公司治理的案例Corporate Governance
7A Survey of Corporate Governance
B. management discretion 经理人的自由
The methods of managers can discretion the investors' funds
常用的方法:
– – – –
a. expropriate directly 直接抽取法 b. transfer pricing-----low price sell to individual. 转移价格―控股公司中常用
解决的方式:从长远利益上协调投资者和 经理人的不一致
解决的方式: a. marginal value of control vs marginal value of benefit 控制权的边际价值vs 利益的边际价值 vs 代理收 益的边际价值 实践形式:绩效考核+股权,股票期权,收入损 失(dismissal of income)
b. some measures of performance vs share ownership, stock option
有效的激励模式:
c. the optimal incentive system is determined by : manager's risk aversion, the importance of his decisions, his ability to pay for the cash flow ownership up front w=f(manager's risk aversion, importance of his decisions, ability to pay for the cash flow ownership)
投资者的本位动机
C. inventive contracts 激励理论
构建具有中国特色的国有企业公司治理结构
构建具有中国特色的国有企业公司治理结构引言公司治理结构，（"Corporate Governance"，又译为"法人治理结构"或"公司督导机制"）是现代企业制度中最重要的架构。
一个现代公司能不能搞好，在很大程度上取决于它的治理结构是否有效。
现代企业区别于传统企业的特点，在于所有权和经营权的分离（在西方称为所有权与控制权的分离）。
这样，就需要在所有者与经营者之间形成一种相互制衡的制度，依靠这一制度对企业进行管理和控制。
现代企业中的公司治理结构正是这样一种制度安排。
随着经济全球化趋势的日益发展，各国经济相互融合步伐的日益加快，许多国家已经把建立良好的公司治理结构当作提高经济活力、增强经济绩效的基本手段。
我国是一个发展中国家，又是一个典型的转轨经济国家。
经济体制正在从计划经济体制向市场经济体制快速转变。
在这一进程中，传统的国有企业必须进行公司化改制，建立现代企业制度，成为'产权清晰、政企分开、权责明确、管理科学"的现代企业。
按照党中央、国务院的部署，我国大多数国有大中型企业根据《中华人民共和国公司法》的要求进行了公司化改制，普遍建立起了股份有限公司、国有独资公司和有限责任公司。
但是，国有企业的管理和效益并没有像预想的那样得到有效的改进。
相反，有些企业经济效益明显下滑，有些经营管理人员腐败。
虽然，经过多方面的努力，去年国有企业的经营状况和效益有了很大改善，按官方消息的说法，就是国有企业三年脱困的任务基本完成，6599户国有及国有控股大中型亏损企业已有一半以上实现脱困。
但是我们应当清楚，这里面起决定性作用的是国家政策的倾斜，而不是国有企业本身竞争力的提高。
越来越多的事实说明，国有企业效率低下的症结在于没有建立起适合中国国情、科学而有效的公司治理结构。
面对我国加入WTO组织进程的不断加快和民营经济的崛起，国有企业要想在与国内外企业竞争中取得优势，不可能再简单依靠国家的政策扶持，必须加紧建立切实有效的公司治理结构，来不断提高实力和活力，这是一项刻不容缓的紧迫任务，关系到国有经济乃至整个国民经济持续快速健康的发展。
丹纳赫企业管治指南Danaher Corporate Governance Guidelines
DANAHER CORPORATIONCORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINESThe Board of Directors (the “Board”) of Danaher Corporation (the “Company”), acting on the recommendation of its Nominating and Governance Committee, has adopted these corporate governance principles (the "Guidelines") to promote the effective functioning of the Board and its committees, to promote the interests of stockholders, and to ensure a common set of expectations as to how the Board, its various committees, individual directors and management should perform their functions. These Guidelines are in addition to and are not intended to change or interpret any Federal or state law or regulation, including the Delaware General Corporation Law, or the Certificate of Incorporation or By-laws of the Company. The Board believes these Guidelines should be an evolving set of corporate governance principles, subject to alteration as circumstances warrant.I.The BoardA.Role of BoardThe business and affairs of the Company are managed by or under the direction of the Board in accordance with Delaware law. The Board's responsibility is to provide direction and oversight. The Board establishes the strategic direction of the Company and oversees the performance of the Company's business and management. The management of the Company is responsible for presenting strategic plans to the Board for review and approval and for implementing the Company's strategic direction. In performing their duties, the primary responsibility of the directors is to exercise their business judgment in the best interests of the Company.Certain specific corporate governance functions of the Board are set forth below:•Management Evaluation and Compensation. The Board has the responsibility to select and make decisions about the retention of the Company's Chief ExecutiveOfficer ("CEO") and to oversee the selection and performance of other executiveofficers. The Compensation Committee has the management evaluation andcompensation responsibilities set forth in the Compensation Committee charter.•Management Succession. The Board shall, with such assistance from the Nominating and Governance Committee as the Board shall request, review andconcur in a management succession plan, developed by the CEO, to ensure continuityin senior management. This plan, on which the CEO shall report at least annually,shall address: emergency CEO succession; CEO succession in the ordinary course ofbusiness; and succession for the other members of senior management.•Director Compensation. The Nominating and Governance Committee shall periodically review the form and amounts of director compensation and makerecommendations to the Board with respect thereto. The Board shall set the form andamounts of director compensation, taking into account the recommendations of theNominating and Governance Committee. Determination of director compensationshall be guided by three goals: compensation should fairly pay directors for workrequired consistent with a company of Danaher's size and scope; compensationshould align directors' interests with the long-term interests of shareholders; and thestructure of the compensation should be simple, transparent and easy for shareholdersto understand. Only non-management directors shall receive compensation forservices as a director. To create a direct linkage with corporate performance, theBoard believes that a meaningful portion of the total compensation of non-management directors should be provided and held in equity-based compensation.B.Board SizeThe Board’s size is set in accordance with the Company’s by-laws, to permit diversity of experience without hindering effective discussion or diminishing individual accountability. The Board will periodically review the size of the Board, and determine the size that is most effective in relation to future operations.C.Board Composition and IndependenceThe members of the Board should collectively possess a range of skills, knowledge, expertise (including business and other relevant experience) and backgrounds:•useful and appropriate to the effective oversight of the Company's business, and•appropriate to building a Board that is effective in collectively meeting the Company's strategic needs and serving the long-term interests of the shareholders.The Board shall consist of a majority of directors who qualify as independent directors (the “Independent Directors”) under the listing standards of the New York Stock Exchange (the “NYSE”). The Board shall review annually each director's relationships with the Company (either directly or as a partner, shareholder, or officer of an organization that has a relationship with the Company), if any. Following such annual review, only those directors whom the Board affirmatively determines have no material relationship with the Company (either directly or as a partner, shareholder, or officer of an organization that has a relationship with the Company) will be considered Independent Directors, subject to any additional independence qualifications that may be prescribed under the listing standards of the NYSE from time to time.The Board anticipates that the Company’s CEO will be regularly nominated to serve on the Board. The Board may also appoint or nominate other members of the Company’s management whose experience and role at the Company are expected to help the Board fulfill its responsibilities.D.Selection of NomineesThe Board will be responsible for the selection of all candidates for nomination or appointment as Board members. The Board's Nominating and Governance Committee shall beresponsible for identifying and recommending to the Board qualified candidates for Board membership, based primarily on the following criteria:•personal and professional integrity and character;•prominence and reputation in the candidate's profession;•skills, knowledge and expertise (including business or other relevant experience) useful and appropriate to the effective oversight of the Company's business;•the extent to which the interplay of the candidate's skills, knowledge, expertise and background with that of the other Board members will help build a Board that iseffective in collectively meeting the Company's strategic needs and serving the long-term interests of the shareholders;•the capacity and desire to represent the interests of the shareholders as a whole; and•availability to devote sufficient time to the affairs of the Company.E. Director Elections and ResignationsIn accordance with the Company’s By-laws, if none of our stockholders provides the Company notice of an intention to nominate one or more candidates to compete with the Board's nominees in a Director election, or if our stockholders have withdrawn all such nominations by the tenth day before the Company mails its notice of meeting to our stockholders, a nominee must receive more votes cast for than against his or her election or re-election in order to be elected or re-elected to the Board. The Board expects a Director to tender his or her resignation if he or she fails to receive the required number of votes for re-election. The Board shall nominate for election or re-election as Director only candidates who agree to tender, promptly following the annual meeting at which they are elected or re-elected as Director, irrevocable resignations that will be effective upon (i) the failure to receive the required vote at the next annual meeting at which they face re-election and (ii) Board acceptance of such resignation. In addition, the Board shall fill Director vacancies and new directorships only with candidates who agree to tender, promptly following their appointment to the Board, the same form of resignation tendered by other Directors in accordance with this Board Practice. If an incumbent Director fails to receive the required vote for re-election, the Nominating and Governance Committee will act on an expedited basis to determine whether to accept the Director's resignation and will submit such recommendation for prompt consideration by the Board. The Board expects the Director whose resignation is under consideration to abstain from participating in any decision regarding that resignation. The Nominating and Governance Committee and the Board may consider any factors they deem relevant in deciding whether to accept a Director's resignation.F. TenureWhen a director's principal occupation changes substantially from the position he or she held when most recently elected or appointed to the Board, the director shall tender a letter of proposed resignation from the Board to the chair of the Nominating and Governance Committee and the Company Secretary (which shall be effective only if accepted by the Board). The Nominating and Governance Committee shall review the director's continuation on the Board, and recommend to the Board whether, in light of all the circumstances, the Board should accept or reject such proposed resignation; provided, that in making such recommendation theNominating and Governance Committee shall consider, among such other factors as it deems relevant, that such director was elected by the shareholders of the Company.The Board does not believe that arbitrary term limits on directors' service are appropriate. The Board annually evaluates each director as part of the board and committee self-evaluation process described below.G. Limits on Other Board MembershipsDirectors should not serve on more than four boards of public companies in addition to the Board. Current positions in excess of these limits may be maintained unless the Board determines that doing so would impair the director's service on the Board. Directors should advise the Chairman of the Board (the “Chair”), the chair of the Nominating and Governance Committee and the Company Secretary before accepting membership on another board of directors or audit committee or any other significant committee assignment, or establishing any significant relationship with any business, institution or other governmental or regulatory entity, and should advise the Chair, the chair of the Nominating and Governance Committee and the Company Secretary of any other material change in circumstance or relationship that may impact a director's independence.H. Chairman of the BoardThe Board appoints the Chair. The offices of the Chair and the CEO shall be vested in separate persons.I. Lead Independent DirectorWhenever the Chair is not independent, a majority of the Independent Directors then in office will select a Lead Independent Director from among the Independent Directors. The Nominating and Governance Committee shall provide its recommendation as to which Independent Director should serve as the Lead Independent Director. The Lead Independent Director will:•preside at all meetings of the Board at which the Chair and the Chair of the Executive Committee are not present, including the executive sessions of non-managementdirectors;•have the authority to call meetings of the Independent Directors;•act as a liaison as necessary between the Independent Directors and the management directors; and•advise with respect to the Board’s agenda.J. Pledging of Danaher StockNo director or executive officer of the Company may pledge as security under any obligation any shares of Company common stock that he or she directly or indirectly owns and controls (provided that any shares of Company common stock directly or indirectly owned and controlled by any director or executive officer of the Company that were pledged as of February 21, 2013 (including any additional shares accruing thereto on or after such date as a result of any stock splits, stock dividends or similar transactions after such date) are not covered by this policy (“Permitted Pledged Shares”)). Permitted Pledged Shares shall not be counted toward the stockownership requirements set forth under the Danaher Stock Ownership Requirements for Directors and Executive Officers.II.Board and Committee MeetingsA. MeetingsThe Board has five regular meetings each year, and such special meetings as are deemed necessary, at which it reviews and discusses reports by management on the performance of the Company, its plans and prospects, as well as immediate, material issues facing the Company. The Chair, in consultation with appropriate members of the Board and with management, shall set the frequency and length of each meeting and the meeting agenda. Management will be responsible for ensuring that, a s a general rule absent exigent circumstances, Board members receive information prior to each Board meeting or committee meeting, as applicable, so that they have an opportunity to reflect properly on the matters to be considered at the meeting. Materials presented to Board members should provide the information needed for the Board members to make an informed judgment or engage in informed discussion.The Board welcomes attendance at Board meetings of senior officers of the Company. Invitations shall be extended by the Chair.Each director is expected to attend all scheduled Board meetings and meetings of committees on which he or she serves. Each director is also expected to review the materials provided by management and advisors in advance of the meetings of the Board and the committees on which such director serves.B. Board CommitteesThe Board has delegated authority to six standing committees: Audit, Compensation, Nominating and Governance, Finance, Executive and Science & Technology. Each committee, other than the Executive, Finance and Science & Technology Committees, is comprised solely of Independent Directors. Committee members and chairs will be appointed by the Board upon the recommendation of its Nominating and Governance Committee. There are no fixed terms for service on committees.Each Committee shall have the number of meetings provided for in its charter, with further meetings to occur (or action to be taken by unanimous written consent) when deemed necessary or desirable by the Committee chair. The Committee chairperson, in consultation with appropriate members of the Committee and with management, shall set the frequency and length of each meeting and the meeting agenda (consistent with any applicable charter requirements). Board members who are not members of a particular committee are welcome to attend meetings of that committee. The Committee chairperson shall report matters considered and acted upon to the full Board at the next regularly scheduled Board meeting. The Board believes that as a practice all Board members should receive notice of each Committee meeting and receive a copy of the minutes of each Committee meeting.C. Meetings of Non-Management DirectorsTo ensure free and open discussion and communication among the non-management directors, these directors shall meet in executive session at least twice per calendar year with nomembers of management present. To the extent the group of non-management directors includes any directors who are not independent, the Independent Directors shall meet in executive session at least once per calendar year.Normally, the meetings described in the preceding paragraph will occur prior to or following regularly scheduled board meetings. The Lead Independent Director shall preside at the aforementioned executive sessions.III.Director Orientation and Continuing EducationThe Chief Financial Officer, General Counsel, Chief Accounting Officer and Company Secretary shall be responsible for providing an orientation for new directors, and for periodically providing materials, briefings and other educational opportunities to permit them to become more familiar with the Company and to enable them to better discharge their duties as directors. Each new director shall, within six months of election to the Board, spend a day at corporate headquarters for personal briefing by senior management on the Company's business, strategic plans, financial statements and key policies and practices.IV.Self EvaluationThe Board and each of the Audit, Compensation and Nominating & Governance committees conduct a self-evaluation annually to assess whether it and its committees are functioning effectively. The Nominating and Governance Committee will solicit each director for his or her assessments of the effectiveness of the Board and the committees on which he or she serves, and will report annually to the Board with an assessment of the Board’s performance, which will be discussed with the full Board.The Nominating and Governance Committee’s assessment will focus on the members’ contributions (e.g., attendance, preparedness and participation) to the Board and its committees, the Board’s contributions to the Company and will identify areas for improvement in the performance of the Board and its committees.V.Access to Senior Management and Independent AdvisorsBoard members have full access to senior management and to information about the Company’s operations. Independent directors are encouraged to contact senior managers of the Company without senior corporate management present. In addition, the Board and its committees shall have the right at any time to retain independent outside financial, legal or other advisors, as they deem necessary and appropriate.。
中国公司治理(外文期刊翻译)
中国公司治理：现代视角Corporate governance in China: A modern perspective Corporate governance in China: A modern perspective☆Fuxiu Jiang, Kenneth A. Kim ⁎School of Business, Renmin University of China, 59 Zhongguancun Street, Haidian District, Beijing, China 100872近年来，许多使用中国金融数据的学术论文发表在领先的学术期刊上。
这一增长这并不奇怪，因为中国是一个转型经济大国，正在从计划经济转向市场经济，现在已经成为世界第二大经济体。
简单地说，中国是有趣和重要的。
然而，一些研究中国的缺点。
首先，考虑到大多数现代金融理论都起源于西方，尤其是美国，因此有很多研究中国的论文使用西方理论和概念来解释他们的实证发现。
2 . However, while it may sometimes be从西方的角度来看待中国的实证结果是恰当的，但在其他时候则不然。
其次，许多报纸似乎都是如此误解(或没有意识到)重要的监管问题;法律、金融和制度环境;和业务中国的风俗习惯。
第三，许多研究中国的论文，即使是最近发表的，现在已经过时了。
的中国过去20年的经济增长是爆炸式的。
在这段时间里，发生了许多变化地方，包括许多监管的变化和引入新的规则，影响公司治理在中国。
鉴于这些不足之处，本文的主要目的有两个:(一)对公司治理现状进行概述(二)指出和探讨公司治理在很大程度上是中国所特有的特点在本期特刊中，我们将为大家提供一个更新的中国公司治理观。
因此,我们也重要的是在适当的地方描述这些论文。
本文的其余部分如下。
在第二部分，我们提供了重要的制度背景资料的中国并讨论了中国公司治理的制度和监管环境。
在第三节,我们提供并讨论与公司治理相关的重要变量的汇总统计。
公司治理模式英文作文
公司治理模式英文作文英文：Corporate governance refers to the system of rules, practices, and processes by which a company is directed and controlled. It involves balancing the interests of a company's many stakeholders, such as shareholders, management, customers, suppliers, financiers, government, and the community. Effective corporate governance ensures that a company is run in a way that is transparent, accountable, and responsible.There are several different models of corporate governance, including the shareholder model, stakeholder model, and hybrid model. The shareholder model prioritizes the interests of shareholders above all other stakeholders and emphasizes maximizing shareholder value. The stakeholder model, on the other hand, takes a broader view of corporate responsibility and seeks to balance the interests of all stakeholders. The hybrid model attempts tocombine elements of both models.In my opinion, the stakeholder model is the most effective form of corporate governance. This is because it recognizes that a company's success is dependent on the support and cooperation of all its stakeholders, not just its shareholders. By taking a more holistic approach to corporate responsibility, companies can build stronger relationships with their stakeholders and create a more sustainable business model.For example, a company that prioritizes the interests of its shareholders above all else may cut corners on environmental or social responsibility in order to boost profits. This could lead to negative consequences for the company in the long run, such as reputational damage or legal liabilities. On the other hand, a company that takes a stakeholder approach may invest in sustainable practices and build stronger relationships with its customers, suppliers, and community, which can help to create a more resilient business model.中文：公司治理模式是指一个公司的管理和控制体系，包括规则、惯例和流程等。
Corporate governance, incentives, and tax avoidance
这种就是分位数回归，最早由Koenker Roger and Bassett Grlbert 于1978 年提
出，是估计一组回归变量X与被解释变量Y的分位数之间线性关系的建模方法， 强调条件分位数的变化。
研究设计
研究方法：
研究设计
研究模型：
研究设计
Tax position EndFin48Bal TAETR Governance and incentives LogNumFinExp PctIndep LogNumDir CEOPortDelta CEOPortVega measured as the firm's ending balance of the uncertain tax benefit account (Compustat TXTUBEND), scaled by the firm's average assets over the period. The mean three-year GAAP ETR (computed as the firm's total tax expense scaled by pre-tax income ) of the firm's size and industry peers minus the firm's three-year GAAP ETR. the natural logarithm of one plus the number of financial experts designated on the board of directors in the year preceding the fiscal year the percentage of independent directors to total directors sitting on the board in the previous year the natural logarithm of one plus the number of total directors sitting on the board in the previous year is the (risk-neutral) dollar change in the firm CEO's equity portfolio value for a 1% change in the (volatility) of the firm's stock price is the (risk-neutral) dollar change in the firm CEO's equity portfolio value for a 1% change in volatility of the firm's stock price cash flow from operations divided by average total assets. the natural logarithm of market value of equity computed for the fiscal year. the natural logarithm of total foreign assets computed for the fiscal year
公司治理结构案例
第七章公司治理结构案例公司治理结构（corporate governance）是指各国经济中的企业制度安排。
这种制度安排，狭义上指的是在企业的所有权和管理权分离的条件下，投资者与企业之间的利益分配和控制关系（希列法和维希尼1996）；广义的则可理解为关于企业组织方式、控制机制、利益分配的所有法律、机构、文化和制度的安排，它不仅界定了企业与所有者的关系，而且还包括企业与所有相关利益集团（例如雇员、顾客、供货商、所处社区等等）之间的关系。
这种制度安排决定了企业为谁服务、由谁控制、风险和利益究竟如何在各利益集团之间分配等一系列问题。
这种制度安排的合理与否是企业绩效最重要的决定因素之一。
我们这里所举的案例，涉及到公司的股东大会、董事会、监事会、经理层和控股股东，希望通过案例的阐述，使学生认识到公司治理结构的重要性，了解各个机构的职责、它们之间的相互联系与相互制约关系，以及如何设计合理的制度使公司业绩有所提高。
案例1ST凯地——监事会终于要说话了ST凯地是1996年7月在深圳证券交易所挂牌上市的，集技、工、贸于一体，印染、服装配套成龙的丝绸企业。
1996年、1997年被中国纺织总会授予“全国纺织工业质量效益先进企业”称号，被国家经贸委和中国人民银行列为国家重点扶持企业。
然而，在经营过程中，ST凯地遇到了一系列问题：大股东长期欠债不还，总经理挪用公司资金，公司重组不断，甚至落难到卖地度日的地步，最后成为浙江省第一家股票被特别处理的上市公司。
公司1993年成立时，发起人之一中国工商（香港）财务有限公司投入306万美元资金，该项资金于1993年3月24日到位。
同年4月，公司以投资为名借给中国工商（香港）财务有限公司200万美元，8月又以同样的名义借出1000万元。
虽然公司扣还其1993年、1994年分红390万元，现金270万元及设备款47万元，但是其余本息均未能收回。
1999年，公司对中国工商（香港）财务有限公司的借款余额达2491．9万元，账龄已超过5年，计提了100％的坏账准备，使公司面临巨大损失。
中国企业公司治理案例
中国企业公司治理案例1. Alibaba Group: In 2020, Jack Ma, the co-founder of Alibaba Group, made controversial comments about China's regulatory system, which led to increased scrutiny and a suspension of the initial public offering of Ant Group, a subsidiary of Alibaba. This raised concerns about the company's corporate governance and its relationship with the Chinese government.2. HNA Group: HNA Group, a Chinese conglomerate, was known for its rapid expansion through a series of debt-funded acquisitions. However, in 2017, its mounting debt and opaque ownership structure raised concerns about its corporate governance. The company faced financial difficulties and had to sell off a significant number of its assets to repay its creditors.3. China Mobile: The state-owned telecommunications company, China Mobile, faced corporate governance issues in 2019 when its chairman, Shang Bing, was investigated for alleged corruption. This highlighted the challenges of maintaining good corporate governance in state-owned enterprises in China.4. Huishan Dairy: In 2017, Huishan Dairy, one of China's largest dairy producers, reported a significant drop in its stock price due to irregularities in its financial statements. It was later revealed that the company fabricated its sales figures, leading to a collapse in its stock price and raising questions about its corporate governance practices.5. BYD Company Limited: In 2016, BYD Company, a Chinese electric vehicle manufacturer, faced a corporate governancescandal when its founder and chairman, Wang Chuanfu, used company funds to invest in the stock market without obtaining necessary approvals. This raised concerns about the company's internal controls and corporate governance practices.These are just a few examples of corporate governance issues in Chinese companies. It is important to note that while these cases highlight challenges and shortcomings, many Chinese companies also have strong corporate governance practices in place.。
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公司管治
McEnally和Kim对公司管治（Corporate Governance）的定义为：一套基于企业的政策和策略；制定了标准的行政步骤，定义了明确责任，以解决企业内部的各种利益冲突为目标的管理系统。
以往的研究已经充分表明，拥有优秀管治系统的公司往往具有更大的成长空间。
相反，不善于解决内部利益冲突的企业往往在管理上要面对额外的风险，从而影响企业的发展，例如2001年的安然时间和2010年国美事件。
公司管治问题存在于每一个行业几乎所有的机构忠，而本文重点分析因为委托代理关系而引起的管治案例。
按照Jensen和威廉·麦克林William Meckling定义，委托代理关系是指根据一份鲜明或隐含的契约，一个或多个行为主体指定雇用另一些行为主体为其提供服务，并根据其提供的数量和质量支付相应的报酬。
由于现代企业的发展，企业的所有权和管理权开始产生明显的分析，企业的原拥有者会委托本身的管理任务交与更优秀的职业经理团队，而在管理过程中，因为管理层和企业的实际所有人追求的利益不同而产生冲突也是屡见不鲜。
以上市公司为例，经理人和股东之间的冲突是普遍存在的，并因此带来了额外的股东监督成本和监控机制的执行成本，间接的加大了企业运作负担。
常见的公司管治问题有三个：1.管理层激励缺陷，2.企业控制权争夺，3.企业重大决策时的博弈。
在企业的管理过程中，管理层决定了企业的发展方向和策略，但在制定决策的过程中，管理层常会根据企业的激励政策不同，选择对有助自身利益最大化的决策。
例如业绩奖金是常见的激励政策，虽然是对经理人而言最直接的管理动机，但却会刺激管理层偏向于最大化短期业绩，甚至牺牲企业的长期竞争优势，从而损害投资者的长期目标。
虽然，通过以股票期权或限制性股票能够激励经理人为企业创造长期价值，但和传统的奖金激励一样，股票期权激励也有着明显的缺陷。
股票期权虽然一定程度上使管珲层和股东利益保持一致，但是随着管理人员级别的降低，期权的效用却急速下降。
对于广大中层管理人员而言，很难注意到个人业绩与公司股票价值间的联系，股票所有权太抽象、遥远，以至难以对人们的行为产生较大影响。
这很容易带来所谓的“搭便车”行为，而削弱股票期权这种激励机制的作用。
当股票价格升至行权价之上时，期权持有者可以行权购入股票使自己获益，但当股价一直低于行权价时，持有期权的管理层却不会有任何损失。
这实际上是“只奖不惩”的过程，不利于刺激管理层的作业。
除此以外，购股期权常规机制中也存在股东和管理层利益脱节之处。
例如，购股期权通常具有较长的期限，行权价固定在期权发行当天的股票价格之上，而股价高低除了公司内部经营因素外，外部环境也有较大影响，这在一定程度上削弱了股价和价值创造方面的联系。
还有一类利益冲突，发生在家族企业上市后因为股权的稀释对企业的影响逐渐变小后产生的公司治理纷争。
2010年的国美便是一个很好的案例。
2010年，国美电器的最大股东黄光裕向三名来自贝恩资本的执行董事投出了反对票，并且同时，最大股东和当时的国美当时的执行董事兼董事会主席陈晓在公司未来的发展战略上出现了意见不合。
黄光裕倾向于扩张的发展战略，而作为直接经理人的陈晓则更偏重与精细化的经营战略。
虽然最后代表广大股东的陈晓获得胜利，而我们也很难判定第一大股东和委托人孰对孰错，但是整个事件过的过程中，国美的内部矛盾已经给企业带来巨大损失。
例如国美的“内战”直接影响了日常事务的运行，使原有的战略计划实施受阻，控制权之争也导致董事会结构缺乏稳定，只是企业的经营，决策效率底下。
而在企业外部，国美的股价也受到严重影响动荡向下，企业声誉和形象也遭受损失，给所有公司的投资者带来重大损失。
国美的事件，清晰的告诉我们，确定一套好的公司管治系统，稳定公司的控制权才是保证企业价值的最根本要求。
一旦企业完成上市，个人或是家庭对企业的控制便会根据股权的稀释而减少，无论是创始人还是大股东都应该正式上市带来的改变，明确公司与个人之间的不同，不能因为个人，而给公司带来额外的运营风险。
最后，公司在面对重大决策时，管理层的行为可能无法保证股东利益的最大化。
例如在衡量项目风险的时候，如果公司采用股票期权的形式来激励管理层的长期表现，可能会引起经理人在风险评估时的偏差。
一方面股票期权是一种共享利益和不贡献损失的激励策略，这就会导致管理层偏向接受风险较大的项目，以期望在未来购股期权行使前，股价大幅度向上波动，但同时不比承担因项目失败而带来的损失。
另一方面，在接近购股期权实行日期或生效后，管理层更有可能产生风险厌恶，偏向于选择风险较小的项目，从而无法保证实现股东利益的最大
化。
最后在面对兼并策略时，股东和管理层的利益矛盾更为明显。
在兼并过程中，一个常见的现象是兼并方的股价大幅度下降，而被兼并方往往因为溢价收购而股价上涨。
根据现代的公司理财理论，兼并方的利益由两公司合并后所产生的协同优势（Synergy）和收购时的溢价程度决定（收益=协同优势价值-收购溢价）。
兼并方的股东往往因为协同优势的难以评估而较为谨慎，而管理层则更希望主动兼并其他公司，以此获得管理更大企业的机会，显示管理能力，提高自己的管理收入。
而对于被兼并方，管理层更关心的是个人的职业是否能再交易继续，待遇是否能够持续等。
不少的研究显示1997年美国出现新一轮的并购狂潮，光是1997年汽车工业有700多次并购活动，交易总额达280亿美元，但最后留下的大多是一个一个失败的案例，投资者为此付出无必要的代价。
综上所述，公司管治是保证所有权和管理权分离后企业保持高效成长的保证。
好的管治系统能为公司将行政成本降为最低，让公司为股东和管理层同时创造最大价值。
每一个公司的股东都希望完全控制管理层，而好的公司治理系统是实现这一目标的唯一方法。
我们的企业在这一方向还有很长的路要走，应当重视公司治理，让股东和管理层一起参与完善系统。