公司治理与资本结构问题研究

专业硕士学位论文THESIS OF PROFESSIONAL MASTER DEGREE论文题目：公司治理与资本结构问题研究（英文）：The Study of CompanyAdministration and Capital StructureCapital Structure所在院、系、所：商学院专业名称：会计学指导教师姓名、职称：宋常论文主题词：公司治理；资本结构学习期限：2000年9 月至2005 年9 月论文提交时间：2004年11月已签名：张彩庆日期：2004.11.11关于论文使用授权的说明本人完全了解中国人民大学有关保留、使用学位论文的规定，即：学校有权保留送交论文的复印件，允许论文被查阅和借阅；学校可以公布论文的全部或部分内容，可以采用影印、缩印或其他复制手段保存论文。

签名：张彩庆导师签名：宋常日期：2004.11.11中国人民大学硕士学位论文摘要（中外文合订）论文题目：（中文）公司治理与资本结构问题研究（英文）The Study of Company administration and Capital Structure作者：张彩庆指导教师：宋常摘要公司治理与资本结构是企业理论和实践中两个至关重要的问题。

我国加入WTO以后，在经济更加开放、逐渐与国际经济全面接轨的形势下，经济体制改革将进入一个新的阶段。

在这一新阶段，改善公司治理不仅是我国各类所有类型企业提高竞争力的现实需要，也是我国能够顺利完成经济转轨、全面建设小康社会的必然选择。

公司治理的进一步改革需要有效的理论指导和政策建议，本文试图从理论和实践两个方面顺应这一改革的需要。

本文的基本思路是通过构建公司治理理论体系和资本结构理论体系，在系统研究公司治理与资本结构关系的基础上，比较国外公司治理模式，根据有效的公司治理模式，并结合我国公司治理的现状，对我国公司治理的改进提出了笔者的若干意见建议。

全文共分为四个部分，其主要想法和观点可简要陈述如下：第一部分，主要探讨了公司治理的涵义、公司治理的相关概念、公司治理研究问题的起因、公司治理的基本理论四个方面的内容。

首先，公司治理是一个内涵非常丰富的概念，对于公司治理可以从各种角度去理解。

从静态上看，公司治理表现为一种结构和关系，从动态上看，则表现为一个过程和机制。

其次，为了进一步研究公司治理问题，解释了与公司治理相关的概念，包括公司治理系统、公司治理模式、公司治理机制、公司治理结构、公司治理主体、公司治理客体、公司治理边界、公司治理成本与效益、公司治理效率。

在公司治理的起因研究中，指出机构投资者的兴起、股东参与意识的提高、前所未有的大规模的公司欺诈和公司倒闭案件的增多、经理人员的报酬的大幅上升引起了股东和社会的不满、转型经济国家出现了严重的“内部人控制”问题、随着经济全球化和经济自由化的发展兼并收购对利益相关者的损害，以上诸多方面引起对公司治理理论的研究。

最后，介绍了公司治理的三种基本理论，即金融模式论、市场短视论、利益相关者论。

第二部分，阐述了资本结构理论。

从二十世纪50年代的MM定理到70年代平衡论、再到80年代非对称信息论的引入，极大拓宽了资本结构领域的研究视野。

资本结构理论表明，公司融资和法人机制是紧密联系在一起的，债务和股权不应仅仅被看作是可替代的融资工具，而且还应该被看作是可替代的治理结构，有效的法人治理结构的形成，要以有效的资本结构为前提。

融资方式的选择决定企业的资本结构，从而影响公司治理机制，最终影响公司市场价值。

因此，企业在安排资本结构时不仅要考虑到资本成本、杠杆比例、税收影响和资金运用安排方面的影响，还要从公司治理的角度出发来安排公司的资本结构。

第三部分，通过分析公司治理与资本结构的关系、国外公司治理模式的比较，提出了有效的公司治理模式，从而为我国如何积极借鉴西方发达国家公司治理结构的成功经验，设计出符合我国国情的公司治理结构模式提供了参考。

公司治理与资本结构相互影响，在既定的制度框架下，资本结构是公司治理的基础和依据，而公司治理结构是资本结构的体现和反映。

资本结构的选择很大程度上决定着公司治理模式的选择、决定着公司治理效率的高低，而资本结构又受到融资方式的影响，融资方式又受到外部金融环境、金融政策、金融市场的影响。

资本结构是公司治理结构最重要的一个方面，资本结构可通过股权和债权的治理效应的发挥协调出资人与经营者之间、出资人内部股东与债权人之间的利益和行为。

首先分析了负债与公司治理激励机制与约束机制的关系。

负债能够激励经营者多努力工作少个人享受，并做出更好的投资决策，从而降低由于所有权与控制权分离而产生的代理成本。

负债还可以约束经营者随意支配现金的行为，从而抑制过度投资、盲目扩张行为，在一定程度上也能降低代理成本。

其次，根据股权结构的二个特征分析了股东身份及股权集中度对公司治理效应的影响。

并得出了对公司治理产生良好治理效应的股权结构所具有的条件应该是适度股权集中、持股者身份明确。

同时，本文从实证的角度在股权静态结构与公司业绩的研究中得出了同样的结论，即有一定集中度、有相对控股股东，并且有其他大股东存在的股权结构能使公司的绩效趋于最大。

不同类型的股东在公司治理结构中发挥的作用是状态依存的，股权结构的多元化对公司业绩的正面影响取决于行业的竞争性。

在提高行业竞争性的基础上，通过适当减持国有股比例，提高法人股和流通股的比例，将能改善公司的治理结构。

就模式部分而言，英美模式中资本市场对企业具有较大的约束作用，英美模式的众多小股东可以通过市场机制来行使自己的监督权和实现利益最大化。

这种通过外部市场对公司进行控制的治理结构模式能够优化资源配置，使股东受益，有利于经济的发展。

但这种模式也易导致经营者的短期行为和对经营者的监控失效的弊病。

日德模式相对集中的所有权结构有助于对经理人的监督和激励，但缺乏竞争的市场环境和来自市场的监督控制。

这两种模式各有长短，在模式发展的过程中，这两种模式在各取所长，出现了同化的趋势。

根据上述理论研究和实践总结，提出了有效的公司治理模式。

阐述了有效公司治理模式的设计原则和及公司治理模式有效性的评价。

第四部分，对策研究部分。

首先对我国公司治理的现状进行的探讨，提出我国的股权结构与控制权市场最终导致了我国股权结构不合理、股东权利残缺、内部人控制加剧代理问题、内部治理机构失灵、缺乏代理权竞争与经理人员约束机制、外部市场机制欠缺。

根据有效的公司治理模式，基于对我国公司治理现状的研究，从内部公司治理和外部公司治理角度提出了改进我国公司治理模式的几点建议。

在内部公司治理方面，主要从董事会、监事会、股东大会功能及激励机制改进方面提出了建议；在外部公司治理方面，主要从法律、政府、市场培育几方面为营造公司治理的外部竞争环境提出了几点意见。

ABSTRACTCompany administration and capital structure are two crucial issues for an enterprise in both theory and practice. Since China entered into the WTO and opened up further to the outside world, its economy has gradually integrated itself with the international economy in an all- round way. Under these circumstances, China’s economic system reform will enter a new stage. At this stage, improving company administration will not only be a practical need for all Chinese enterprises to raise their competition, but will also be an unavoidable choice for China to accomplish its economic switch-over and build a well-off society. Effective theoretic guidance and policy advices will be required in improving company administration.The basic thinking line of this paper is that the author makes several suggestions for the improvement of China’s company administration through building-up systems of company administration theory and capital structure theory, comparing with foreign administration model on the basis of systematic study of the relations between company administration and capital structure, relying on effective company administration model and combining the reality of China’s company administration. The whole paper is divided into four parts and its main viewpoints can be explained briefly as follows:Part OneThe author mainly discussed four things in this part: the meaning, the related concepts, the cause and the basic theory of company administration. Firstly, company administration is a concept of rich implications and one may look at it from different angles. From static analysis, company administration displays itself as a kind of structure and relation, but from dynamic analysis, as a process and system. Secondly, to further study the company administration, the paper explained the concepts on company administration including company administering system, company administering mode, company administering mechanism, company administering structure, company administering subject & object, company administering boundary, company administering cost & benefits and company administering efficiency. As for the study of the cause of company administration, the author points out the spring-up of the institution investors, the enhanced sense of participation among the stockholders, the unprecedented large-scale company frauds and bankruptcies, the dissatisfaction of the stockholders and society as a whole caused by the big income rise of the managerial staffs, the problem of “being controlled by the inner-circle”propped up in the economic shift-over and the losses suffered by those with interests connected to company annexations as economic internationalization and liberalization develops. It is the abovementioned phenomena that give rise to the study of companyadministration theory. Finally, the paper presented the three basic theories of company administration, that is, the theory of financing mode, the theory of market myopia, and the theory of relevant benefit.Part TwoThe theory of capital structure is explained by the author here. From the MM theorem of the 50s in the 20th century to the theory of balance of the 70s, and further to the introduction of the theory of non-symmetric information, the view in the field of capital structure study has been greatly broadened. The capital structure theory shows that the financing of a company is closed linked with the mechanism of the legal entity. Debts and stock rights should not only be regarded as a substitutable financing tool, but also as a replaceable administer structure. An effective capital structure is the prerequisite for the forming of an effective legal entity administering structure. The choice of financing methods decides the capital structure of an enterprise, thus effecting the company’s administering structure and market value in the end. Therefore, while laying out capital structure, an enterprise should not only concern its capital cost, lever ratio, taxation impact or financial operation effect, but also arrange its capital formation from the angle of company administration.Part threeIn this part, by analyzing the relations between company administration and capital structure and comparing the administering pattern of foreign companies, the author gives out an effective model to administer a company. Therefore, provides a reference for our country to actively draw on the successful experiences of the company administration structure of the advanced Western countries and draw up a company administering structure pattern suitable for China’s special situation.Corporation administration has a direct bearing on capital structure and vice versa. Within the established system framework, capital structure is the basis for corporation administration and the corporation administering structure is the reflection of capital structure. The selection of corporation administering pattern and degree of corporation administering efficiency depend largely on the selection of capital structure. However, capital structure is again influenced by financing methods and financing methods are influenced by external monitory conditions, policies and markets.Capital structure is the most important part in corporation administering structure. It can coordinate the interests and behavior between the investors and business operators as well as between the investors’internal shareholders and creditors through administering effects of the stock and credit rights. First of all, the author analyses the relations between debts incurring and corporation administering mechanism of encouragement and restraints. Being in debt can encourage the operators to work harder, live simpler and make better investment decisions, thus lowering the cost of attorney resulted from the separation of ownership and the right of control. It can also restrain the operators from random usage of money, thus constraining the acts of overinvestment and blind expansion, which can also reduce the attorney cost to some extend. Secondly, in accordance with the two characters of the stockownership structure, the author analyses the impacts of shareholder identity and the degree of concentration of stockownership on corporation administering effect. And the result drawn from this analysis is that an appropriate concentration of stockholders’right and a clear identity of stockowners are conditions for a stockownership structure that produces sound effects in corporation administration. Meanwhile, the author has come to the same conclusion in the study of static structure of stockownership and corporation business records from the angle of factual proof, i.e. a stockownership structure that has certain degree of concentration, a shareholder with relative control right and the presence of other big stockholders can maximize a corporation’s business results. The role played by different types of shareholders in the corporation administering structure is position-relying. The positive effects on business records by a pluralistic stockownership structure are decided by the industrial competitiveness. Based on increased industrial competitiveness, by properly reducing the proportion of the state-owned stocks and enlarge that of the circulating stocks and shares held by the legal entities, a corporation can improve its administering structure.As for the patterns, capital market plays a greater role in restraining corporations in the Anglo-American pattern in which a host of small shareholders can, through market mechanism, use their rights of supervision and maximize their economic benefits. This administering structure pattern of controlling corporations through external markets can optimize the distribution of resources and be beneficial to shareholders as well as economic development as a whole. But this model can lead to short-term activities by the operators and lack of supervision over them. The comparatively concentrated stockownership structure of the Japan-German pattern is helpful to corporations in supervising and encouraging their managerial staffs, but lacks of competition and regulation from the market. Both patterns have strong and weak points, and they are learning from each other. There appears a tendency of assimilation between the two in the process of pattern development.On the basis of the abovementioned theoretic study as well as conclusions drawn from practices, the author brings forward an effective corporation administering model, explains the design principles of this model and comments on its effectiveness.Part FourCounter-measure study. The author examines the reality of our corporation administration first, pointing out that China’s stockownership structure and controlling market has led to the irrationality of our stockownership structure and the disability of our shareholders’rights, to the growing attorney problems arisen from “being controlled by the inner circle”, to the breakdown of the internal administering mechanism and to the lack of competition in attorney rights, of restraining mechanism over managers and of external market mechanism.According to the effective corporation administering pattern and based upon the studies of the realities of China’s corporation administration, the author raises several suggestions for the improvement of our corporation administering pattern from the angle of both internal and external administration. In the internal side, suggestions are concentrated on the improvement of the functions of the board of directors, the committee of supervisors and the stockholders meetings, and of the mechanism of encouragement. In the external side, they are chiefly on the creation of external competing environment for corporation administration by the law, government and market cultivation.目录一、公司治理及其基本理论______________________________________1 （一）公司治理的涵义____________________________________________1 （二）公司治理的相关概念________________________________________4 （三）公司治理问题研究的起因__________________________________5（四）公司治理的基本理论________________________________________7 二、资本结构及其基本理论____________________________________11（一）资本结构的涵义_______________________________________11（二）资本结构基本理论沿革_________________________________11三、公司治理与资本结构的关系分析___________________________22（一）负债的作用___________________________________________22（二）股权的影响___________________________________________23四、资本结构与融资方式的关系探讨___________________________30（一）持距型融资___________________________________________30（二）控制型融资___________________________________________30五、国外典型公司治理模式比较研究___________________________32（一）英美公司治理模式_____________________________________32（二）日德公司治理模式_____________________________________35（三）模式比较的基本结构___________________________________37（四）探析有效的公司治理模式_______________________________40六、改进和完善我国公司治理的若干思考及政策建议_________44（一）我国公司治理的现状___________________________________44（二）改进和完善公司治理的几点建议_________________________46注释_________________________________________________________55 参考文献____________________________________________________56公司治理与资本结构问题研究张彩庆一、公司治理及其基本理论（一）公司治理的涵义由于人们看问题的角度不同，对公司治理的界定也就有着诸多不同。