文档不适用该条件!)。
3、如文档侵犯您的权益，请联系客服反馈,我们会尽快为您处理(人工客服工作时间：9:00-18:30)。

灾难性的违约和贷款机构的信用风险外文翻译

商业银行风险管理中英文对照外文翻译文献

商业银行信贷风险管理外文文献翻译中文3000多字

不良贷款管理中英文对照外文翻译文献

信用担保机构问题研究外文文献翻译最新译文

信用风险和信贷衍生产品在银行【外文翻译】

关于金融危机的英文词汇

十分钟搞懂“次贷危 机” The crisis of credit visualized 英汉对照

灾难性的违约和贷款机构的信用风险外文翻译

贷款与风险【外文翻译】

信贷基本词汇英汉对照

十分钟搞懂“次贷危机” The crisis of credit visualized 英汉对照