【语言哲学】语言学研究要以哲学为基础
社会建构主义的语言哲学基础
社会建构主义的语言哲学基础社会建构主义是一种理论框架，强调语言在社会现实中的塑造力量。
语言哲学是社会建构主义思想的重要组成部分，探讨语言如何影响人们的观念、价值观和行为，以及语言如何在社会构建中发挥作用。
本文将探讨社会建构主义语言哲学基础，着重于语言、现实和社会建构之间的关系。
第一部分：语言哲学和社会建构主义社会建构主义强调社会现实是由人们的经验、信念和语言构建的。
这个观点可以追溯到早期的象征互动主义，通常被认为是社会建构主义的前身。
象征互动主义认为人们在相互作用中交流信息，通过符号和象征意义来创造共同的现实。
这一理论为社会建构主义提供了哲学基础，支持它强调语言和符号在社会建构中的重要作用。
语言哲学与社会建构主义密切相关。
语言哲学探讨语言与意义之间的关系，以及如何理解语言的作用和功能。
社会建构主义强调语言是社会建构的中心，通过语言人们创造和共享现实。
因此，语言哲学对社会建构主义理论提供了重要启示，特别是对于理解语言如何影响和塑造现实的作用。
第二部分：语言和现实的关系在社会建构主义中，现实是由人们的经验、信念和语言构建的。
语言是现实的一个核心元素。
语言可以被视为符号系统，表达人们对世界的理解和认知。
人们使用语言来构建、描述和共享现实。
语言通过对于现实的描述和解释，影响我们对于现实的认知和理解，以及我们对现实的反应。
语言与现实之间的关系是互动的。
语言不仅描述现实，而且可以通过描述、解释和修饰现实来改变现实。
例如，当人们使用某种特定的语言来描述某些社会群体时，这种描述可能会强化或削弱这些群体的身份和地位。
因此，我们可以看到，语言不仅是现实的一种反映，而且具有改变、创建和塑造现实的力量。
第三部分：社会建构和语言社会建构主义认为，社会现实是由人们共同的经验和信念通过语言构建而成的。
语言是人们共同构建现实的工具，也是社会建构的基础。
即使是基本的概念，例如时间和空间，都是通过语言和文化构建而成的。
在社会建构中，语言不仅作为连接个体和社会之间的纽带，而且也是社会结构中的一个重要元素。
【语言哲学】莱考夫谈认知语言学的哲学基础
"Philosophy In The Flesh"A Talk With George LakoffJB: What is a body?LAKOFF: That's an interesting question. Pierre Bourdieu has pointed out that our bodies and what we do with them differ significantly from culture to culture. Frenchmen do not walk like Americans do. Women's bodies are different than men's bodies. The Chinese body is not like the Polish body. And our understanding of what the body is has changed drastically over time, as postmodernists have often observed.But nonetheless, our bodies do share a lot. We have two eyes, two ears, two arms, two legs, blood that circulates, lungs used to breathe, skin, internal organs, and on and on. The common conventionalized aspects of our conceptual systems tend to be structured by what our bodies have in common, which is a lot.JB: But we go from being a machine to an information system, and eventually those orifices may not be part of the conversation.LAKOFF: When you start to study the brain and body scientifically, you inevitably wind up using metaphors. Metaphors for the mind, as you say, have evolved over time -- from machines to switchboards to computers. There's no avoiding metaphor in science. In our lab, we use the Neural Circuitry metaphor ubiquitous throughout neuroscience. If you're studying neural computation, that metaphor is necessary. In the day to day research on the details of neural computation, the biological brain moves into the background while the Neural Circuitry introduced by the metaphor is what one works with. But no matter how ubiquitous a metaphor may be, it is important to keep track of what it hides and what it introduces. If you don't, the body does disappear. We're careful about our metaphors, as most scientists should be..JB: There were no information processing metaphors 35-40 years ago - and so is the body real, or is it invented?LAKOFF: There's a difference between the body and our conceptualization of it. The body is the same as it was 35 years ago; the conception of the body is very different. We have metaphors for the body we didn't have then, with relatively advanced science built on those metaphors. In this respect, the contemporary body and brain, conceptualized in terms of neural circuitry and other information processing metaphors, were "invented." Such inventions are crucial to science. Our emerging understanding of the embodiment of mind would not be possible without them.JB: How does this approach depart from your early work?LAKOFF: My really early work was done between 1963 and 1975, when I was purs uing the theory of Generative Semantics. During that period, I was attempting to unify Chomsky's transformational grammar with formal logic. I had helped work out a lot of the early details of Chomsky's theory of grammar. Noam claimed then-and still does, so far as I can tell-that syntax is independent of meaning, context, background knowledge, memory, cognitive processing, communicative intent, and every aspect of the body.In working through the details of his early theory, I found quite a few cases where semantics, context, and other such factors entered into rules governing the syntactic occurrences of phrases and morphemes. Icame up with the beginnings of an alternative theory in 1963 and, along with wonderful collaborators like Haj Ross and Jim McCawley, developed it through the sixties. Back in 1963, semantics meant logic - deductive logic and model theory - and our group developed a theory of Generative Semantics that united formal logic and transformational grammar. In that theory, semantics (in th e form of logic) was taken as prior to syntax on the basis of evidence that semantic and pragmatic considerations entered into generalizations governing syntactic structure. Chomsky has since adopted many of our innovations, though he fought them viciously in the 60's and 70's.In 1975, I became acquainted with certain basic results from the various cognitive sciences pointing toward an embodied theory of mind - the neurophysiology of color vision, prototypes and basic-level categories, Talmy's work on spatial relations concepts, and Fillmore's frame semantics. These results convinced me that the entire thrust of research in generative linguistics and formal logic was hopeless. I set about, along with Len Talmy, Ron Langacker, and Gilles Fauconnier, to form a new linguistics - one compatible with research in cognitive science and neuroscience. It is called Cognitive Linguistics, and it's a thriving scientific enterprise. In 1978, I discovered that metaphor was not a minor kind of trope used in poetry, but rather a fundamental mechanism of mind. In 1979, Mark Johnson visited in the Berkeley Philosophy Department and we began working out the details and their implications for philosophy. We've been collaborating for 20 years. Mark is now Chair of Philosophy at Oregon.JB: Distinguish cognitive science from philosophy?LAKOFF: That is a deep and important question, and central to the enterprise of Philosophy In The Flesh. The reason that the question doesn't have a simple answer is that there are two forms of cognitive science, one fashioned on the assumptions of Anglo-American philosophy and one (so far as we can tell) independent of specific philosophical assumptions that determine the results of the inquiry.Early cognitive science, what we call "first-generation" cognitive science (or "disembodied cognitive science"), was designed to fit a formalist version of Anglo-American philosophy. That is, it had philosophical assumptions that the determined important parts of the content of the scientific "results." Back in the late 1950's, Hilary Putnam (a noted and very gifted philosopher) formulated a philosophical position called "functionalism." (Incidentally, he has since renounced that position.) It was an apriori philosophical position, not based on any evidence whatever. The proposal was this:The mind can be studied in terms of its cognitive functions - that is, in terms of the operations it performs - independently of the brain and body.The operations performed by the mind can be adequately modeled by the manipulation of meaningless formal symbols, as in a computer program.This philosophical program fit paradigms that existed at the time in a number of disciplines.In formal philosophy:The idea that reason could be adequately characterized using symbol ic logic, which utilizes the manipulation of meaningless formal symbols.In generative linguistics:The idea that the grammar of a language can be adequately characterized in terms of rules that manipulate meaningless formal symbols.In artificial intelligence:The idea that intelligence in general consists in computer programs that manipulate meaningless formal symbols.In information processing psychology:The idea that the mind is an information-processing device, where information-processing is taken as the manipulation of meaningless formal symbols, as in a computer program.All of these fields had developed out of formal philosophy. These four fields converged in the 1970's to form first-generation cognitive science. It had a view of mind as the disembodied manipulation of meaningless formal symbols.JB: How does this fit into empirical science?LAKOFF: This view was not empirically based, having arisen from an apriori philosophy. Nonetheless it got the field started. What was good about it was that it was precise. What was disastrous about it was that it had a hidden philosophical worldview that mascaraded as a scientific result. And if you accepted that philosophical position, all results inconsistent with that philosophy could only be seen as nonsense. To researchers trained in that tradition, cognitive science was the study of mind within that apriori philosophical position. The first generation of cognitive scientists was trained to think that way, and many textbooks still portray cognitive science in that way. Thus, first generation cognitive science is not distinct from philosophy; it comes with an apriori philosophical worldview that places substantive constraints on what a "mind" can be. Here are some of those constraints:Concepts must be literal. If reasoning is to be characterized in terms of traditional formal logic, there can be no such thing as a metaphorical concept and no such thing as metaphorical thought.Concepts and reasoning with concepts must be distinct from mental imagery, since imagery uses the mechanisms of vision and cannot be characterized as being the manipulation of meaningless formal symbols.Concepts and reasoning must be independent of the sensory-motor system, since the sensory motor system, being embodied, cannot be a form of disembodied abstract symbol-manipulation.Language too - if it was to fit the symbol-manipulation paradigm - had to be literal, independent of imagery, and independent of the sensory-motor system.From this perspective, the brain could only be a means to implement abstract "mind" - wetware on which the "programs of the mind" happened to be implementable. Mind on this view does not arise from and is not shaped by the brain. Mind is a disembodied abstraction that our brains happen to be able to implement. These were not empirical results, but rather followed from philosophical assumptions.In the mid-1970's, cognitive science was finally given a name and outfitted with a society and a journal. The people who formed the field accepted the sym bol-manipulation paradigm. I was originally one of them (on the basis of my early work on generative semantics) and gave one of the invited inaugural lectures at the first meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. But just around the time that the field officially was recognized and organized around the symbol-manipulation paradigm, empirical results started coming in calling the paradigm itself into question.This startling collection of results pointed toward the idea that mind was not disembodied - not characterizable in terms of the manipulation of meaningless symbols independent of the brain and body, that is, independent of the sensory- motor system and our functioning in the world. Mind instead is embodied, not in the trivial sense of being implementable in a brain, but in the crucial sense that conceptual structure and the mechanisms of reason arise ultimately and are shaped by from the sensory-motor system of the brain and body.JB: Can you prove it?LAKOFF: There is a huge body of work supporting this view. Here are some of the basic results that have interested me the most: The structure of the system of color categories is shaped by the neurophysiology of color vision, by our color cones and neural circuitry for color. Colors and color categories are not "out there" in the world but are interactional, a nontrivial product of wave length reflactances of objects and lighting conditions on the one hand, and our color cones and neural circuitry on the other. Color concepts and color-based inferences are thus structured by our bodies and brains.Basic-level categories are structured in terms of gestalt perception, mental imagery, and motor schemas. In this way the body and the sensory-motor system of the brain enters centrally into our conceptual systems.Spatial relations concepts in languages around the world (e.g, in, through, around in English, sini in Mixtec, mux in Cora, and so on) are composed of the same primitive "image-schemas", that is, schematic mental images. These, in turn, appear to arise from the structure of visual and motor systems. This forms the basis of an explanation of how we can fit language and reasoning to vision and movement.Aspectual concepts (which characterize the structure of events) appear to arise from neural structures for motor control.Categories make use of prototypes of many sorts to reason about the categories as a whole. Those prototypes are characterized partly in terms of sensory-motor information.The conceptual and inferential system for reasoning about bodily movements can be performed by neural models that can model both motor control and inference. Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical, based on metaphors that make use of our sensory-motor capacities to perform abstract inferences. Thus, abstract reason, on a large scale, appears to arise from the body.These are the results most striking to me. They require us to recognize the role of the body and brain in human reason and language. They thus run contrary to any notion of a disembodied mind. It was for such reasons that I abandoned my earlier work on generative semantics and started studying how mind and language are embodied. They are among the results that have led to a second-generation of cognitive science, the cognitive science of the embodied mind.JB: Let's get back to my question about the difference between cognitive science and philosophy.LAKOFF: OK. Cognitive science is the empirical study of the mind, unfettered by apriori philosophical assumptions. First-generation cognitive science, which posed a disembodied mind, was carrying out a philosophical program. Second-generation cognitive science, which is working out the nature of the mind as it really is - embodied! - had to overcome the built-in philosophy of earlier cognitive science.JB: Does "second-generation cognitive science" presuppose a philosophy?LAKOFF: We have argued that it does not, that it simply presupposes commitments to take empirical research seriously, seek the widest generalizations, and look for convergent evidence from many sources. That is just what science is committed to. The results about the embodied mind did not begin from, and does not presuppose, any particular philosophical theory of mind. Indeed, it has required separating out the old philosophy from the science.JB: Where does this leave philosophy?LAKOFF: In a position to start over from an empirically responsible position. Young philosophers should be thrilled. Philosophy is anything but dead. It has to be rethought taking the empirical results about the embodied mind into account. Philosophy considers the deepest questions of human existence. It is time to rethink them and that is an exciting prospect.JB: What about the academic wars between postmodern and analytic philosophy? LAKOFF: The results suggest that both sides were insightful in some respects and mistaken in others. The postmodernists were right that some concepts can change over time and vary across cultures. But they were wrong in suggesting that they all concepts are like that. Thousands are not. They arise around the world in culture after culture from our common embodiment.Postmodernists were right in observing that there are many places where the folk theory of essences fails. But they were wrong in suggesting that such a failure undercuts our conceptual systems and makes them arbitrary. The analytic tradition insightfully characterized the theory of speech acts. Although formal logic does not work for all, or even most, of reason, there are places where something akin to formal logi c (much revised) does characterize certain limited aspects of reason. But the analytic tradition was wrong in certain of its central theses: the correspondence theory of truth, the theory of literal meaning, and the disembodied nature of reason.The academic world is now in a position to transcend both positions, each having contributed something important and each needing revision.JB: Is there an East Coast and West Coast divide?LAKOFF: Dan Dennett referred to the "East Pole" and "West Pole" back in the early-to-mid 1980's, as if the proponents of the disembodied mind were all on the East Coast and the proponents of the embodied mind were all on the West Coast. Research on the embodied mind did tend to start on the West Coast, but even then the geographical characterization was oversimplified. By now, both positions are represented on both coasts and throughout the country. Cambridge and Princeton in the past have tended largely toward the old disembodied mind position, at least in certain fields. But there are so many interesting thinkers on both coasts and spread across the country that I think that any geographical divisions that still exist won't last long.When Dennett first made that distinction, the great revolutions in neuroscience and neural mo deling were just starting. Cognitive linguistics was just coming into existence. Metaphors We Live By had barely come out and Women, Fire, And Dangerous Things had not yet been written. Nor had Edelman's Bright Air, Brilliant Fire nor Damasio's Descartes Error, nor Regier's The Human Semantic Potential, nor the various books by Pat and Paul Churchland. Over the past decade and a half, neuroscience and neural computation have changed the landscape of cognitive science and they will change it even more in next decade or two. Those changes will inevitably move us further toward an appreciation of the embodiment of mind. You cannot think anything without using the neural system of your brain. The fine structure ofneural connections in the brain, their connections to the rest of the body, and the nature of neural computation will keep being developed. The more we discover about the details, the more we will come to understand the detailed nature of how reason and the conceptual systems in which we reason are embodied.The idea of disembodied reason was an apriori philosophical idea. It lasted 2500 years. I can't imagine it lasting another 30 years in serious scientific circles.JB: And what do we have to look forward to?LAKOFF: Cognitive science and neuroscience are triggering a philosophical revolution. Philosophy In The Flesh is just part of the first wave. Over the next decade or two, the neural theory of language should develop sufficiently to replace the old view of language as meaningless disembodied symbol manipulation that one finds in the old Chomskyan tradition. But the biggest, and one of the most important, changes will come in our understanding of mathematics.The precursor of that change was Stanislas Dehaene's The Number Sense, which reviewed the evidence from neuroscience, child development, and animal research indicating that we (and certain other animals) have evolved with a part of our brains dedicated to enumeration and simple arithmetic up to a small number of objects (around four). Rafael Núñez and I begin with those findings and ask how sophisticated arithmetic (with the laws of arithmetic) developed, that is, how could ordinary conceptual mechanisms for human thought have given rise to mathematics?Our answer is that the ordinary embodied mind, with its image schemas, conceptual metaphors, and mental spaces, has the capacity to create the most sophisticated of mathematics via using everyday conceptual mechanisms. Dehaene stopped with simple arithmetic. We go on to show that set theory, symbolic logic, algebra, analytic geometry, trigonometry, calculus, and complex numbers can all be accounted for using those everyday conceptual mechanisms. Moreover, we show that conceptual metaphor is at the heart of the development of complex mathematics. This is not hard to see. Think of the number line. It is the result of a metaphor that Numbers Are Points on a Line. Numbers don't have to be thought of as points on a line. Arithmetic works perfectly well without being thought of in terms of geometry. But if you use that metaphor, much more interesting mathematics results. Or take the idea, in set-theoretical foundations for arithmetic, that Numbers Are Sets, with zero as the empty set, one as the set containing the empty set, and so on. That's a metaphor too. Numbers don't have to be thought of as being sets. Arithmetic went on perfectly well for 2000 years without numbers being conceptualized as sets. But if you use that metaphor, then interesting mathematics results. There is a third less well-known metaphor for numbers, that Numbers Are Values of Strategies in combinatorial game theory. So which is it? Are numbers points? Are they sets? Are numbers fundamentally just values of strategies in combinatorial games?These metaphors for numbers are part of the mathematics, and you make a choice each time depending on the kind of mathematics you want to be doing. The moral is simple: Conceptual metaphor is central to conceptualization of number in mathematics of any complexity at all. It's a perfectly sensible idea. Conceptual metaphors are cross-domain mappings that preserve inferential structure. Mathematical metaphors are what provide the links across different branches of mathematics. One of our most interesting results concerns the conceptualization of infinity. There are many concepts that involve infinity: points at infinity in projective and inversive geometry, infinite sets, infinite unions, mathematical induction, transfinite numbers, infinite sequences, infinite decimals, infinite sums, limits, least u pper bounds, andinfinitesimals. Núñez and I have found that all of these concepts can be conceptualized as special cases of one simple Basic Metaphor of Infinity. The idea of "actual infinity"-of infinity not just as going on and on, but as a thing- is metaphorical, but the metaphor, as we show turns out to quite simple and exists outside of mathematics. What mathematicians have done is to provide elaborate carefully devised special cases of this basic metaphorical idea.What we conclude is that mathematics as we know it is a product of the human body and brain; it is not part of the objective structure of the universe - this or any other. What our results appear to disprove is what we call the Romance of Mathematics, the idea that mathematics exists independently of beings with bodies and brains and that mathematics structures the universe independently of any embodied beings to create the mathematics. This does not, of course, result in the idea that mathematics is an arbitrary product of culture as some postmodern theorists would have it. It simply says that it is a stable product of our brains, our bodies, our experience in the world, and aspects of culture. The explanation of why mathematics "works so well" is simple: it is the result of tens of thousands of very smart people observing the world carefully and adapting or creating mathematics to fit their observations. It is also the result of a mathematical evolution: a lot of mathematics invented to fit the world turned out not to. The forms of mathematics that work in the world are the result of such an evolutionary process.It is important to know that we create mathematics and to understand just what mechanisms of the embodied mind make mathematics possible. It gives us a more realistic appreciation of our role in the universe. We, with our physical bodies and brains, are the source of reason, the source of mathematics, the source of ideas. We are not mere vehicles for disembodied concepts, disembodied reason, and disembodied mathematics floating out there in the universe. That makes each embodied human being (the only kind) infinitely valuable - a source not a vessel. It makes bodies infinitely valuable - the source of all concepts, reason, and mathematics.For two millenia, we have been progressively devaluing human life by underestimating the value of human bodies. We can hope that the next millenium, in which the embodiment of mind will come to be fully appreciated, will be more humanistic.JB: Where are you headed next?LAKOFF: I've plunged myself as fully as possible into the research that Jerry Feldman and I have been doing for the past decade at the International Computer Science Institute on the Neural Theory of Language (www.ics /NTL). That's where most of my technical research effort is going to go for quite a while.Jerry developed the theory of structured connectionism (not PDP connectionism) beginning in the 1970's. Structured connectionism allows us to constructed detailed computational neural models of conceptual and linguistic structures and of the learning of such structures.Since 1988, we've been running a project takes up a question that has absorbed both of us: From the perspective of neural computation, a human brain consists of a very large number of neurons conne cted up in specific ways with certain computational properties. How is it possible to get the details of human concepts, the forms of human reason, and the range of human languages out of a lot of neurons connected up as they are in our brains? How do you get thought and language out of neurons? That is the question we are trying to answer in our lab through the computational neural modeling of thought and language.JB: How do you connect structures in the brain to ideas of space?LAKOFF: Terry Regier has taken the first step to figuring that out in his book The Human Semantic Potential. He has hypothesized that certain types of brain structures - topographic maps of the visual field, orientation-sensitive cells, and so on - can compute the primitive spatial relations (called "image-schemas") that linguists have discovered. The amazing thing to me is that not only do we actually have a reasonable idea of how certain types of neural structures can give rise to spatial relations concepts. Recent neural modeling research by Narayanan has similarly given us an idea of how brain structures can compute aspectual concepts (which structure events), conceptual metaphors, mental spaces, blended spaces, and other basics of human conceptual systems. The next breakthroug h, I think, will be a neural theory of grammar.These are remarkable technical results. When you put them together with other results about the embodiment of mind coming from neuroscience, psychology, and cognitive linguistics, they tell us a great deal about things that are important in the everyday lives of ordinary people - things that philosophers have speculated about for over 2500 years. Cognitive science has important things to tell us about our understanding of time, events, causation, and so on.JB: Like what?When Mark Johnson and I looked over these results from the cognitive sciences in detail, we realized that there were three major results that were inconsistent with almost all of Western philosophy (except for Merleau-Ponty and Dewey), namely:The mind is inherently embodied.Most thought is unconscious.Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical.This realization led us to ask the following question in Philosophy In The Flesh: What would happen if we started with the new results about the mind and reconstructed philosophy from there? What would philosophy look like?It turns out that it looks entirely different from virtually all the philosophy that went before. And the differences are differences that matter in your life. Starting with results from cognitive semantics, we discovered a lot that is new about the nature of moral systems, about the ways that we conceptualize the internal structure of the Self, even about the nature of truth.JB: This seems like a distinctively new kind of enterprise.LAKOFF: It's an interesting enterprise to take philosophy as a subject matter for empirical study in cognitive science. Most philosophers take philosophy as an apriori discipline, where no empirical study of the mind, reason, and language is necessary. In the Anglo-American tradition, you are taught to think like a philosopher and then it is assumed that you can, on the basis of your philosophical training, make pronouncements about any other discipline. Thus, there are branches of philosophy l ike the Philosophy of Language, the Philosophy of Mind, the Philosophy of Mathematics, and so on. Johnson and I realized that philosophy itself, which consists of systems of thought, needed to be studied from the perspective of the cognitive sciences, especially cognitive semantics, which studies systems of thought empirically. Our。
浅谈哲学与语言学的关系
浅谈哲学与语言学的关系哲学与语言学是密不可分的两个学科领域。
语言作为人类表达思想、意义和情感的主要工具，是哲学思考的基础。
本文将从哲学与语言学的两个角度探讨它们之间的关系。
一、哲学视角1.语言的本性和本体论问题语言作为人类活动的基础，是哲学研究的重点之一。
在语言的本体论问题中，哲学家们一直在探讨语言的本质、语言与世界的关系和语言的符号特征。
如早期的逻辑实证主义认为，语言只是一种符号系统，它的作用是对客观存在进行描述和表示。
而后来的语言哲学家则认为，语言是一种表达主观感知和思想的工具，它的意义和价值是建立在文化和社会背景之上。
2.语言的意义和真理问题语言的意义和真理问题是哲学研究的核心之一。
哲学家们一直在思考语言的意义究竟来源于何处，语言的真理与谎言又是如何产生的。
例如，逻辑实证主义认为，语言的真理性是通过语言描述世界的符号对应于世界本身的现象来实现的。
而后来的后现代主义认为，语言并没有固定的概念和真理，真理是被不同社会和文化建构的。
3.语言的文化和社会问题语言的文化和社会问题是哲学研究的重要方向之一。
哲学家们一直在探讨语言的语境和文化背景对语义建构和解读的影响，以及语言与社会、政治、历史、道德等领域的相互关系。
例如，班雅明认为，语言是文化的媒介，它以这种方式与社会、政治、经济和生活的其他方面紧密联系在一起。
二、语言学视角1.语言与哲学的关系语言学是哲学的一支分支，它通过对语言系统和使用的观察和分析，帮助哲学家们研究语言的符号特性和语言与思维的关系。
语言学家一直在探讨语言和思维之间的相互作用，例如语言如何影响人类的思维模式、语言的语法结构和词汇如何反映人类的认知体系、语言的语义如何揭示人类对世界的理解。
2.语言的多样性问题语言的多样性问题是语言学研究的重要方向之一。
语言学家们一直在研究不同语言之间的差异和联系，以及在不同文化和社会背景下的语言使用。
例如，语言领域的跨文化交流越来越普遍，研究不同语言和文化之间的交互影响是非常重要的。
语言哲学的认识论基础——语言学形式与功能“大统一”方法论初探
维工具 。语 言学 和哲 学像 一 对 亲 密 的伙 伴 ， 密不 可 分 。两 者互 为基 础 ， 辅相 成 。语 言 为哲 学 提供 思 相
观世界 的联 系问题 ： 传统 的命名 论 ， 为语言是概 念 认
化过程 ， 是客 观世界 的反 映 ； 沃耳夫 的语言相对 论 而 认 为语 言是塑 造思 维 的手段 。
以下几点 ：
识理 论 的滋养 。从 哲 学 认识 论 角度 来 看 ， 言学领 语 域 一直存在 “ 式主义 ” “ 能 主义” 大对 立 流 形 和 功 两
派， 两者对 语 言 结 构 和 意 义 的 阐释 存 在 较 大 差 异。 本 文试 图对 两个流 派进行 比较 ， 并对 “ 一” 论 的 统 理
语 言 哲 学 的认 识论 基 础
— —
语 言学形式与功能“ 大统一” 方法论初探
陈劲松 （ 东北 电力大学 外 国语学 院 ， 吉林 １２ １ ） ３０２
摘
要 ： 言学是 哲学 的重要分 支 ， 断接受哲 学认 语 不
对语 言知识 和使 用 一直 存 在 争议 ， 的说来 归 纳 为 总
以上三 个 问题 基本 上反 映 了对语 言本质 的理解
和使 用 上 的 分 歧 ： 一 个 问 题 涉 及 语 言 处 理 网络 第
— —
大脑 ， 议在 于 语 言是 生 物禀 赋 （ 见 乔母 斯 争 参
基等 ） 还是后 天 习惯 （ 见 斯 基 那等 ） 第 二 个 问题 参 ；
一
、
语 言 的 哲学 基础
本 文侧 重 语 言本 体论 ， 把语 言体 系 和其 表象 作 为研究对象 ， 也就是从第二个 问题即形式与功能的 对 立角 度尝试 探 讨 统一 理 论 。从 认 识 论 而言 ， 言 语 的理解 可 以归 纳为 两条 主线 ， 以逻 辑 、 智 、 心 规定 、 规 则 的理 想化 为一 主线 ； 以现实 、 文化 、 述 、 描 动态 的不
试论外语教育语言学的语言哲学基础 王雪鉴
外语教育语言学中的语言哲学基础文献综摘要：本文简要概述了古今中外著名语言学者及著名哲学家的语言哲学观点，从索绪尔的结构主义语言学到系统功能语法理论的韩礼德，从转换-生成语法的创立者乔姆斯基奥斯汀的言语行为理论，从维特根斯坦的语言游戏论到巴赫金的对话理论，从王寅对Lakoff 和Johnson体验哲学的论述到社会语言学家的“语言相对论”，并阐述了这些理论对外语教学的启示作用。
关键词：语言哲学语言教学自从有外语教学以来，在外语教学的指导理论上就一直存在分歧，有人认为外语教学要以教育学为指导，有人认为应以心理学为指导，还有人认为既然外语是一门语言，就应当以语言学为指导，然而，笔者认为，这些观点都有失偏颇，都各自只从某一方面反映了语言教育的规律。
外语教学既然是语言教学，而语言有其自身的规律，语言哲学是语言内部的本质的规律性反映，那么语言教学也应该顺应语言的内部规律。
以语言哲学为指导，从宏观上，弥补了以往语言教学指导原则上的不足，为语言教师的发展提供了新的广阔的视野。
笔者认为，凡是阐明了语言本质，反映语言与现实的关系，对语言内在规律进行分析的语言哲学理论都应成为外语教学的理论基础。
有“现代语言学之父”美称的著名结构主义语言学的典型代表索绪尔主张语言学仅是宽泛的或广义的符号学的一部分或一个分支；语言的根本属性是任意性；语言符号本身被分为两面，即音响形象和概念，进而二者又被称为能指和所指；语言的存在是以声音与意义的结合为条件的；索绪尔区分了语言和言语，得出结论是：语言学是语言的理论，包含语言和言语。
对一个语言学家来说，描述语言而不是解释语篇是没有结果的，描述语篇而不涉及语言也是空洞无物的；他的理论对我们外语教学重视口语教学提供了很好的理论参考。
教师在对学生的教学中应该从“言语”入手，提升学生的“语言”能力，并最终使学生以“语言”为指导增强“言语”交际能力。
系统功能语法理论的代表韩礼德认为语篇功能的句子的内部结构有两种，一是信息结构，另一个是主位—述位结构。
语言哲学概念是什么
语言哲学概念是什么说到语言哲学，可能很多人还不了解，那么就让小编来告诉你语言哲学概念是什么吧。
语言哲学概念是什么语言哲学(英语：The philosophy of language)是一个哲学分支学科。
笼统地说，其是当代西方哲学家对语言现象的研究，是分析哲学的一个支派或变种，因其所用的方法是对语言进行逻辑分析，是以现代数理逻辑的运用为基础的。
语言哲学是现代西方哲学中影响最大、成果最为卓著的一个哲学流派。
加强对语言哲学基本理论、基本方法的研究对于哲学学科的创新和发展具有极其重要的意义。
语言哲学包括三方面的内容：一：语言学哲学，是对意义，同义词，句法，翻译等语言学共相进行哲学思考，并且对语言学理论的逻辑地位和验证方式进行研究的学科，它是科学哲学的特殊分支，与物理学哲学，心理学哲学等并列的学科。
二：语言哲学，包括基于自然语言或人工语言的结构和功能的任何一种概念的研究。
举例来说，亚里斯多德关于存在的哲学思考，罗素的特称描述语理论，莱尔关于心灵概念的著作，都在这类研究的范围之内。
三：语言的哲学，是对关于语言本质，语言与现实的关系等内容的哲学性质的论著。
语言哲学的研究以逻辑实证主义、言语行为理论、生成语言学这三条线索进行。
研究的核心问题包括以下9个方面：语言的本质;西方哲学发展中的语言转向;涵义与指称理论;语言的意义和证实;“图像论”、“使用论”与语境;行为反应论与言语行为理论;语言的表达与理解;自然语言句法分析;逻辑分析方法。
维特根斯坦是语言学派的主要代表人物。
他的哲学主要研究的是语言，他想揭示当人们交流时，表达自己的时候到发生了什么。
他主张哲学的本质就是语言。
语言是人类思想的表达，是整个文明的基础，哲学的本质只能在语言中寻找。
他消解了传统形而上学的唯一本质，为哲学找到了新的发展方向。
他的主要著作《逻辑哲学论》和《哲学研究》分别代表了一生两个阶段的哲学体系。
前者主要是解构，让哲学成为语言学问题，哲学必须直面语言，“凡是能够说的事情，都能够说清楚，而凡是不能说的事情，就应该沉默”，哲学无非是把问题讲清楚。
哲学和语言哲学的关系
哲学和语言哲学的关系
哲学和语言哲学的关系
哲学是探讨人类存在、知识、价值和实在等基本问题的学科，而语言哲学则是探讨语言的本质、功能、结构和使用等问题的学科。
两者有着密切的关系，因为语言是哲学研究的一种重要工具，同时也是哲学问题的关键。
首先，语言是哲学研究的一种重要工具。
在哲学中，语言被广泛运用于表达和解释哲学观念和理论，例如哲学家们通过语言来表达他们对生命意义、真理、伦理道德、政治等问题的理解。
此外，语言也被用于研究哲学问题，例如通过语言分析的方法来分析哲学问题的本质和结构。
其次，语言哲学关注语言的本质、功能、结构和使用等问题，这些问题与哲学有着密切的关系。
例如，语言哲学研究语言的意义和真值等问题，这些问题也是哲学中经典的问题，例如“真理是什么”，“我们是如何知道真理的”等。
另外，语言哲学也研究语言的语法结构和语义结构等问题，这些问题也与哲学中关于实在和本体论的问题有关。
总之，哲学和语言哲学的关系是密不可分的。
语言是哲学中的一种重
要工具，同时也是哲学问题的关键。
语言哲学则关注语言的本质、功能、结构和使用等问题，这些问题与哲学有着密切的联系。
语言哲学的实验转向——梅剑华《直觉与理由：实验语言哲学的批判性研究》评介
著述评论语言哲学的实验转向——梅剑华《直觉与理由：实验语言哲学的批判性研究》评介李金彩21世纪以来，分析哲学正在经历一场重要的方法论变革。
哲学家借鉴心理学家、认知科学家等惯常使用的实证研究范式，尝试为诸多古老的哲学议题给出新颖的注解，由此产生了一系列丰硕且颇具影响力的研究成果，呈现出一种“哲学科学化”或曰“科学哲学化”的趋势。
实验语言哲学作为其中的一个重要分支，引起了学界的广泛关注。
从美国哲学家爱德华·麦希瑞（Edouard Machery ）等于2004年发表在Cognition 上的《语义学：跨文化风格》①一文算起，实验语言哲学诞生至今正好20周年。
众多英美哲学家（如Michael Devitt、Genoveva Marti 、Nat Hansen、Joushua Knobe、Eugen Fisher、Ron Mallon，等等）围绕名称指称问题以及意义的阐释等核心语言哲学议题，展开了激烈的理论争鸣与持续的实证探索，业已发表两百余篇学术论文，此外还有两部英文论文集集中探讨这个新兴领域的研究现状、问题与趋势。
这一系列研究通过考察大众视域中的语言哲学论题，开拓了语言哲学的实验研究路径，开启了语言哲学作者简介：李金彩，华东师范大学外语学院英语系讲师，明园晨晖学者。
基金项目：国家社会科学基金项目“实验语言哲学视域下的专名指称机制建构”(21CZX065)。
073著述评论的“实验转向”，推动了语言哲学的发展②。
在国内学界，虽有不少学者积极关注并投身这场轰轰烈烈的实验哲学运动，但针对实验语言哲学这一子领域的具体研究仍处于缓慢起步阶段。
在中国知网上，检索“实验语言哲学”“实验语义学”“语义直觉”等关键词，实验语言哲学文献仅十余条。
梅剑华教授作为长期在语言哲学和心智哲学领域深耕的中国哲学学者，敏锐地捕捉到这一国际研究热点，在《实验哲学、语义学直觉与文化风格》③一文中，首次较为系统地引介了该哲学运动。
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朱晓军新疆大学学报
“从哲学角度研究语言学”包括两方面的意义:
一指研究语言所采取的语言观,即语言研究的哲学基础;
二指语言研究也应该采用哲学思辨形式,富有逻辑和可验证性。
本文重在强调语言研究的哲学基础。
当代语言学各流派大多可归入形式主义(formalism)和功能主义(functionalism)这两大阵营。
这两大派别最外在的差别体现在研究重心、分析方法和表述方式方面。
形式主义重点在对语言的形式结构和特征的刻划上,在取材上注重内省的、理想化的语料,并用概括性极强的抽象的形式化规则表述出来;
后者则主要着眼于语言构造中的功能因素,注重自然、实际的语料,重视语义、语用、话语的分析,并将形式上的规律诉诸非形式化的合乎直觉的外在解释。
究其根本,二者的分歧多出自对语言的本质看法上的不同,或曰语言观上的差异,即到底是把语言看作一种天赋的、自主的形式装置,还是基于人类一般认知能力,负载交际功能的符号系统。
任何语言观都建立在一定的哲学理论基础上。
形式主义的哲学基础：客观主义认知观, 本质在：人类心智是脱离主体的,是超验(transcendental)的,不依赖与认知主体的身体经验以及与现实之间的相互作用,而仅仅是以映射(mapping)的方式被动的反映现实。
这种认知观的一个基本特征就是将符号与其意义分割开来,只有这样,才能将思维看作抽象符号的算法操作。
客观主义认知观的背后的形而上学也是客观主义的。
普特南将它称作“形而上学现实主义(metaphysical real-ism)”,他认为:世界是由这样的实体构成的:他们有着固定的特性,特性间存在着在任何时刻都一成不变的关系。
这样的体系与心智无关,即独立于人类的理解之外。
这种状况显然有其深刻的历史根源。
客观主义范式本身就是延续了两千多年的主流的西方哲学、文化传统的一部分。
近几百年,尤其是本世纪以来西方哲学和科学的发展又起到推波助澜的作用,使之进一步具体化和精细化。
功能主义,尤其是近些年来发展起来的认知语言学认为:客观主义范式忽略了人类认知最重要的一个特点,即在形成有意义的概念、进行推理的过程中,人类的生理构造、身体经验以及人类丰富的想象力扮演了重要的角色。
人类概念范畴的形成受制于人类感知能力。
语言与人类的认知密不可分。
人类所以能够创造和使用语言,是与其感知、记忆、判断等基本能力分不开的。
人类有一种天生的,区别于其他动物的认知能力。
而认知对象是一个外在的、客观的经验世界。
语言具有丰富的属性,包括物质的、生理心理的、社会文化交际的等等属性。
语言的形成的两方面的决定因素=认知能力和经验世界(认知对象),语言系统就是认知能力和认知对象相互作用的产物[6]。
Lakoff和Johnson提出了一种新的认知理论,称为“经验主义现实论(experientialist realism)”。
他首先是现实主义的,更重要的是其经验性,包括人类基本的感觉——运动经验、情感经验、社会经验,特别包括塑造这些经验并使之成为可能的人类天赋的认知能力。
四、语言学与哲学密不可分
在哲学上,语言学的地位从来没有像现在这样高过,哲学家可以从语言学汲取营养,就像从各种经验各门学科汲取营养。
在语言学上,越来越多的语言学家开始关注哲学问题。
一些有真知灼见的学者开始振臂高呼:语言学家必须要懂哲学。
在西方,洪堡特索绪尔乔姆斯基奥斯汀等不但是语言学家,也是哲学家,陈嘉映在《语言哲》中称他们“之为哲学家,殊不亚于一般所称的哲学家”
在国内,以钱冠连《美学语言学》一书为例,能够更好地说明语言学要有新的发展,必须以哲学为基础。
钱冠连把语言学与美学相结合,在探索语言学的新发展方面进行了有益的尝试。
1994年12月5日,钱冠连在中国英汉对比研究会首届学术年会(长沙)的闭幕式上,应与会者要求和大会执行主席杨自俭教授(现任中国英汉对比语言学会会长)之邀,在会上对美学语言学的构思作了介绍,回答了问题。
但作者在网上发表文章《一个新思路:美学语言学》时,恳切地承认:“这些评价,从总体上说明了,美学语言学是可以讨论下去的,是有发展前景的。
但是,目前的讨论和评价,大都是由语言学者作出的,只有少数的哲学家参加。
对于自己的作品,作者往往视若珙璧,但我还是愿意借这个机会坦率地承认,美学语言学的前景的最严重的考验(即它能否成为一个学科)是:哲学家如何说话。
这样说,是从下面这样的意见中得到了启发:有不少语言学者诚恳地表示过,他们想写评论,但对哲学部分不熟悉(尤其是第七章中克罗齐美学与语言学重合论的哲学根源),难于动笔。
恐怕这不仅仅是谦词,还有一定的见地。
那便是:任何封闭的体系,如果要有活力,要能成活,必须将封闭的体系冲开,让体系之外的能量与信息参加进来。
哲学作为语言理论之外的能量与信息,尤其重要。
语言理论体系中的语言学家,对自己的语言理论,总免不了片面性。
纠正这个片面性的人,以哲学家为最理想。
”
潘文国先生在《汉英对比纲要》一书中设专门一章来谈“对比研究的哲学基础”,在“萨皮尔-沃尔夫假说”和洪堡特“每一语言里都包含着一种独特的世界观”基础上,他认为语言是一种世界观。
“承认语言是一种世界观会给语言以本体论的地位、会更加注重从民族和民族文化角度对语言进行研究、会把语言研究的重点放到语义上”。
吴铁平引述西方哲学家和语言学家的话指出,在古希腊语中,philosophy(词源意义…智慧的爱好者‟)原本几乎囊括人类的全部知识,包括我们今天认为应属于早期语言学探索的内容。
现在反过来,在西方,美学乃至文艺理论,有被现代语言学囊括的趋势。
国际上的这种思潮也促使我们对语言和语言学的问题重新思考,使我们的语言研究建立在一个更
高、更坚实的基点上。