BCBL-1提KSHV
罗托克电动头中文说明书
IQ10至IQ35
B型非推力底座
卸下底盘的四个螺栓，确保底盘的安全，卸下底盘。
此时可看到驱动轴套和卡簧。
B3和B4型的拆卸：
(参见图7a)
用外卡簧钳涨开卡簧，同时向外拉驱动轴套。驱动轴套将从
执行器中心套筒上脱开，但卡簧仍留在轴套的槽中。
图7a
B3和B4型的重新组装
润滑驱动轴套和卡簧。将卡簧装入驱动轴套的槽中，将驱动轴套送入执行器中心套筒底部，对准键和槽。
提升1
侧面安装
非提升杆式阀门-11
顶部安装
手轮密封11
IQM调节型执行器12
IQML线性推力装置12
IQML线性行程的调整12
6接线14
地线的连接14
端子箱盖的拆卸14
电缆入口14
端子的接线15
端子箱盖的复位15
7设定16
设定程序16
设定器17
进入设定程序18
如果需要进一步有关RotorkIQ系列执行器的资料和指南，我们将根据需要提供。
如果执行器不能立即安装，则应将它保存在一个干燥的地方，直到准备接线。
如果执行器已安装好，但还没有接线，那么建议您将电缆入口的塑料塞换成缠有聚四氟乙烯的密封金属塞。
如无意外，Rotork产品的双密封结构能很好地保护内部的电气元件。
图15上紧止挡圈的定位螺栓
IQ40至IQ95
B型非推力底座
B1型
输出轴的孔和键均符合ISO 5210标准。驱动轴套无需加工。
B3和B4型
此两种驱动轴套可根据顶部带帽的螺栓来鉴别。
B3在提供时已按ISO5210标准预加工。
B4在提供时为实心，需按阀门或齿轮箱的驱动轴进行加工。
CHECK VALVE
Check ValvesDirect and pilot operated check valve functions for applicationsup to 350 bar (5000 psi) and 227 L/min (60 USgpm)GSection ContentsTypical Application Rated FlowModel Pressure bar (psi)L/min (USgpm)Page Check Valves - Introduction, features & benefits............................................................................................................G-3 Check Valves, 2 wayCV3-4...........................350 (5000) (NEW)....................................................8 (2)..........................................................G-4 CV3–8..........................350 (5000)................................................................30 (8)........................................................G-6 CV1–10........................350 (5000) (UPGRADED).........................................45 (12)......................................................G-8 CV3–10........................350 (5000) (UPGRADED).........................................76 (20)....................................................G-10 CV16–10.......................350 (5000)................................................................76 (20)....................................................G-12 CV11–12.......................350 (5000)................................................................114 (30)...................................................G-14 CV1–16........................210 (3000)................................................................151 (40)..................................................G-16 CV2–20........................210 (3000)................................................................227 (60)..................................................G-18 Check Valves with Bypass OrificeCV6–10........................350 (5000) (NEW)....................................................76 (20)....................................................G-20 CV6–16........................210 (3000) (NEW).....................................................151 (40)..................................................G-22 Restrictive Check ValvesRCV3–10......................350 (5000) (NEW)....................................................76 (20)....................................................G-24 Single Pilot Operated Check Valves, Cartridge TypeSPC2-8.........................240 (3500)................................................................19 (5)......................................................G-26 SPC2–10......................210 (3000)................................................................23 (6)......................................................G-28 Single Pilot Operated Check Valves, In-line Housing TypeSPC1–10......................210 (3000)................................................................45 (12)....................................................G-30 SPC1–16......................210 (3000)................................................................151 (40)..................................................G-32 SPC1–20......................210 (3000)................................................................227 (60)..................................................G-34 Single Pilot Operated Check Valves, Cartridge Type (high pressure)POC1-10.......................350 (5000)................................................................57 (15)....................................................G-36 POC1-12.......................350 (5000)................................................................114 (30)..................................................G-38 Double Pilot Check Valves, Cartridge TypeDPC2–8........................240 (3500)................................................................19 (5)......................................................G-40 Double Pilot Check Valves, In-line Housing TypeDPC1–10......................210 (3000)................................................................45 (12)....................................................G-42 DPC11–12....................350 (5000) (NEW)....................................................114 (30)..................................................G-44 DPC1–16......................210 (3000)................................................................151 (40)..................................................G-46 DPC1–20......................210 (3000)................................................................227 (60)..................................................G-48This section gives basic specifications for the full line of Vickers screw-in cartridge check valves. Its purpose is to provide a quick, convenient reference tool when choosing Vickers cartridge valves or design-ing a system using these components.The Vickers range of direct and pilot operated check valves provides the hydraulic circuit designer with a wide selection of cartridge and in-line products.Two pressure ratings are shown for all products featured in this catalog. The typical application pressure rating is the maximum recommended operating pressure for the valve in a given system. The fatigue pressure rating is the pressure for the valve to be free for infinite life from metal fatigue.All poppet type check valve cartridges have hardened and ground poppets and sharp-edged ground steel seats. This provides an excellent product that isdirt-tolerant, has reliable seating, and is suitable for fast cycling with long life. Direct operated check valvesCartridges fit into industry standard cavities and may be supplied for installation in manifolds, or be provided in standard housings having SAE or BSPP ports suitable for in-line mounting.A wide selection of cracking pressures is available from 0,21 to 20,7 bar (3 to 300 psi). Thus the opportunity exists to use the valves not only as conventional check but also as low pressure relief valves.Pilot operated checkvalvesThese valves are used for:• Position load locking• As an alternative tocounterbalance valveswhere neither theoverrunning loads orrelease speed arefactors in theapplication.The high pressure POC*-10and POC*-12 series ofpilot-to-open check valvescomplement the CBV*-10and CBV*-12counterbalance cartridgesand are physicallyinterchangeable with them.The POC’s provide a lowcost alternative to loadcontrol when the dynamicsof neither overrunning loadsnor load release speed arefactors to be considered inthe design of the hydrauliccircuit for the load to becontrolled.The pilot-to-open valvespositively lock a load fromport 1 to port 2 until pilotpressure applied to port 3is sufficient to unseat thevalve. This then permitsflow from port 1 to port 2.The load can also bereleased through means ofan optional screw typeoverride.The POC*-10 covers flowup to 60 L/min (15 USgpm).The POC*-12 covers flowup to 114 L/min (30USgpm). With infinite lifequalification to a fatiguepressure rating of 310 bar(4500 psi), these POCvalves are suitable for usein a broad range of loadcontrol applications withtypical system operatingpressures up to 350 bar(5000 psi). Tailoring of thecircuit to gain energysavings while minimizingshock is obtained throughthe use of several standardcracking pressure rangesfrom 2,0 bar (30 psi) to 7bar (100 psi). Whenanti-cavitation protection isrequired, the 0,30 bar (5psi) spring should be used.For those applicationswhere pilot pressure maynot always be available, thevalve can be ordered withan optional adjustableoverride.Features and benefits•Products in this cataloghave been fatigue testedfor one million cycles at132% or 10 million cyclesat 115% of ratedpressure.• Simple load holdingdevice. Low costalternative to morecomplex solutions whenoverrunning loads are notpresent and / or controlof load release speed isnot required.• Provides high operationalefficiency and low springsettings.• Valves are offered with awide variety of standardhousings with SAE andBSPP port options in thefollowing configurations:– In-line single– In-line dual– SAE, 4-bolt, code 61– Close coupled, nipplemounted– Gasket mounted single– Gasket mounted dualThese valves can also beused in a C–10–3S orC–10–3S cavity.• Four standard crackingpressures permit energysavings, while tailoringthe hydraulic systemrequirements to minimizeshock.• Unique dual spring designprovides high operationalefficiency and a lowpressure spring optionfor effective anti-cavitation protection.• Unique design providescompact package andlow pressure drops thatmatch or exceed currentmarket expectations andprovide for excellentrepeatability and stability.• 3:1 pilot ratio satisfiessimple load holdingapplication requirements,while providing smoothoperation and longeroperating life.• Optional adjustableoverride releases theload for situations wherepilot pressure is notalways available.Single pilot checkAlso offered are SPC2-8and SPC2-10 single pilotcheck valves withpressures to 240 bar (3500psi) and flows to 23 L/min(6 USgpm). These valvesoperate similar to the POC1product but offer anopposite flow path whichoffers the designer a choiceof pilot operated checkvalve when laying out acustom manifold for easeof design.Supporting productsVickers screw incartridge valves are avail-able in a wide range ofmounting configurationsand porting options toprovide flexibility indeveloping circuits.Housings are available ineither aluminum 210 bar(3000 psi) or steel 350 bar(5000 psi) configurations.All are available with achoice of BSPP(ISO–0228/1) or SAE styleports.DescriptionThe CV3-4-B is a ball type,screw-in cartridge check valve.CV3-4Check valve21Functional SymbolProfile ViewRATINGS AND SPECIFICATIONSPerformance data is typical with fluid at 21,8 cSt (105 SUS) and 49˚C (120˚F)Typical application pressure (all ports) 350 bar (5000 psi)Cartridge fatigue pressure (infinite life)350 bar (5000 psi) Rated flow 7.6 L/min (2 USgpm) Free flow cracking pressure @ 1 l/min (0.25 USgpm) 5– 0,34 bar (5 psi)Internal leakage, Port 2 to 1 5 drops/min maximum @ 210 bar (3000 psi)Temperature range -40°to 120°C (-40°to 248°F)Cavity C–4–2Fluids All general purpose hydraulic fluids such as:MIL–H–5606, SAE 10, SAE 20, etc.Filtration Cleanliness code 18/16/13Weight cartridge only 0,04 kg (0.09 lbs)Seal kit 9900174-000 Buna–N9900175-00 Viton ®Viton is a registered trademark of E.I. DuPontPressure Drop Curves Cartridge onlyOperationThis valve remains closed until the bias is reached at port 1 at which time thepoppet lifts off the seat and allows flow from port 1 to port 2.12Flow - USgpm (105 SUS oil @ 120° F)10000.511.520 3.87.6 2.532003004007142028P r e s s u r e D r o p - p s iP r e s s u r e D r o p - b a rPressure vs. Flow - L/min (21,8 cSt oil @ 49° F)Model Code CV3 – 4 (V) – B – ***– **– 00Dimensionsmm (inch)Torque cartridge inaluminum or steel housing to 8.1-13.6 Nm (6-10 ft. lbs)2453167FunctionCV3- Check valve Size 4- 4 Size21SealsBlank - Buna-N V - Viton ®Style B -Ball type43Port size000- Cartridge only Free flow cracking pressure05- 0,34 bar (5 psi)65Special features 00- None(Only required if valve has special features - omitted if “00”)79/16" HEX7/16 - 20 UNF - 2ACV3-4DescriptionThe CV3–8–P is a direct acting, poppet type check valve.CV3-8Check ValveRATINGS AND SPECIFICATIONSPerformance data is typical with fluid at 21,8 cSt (105 SUS) and 49˚C (120˚F)Typical application pressure (all ports)350 bar (5000 psi)Cartridge fatigue pressure (infinite life)280 bar (4000 psi)Rated flow30 L/min (8 USgpm) Cracking pressures @ 1.0 L/min (0.25 USgpm)4– 0,28 bar (4 psi) 10– 0,7 bar (10 psi)15– 1,03 bar (15psi)25– 1,7 bar (25 psi)30– 2,07 bar (30 psi)60– 4,0 bar (60 psi)Internal leakage 5 drops/min. maximum @ 350 bar (5000 psi)CavityC-8-2Standard housing materials Aluminum or steelTemperature range -40˚ to 120˚C (-40˚ to 248˚F)FluidsAll general purpose hydraulic fluids such as:MIL–H–5606, SAE 10, SAE 20, etc.FiltrationCleanliness code 18/16/13Weight cartridge only 0,05 kg (0.12 lb)Seal kits02-165875 Buna–N 02-165877 Viton ®Viton is a registered trademark of E.I.DuPontFunctional SymbolSectional ViewPressure Drop Curves Cartridge only211P r e s s u r e D r o p - p s iP r e s s u r e D r o p - b a rFlow - USgpm (105 SUS oil @ 120°F)06010015020025030035002.55.08.00102034812162024ABCDFlow - L/min (21,8 cSt oil @ 49°F)A – CV3-8-P-O-60B – CV3-8-P-O-25C – CV3-8-P-O-10D – CV3-8-P-O-4OperationThis valve remains closed until the spring bias is reached at port 1.The poppet then lifts off the seat and allows flow from port 1 to port 2.Model Code CV3-8Dimensionsmm(inch)Torque cartridge inaluminum or steel housing 34-41 Nm (25-30 ft. lbs)FunctionCV3– Check Valve Size 8– 8 Size SealsBlank –Buna-N V – Viton ®Style P – PoppetValve housing material Omit for cartridge only A – Aluminum S – SteelPort size0– Cartridge onlyCracking Pressure 004– 0,28 bar (4 psi)010– 0,70 bar (10 psi)015– 1,03 bar (15psi)025– 1,70 bar (25 psi)030– 2,07 bar (30 psi)060– 4,00 bar (60 psi)Special Features 00– None(Only required if valve has special features - omitted if “00”)87654321CV3 – 8 (V) – P – (*) ** – *** – 00CODE PORT SIZEHOUSING NUMBER AluminumSteelFatigue ratedFatigue rated4T SAE 402-16073002-1607366T SAE 602-16073102-1607378T SAE 802-16073202-1607382G 1/4” BSPP 02-16072702-1607333G3/8” BSPP 02-16072802-160734See Section J for housing details.23451678DescriptionThe CV1-10-P is a poppet type, screw-in cartridge check valve.CV1–10Check valve211Flow - USgpm (105 SUS oil @ 120°F)Flow - L/min (21,8 St oil @ 49°F)P r e s s u r e D r o p - b a r 2468101250100150200250203040161410640102812ABCP r e s s u r e D r o p - p s iFunctional SymbolProfile ViewOperationThis valve remains closed until the bias is reached at port 1 at which time thepoppet lifts off the seat and allows flow from port 1 to port2.ImportantUpgraded to 350 bar (5000 psi)RATINGS AND SPECIFICATIONSPerformance data is typical with fluid at 21,8 cSt (105 SUS) and 49˚C (120˚F)Typical application pressure (all ports) 350 bar (5000 psi)Cartridge fatigue pressure (infinite life)350 bar (5000 psi) Rated flow45 L/min (12 USgpm) Free flow cracking pressure @ 1 L/min (0.25 USgpm)005– 0,34 bar (5 psi)015– 1,03 bar (15 psi)030– 2,07 bar (30 psi)065– 4,48 bar (65 psi)080– 5,12 bar (80 psi)100– 6,90 bar (100 psi)140– 9,66 bar (140 psi)260– 17,93 bar (260 psi)300– 20,7 bar (300 psi)Internal leakage, Port 2 to 1 5 drops / min. maximum @ 350 bar (5000 psi)Temperature range –40˚ to 120˚C (–40˚ to 248˚F)Cavity C–10–2FluidsAll general purpose hydraulic fluids such as:MIL–H–5606, SAE 10, SAE 20, etc.FiltrationCleanliness code 18/16/13Standard housing materials Aluminum or Steel Weight cartridge only 0,08 kg (0.17 lb)Seal kit565803 Buna–N 566086 Viton ®Viton is a registered trademark of E.I.DuPontPressure Drop CurvesCartridge onlyA - CV1 10*P 000 065 00B - CV1 10*P 000 030 00C - CV1 10*P 000 065 00Model CodeDimensionsmm (inch)Torque cartridge in housing A - 47-54 Nm (35-40 ft. lbs)S - 68-70 Nm (50-55 ft. lbs)FunctionCV1 – Check valve Size 10– 10 Size Seals N – Buna-N V – Viton Style P – PoppetValve housing material 0– Cartridge only A – Aluminum S – SteelPort size00– Cartridge onlyFree flow cracking pressure005– 0,34 bar (5 psi)(Anti-cavitation)015– 1,03 bar (15 psi)030– 2,07 bar (30 psi)065– 4,48 bar (65 psi)080– 5,12 bar (80 psi)100– 6,90 bar (100 psi)140– 9,66 bar (140 psi)260– 17,93 bar (260 psi)300– 20,70 bar (300 psi)Special Features 00– None(Only required if valve has special features - omitted if “00”)87654321CV1 10 * P * ** *** 0012345678CODE PORT SIZEHOUSING NUMBER AluminumAluminum SteelLight DutyFatigue ratedFatigue rated3B 3/8” BSPP 02-175462––6T SAE 6566151–02-1751008T SAE 8––02-1751012G 1/4” BSPP –87670202-1751023G 3/8” BSPP –87670302-1751036H SAE 6–876700–8HSAE 6–876701–See Section J for housing details.CV1-10DescriptionThe CV3-10-P is a poppet type, screw-in cartridge check valve.CV3-10Check valveOperationThis valve remains closed until the spring bias isreached at port 1 at whichtime the poppet lifts off the seat and allows flow from port 1 to port 2.ImportantUpgraded to 350 bar (5000 psi)211Flow - USgpm (105 SUS oil @ 120°F)P r e s s u r e D r o p - p s iP r e s s u r e D r o p - b a r510152001002003004005002040608020ABC1030Flow - L/min (21,8 cSt oil @ 49°F)Functional SymbolSectional ViewRATINGS AND SPECIFICATIONSPerformance data is typical with fluid at 21,8 cSt (105 SUS) and 49˚C (120˚F)Typical application pressure (all ports)350 bar (5000 psi)Cartridge fatigue pressure (infinite life)350 bar (5000 psi)Rated flow76 L/min (20 USgpm)Free flow cracking pressure @1 L/min (0.25 USgpm)003– 0,21 bar (3 psi)010– 0,69 bar (10 psi)020–1,38 bar (20 psi)035 –2,41 bar (35psi)040– 2,76 bar (40 psi)065– 4,48 bar (65 psi)100– 6,90 bar (100 psi)180–12,40 bar (180 psi)210–14,50 bar (210 psi)Internal leakage, Port 2 to 1 5 drops / min. maximum @ 350 bar (5000 psi)Temperature range –40˚ to 120˚C (–40˚ to 248˚F)Cavity C–10–2FluidsAll general purpose hydraulic fluids such asMIL–H–5606, SAE 10, SAE 20, etc.FiltrationCleanliness code 18/16/13Standard housing materials Aluminum or steel Weight cartridge only 0,08 kg (0.17 lb)Seal kit565803 Buna–N 566086 Viton ®Viton is a registered trademark of E.I.DuPontPressure Drop Curves Cartridge onlyA - CV3 10*P 000 210 00B - CV3 10*P 000 040 00C - CV3 10*P 000 003 00FunctionCV3– Check valve Size 10– 10 Size Seals N – Buna-N V – Viton ®Style P – PoppetValve housing material 0– NoneA – Aluminum S – SteelPort size 00–Cartridge onlyFree flow crackingpressure003– 0,21 bar (3 psi)(Anti-cavitation)010– 0,69 bar (10 psi)(Anti-cavitation)020– 1,38 bar (20 psi)035– 2,41 bar (35psi)040– 2,76 bar (40 psi)065– 4,48 bar (65 psi)100– 6,90 bar (100 psi)180– 12,4 bar (180 psi)210– 14,5 bar (210 psi)Special Features 00– None(Only required if valve has special features - omitted if “00”)87654321CV3 10 * P * ** *** 0012678Dimensionsmm (inch)Torque cartridge in housing A - 47-54 Nm (35-40 ft. lbs)S - 68-70 Nm (50-55 ft. lbs)CODE PORT SIZEHOUSING NUMBERAluminumAluminumSteelLight DutyFatigue ratedFatigue rated3B 3/8” BSPP 02–175462––6T SAE 6566151–02–1751008T SAE 8––02–1751012G 1/4” BSPP –87670202–1751023G 3/8” BSPP –87670302–1751036H SAE 6–876700–8H SAE 8–876701–See Section J for housing details.8,0 (0.31)345DescriptionThe CV16-10-P is a poppet type, screw-in cartridge check valve.Check Valve(side in, nose out)OperationThis valve remains closed until the spring bias isreached at port 2 at whichtime the poppet lifts off the seat and allows flow from port 2 to port 1.RATINGS AND SPECIFICATIONSPerformance data is typical with fluid at 21,8 cSt (105 SUS) and 49˚C (120˚F)Typical application pressure (all ports)350 bar (5000 psi)Cartridge fatigue pressure (infinite life) 310 bar (4500 psi)Rated flow76 L/min (20 USgpm)Free flow cracking pressure @1 L/min (0.25 USgpm)5– 0,34 bar (5 psi)15– 1,03 bar (15 psi)25–1,70 bar (25 psi)50– 3,40 bar (50 psi)Internal leakage, Port 2 to 1 5 drops / min. maximum @ 350 bar (5000 psi)Temperature range –40˚ to 120˚C (–40˚ to 248˚F)Cavity C–10–2FluidsAll general purpose hydraulic fluids such as:MIL–H–5606, SAE 10, SAE 20, etc.FiltrationCleanliness code 18/16/13Standard housing materials Aluminum or steel Weight cartridge only 0,08 kg (0.17 lb)Seal kit565803 Buna–N 566086 Viton ®Viton is a registered trademark of E.I.DuPont211Flow - USgpm (105 SUS oil @ 120°F)P r e s s u r e D r o p - p s iP r e s s u r e D r o p - b a rAB1020304050602468101214161830507090110369CDFlow - L/min (21,8 cSt oil @ 49°F)Functional SymbolSectional ViewPressure Drop CurvesCartridge onlyA – CV16-10-P-O-50B – CV16-10-P-O-25C – CV16-10-P-O-15D – CV16-10-P-O-58,0 (0.31)0.875"–14 Thd.Dimensionsmm (inch)Torque cartridge in housingA- 47-54 Nm(35-40 ft. lbs)S- 68-75 Nm(50-55 ft. lbs)FunctionCV16– Check ValveSize10– 10 SizeSealsBlank – Buna-NV– Viton®StyleP– PoppetValve housing materialOmit for cartridge onlyA– AluminumS– SteelPort size0– Cartridge onlyFree flow crackingpressure5– 0,34 bar (5 psi)(Anticavitation)15– 1,03 bar (15 psi)25– 1,70 bar (25 psi)50– 3,40 bar (50 psi)Special Features00– None(Only required if valve hasspecial features - omittedif “00”)87654321CV16 – 10 (V) – P – (*) ** – *** – 00CODE PORT SIZE HOUSING NUMBERAluminum Aluminum SteelLight duty Fatigue rated Fatigue rated3B3/8” BSPP02–175462––6T SAE 6566151–02–1751008T SAE 8––02–1751012G1/4” BSPP–87670202–1751023G3/8” BSPP–87670302–1751036H SAE 6–876700–8H SAE 8–876701–See Section J for housing details.WARNINGand 36,00 (112345678DescriptionThe CV11-12 is a poppet type, screw-in cartridge check valve.Check valveOperationThis valve remains closed until the spring bias isreached at port 1 at whichtime the poppet lifts off the seat and allows flow from port 1 to port 2.RATINGS AND SPECIFICATIONSPerformance data is typical with fluid at 21,8 cSt (105 SUS) and 49˚C (120˚F)Typical application pressure (all ports)350 bar (5000 psi)Cartridge fatigue pressure (infinite life)350 bar (5000 psi)Rated flow114 L/min (30 USgpm)Free flow cracking pressure @ 1 L/min (0.25 USgpm)2.5– 0,17 bar (2.5 psi)5.0– 0,35 bar (5.0 psi)10– 0,69 bar (10 psi)20–1,38 bar (20 psi)40– 2,76 bar (40 psi)80– 5,50 bar (80 psi)160– 11,0 bar (160 psi)Internal leakage, Port 2 to 1 5 drops / min. maximum @ 350 bar (5000 psi)HysteresisLess than 0,35 bar (5 psi)Temperature range –40˚ to 120˚C (–40˚ to 248˚F)Cavity C–12–2 or C–12–2UFluidsAll general purpose hydraulic fluids such as:MIL–H–5606, SAE 10, SAE 20, etc.FiltrationCleanliness code 18/16/13Standard housing materials Aluminum or steel Weight cartridge only 0,24 kg (0.54 lb)Seal kit02–165889 Buna–N 02–165888 Viton ®Viton is a registered trademark of E.I.DuPont211Flow - L/min (21,8 cSt oil @ 49°C)Flow - USgpm (105 SUS oil @ 120°F)P r e s s u r e D r o p - b a r51015202530210080604020501001502002503004681012141618A B CP r e s s u r e D r o p - p s iFunctional SymbolProfile ViewPressure Drop Curves Cartridge onlyA – CV11-12-P-O-80B – CV11-12-P-O-20C – CV11-12-P-O-2.518,91,6 (1.25) hex1.062"–12 Thd.FunctionCV11– Check valve Size 12– 12 Size SealsBlank – Buna-N V – Viton ®Style P – PoppetValve housing material Omit for cartridge only A – Aluminum S – SteelPort size0– Cartridge onlyCavityBlank – Cavity withoutundercutU – Cavity with undercutCracking pressure 2.5 – 0,17 bar (2.5 psi)5.0 – 0,35 bar (5 psi)10 – 0,69 bar (10 psi)20 – 1,38 bar (20 psi)40 – 2,75 bar (40 psi)80 – 5,50 bar (80 psi)160 – 11,0 bar (160 psi)Special Features 00– None(Only required if valve has special features - omitted if “00”)987654321CV11 – 12 (V) – P – (*) *** (U) – ** – 001234567CODE PORT SIZEHOUSING NUMBERC-12-2UC-12-2C-12-2U C-12-2Aluminum Aluminum SteelSteelFatigue ratedFatigue ratedFatigue ratedFatigue rated10T SAE 1002–16064102–16064002–16981702–16974412T SAE 1202–16064502–16064402–16979002–1697824G 1/2” BSPP 02–16111602–16111802–17251202–1720626G3/4” BSPP 02–16111502–16111702–16292202–169665See Section J for housing details.89Dimensionsmm (inch)Torque cartridge in housing A - 81-95 Nm (60-70 ft. lbs)S - 102-115 Nm (75-85 ft. lbs)Check ValveRATINGS AND SPECIFICATIONSPerformance data is typical with fluid at 21,8 cSt (105 SUS) and 49˚C (120˚F)Typical application pressure (all ports)210 bar (3000 psi)Cartridge fatigue pressure (infinite life)210 bar (3000 psi)Rated flow151 L/min (40 USgpm)Free flow cracking pressure @1 L/min (0.25 USgpm)5– 0,34 bar (5 psi)20– 1,34 bar (20 psi)30– 2,07 bar (30 psi)40– 2,67 bar (40 psi)50– 3,45 bar (50 psi)100– 6,90 bar (100 psi)Internal leakage, Port 2 to 1 5 drops / min. maximum @ 210 bar (3000 psi)Temperature range –40˚ to 120˚C (–40˚ to 248˚F)Cavity C–16–2FluidsAll general purpose hydraulic fluids such as:MIL–H–5606, SAE 10, SAE 20, etc.FiltrationCleanliness code 18/16/13Standard housing materials Aluminum Weight cartridge only 0,26 kg (0.58 lb)Seal kit565810 Buna–N 889609 Viton ®Viton is a registered trademark of E.I.DuPont211Flow - USgpm (105 SUS oil @ 120°F)Flow - L/min (21,8 cSt oil @ 49°F)P r e s s u r e D r o p - p s iP r e s s u r e D r o p - b a r10203040025507510012540801201602468ABCDescriptionThe CV1-16-P is a poppet type, screw-in cartridge check valve.OperationThis valve remains closed until the spring bias isreached at port 1 at whichtime the poppet lifts off the seat and allows flow from port 1 to port 2.Functional SymbolSectional ViewPressure Drop CurvesCartridge onlyA – CV1-16-P-O-50B – CV1-16-P-O-20C – CV1-16-P-O-5Dimensionsmm (inch)Torque cartridge in aluminum housing108-122 Nm (80-90 ft. lbs)FunctionCV1– Check Valve Size 16– 16 Size SealsBlank – Buna-N V – Viton ®Style P – PoppetPort size0– Cartridge only54321CV1 – 16 (V) – P *** – ** – 001234567GDescriptionThe CV2-20-P is a poppet type, screw-in cartridge check valve.Check valveOperationThis valve remains closed until the spring bias isreached at port 1 at whichtime the poppet lifts off the seat and allows flow from port 1 to port 2.RATINGS AND SPECIFICATIONSPerformance data is typical with fluid at 21,8 cSt (105 SUS) and 49˚C (120˚F)Typical application pressure (all ports) 210 bar (3000 psi)Cartridge fatigue pressure (infinite life) 210 bar (3000 psi)Rated flow227 L/min (60 USgpm)Free flow cracking pressure @1 L/min (0.25 USgpm)5– 0,34 bar (5 psi)15– 1,03 bar (15 psi)30– 2,07 bar (30 psi)60– 4,14 bar (60 psi)100– 6,90 bar (100 psi)Internal leakage, Port 2 to 1 5 drops / min. maximum @210 bar (3000 psi)Temperature range –40˚ to 120˚C (–40˚ to 248˚F)Cavity C–20–2FluidsAll general purpose hydraulic fluids such as:MIL–H–5606, SAE 10, SAE 20, etc.FiltrationCleanliness code 18/16/13Standard housing materials Aluminum Weight cartridge only 0,49 kg (1.09 lb)Seal kit889615 Buna–N 889619 Viton ®Viton is a registered trademark of E.I.DuPont211Flow - USgpm (105 SUS oil @ 120°F)P r e s s u r e D r o p - p s i P r e s s u r e D r o p - b a r10203040255075100125408015050602468120160200240ABC10Flow - L/min (21,8 cSt oil @ 49°F)Functional SymbolSectional ViewPressure Drop CurvesCartridge onlyA – CV2-20-P-O-100B – CV2-20-P-O-30C – CV2-20-P-O-5。
keithley Connectors
2600-KIT
2600-TRIAX
3706-BKPL 3720-ST 3721-ST 3723-ST 3723-ST-1 3724-ST 3730-ST 3731-ST 3740-ST 3750-ST 3790-KIT50-R 3791-CIT 3791-KIT78-R 3792-KIT104-R 3792-KIT104-R/F 4851 6171
7078-HCT 7078-KIT 7078-MTR
7078-TRX-BNC
7078-TRX-GND
7078-TRX-TBC
7152-HCT 7152-KIT 7152-MTR 7703-306A 7709-308A 7712-SMA-N 7755 7788
7789
7790
8610 8620 8680
ACCESSORIES
1.888.KEITHLEY (U.S. only) w w w.
A GREATER MEASURE OF CONFIDENCE
Connectors, Adapters, and Tools
Model
BG-18 CAP-18 CAP-31 CS-400 CS-458 CS-565 CS-630
2-lug triax connectors
2-slot Male to 3-Lug Female Triax Adapter
7065, 2500INT
Model
7001-PNL 7011-KIT-R
7011-MTR 7011-ST 7012-ST 7013-ST 7014-ST 7015-ST 7018-ST 7074-CIT 7074-HCT 7078-CIT
LLC谐振变换器参数计算
LLC变换器谐振参数计算1概述现有的LLC设计是基于基波分析(FHA)进行的，就是说，谐振槽输入的方波中，只有开关频率的基波在传输能量，其他高次谐波忽略不计。
按基波分析法，在一个开关周期中，电感L m一直在参与谐振。
图1所示是全桥LLC在f s<f r的谐振槽电流波形。
t0~t1期间，L m被钳位在NV o，只有L r、C r参与谐振。
t1~t2期间，变压器副边断开，L m参与谐振。
所以基波分析法用于LLC有误差， f s离f r越远误差越大。
在输入掉电、输出有“保持时间”要求的场合，希望能精确计算出LLC最低输入电压对应的最低开关频率，以便设置最低频率限制，确保LLC谐振槽始终工作在感性区域，而非容性区域。
这时，由于f s≪f r，使用基波分析法算出的最低频率会有很大的误差。
图1 全桥LLC以及谐振槽电流波形，f s<f rf s>f r L m NV o t0~t1L r C rV in−NV o t1~t2V in+NV o分析f s>f rLLC进入轻载打嗝的频率。
图2 LLC谐振槽电流，f s>f r本文基于根轨迹法对LLC谐振变换器进行了详细的分析，讲解了谐振参数的设计、以及开关频率的精确计也就确定了。
L m参与谐振算。
根据本文的分析可以知道，最低开关频率相对于谐振频率的比率定好后，K=L mL r时，谐振槽电流I r等于流经L m的电流I m，I m的大小决定了谐振参数。
MOS能否实现ZVS开通，不仅取决于上下管换相时的I m，还受制于此时L m的电压是否被钳位。
基于本文介绍的方法编制了LLC设计的Mathcad计算单，并有LLC仿真电路配合大家的设计，该仿真电路可以在Pspice-for-TI环境下运行。
Pspice-for-TI可以从TI网站免费下载。
2谐振槽的根轨迹对于图3所示的LC谐振电路，如果以谐振电容电压v C(t)为横坐标、R0i L(t)为纵坐标，电流和电压变化的轨迹是一个圆：V m2=(R0i L(t))2+(v C(t)−V tank)2，V tank是谐振槽电压、i L(t)是谐振电感电流，v C(t)是谐振电容电压，V m是电容上电压其中：R o=√L rC r的波动幅值。
Another Look at HMQV
ANOTHER LOOK AT HMQVALFRED MENEZESAbstract.The HMQV protocols are‘hashed variants’of the MQV key agree-ment protocols.They were recently introduced by Krawczyk,who claimed thatthe HMQV protocols have very significant advantages over their MQV coun-terparts:(i)security proofs under reasonable assumptions in the(extended)Canetti-Krawczyk model for key exchange;and(ii)superior performance insome situations.In this paper we demonstrate that the HMQV protocols are insecure by presenting realistic attacks in the Canetti-Krawczyk model that recover a vic-tim’s static private key.We propose HMQV-1,patched versions of the HMQVprotocols that resists our attacks(but do not have any performance advantagesover MQV).We also identify some fallacies in the security proofs for HMQV,critique the security model,and raise some questions about the assurancesthat proofs in this model can provide.1.IntroductionThe MQV protocols[27]are a family of efficient Diffie-Hellman authenticated protocols that have been widely standardized[2,3,18,19,36].The two-pass proto-col in this family(which is what the term“the MQV protocol”sometimes refers to) provides implicit key authentication.A three-pass variant adds key confirmation, thus providing explicit key authentication,while a one-pass variant is useful for ap-plications such as email where only the sender may be online.The protocols were designed to meet a variety of security goals even in the presence of active attacks.The security of the MQV protocols has been intensively studied since1995. However,until recently there was no attempt to‘prove’that the protocols actually meet their security objectives.In a recent paper(see[25]and the expanded version [26]),Krawczyk undertook the ambitious task of trying to prove the security of the MQV protocols in the Canetti-Krawczyk model for key exchange[13,14,15].This model provides a formal security definition by carefully specifying the capabilities and goals of an attacker.Krawczyk’s analysis of MQV[25,26]resulted in his concluding that“...MQV falls to a variety of attacks in[the Canetti-Krawczyk]model that invalidate its basic security as well as many of its stated security goals”and“...raises clear concerns about the security of the protocol...”He then proceeded to modify the MQV protocols to produce HMQV,a‘hashed variant’that“...provides the same superb performance and functionality of the original protocol but for which all the MQV security goals can be formally proved to hold in the random oracle model under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption.”Date:June27,2005;updated on Jul1,5,6,Aug8,and Nov2,2005.12ALFRED MENEZESThe HMQV protocols are no less efficient than their MQV counterparts because the additional hashing performed takes negligible time compared to the group ex-ponentiations.In fact,the HMQV protocols are significantly faster in some cases because they dispense with the potentially expensive public-key validations that are mandated in MQV.An important result stated in[25,26]is that this performance improvement of HMQV is proven not to affect security in any way.We show in§2of this paper that the omission of public-key validation in the HMQV protocols is a fatal security weakness.We accomplish this by presenting small-subgroup attacks that let an attacker recover a victim’s static private key.Our attacks on the HMQV protocols are more realistic and have much more damaging consequences than any of the proposed attacks on MQV in[25,26].Our attacks can be circumvented by requiring that all public keys be validated,leading to new variants of the HMQV protocols that we call Patched HMQV(HMQV-1).As a consequence of reinstating public-key validation,the HMQV-1protocols no longer have any performance advantages over their MQV counterparts.We also present an unknown-key share attack on the one-pass HMQV-1protocol which demonstrates a deficiency in the binding between the identities of the communicating parties and the key derivation.In§3we identify someflaws in the security proofs given in[26].We critique some aspects of the Canetti-Krawczyk model,and discuss the difficulty of obtaining security reductions in this model that are meaningful in practice.In§4the purported attacks on MQV that were listed in[25,26]are analyzed and critiqued.The paper concludes with some remarks in§5.2.The HMQV key agreement protocolsLet G be a multiplicatively-written abelian group of order N,and let G= g be a subgroup of G of prime order q.We call G the main group and G the supergroup.The integer h=N/q is called the cofactor.We assume that gcd(h,q)=1,from which it follows that G is the unique subgroup of G having order q.The fundamental security requirement that determines the suitability of a group for implementing Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocols is that the discrete logarithm problem(DLP)in G should be intractable.Groups arising fromfinite fields and from elliptic curves are the only ones presently in widespread use.Infinitefield systems,G is the multiplicative group Z∗p of a primefield Z p and G is the subgroup of order q for some prime divisor q of p−1.As in DSA,the primes p and q are usually chosen so that the bitlength of q is considerably smaller than that of p.This is because the DLP in Z∗p can be solved using index-calculus methods whose running times are subexponential in p,whereas the best algorithms known for solving the DLP directly in G have running time O(√q).If p and q are selected in this way,then the cofactor h is much larger than q.For example,to achieve an80-bit security level1against discrete logarithm attacks,one might take the bitlengths of p and q to be1024and160,respectively;in this case the cofactor h has bitlength about864.1A k-bit security level means that an attacker is expected to expend at least2k effort before it can solve a computational problem or defeat the security objectives of a protocol.ANOTHER LOOK AT HMQV3 In elliptic curve systems,G is the group of points E(L)on an elliptic curve E defined over afinitefield L,and G is a subgroup of E(L)of prime order q.2Elliptic curves of(almost)prime order can be easily found,so in practice the cofactor h is very small.For example,the15NIST-recommended elliptic curves[17]have h=1,2or4.2.1.Protocol descriptions.The least non-negative residue of an integer x mod-ulo t is denoted by x t.The following notation is from[26]and will be used throughout this paper.ˆA,ˆB Identities of two communicating parties.a,b Static private keys ofˆA andˆB;a,b∈R[1,q−1].A,B Static public keys ofˆA andˆB;A=g a,B=g b.x,y Ephemeral private keys ofˆA andˆB;x,y∈R[1,q−1].X,Y Ephemeral public keys ofˆA andˆB;X=g x,Y=g y.H A hash function.H An l-bit hash function,where l=( log2q +1)/2.MAC Message authentication code algorithm.K m MAC key.K Session key.The identitiesˆA andˆB may also include certificates for their respective static public keys.2.1.1.Description of two-pass HMQV.The parties exchange their identifiers and ephemeral public keys.That is,ˆA sends(ˆA,ˆB,X)toˆB,whileˆB sends(ˆB,ˆA,Y) toˆA.ThenˆA checks3that Y=0and computes the shared secret(1)σˆA=(Y B e)x+da,whileˆB checks that X=0and computes(2)σˆB=(XA d)y+eb,where(3)d=H(X,ˆB)and e=H(Y,ˆA).Notice thatσˆA=σˆB=g(x+da)(y+eb),and so both parties can compute the session key K=H(σˆA)=H(σˆB).2.1.2.Description of three-pass HMQV.Three-pass HMQV adds key confirmation to the two-pass HMQV protocol.After receiving(ˆA,ˆB,X)from the initiatorˆA, the responderˆB checks that X=0,computesσˆB,K m=H(σˆB,0),K=H(σˆB,1),(“1”))toˆA.Upon receipt of this message,ˆA checks and sends(ˆB,ˆA,Y,MAC Kmthat Y=0,computesσˆA,K m=H(σˆA,0),K=H(σˆB,1).ˆA verifies the MAC tag(“0”)toˆB.Finally,ˆB verifies the latter MAC tag. received,and sends MAC Km2The elliptic curve group law is usually written additively,but in this paper we shall use multiplicative notation for the sake of consistency.3If G is the multiplicative group of afinitefield,then the element0in checks such as“Y=0”refers to the zero element of thefinitefield.However,since the HMQV protocols are described for generic cyclic groups G ,such checks are not well defined since it is not clear what is meant by the element“0”.4ALFRED MENEZES2.1.3.Description of one-pass HMQV.In one-pass key agreement protocols,only the sender can contribute an ephemeral public key.In one-pass HMQV,the sender ˆA transmits the single message(ˆA,ˆB,X)toˆB.Let d=H(X,ˆA,ˆB).The sessionkey computed byˆA is K=H(B x+da),whileˆB computes the same key(after checking that X=0)as K=H((XA d)b).2.2.The insecurity of HMQV.We present‘small-subgroup attacks’on all three versions of HMQV described in§2.1.The adversary’s actions in all these attacks are legitimate in that they are allowable within the Canetti-Krawczyk security model (cf.§3.1).The attacks have the most damaging consequences possible since the attacker is able to learn the victim’s static private key.Our attacks exploit the omission in the HMQV protocols of public-key validation of static and ephemeral public keys.That is,the receiver of an element X does not take any steps to verify that X is indeed an element of order q in the main group G–the only required check is X=0.Also,a certification authority who issues a certificate to partyˆA for its static public key A does not take any steps to verify that A is an element of order q in G.These omissions are by design rather than by accident.They are desirable because the parties and certification authority do not have to perform costly exponentiations by q to verify that a supergroup element is also in G,and also because some certification authorities may not be configured to do such tests[26].In[26]proofs are claimed that all three versions of HMQV are secure without these checks.Our attacks demonstrate that the security proofs must be fallacious.Some errors in the proofs will be identified in§3.2.2.2.1.Attack on one-pass HMQV.The attackerˆA,who wishes to learnˆB’s static private key,selects an elementγ∈G of order t for some small prime divisor t=q of N.(Recall that N is the order of the supergroup G .)Here by‘small’we mean thatˆA can feasibly perform t group operations and hash function evaluations.The attacker selects a∈[1,t−1],and obtains a certificate for her static public key A=γa.She then selects x∈[1,t−1],computes X=γx,and sends(ˆA,ˆB,X) toˆB.Upon receipt,ˆB verifies that X=0and computes the session key K= H((XA d)b)=H((γx+da)b)where d=H(X,ˆA,ˆB).Next,ˆA learns K by issuing a session-key query4and computesβ=γx+da.ˆA then computes K =H(βc)for c=0,1,2,...,t−1until K =K.When the latter condition is met,ˆA knows that c= b t.After repeating this procedure for several different primes t,the value b can be easily determined by the Chinese Remainder Theorem.2.2.2.Feasibility of the attack.Wefirst note that session-key queries are allowable in the Canetti-Krawczyk model.However,in practiceˆA may not even have to issue a session-key query.For example,ifˆB were to subsequently sendˆA an authenticated message(m,T=MAC K(m)),thenˆA could determine b t by iteratively computing K =H(βc)and T =MAC K (m)for c=0,1,2,...until T =T.As before,ˆA then deduces that c= b t.Is it reasonable to expect that N/q has several small prime factors?In the case of DSA-like parameters,the cofactor h=(p−1)/q is large and thus one can expect it to have several small prime factors if p and q were randomly generated.However, 4A well-designed key agreement protocol should achieve its security goals even if an attacker is able to learn some session keys.This is because a key agreement protocol cannot guarantee that session keys won’t be subsequently used in insecure applications(e.g.,to encrypt messages with a weak symmetric-key encryption scheme).ANOTHER LOOK AT HMQV5 if it happens that(p−1)/q does not have several small prime factors,the extremecase occurring when(p−1)/q is twice a prime,then the attack cannot be mounted.In the case of elliptic curve groups,we have noted that the cofactor h is verysmall,and sometimes h=1,so the attack as described above will generally fail.However,ˆA has the option of mounting an invalid-curve attack[4]which we describenext.Suppose that G =E(L)where E is an elliptic curve defined over afinitefield L.The attacker selects an elliptic curve E defined over L whose Weierstrassequation y2+a1xy+a3y=x3+a2x2+a4x+a6differs from E’s only in the coefficienta6,and such that the order of E (L)contains a prime factor t of the desired size.Then,as observed by Biehl,Meyer and M¨u ller[9],the usual formulas for addingpoints in E(L)do not involve a6and thus are identical to the formulas for addingpoints in E (L).IfˆA selects order-t points X,A∈E (L)andˆB does not checkwhether X,A∈E(L),thenˆB will successfully compute(XA d)b∈E (L)and the attack can proceed as before.Unlike in the case of DSA-like groups,the invalid-curve attack with elliptic curves is certain to succeed since there is an abundanceof elliptic curves over L with group orders divisible by small primes.We note that E (L)is not a supergroup of the main group of E(L).One couldperhaps argue that the HMQV specification implicitly required a recipient of anelement X to check that it belongs to the supergroup E(L),thus thwarting theattack.However,we maintain that it is reasonable to suppose that this check isnot likely to be performed since points in E (L)are represented in the same wayas points in E(L),5and since the HMQV specification[26]explicitly states that nochecks are required other than X=0.2.2.3.Attack on two-pass HMQV.As in the attack on one-pass HMQV,the at-tackerˆA selects an elementγ∈G of order t,selects a static public key A=γa,and sends an ephemeral public key X=γx toˆB.WhileˆB is computing the ses-sion key,ˆA issues a state-reveal query6and learnsˆB’s ephemeral private key y.AfterˆB has computedβ=XA d and the session key K=H(βy+eb),ˆA learnsK via a session-key query.NowˆA can obtain c= b t by iteratively computingK =H(βy+ec)for c=0,1,2,...until K =K.This attack is not as realistic as the attack on one-pass HMQV since a state-reveal query is required.Nonetheless,it is relevant to our analysis of the claims in[26],which include the author’s claim to have proven resistance of two-pass HMQVto damage from leakage of ephemeral private keys.7ttice attack on two-pass HMQV.The attack in§2.2.3assumes thatˆBdoes not reduce the exponent y+eb prior to computingβy+eb.This assumption isreasonable because the HMQV specification does not require y+eb to be reduced.Moreover,it is not at all clear howˆB should reduce y+eb because the order ofβisunknown toˆB(since X and A are not validated as belonging to the main group G5For example,if L=F2m,then a point in E(L)or E (L)is represented by a pair of bitstringsof length m.6State-reveal queries capture the possibility of an attacker learning some secret information such as ephemeral private keys that are specific to a particular session.Such queries do not reveal static private keys.7In[25,26],the author points out that resistance of Diffie-Hellman protocols to damage from the disclosure of ephemeral private keys is‘a prime security concern’.This is because many applications can be expected to precompute ephemeral pairs(x,X)and(y,Y)in order to improve performance,and these stored pairs become more vulnerable to disclosure.6ALFRED MENEZESof order q ).Nonetheless,one can expect that ˆB will reduce the exponent y +eb in order to accelerate the computation of βy +eb .So,let us suppose that ˆBcomputes βs where s = y +eb q .Then the following small-subgroup attack can be mounted.The attacker ˆA selects A =γa and X =γx ,where γ∈G has order t =2r for some small r (e.g.,r =6).ˆA then learns y and K =H (βs )through state-reveal and session-key queries,respectively.Now,ˆAcan determine s t by exhaustive search,thereby obtaining the r least significant bits of s .After repeating this procedure a few times (e.g.,30times),ˆAcan use the lattice attack of Leadbitter and Smart 8[28](see also [30])to find the f/2most significant bits of b ;here f is the bitlength of q .The remaining f/2bits of b can then be found in O (q 1/4)steps using Pollard’s lambda method [33].2.2.5.Attacks on three-pass HMQV.The attacks on three-pass HMQV are similar to the ones on two-pass HMQV in §2.2.3and §2.2.4except that a session-key query is not needed.This is because ˆA learns MAC K m(“1”)from ˆB ’s response,and can use this tag to recognize a correct guess for b t or s t .2.3.Patched HMQV (HMQV-1).Our small-subgroup attacks on the HMQV protocols are thwarted if public keys are validated as mandated in MQV [27].That is,the certification authority should verify that a party’s static public key A is indeed an element of order q in the main group G before issuing a certificate.Similarly,the recipient of an ephemeral public key X should verify that X is an element of order q in G before proceeding with the next step of the protocol.If the cofactor h is small,as is the case with elliptic curve groups,the com-putational cost of ephemeral public-key validation can be reduced significantly by requiring only that the recipient ˆB of X verify that X ∈G and that σh ˆB =1before computing the session key H (σh ˆB ).9This process is called ‘embedded’public-key validation in [27].2.4.Unknown-key share attack on one-pass HMQV-1.In an unknown-key share (UKS)attack,first formulated by Diffie,van Oorschot and Wiener [16],an adversary interferes with ˆA ’s and ˆB ’s communications.The result is that ˆA and ˆB still compute the same session key.However,even though ˆA correctly believes the key is shared with ˆB ,ˆB mistakenly believes that the key is shared with a third party ˆC∈{ˆA,ˆB }.One-pass HMQV-1succumbs to the following online UKS attack;such attacks were first mounted by Kaliski on the two-pass MQV protocol [21].Party ˆA trans-mits the message (ˆA,ˆB,X )and computes the session key K =H (B x +da ).The mes-sage is intercepted by the adversary ˆC ,who selects an arbitrary integer u ∈[1,q −1]and computes X =XA d g −u ,d =H (X ,ˆC,ˆB ),and C =g u (d )−1mod q .ˆC reg-isters C as her static public key (with c =u (d )−1mod q being the corresponding static private key),and then transmits (ˆC,ˆB,X )to ˆB .Note that X and C are valid public keys.Party ˆBthen computes the shared secret (X C d )b =(XA d g −u (g u (d )−1)d )b =(XA d g −u g u )b =(XA d )b =B x +da .8The Leadbitter-Smart lattice attack does not require complete knowledge of y ;it only needs the r least significant bits of y .9Thus,contrary to what is stated in [26],it is not the case that ephemeral public-key validation is always as costly as a full exponentiation in G .ANOTHER LOOK AT HMQV7 ThusˆB computes the same session key K asˆA,even thoughˆB believes that the key is shared withˆC.A similar UKS attack can also be mounted on the variant of one-pass HMQV-1suggested in[26,Remark9.2]wherebyˆA andˆB compute the shared secret as (BB e)x+da and(XA d)b+eb respectively,where d=H(X,ˆA,ˆB)and e=H(B,ˆB,ˆA). To mount the attack,the adversaryˆC interceptsˆA’s message(ˆA,ˆB,X)and re-places it with(ˆC,ˆB,X )where X =(XA d g−u)(1+e)(1+e )−1,e =H(B,ˆB,ˆC), d =H(X ,ˆC,ˆB),and C=g u(d )−1(1+e)(1+e )−1.Once again,ˆA andˆB compute the same session key even thoughˆB believes that the key is shared withˆC.These UKS attacks illustrate the unsuitability of one-pass HMQV-1for use as an authenticated CCA encryption scheme or as a verifier-specific signature scheme as described in[26].The UKS attacks are thwarted if the identifiersˆA andˆB are included in the key derivation function,i.e.,K=H(σ,ˆA,ˆB).3.Critique of the formal analysis in[26]Formal analysis of a cryptographic protocol entails the following steps.(i)(security model)Providing a clear specification of the capabilities of anadversary and how it interacts with honest parties.(ii)(security definition)Providing a clear description of the goals of the adver-sary.(iii)(security proof)Proving that the only way an adversary can meet its goals is by solving a computational problem that is widely believed to be in-tractable.The proof in step(iii)typically takes the form of a reduction,whereby one shows how a(hypothetical)adversary who succeeds in its task can be used to solve the hard computational problem with little additional effort.10The declaration that a cryptographic protocol is‘provably secure’should always be met with a healthy dose of skepticism.First,one should verify that the security model and definition are the‘right’ones,i.e.,they accurately capture the capabil-ities of attackers that one could expect in the environments in which the protocol will eventually be deployed.Second,the proof should be checked for correctness. This step is notoriously difficult since the proofs are typically long,complicated, and often poorly written.History has shown that subtleflaws may take years to be discovered.Indeed,Stern[37]has proposed adding a validation step to any security proof:Also,the fact that proofs themselves need time to be validatedthrough public discussion was somehow overlooked.Finally,one should carefully consider what the proof actually means,i.e.,what assurances are actually provided when the protocol is deployed.This step involves examining the reasonableness of the stated assumptions,and performing a concrete security analysis.The next paragraph elaborates on this last point.About ten years ago,Bellare and Rogaway(see[5])developed the notion of “practice-oriented provable security”.As a result of their work there was a greater awareness of the need to quantify the aforementioned‘additional effort’expended in a security reduction.The measure of this additional effort,obtained through a 10The effort includes the number of times the adversary is invoked;here we are thinking of the adversary as a computer program.8ALFRED MENEZESconcrete(non-asymptotic)security analysis,could then be used to provide concrete recommendations about keylengths.If the additional effort is relatively small,then the reduction is said to be tight and the security of the protocol is closely linked to the hardness of the related computational problem.For example,if there is a tight reduction from the DLP in a group G to the breaking of a protocol,then the protocol attains an80-bit security level if the parameters for G are selected so that the best algorithms known for solving the DLP in G take about280operations. On the other hand,a non-tight reduction only assures us that the protocol has an80-bit security level if the parameters for G are selected so that the best DLP solvers require significantly more than280operations.The latter assurance can be achieved only by using significantly larger group parameters,a direct consequence of which is slower performance.In the remainder of this section we provide a critique of various aspects of the HMQV security proofs given in[26].3.1.Security model and definition.In a series of papers,Canetti and Krawczyk [13,14,15]carefully developed security models and definitions for key establish-ment.Their model corrected shortcomings in previous attempts(e.g.,[8,10,6,35]), and at present is widely accepted as being the‘right’one.In the Canetti-Krawczyk model,the attacker controls all communications be-tween honest parties.Through‘corrupt’,‘session-key’and‘state-reveal’queries, she is even able to learn the static private keys of some parties,learn session keys, and learn certain secret information that is associated with a particular session.Her goal is to learn something about a session key that she cannot deduce by trivial means(e.g.through a session-key query).The thesis is that the Canetti-Krawczyk model captures all realistic attacks in an open network such as the Internet.However,one should be careful not to be lulled into a false sense of security since there may be desirable security attributes which are not adequately addressed by the model.As an example,consider the case of key-compromise impersonation(KCI)at-tacks.In these attacks,first studied by Just and Vaudenay[20],the adversary learns a partyˆA’s static private key and then tries to impersonate another honest partyˆB toˆA.Resistance to KCI attacks is important in situations where an at-tacker wishes to obtain some information possessed byˆA,who is only willing to divulge this information toˆB(and where the attacker is not able to obtainˆB’s static private key).The Canetti-Krawczyk model did not cover resistance to KCI attacks,and hence protocols proved secure in the model have to be examined on a case-by-case basis for KCI resistance.For example,the ISO[13]and SIGMA[24] protocols would appear to resist KCI attacks,while the Boyd-Mao-Paterson[11] protocol does not.This deficiency in the Canetti-Krawczyk model has apparently been addressed by Krawczyk[26].Another deficiency of the Canetti-Krawczyk model is that it does not account for the security of a session for which a state-reveal query has been issued—only the security of other sessions is considered.This deficiency was recognized in[26] where the security of HMQV session keys that were derived using compromised ephemeral private keys is analyzed.One should also be aware that the Canetti-Krawczyk model does not account for most kinds of secret-information leakage,e.g.,partial information about the static private key that may be obtainable through side-channel attacks that analyze powerANOTHER LOOK AT HMQV9 consumption[23]or electromagnetic radiation[1].An example of an attack on MQV (and HMQV-1)that is not considered in the Canetti-Krawczyk model is the side-channel attack of Leadbitter and Smart[28](cf.§2.2.4)whereby a static private key b can be deduced from the least significant bits of some ephemeral private keys y and the least significant bits of the associated secret values s= y+eb q.Krawczyk[26]states that the potentially expensive procedure of ephemeral public-key validation can be omitted if one is certain that private keys y are never revealed.However,as observed in§2.2.4,a small-subgroup attack that recovers the static private key b can be launched on two-pass and three-pass HMQV if the attacker can learn a small number of the least significant bits of each ephemeral secret y.Hence,omitting public-key validation makes two-pass and three-pass HMQV more vulnerable to side-channel attacks since an attacker only needs to obtain the least significant bits of y through a side channel.(The least significant bits of the associated secret values s do not have to be gathered using a side chan-nel,but instead can be deduced using the method described in§2.2.4.)Thus the performance improvement that can be achieved by omitting public-key validation does not seem justifiable,especially in the case of elliptic curve groups where the cost of embedded public-key validation is negligible(cf.§2.3).It is interesting that our conclusion about the performance-security trade-offfor public-key validation in two-pass and three-pass HMQV,which is based on concrete cryptanalysis and other practical considerations,is different from the conclusion derived from the proof-driven design methodology of[26].The state-reveal query is indeed useful for modeling some realistic scenarios such as the loss of ephemeral private keys.However,in the Canetti-Krawczyk model each item that is the result of some intermediate calculation involving secret data must be specified as either being in highly secure memory(whose contents are only accessible via a corrupt query),or belonging to less-secure memory(whose contents are accessible via either a state-reveal query or a corrupt query).This distinction is potentially misleading because implementors may be lulled by a provable security result into thinking that there is no possible risk in performing certain calculations in less-secure memory,and this may increase their exposure to side-channel and other attacks.3.2.The proofs.The HMQV security proof in[26]has two steps.First,an‘ex-ponential challenge-response’signature scheme XCR is defined and proven secure under the computational Diffie-Hellman(CDH)assumption.Second,the security of XCR(actually a‘dual’version of XCR)is proven to imply the security of HMQV. The reduction in thefirst step is relatively straightforward,but the second reduction is extremely long and complicated.In the XCR scheme,a verifierˆA selects x∈R[0,q−1]and sends the challenge X=g x and a message m to the signerˆB.ˆB responds by selecting y∈R[0,q−1] and sending the signature(Y=g y,σ=X y+eb)toˆA where e=H(Y,m)and(B,b) isˆB’s static key pair.The signature is accepted byˆA provided that Y=0and σ=(Y B e)x.XCR signatures are different from ordinary digital signatures.In particular,ˆA cannot convince a third party thatˆB generated a signature(Y,σ)for message m and challenge X becauseˆA could have generated this signature herself.The HCR signature scheme[26]is a slight variant of XCR where the second signature component is hashed;i.e.,ˆB’s HCR signature is(Y,H(σ))instead of (Y,σ).The HCR scheme is proven secure under the Gap Diffie-Hellman(GDH)。
硼中子俘获治疗技术的研究进展及突破关键
硼中子俘获治疗技术的研究进展及突破关键摘要：介绍了硼中子俘获疗法（BNCT）治疗恶性肿瘤的原理及特点，分析了BNCT疗法的优势、试治的成就以及面临的主要挑战，并从三个方面展望了BNCT技术的未来前景。
关键词：硼中子俘获治疗恶性肿瘤发展前景引言硼中子俘获治疗（Boron Neutron Capture Therapy，BNCT）概念首先由美国生物物理学家Locher于1936年提出，其原理为[1]：将10B结合到L-对硼酰基苯丙氨酸（BPA）或巯基十二硼烷二钠盐（BSH）中形成含硼化合物，注入患者体内后，该化合物特异浓集在肿瘤内。
然后用中子束照射该部位，中子被10B 原子核俘获，生成不稳定的复合核11B，11B再自发分裂成一个1.78 MeV的α粒子和一个1.01MeV的7Li核（反应截面6.3%）；或者一个1.47MeV的α粒子和一个0.84MeV的7Li核并发射一个0.48MeV的光子（反应截面93.7%），其反应式为：因7Li及粒子的能量较高，具有高线性能量转换（LET）和低氧增强比的特性，可有效地杀死肿瘤细胞。
而目前采用较多的放疗手段（X射线、γ射线、电子和快中子等），人体组织内剂量分布随深度呈指数衰减，因此，在杀死肿瘤细胞的同时，处在射线通道上的健康组织同样会受到较大损伤。
同常规放疗相比，BNCT疗法具有独特的优势：①中子的穿透性比质子和重离子好，能够治疗深部肿瘤，和质子和重离子治疗机相比，其造价低廉，只有1/10以下；②发挥治疗作用的7Li 和α粒子，在组织内的射程约10微米，相当于一个细胞直径范围，故只能杀死单个肿瘤细胞，而对周围正常细胞基本无影响；③含硼药物可以在细胞水平上选择肿瘤和非肿瘤细胞，极大地提高了BNCT疗效；1 BNCT技术进展回顾尽管硼中子俘获治疗BNCT概念从提出迄今接近八十年了，但限于技术条件和对治疗原理理解的不透彻，临床进展十分缓慢。
上世纪50年代实施了首例NCT临床试治；70年代，由于改进了硼药物的性能以及解决了热中子源的问题，BNCT治疗效果有了显著提高，进入临床试治阶段；80年代后期，日本医学界采用外科手术和BNCT相结合的方法治疗恶性脑肿瘤，五年存活率高达40%；90年代，美国的coderre等人用BPA药物治疗9例神经胶质瘤患鼠取得非常理想的效果；当前，世界上有美国、日本、芬兰、荷兰、澳大利亚等国的学者在开展BNCT的研究，其中美国和日本的研究最有成效，相继做过上百例的临床试验。
过表达白鳍鲨硒结合蛋白1对HL-7702
网络出版时间：2013-12-23 14:30网络出版地址：/kcms/doi/10.11844/cjcb.2014.01.0223.html中国细胞生物学学报 Chinese Journal of Cell Biology 2014, 36(1):DOI: 10.11844/cjcb.2014.01.0223过表达白鳍鲨硒结合蛋白1对HL-7702细胞镉胁迫的解毒作用王勇1*何曼文2孙艳梅2刘琼1(1深圳大学生命科学学院, 深圳市海洋生物资源与生态环境重点实验室, 深圳 518060;2深圳大学生命科学学院, 深圳市微生物基因工程重点实验室, 深圳 518060)摘要硒结合蛋白1(Selenium-binding protein 1, SBP1)与肿瘤相关, 并可以与重金属镉直接结合。
该研究构建了白鳍鲨SBP1重组质粒Myc-SBP1并转染人HL-7702细胞, 利用CCK-8和CFDA SE检测Cd胁迫下的细胞增殖情况, 利用流式细胞仪检测细胞内ROS的水平。
结果显示, 过表达白鳍鲨SBP1可拮抗Cd对HL-7702细胞的毒害作用。
在100 µmol/L的CdCl2应激下, 表达SBP1组存活率为76.4%, 约为对照组存活率的2倍, 实验组的细胞增殖指数和分裂能力也略高于对照组。
一级结构分析表明, 白鳍鲨SBP1具有两个C XX C区域, 为抗氧化位点, 具有2个H×D和3个H××H保守区域, 它们为推测的Cd结合位点, 为在HL-7702细胞中表达白鳍鲨SBP1蛋白能拮抗Cd的结构基础。
此外,ROS检测实验表明白鳍鲨SBP1蛋白能显著降低胞内ROS水平, 提示硒结合蛋白除通过直接与Cd结合降低毒性外, 降低重金属引起的氧化胁迫也可能发挥一定解毒作用。
关键词硒结合蛋白; 白鳍鲨; HL-7702细胞; Cd胁迫The Detoxification Effect of Overexpressed Shark SBP1 onHL-7702 Cells under Cadmium StressWang Yong1*, He Manwen2, Sun Yanmei2, Liu Qiong1(1College of Life Science, Shenzhen Key Laboratory of Marine Bioresources and Ecology, Shenzhen University,Shenzhen 518060, China;2College of Life Science, Shenzhen Key Laboratory of Microbial Genetic Engineering,Shenzhen University, Shenzhen 518060, China)Abstract Selenium-binding protein 1 (SBP1) is involved in tumorigenesis and has the ability to bind the heavy metal cadmium. In this study, recombinant plasmid of white tip shark SBP1 was constructed and transfected into HL-7702 cells. CCK-8 and CFDA SE were used to detect cell proliferation under Cd stress; flow cytometry was used to analyze intracellular ROS levels. Under 100 μmol/L of CdCl2 stress, the cell viability of expression SBP1 group was 76.4%, which was approximately 2-fold of the control group; meanwhile, the cell proliferation index of experimental group was also higher than that of control group. Furthermore, we speculated that the reason for shark SBP1 expression efficiently helps to detoxify Cd for HL-7702 cells was based on the 2 C××C, 2 H×D and 3 H××H motifs of it, which is speculated antioxidation and metal binding sites respectively. In addition, a 收稿日期: 2013-07-21 接受日期: 2013-10-17国家自然科学基金(批准号: 21271131、31070731)资助的课题*通讯作者。
建伍TH-K40A维修手册B53-7017-00
Note:
When reassembling the unit in the chassis, be sure to solder the antenna terminal.
2
TH-K40A/K40E
DISASSEMBLY FOR REPAIR
j
3. Removing the Rear Panel
DISASSEMBLY FOR REPAIR
1. Separating thes
1. Remove the two knobs (a). 2. Remove the two screws (b). 3. Pull off the cap from SP/MIC jack (c). 4. Expand the right and left sides of the bottom of the case assembly, Iift the chassis, and remove it from the case assembly (d).
1. Raise the rear panel on the chassis (k).
Antenna terminal
g
h i i
k
f
CLONE MODE
Programming data can be transferred from one transceiver to another by connecting them via their SP/MIC connectors. Cloning can copy the transceiver data to another transceiver even without the use of a personal computer. The following data cannot be cloned. • Tuning data 1. Connect the cloning cable (part No. E30-3410-05) to the SP/MIC connectors on the source and target transceivers. 2. Turn the source and target transceiver power OFF. 3. Turn the source transceiver power ON while pressing the [CALL] keys, to enter clone mode. ”CLONE” appears on the display. 4. Turn the target transceiver power ON. 5. Press the [CALL] key on the source transceiver while ”SEND” is displayed. The data of the source is sent to the target. While the target is receiving data, ”RECV” appears on the display. When cloning is completed, the ”END” appears on the source and target display. 6. Turn the source and target transceiver power OFF.
软管规格表
静态 弯曲 半径 Ｓｔａｔ．ｒ
13
20
35
动态 弯曲 半径 Ｄｙｎ．ｒ
包装 Packing
M
35 100M 45 100M 55 100M
波 纹
强度好可以承受重的负载；耐酸，耐切 exterior,stronger machinism loading, 屑液，润滑油，冷却液等；表面有光泽， perfect flexible 耐摩擦；黑色耐紫外线，机械强度高； Functions:insulated,protect cables
RoHS
日
单位／Ｕｎｉｔ：ｍｍ
成
P A 尼 龙
材 质: 进口PA6 尼龙(Polyamide) 温 度:-40℃-125℃,短时达到150℃ 产品认证: 美国UL,欧洲CE, 欧洲环保
ROHS,REACH. 防火等级:94HB。 特 性:柔软有韧性，抗扭曲；机械，
Material:PA (Polyamide) Work Temperature:-40℃ to125℃, 150℃ in short time Color:black Certificates: CE,ROHS,REACH. Characheristics:good luster of
材 质:PA
Material:PA
产品认证: 欧洲CE, 欧洲环保ROHS
Certificate: CE, ROHS
特 性:安装容易，适合于两端线头已固定 Features:easy to stall，suitabel to wire
使用方法:将电线电缆放入管内即可 下表型号数据参考 BG系列
fixed in both terminals How to use:input the cables or wires Datas,please refer to BG series
高迁移率族蛋白B1对激素难治性前列腺癌冷冻免疫反应影响的实验研究的开题报告
高迁移率族蛋白B1对激素难治性前列腺癌冷冻免疫反应影响的实验研究的开题报告一、研究背景和意义：前列腺癌是临床上常见的男性恶性肿瘤，激素治疗是前列腺癌的一种重要治疗方法。
但是部分患者可能会产生激素抵抗现象，导致治疗难度增加。
因此，寻找新的治疗方法和治疗靶点对于激素难治性前列腺癌的治疗非常重要。
高迁移率族蛋白B1 (HMGB1)是一种激素相关的转录因子，参与了许多生物学过程，并发挥着重要的作用。
最近的研究表明，HMGB1可能在肿瘤治疗中发挥着关键作用。
因此，本研究旨在探讨HMGB1在激素难治性前列腺癌中的作用及其对冷冻免疫反应的影响。
二、研究内容和方法：1. 研究内容：本研究将采用前列腺癌细胞系(PC-3)建立激素难治性前列腺癌模型，分别观察HMGB1在该模型中的表达情况及其与临床指标的关系。
同时，利用冷冻免疫反应技术，研究HMGB1对前列腺癌细胞的增殖、凋亡和免疫返祖的影响及其可能的机制。
2. 研究方法：(1) 建立激素难治性前列腺癌模型：采用荷尔蒙剥夺方法建立激素难治性前列腺癌模型。
(2) HMGB1的表达情况和临床指标的关系：采用Western blot和免疫组化等方法检测PC-3细胞中HMGB1的表达情况，并分析其与临床指标的关系。
(3) HMGB1对前列腺癌细胞增殖、凋亡和免疫返祖的影响及机制：采用CCK-8法、流式细胞术和Real-time PCR等方法研究HMGB1在PC-3细胞中的影响及其可能的机制。
三、研究预期结果：本研究将探讨HMGB1在激素难治性前列腺癌中的作用及其对冷冻免疫反应的影响，预计可获得以下科学数据：(1) HMGB1与激素难治性前列腺癌的临床指标相关；(2) HMGB1在冷冻免疫反应中的作用及其机制；(3) HMGB1在激素难治性前列腺癌治疗中的潜在作用和价值。
- 1、下载文档前请自行甄别文档内容的完整性，平台不提供额外的编辑、内容补充、找答案等附加服务。
- 2、"仅部分预览"的文档,不可在线预览部分如存在完整性等问题,可反馈申请退款(可完整预览的文档不适用该条件!)。
- 3、如文档侵犯您的权益，请联系客服反馈,我们会尽快为您处理(人工客服工作时间：9:00-18:30)。
配RPMI1640符合培养基
将双抗AA100mixture 5mL，及10%FBS 55mL，加入500mL的RPMI1640培养基中，后分装到
50mL试管中，
FBS从-80℃冰箱，在室温系，放入水中融化，外有烧杯，注意防止感染，融化后，56℃水浴
30min，后放桌上约30min后变冷到室温，放入-20℃冰箱保存。
复苏细胞：
(1)将RPMI1640培养基10mL加至15mL试管中；
(2)将B95-8细胞从液氮中拿出，37℃水浴，注意水不能没过试管盖，防止污染。复苏细胞时，
注意观察细胞溶剂，不能融化过度。看到还剩一个冰芯后，取出，用酒精喷一下管外，擦干
后放入超净工作台；
(3)用10mL1640 medium洗细胞(因为冻存细胞溶剂里有DMSO)；
(4)将试管放入离心，1000rpm，5min，20℃离心细胞；
(5)抽真空前先用酒精喷一下负压管，将离心后的上清小心抽走，留下试管底部的细胞沉淀；
(6)取10mL1640medium，将细胞沉淀溶解，后加入培养瓶。放入5%CO2,37℃培养箱；
(7)HR-1,Akata EBV+细胞液按照以上方法复苏细胞
HR-1 5d
离心收上清。4℃预冷离心机
1.1000rpm，5min离心，50mL离心管
2.用pipette吸取上清到另一支新的50mL离心管
3.用0.45uM滤膜过滤，至第三支新的离心管，封号，4℃冰箱
4.将3步的上清加入超离心管
5.加入5ml25%sucrose PBS溶液分层，sucrose在下层
6.配平
7.离心，31000Ti＞0,1h,4℃先Vocumn装离心管、浅黄色盖、rotor盖(黑橡皮圈涂凡士林、
Vocumn、enter、start)离心分三层(镊子、擦镜纸、废液缸)，Virion在瓶的最底层，拿出来的
时候勿晃动
8.吸取上清，不要触及最底层瓶底，倒扣在纸上
+200uL PBS 封口膜封号，4℃保存 O/N
Purification of KSHV virions.
BCBL-1, a latently KSHV-infected primary effusion lymphoma cell line, was maintained in RPMI
1640 medium supplemented with 10% fetal bovine serum. For virus production, BCBL-1 cells (0.5
× 106/ml) were induced with 20 ng of phorbol-12-tetradecanoate-13-acetate (TPA) per ml and
0.5 μMionomycin (Sigma, St. Louis, Mo.) for 5 to 7 days. The medium was collected and cleared
by centrifugation at 4,000 × g for 30 min and then at 8,000 × g for 15 min to remove cells and cell
debris. The supernatant was filtered through 0.45-μm-pore-size filters. Virions were pelleted at
27,000 rpm for 1 h through a 5% sucrose cushion (5 ml) in a Beckman SW28 rotor and
resuspended in 1× phosphate-buffered saline (PBS) plus 0.1% bacitracin (Sigma) in 1/100 of the
original volume. The concentrated virus particles were centrifuged through a 20 to 35% Nycodenz
(Sigma) step gradient at 24,000 rpm for 2 h. The virus band at the gradient junction was collected.
The virions were then diluted with 1× PBS and pelleted at 27,000 rpm for 1 h. The pellets were
resuspended in 1× PBS and further purified through a 20 to 35% continuous Nycodenz gradient.
BCBL-1培养RPMI1640+10%牛胚胎血清；
1.0.5×106ml细胞，用20ng/ml TPA+0.5um ionomycin诱导5-7days；
2.4000g 30min 离心，8000g 15min 离心；
3.上清液用0.45um过滤器过滤；
4.27000rpm 1h +5%蔗糖通过SW28转头离心，1×PBS重悬+0.1%杆菌肽 1/100；
5.24000rpm倾斜离心2h；20-35%连续倾斜梯度
6.virus band
7.1×PBS稀释病毒，27000rpm 1h
8.1×PBS重悬，20-35%连续倾斜梯度进一步提纯
提DNA
将溶有病毒的PBS在冰上摇床稍稍摇晃后，用枪充分吸干净(-80保存，或直接往下做)
提取病毒体的DNA，准备80℃，56水浴，将AL buffer取出放到室温。
1.测每个sample的总体积；
2.每个sample中取177uL病毒悬液加入3uL DNaseI、20uL 10×Dnase I buffer，在37℃温箱
中孵育1h；
3.向上述溶液中加入0.5M EDTA 10uL，mix，终于反应；
4.80℃水浴热灭活10min；
5.加入20 uL proteinase K溶液，紧接着加入200uL ALbuffer，vortex。
6.56℃水浴10min；
7.1:1加入酚氯仿抽提病毒颗粒内DNA，加入420uL酚氯仿，vortex。
8.12,000rpm，4℃，离心10min；
9.离心后分层。抽提上层清液，约320uL至另一EP管避免抽到下层的酚氯仿
1:1加入酚氯仿：异戊醇（24:1）50ul:1ul，4℃，12,000rpm 取上清（200uL）
10.加入5M Nacl溶液4uL，加入冰乙醇（2.5-3倍），约600uL，加入Glycogen 1uL.
11.mix well后放入-80℃，＞1h，接着往下做
(1)将DNA从-80℃拿出，12,000rpm，4℃，15min离心，后去除上清；
(2)EP管底部出现DNA pellet，用1mL70%冰乙醇洗，盖上盖，上下混匀几次；
(3)12,000rpm，4℃，10min离心，弃上清（勿直接倒出，要用抢抽出上层的乙醇）；
(4)12,000rpm，4℃，1min离心，除去残余的酒精；
(5)打开EP管盖，air dry2-3min；
(6)加入40uL ddH20溶解DNA pellet，1h后spin，-20℃保存，留作qPCR用。