股权融资中英文对照外文翻译文献

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股权集中度“控制权私人收益”和债务融资-外文资料翻译译文

股权集中度“控制权私人收益”和债务融资-外文资料翻译译文XX 理工大学毕业设计(论文)外文资料翻译系部：专业：姓名：XX学号：外文出处: Ownership Concentration, ‘PrivateBe nefits of Control’ and DebtFinancing[J]. Journal ofCorporation Law,2004,Vol.29,No.4,719-734附件：1.外文资料翻译译文；2.外文原文。

附件1：外文资料翻译译文股权集中度，“控制权私人收益”和债务融资摘要：基于快速成长的'法律和经济’文献，本文分析了主要所有者在以牺牲小股东利益而获取“控制权私人收益”的环境中进行债务融资的公司治理。

这表明，所有权集中是与作为一个公司的负债比率和衡量投资的财政资源的使用效率较低有关，而这并不取决于最大股东的身份，固定的具有支配权的股东可以串通股权持有者进行控股溢价。

这个结论的其中一个可能的结果就是债务市场的企业信贷压缩，这有转型期经济体的证据支持。

关键词：所有权，控制权收益，债务引言有一个大量研究金融经济学和战略管理的文献显示获得控制权私人收益的方式和数量与管理行为和企业业绩有关。

(Gibbs, 1993；Hoskisson et al., 1994；Jensen and Warner, 1988)然而，大多以往的研究集中于大型、公开的在传统的美国/英国公司控制模型的框架范围内分散所有权的上市公司，很少是关于所有权集中的公司治理（Holderness and Sheehan, 1988；Short,1994）。

快速成长的企业所有制结构的优化取决于“控制权私人收益”的水平。

（e.g., Bennedsen and Wo lfenzon, 2000； Grossman and Hart, 1988；Harris and Raviv, 1988）。

文献已超出传统的治理研究美国/英国环境，并在最近成为理论和政策辩论。

金融体系中英文对照外文翻译文献

金融体系中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)Comparative Financial Systems1 What is a Financial System?The purpose of a ﬁnancial system is to channel funds from agents with surpluses to agents with deﬁcits. In the traditional literature there have be en two approaches to analyzing this process. The ﬁrst is to consider how agents interact through ﬁnancial markets. The second looks at the operation ofﬁnancial intermediaries such as banks and insurance companies. Fifty years ago, the ﬁnancial system co uld be neatly bifurcated in this way. Rich house-holds and large ﬁrms used the equity and bond markets,while less wealthy house-holds and medium and small ﬁrms used banks, insurance companies and other ﬁnancial institutions. Table 1, for example, shows the ownership of corporate equities in 1950. Households owned over 90 percent. By 2000 it can be seen that the situation had changed dramatically.By then households held less than 40 percent, nonbank intermediaries, primarily pension funds and mutual funds, held over 40 percent. This change illustrates why it is no longer possible to consider the role of ﬁnancial markets and ﬁnancial institutions separately. Rather than intermediating directly between households and ﬁrms, ﬁnancial institutions have increasingly come to intermediate between households and markets, on the one hand, and between ﬁrms and markets,on the other. This makes it necessary to consider the ﬁnancial system as anirreducible whole.The notion that a ﬁnancial system transfers resources between households and ﬁrms is, of course, a simpliﬁcation. Governments usually play a significant role in the ﬁnancial system. They are major borrowers, particularlyduring times of war, recession, or when large infrastructure projects are being undertaken. They sometimes also save signiﬁcant amounts of funds. For example, when countries such as Norway and many Middle Eastern States have access to large amounts of natural resources (oil), the government may acquire large trust funds on behalf of the population.In addition to their roles as borrowers or savers, governments usually playa number of other important roles. Central banks typically issue ﬁat money and are extensively involved in the payments system. Financial systems with unregulated markets and intermediaries, such as the US in the late nineteenth century, often experience ﬁnancial crises.The desire to eliminate these crises led many governments to intervene in a signiﬁcant way in the ﬁnancial system. Central banks or some other regulatory authority are charged with regulating the banking system and other intermediaries, such as insurance companies. So in most countries governments play an important role in the operation of ﬁnancialsystems. This intervention means that the political system, which determines the government and its policies, is also relevant for the ﬁnancial system.There are some historical instances where ﬁnancial markets and institutions have operated in the absence of a well-deﬁned legal system, relyinginstead on reputation and other im plicit mechanisms. However, in most ﬁnancial systems the law plays an important role. It determines what kinds ofcontracts are feasible, what kinds of governance mechanisms can be used for corporations, the restrictions that can be placed on securities and so forth. Hence, the legal system is an important component of a ﬁnancial system.A ﬁnancial system is much more than all of this, however. An important pre-requisite of the ability to write contracts and enforce rights of various kinds is a system of accounting. In addition to allowing contracts to be written, an accounting system allows investors to value a company more easily and to assess how much it would be prudent to lend to it. Accounting information is only one type of information (albeit the most important) required by ﬁnancial systems. The incentives to generate and disseminate information are crucial features of a ﬁnancial system.Without signiﬁcant amounts of human capital it will not be possible for any of these components of a ﬁnancial system to operate eﬀectively. Well-trained lawyers, accountants and ﬁnancial professionals such as bankers are crucial for an eﬀective ﬁnancial system, as the experience of Eastern Europe demonstrates.The literature on comparative ﬁnancial systems is at an early stage. Our survey builds on previous overviews by Allen (1993), Allen and Gale (1995) and Thakor (1996). These overviews have focused on two sets of issues.(1)Normative: How eﬀective are diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial system atvarious functions?(2) Positive: What drives the evolution of the ﬁnancial system?The ﬁrst set of issues is considered in Sections 2-6, which focus on issues of investment and saving, growth, risk sharing, information provision and corporate governance, respectively. Section 7 consider s the inﬂuence of law and politics on the ﬁnancial system while Section 8 looks at the role ﬁnancial crises have had in shaping the ﬁnancial system. Section 9 contains concludingremarks.2 Investment and SavingOne of the primary purposes of the ﬁnancial system is to allow savings to be invested in ﬁrms. In a series of important papers, Mayer (1988, 1990) documents how ﬁrms obtained funds and ﬁnanced investment in a number of diﬀerent countries. Table 2 shows the results from the most recent set of studies, based on data from 1970-1989, using Mayer’s methodology. The ﬁgures use data obtained from sources-and-uses-of-funds statements. For France, the data are from Bertero (1994), while for the US, UK, Japan and Germany they are from Corbett and Jenkinson (1996). It can be seen that internal ﬁnance is by far the most important source of funds in all countries.Bank ﬁnance is moderately important in most countries and particularly important in Japan and France. Bond ﬁnance is only important in the US and equity ﬁnance is either unimportant or negative (i.e., shares are being repurchased in aggregate) in all countries. Mayer’s studies and those using his methodology have had an important impact because they have raised the question of how important ﬁnancial marke ts are in terms of providing funds for investment. It seems that, at least in the aggregate, equity markets are unimportant while bond markets are important only in the US. These ﬁndings contrast strongly with theemphasis on equity and bond markets in the traditional ﬁnance literature. Bank ﬁnance is important in all countries,but not as important as internal ﬁnance.Another perspective on how the ﬁnancial system operates is obtained by looking at savings and the holding of ﬁnancial assets. Table 3 shows t he relative importance of banks and markets in the US, UK, Japan, France and Germany. It can be seen that the US is at one extreme and Germany at the other. In the US, banks are relatively unimportant: the ratio of assets to GDP is only 53%, about a third the German ratio of 152%. On the other hand, the US ratio of equity market capitalization to GDP is 82%, three times the German ratio of 24%. Japan and the UK are interesting intermediate cases where banks and markets are both important. In France, banks are important and markets less so. The US and UK are often referred to as market-based systems while Germany, Japan and France are often referred to as bank-based systems. Table 4 shows the total portfolio allocation of assets ultimately owned by the household sector. In the US and UK, equity is a much more important component of household assets than in Japan,Germany and France. For cash and cash equivalents (which includes bank accounts), the reverse is true. Tables 3 and 4 provide an interesting contrast to Table 2. One would expect that, in the long run, household portfolios would reﬂect the ﬁnancing patterns of ﬁrms. Since internal ﬁnance accrues to equity holders, one might expect that equity would be much more important in Japan, France and Germany. There are, of course, diﬀerences in the data sets underlying the diﬀerent tables. For example, household portfolios consist of ﬁnancial assets and exclude privately held ﬁrms, whereas the sources-and-uses-of-funds data include all ﬁrms. Nevertheless, it seem s unlikely that these diﬀerences could cause such huge discrepancies. It is puzzling that these diﬀerent ways of viewing the ﬁnancial system produce such radically diﬀerent results.Another puzzle concerning internal versus external ﬁnance is the diﬀerence between the developed world and emerging countries. Although it is true for the US, UK, Japan, France, Germany and for most other developed countries that internal ﬁnance dominates external ﬁnance, this is not the case for emerging countries. Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) show that, for a range of emerging economies, external ﬁnance is more important than internal ﬁnance. Moreover, equity is the most important ﬁnancing instrument and dominates debt. This diﬀerence between the industrialized nations and the emerging countries has so far received little attention. There is a large theoretical literature on the operation of and rationale for internal capital markets. Internal capital markets diﬀer from external capital markets because of asymmetric information, investment incentives, asset speciﬁcity, control rights, transaction costs or incomplete markets There has also been considerable debate on the relationship between liquidity and investment (see, for example, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen(1988), Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991))that the lender will not carry out the threat in practice, the incentive eﬀect disappears. Although the lender’s behavior is now ex post optimal, both parties may be worse oﬀ ex ante.The time inconsistency of commitments that are optimal ex ante and suboptimal ex post is typical in contracting problems. The contract commits one to certain courses of action in order to inﬂuence the behavior of the other party. Then once that party’s behavior has been determined, the beneﬁt of the commitment disappears and there is now an incentive to depart from it.Whatever agreements have been entered into are subject to revision because both parties can typically be made better oﬀby “renegotiating” the original agreement. The possibility of renegotiation puts additional restrictions on the kind of contract or agreement that is feasible (we are referring here to the contract or agreement as executed, ratherthan the contract as originally written or conceived) and, to that extent, tends to reduce the welfare of both parties ex ante. Anything that gives the parties a greater power to commit themselves to the terms of the contract will, conversely, be welfare-enhancing.Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) (included as a chapter in this section) have suggested that ﬁnancial markets have an advantage over ﬁnancial intermediaries in maintaining commitments to refuse further funding. If the ﬁrm obtains its funding from the bond market, th en, in the event that it needs additional investment, it will have to go back to the bond market. Because the bonds are widely held, however, the ﬁrm will ﬁnd it diﬃcult to renegotiate with the bond holders. Apart from the transaction costs involved in negotiating with a large number of bond holders, there is a free-rider problem. Each bond holder would like to maintain his original claim over the returns to the project, while allowing the others to renegotiate their claims in order to ﬁnance the additional investment. The free-rider problem, which is often thought of as the curse of cooperative enterprises, turns out to be a virtue in disguise when it comes to maintaining commitments.From a theoretical point of view, there are many ways of maintaining a commitment. Financial institutions may develop a valuable reputation for maintaining commitments. In any one case, it is worth incurring the small cost of a sub-optimal action in order to maintain the value of the reputation. Incomplete information about the borrower’s type may lead to a similar outcome. If default causes the institution to change its beliefs about the defaulter’s type, then it may be optimal to refuse to deal with a ﬁrm after it has defaulted. Institutional strategies such as delegating decisions to agents who are given no discretion to renegotiate may also be an eﬀective commitment device.Several authors have argued that, under certain circumstances, renegotiation is welfare-improving. In that case, the Dewatripont-Maskin argument is turned on its head. Intermediaries that establish long-term relationships with clients may have an advantage over ﬁnancial markets precisely because it is easier for them to renegotiate contracts.The crucial assumption is that contracts are incomplete. Because of the high transaction costs of writing complete contracts, some potentially Pareto-improving contingencies are left out of contracts and securities. This incompleteness of contracts may make renegotiation desirable. The missing contingencies can be replaced by contract adjustments that are negotiated by the parties ex post, after they observe the realization of variables on which the contingencies would have been based. The incomplete contract determines the status quo for the ex post bargaining game (i.e., renegotiation)that determines the ﬁnal outcome.An import ant question in this whole area is “How important are these relationships empirically?” Here there does not seem to be a lot of evidence.As far as the importance of renegotiation in the sense of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), the work of Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) suggests that little renegotiation occurs in the case of ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms.Conventional wisdom holds that banks are so well secured that they can and do “pull the plug” as soon as a borrower becomes distressed, leaving theunsecured creditors and other claimants holding the bag.Petersen and Rajan (1994) suggest that ﬁrms that have a longer relationship with a bank do have greater access to credit, controlling for a number of features of the borrowers’ history. It is not clea r from their work exactly what lies behind the value of the relationship. For example, the increased access to credit could be an incentive device or it could be the result ofgreater information or the relationship itself could make the borrower more credit worthy. Berger and Udell (1992) ﬁnd that banks smooth loan rates in response to interest rate shocks. Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Berlin and Mester (1997) ﬁnd that smoothing occurs as a ﬁrm’s credit risk changes.Berlin and Mester (1998) ﬁnd that loan rate smoothing is associated with lower bank proﬁts. They argue that this suggests the smoothing does not arise as part of an optimal relationship.This section has pointed to a number of issues for future research.• What is the relationship between th e sources of funds for investment,as revealed by Mayer (1988, 1990), and the portfolio choices of investorsand institutions? The answer to this question may shed some light onthe relative importance of external and internal finance.• Why are financing patterns so different in developing and developedeconomies?• What is the empirical importance of long-term relationships? Is renegotiationimportant is it a good thing or a bad thing?• Do long-term relationships constitute an important advantage of bankbasedsystems over market-based systems?金融体系的比较1、什么是金融体系？一个金融系统的目的（作用）是将资金从盈余者（机构）向短缺者（机构）转移（输送）。

股份投资合同的标准文本中英文版本

Anti-Dilution反稀释条款The Conversion Price shall be adjusted on a full-ratchet basis for issuance of any securities of the Company at a purchase price less than the then-effective conversion price. Additionally, the Conversion Price shall be proportionally adjusted for share splits, share dividends, recapitalizations and the like.若公司以低于届时转股价格的价格发行任何证券，转股价格将调整为新发行的证券的价格。

发生股票分拆、发放股票股利、再资本化和类似情形时，转股价格亦将按比例作相应调整。

Protective Provisions保护性条款The consent of 75% of the CN holders will be required for any of the following actions of the Company and its subsidiaries:公司及其子公司的下述事项须征得75%的可转换债券持有人同意：1) Amendment to the Memorandum of Articles of Association公司章程的修改2) Make any material change in the nature of its business公司业务性质的任何重大改变3) Merger, consolidation, reorganization, liquidation, dissolution, or winding-up合并、收购、重组、清算、解散或停业4) Acquire, grant an operating right in relation to or otherwise dispose of any shares or securities or material part of its business or assets (excluding current assets)股权、重要业务或重大资产（不包括流动资产）的收购、处置，经营权的获取、授予5) Sell, mortgage, pledge, lease, transfer or otherwise dispose of a substantial portion of assets重大资产的出售、抵押、担保、租赁、转让或处置6) Issuance of equity or debt securities, repurchase or redemption of any equity security: re-classification of issued securities; increases, decreases or alters the existing issued share capital 股权或债权证券的发行，任何股权证券的赎回，已发行证券的重新分类，现有股本的增加、减少或改变7) Declaration or payment of dividends宣布发放或支付股利8) Enter into any joint venture, partnership or consortium arrangement签订任何合营或联营协议9) Termination, or material amendment to the terms of stock option plan including number of options, vesting period, and exercise price of options股票期权计划的终止，或其中条款的重大改变（包括期权总额、行权期、行权价格）10) Any loans to any director, officer or employee提供给任何董事、高管人员或雇员的贷款11) Any related party transaction outside the ordinary course of business任何非正常业务之外的关联交易12) Incurrence of any external borrowing by the Company which exceeds US$ [ ], or a series of external borrowing by the Company which in the aggregate over any 12 month period exceed US$ [ ].公司超过[ ]美元的任何外部借贷，或12个月内累计超过[ ]美元的一系列外部借贷的发生13) Change the terms of employment of any employee whose base salary is in excess of US$50,000 per annum任何底薪超过5万美元/年的雇员雇用条款的改变14) Hire or dismiss key management staff聘用或解雇关键管理人员15) Enter into any contract or arrangement which involves a consideration or payment exceeding US$[ ] to be made within any one year任何1年内须支付对价超过[ ]美元的合同或安排的达成16) Change of the Auditors or any material change in accounting practices or policies审计师事务所的变更或任何会计制度或政策的重大改变17) Select the listing exchange or the underwriters for an IPO or approve the valuation and terms and conditions for the IPO, whether or not the IPO is a Qualified IPOIPO上市交易所或承销商的选择，或IPO（不管是否合格IPO）估值以及条款的批准18) Annual budget including capital expenditure.年度预算（包括资本支出）。

金融学专业私募股权投资资料外文翻译文献

金融学专业私募股权投资资料外文翻译文献外文题目：Financial Foreign Direct Investment: The Role of Private Equity Investments in the Globalization of Firms from Emerging Markets原文：1. Introduction International International business business business and and and economic economic economic development development development are are are closely closely closely related. related. related. When When applying applying to to to emerging emerging emerging markets, markets, markets, foreign foreign foreign direct direct direct investment investment investment (FDI) (FDI) (FDI) and and and development development economics are two sides of the same coin. In terms of the classical OLI model of the economics of international business, the multinational enterprises (MNE) brings into play the ownership advantage while the governments of emerging markets bring into play play the the the location location location advantage advantage advantage (Dunning (Dunning (Dunning 2000). 2000). 2000). For For For most most most part, part, part, the the the economics economics economics and and and the the strategy strategy of of of international international international business business business focused focused focused on on on the the the MNE MNE MNE while while while economic economic economic geography geography from from Koopman Koopman (1957) to to Krugman Krugman (1991) and and later later later (as (as well as as development development economics) have focused on the country in which the investment takes place. This This paper paper paper brings brings brings together together together international international international business business business development development development economics economics economics and and international trade to gain better insights into an important and fascinating phenomenon phenomenon in in in the the the arena arena arena of of of international international international business business business –– the the recent recent recent growth growth growth of of of private private equity equity investments investments investments in in in emerging emerging emerging markets. markets. markets. The The The tremendous tremendous tremendous growth growth growth of of of private private private equity equity investments in emerging markets is evident from the data presented in Table 1. The total total went went went up up up almost almost almost ten ten ten times, times, times, from from from about about about $3.5B $3.5B $3.5B to to to more more more than than than $33B $33B $33B in in in the the the period period 2003-2006. Emerging Asia led the emerging markets with $19.4B raised in 2006 by 93 funds; about a third of the money that was raised by these funds went to China and India. The main argument that is presented and discussed in this paper is that private equity equity investments investments investments in in in emerging emerging emerging markets markets markets is is is another another another expression expression expression of of of foreign foreign foreign direct direct investment (FDI) where firms from the developed countries export specific factors of production (their ownership advantage) to small countries and emerging markets (new locations) as a way to generate value to all stakeholders. The firms in the developed countries countries in in in this this this case case case are are are specialized specialized specialized financial financial financial institutions institutions institutions (private (private (private equity equity equity funds) funds) (Yoshikawa (Yoshikawa et et et al. al. al. 2006) 2006) 2006) and and and the the the factor factor factor of of of production production production that that that they they they export export export is is is high-risk high-risk sector sector specific specific specific capital. capital. capital. We We dubbed dubbed this this this form form form of of of FDI FDI FDI as as as financial financial financial foreign foreign foreign direct direct investment investment (FFDI), but (FFDI), but the process and the rational a re the same as in are the same as in the classical FDI analysis. FFDI (synonymous –but not restricted to –for private equity throughout this this paper) paper) paper) is is is a a a subset subset subset of of of FDI FDI FDI that that that is is is solely solely solely devoted devoted devoted––as as the the the name name name implies implies implies––for investments in private firms in purpose of generating high return on- investment over a relatively short period (5-7 years). The term “short” is relative and in comparison with with the the the typical typical typical investment investment investment periods periods periods of of of the the the investors investors investors of of of private private private equity equity equity funds funds funds (e.g., (e.g., pension funds, endowment funds and the like). At the extreme, i.e., in venture capital investments, investors take into account upfront that some of their investments will be written written off off at at the the the prospects prospects prospects that that that few few few will will will generate generate generate return return return that that that will will will more more more than than compensate compensate those those those sunk sunk sunk investments investments investments (hence (hence (hence the the the “high “high “high-r -r -risk” isk” isk” referral). referral). referral). Sector Sector Sector specific specific capital is a general phenomenon. In many industries such investment is more than mere financial investment and is augmented by specific information that the investor may posses in the form of managerial expertise, deal structuring specialty, networking capabilities and the like. In the case of the high-risk capital industry there is a need to bridge the gap between the risk perception of the investment project by the entrepreneurs entrepreneurs or or or the the the “insiders” “insiders” “insiders” and and and the the the investors investors investors (most (most (most often often often risk-averse risk-averse risk-averse investors), investors), the the “outsiders”. “outsiders”. “outsiders”. This This This is is is accomplished accomplished accomplished by by by a a a combination combination combination of of of validation validation validation processes processes processes and and screening mechanisms that are engaged by the private equity funds. In this regard they act act as as as financial financial financial and and and risk risk risk intermediaries intermediaries intermediaries (Coval/Thakor (Coval/Thakor (Coval/Thakor 2005, 2005, 2005, provide provide provide an an an analytical analytical framework framework for for for this this this approach). approach). approach). The The The value value value of of of the the the general general general partners partners partners of of of private private private equity equity funds funds depends depends depends on on on the the the quality quality quality of of of the the the risk risk risk intermediation intermediation intermediation that that that they they they perform perform perform for for for their their investors. This makes them credible and reliable processors of information. Table 1: Emerging Markets Private Equity Funds Raising, 2003-2006 (US$ Millions) Emerging Asia CEE Russia Latham Sub-Sah ara Africa Middle- East Africa Multi ple Regions Total 2003 2,200 406 417 NA 350 116 3,489 2004 2,800 1,777 714 NA 545 618 6,454 2005 15,446 2,711 1,272 791 1,915 3,630 25,765 2006 19,386 3,272 2,656 2,353 2,946 2,580 33,193 Source: EMPEA (Emerging Markets Private Equity Association) 2007. The discussion and the analysis presented in this paper draw on three different bodies of literature; the literature of finance and growth from development economics, (Levine (Levine 1997, 1997, 1997, 2004), 2004), 2004), the the the literature literature literature on on on comparative comparative comparative advantage advantage advantage in in in the the the discussion discussion discussion of of patterns of trade (Deardorff 2004) and the literature of imperfect contracts in micro economics and in financial economics (Hart 2001, Zingales 2000). Financial foreign direct investment as practiced by private equity funds can be a powerful powerful contributor contributor contributor to to to economic economic economic and and and business business business growth growth growth in in in emerging emerging emerging markets. markets. markets. FFDI FFDI changes changes the the the scene scene scene of of of international international international business business business as as as it it it contributes contributes contributes to to to a a a change change change in in in the the relations relations between between between firms firms firms in in in developed developed developed countries countries countries and and and firms firms firms in in in the the the emerging emerging emerging markets. markets. The The unique unique unique relatively relatively relatively short short short term term term nature nature nature of of of a a a private private private equity equity equity investment investment investment makes makes makes it it it an an appropriate instrument for for the the transition period that that the the world of of international international business is experiencing regarding the role of emerging markets and the role of China and and India India India in in in particular. particular. particular. This This This is is is so so so because because because the the the short short short term term term nature nature nature of of of private private private equity equity investments investments allows allows allows firms firms firms in in in emerging emerging emerging markets markets markets for for for sufficient sufficient sufficient time time time for for for transfer transfer transfer of of information and learning and yet allow the local stakeholders to resume full ownership once the process is completed. The The relations relations relations between between between the the the development development development economics economics economics literature literature literature on on on finance finance finance and and growth and the international business literature is presented and discussed in the next section section of of of the the the paper. paper. paper. It It It is is is shown shown shown that that that the the the two two two bodies bodies bodies of of of literatures literatures literatures are are are quite quite quite related related once one penetrates the specific lingo employed by each one of them. The problems in in the the the institutional institutional institutional setting setting setting and and and the the the lack lack lack of of of sufficient sufficient sufficient development development development of of of the the the capital capital markets markets in in in most most most emerging emerging emerging markets markets markets are are are overcome overcome overcome by by by creating creating creating specific specific specific international international alliances that generate local comparative advantage. In section three, the concept of local local comparative comparative comparative advantage advantage advantage (Deardorff (Deardorff (Deardorff 2004) 2004) 2004) is is is used used used for for for better better better understanding understanding understanding of of FFDI. The perfect and efficient financial market of the Modern Theory of Finance is replaced by a set of imperfect contracts negotiated and renegotiated between domestic firms firms in in in emerging emerging emerging markets markets markets and and and private private private equity equity equity funds funds funds from from from the the the US US US and and and other other other major major capital capital markets. markets. markets. This This This issue issue issue is is is discussed discussed discussed and and and analyzed analyzed analyzed in in in section section section four four four of of of the the the paper. paper. Private equity funds drew a fair amount of criticism lately. The potential of private equity investment in emerging markets is discussed in section five of the paper. The conclusions conclusions of of of the the the study study study are are are briefly briefly briefly discussed discussed discussed in in in section section section six, six, six, the the the last last last section section section of of of the the paper. 2. Finance, Growth and International Business In a survey paper on the relations between financial development and economic growth growth Levine Levine Levine (1997) (1997) (1997) states states states that: that: that: “…the “…the “…the development development development of of of financial financial financial markets markets markets and and institutions are critical and inextricable part of the growth process”. He continues and says that: “…financial d evelopment development development is is is a a a good predictor of future rates of econom good predictor of future rates of econom ic growth, capital accumulation and and technological technological technological change. change. change. Moreover, Moreover, Moreover, cross-country, cross-country, cross-country, case case case study, study, study, industry- industry- industry- and and firm- firm- level level level analyses document extensive periods when financial development-or the analyses document extensive periods when financial development-or the lack lack thereof-crucially thereof-crucially thereof-crucially affect affect affect the the the speed speed speed and and and the the the pattern pattern pattern of of of econom econom economic ic ic development”, development”, (Levine (Levine 1997, 1997, 1997, p. p. p. 689). 689). 689). Levine Levine Levine makes makes makes two two two other other other important important important points; points; points; first first first that that that the the discussion of finance and developments takes place outside the state-contingent world of Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959) and the discussion takes place in an incomplete world with imperfect (monopolistic) competition. The second point is that there are three main research questions in the field of finance and development that needs more attention. attention. (1) (1) (1) Why Why Why does does does financial financial financial structure structure structure change change change as as as countries countries countries grow? grow? grow? (2) (2) (2) Why Why Why do do countries at similar stages of economic development have different looking financial systems? systems? and and and (3) (3) (3) are are are there there there longterm longterm longterm economic economic economic growth growth growth advantages advantages advantages to to to adopting adopting adopting legal legal and policy changes that create one type of financial system vis-à-vis another? The three research questions raised by Levine deal with different aspects of the location of foreign direct investment. In particular, the three research questions deal with the gap between the potential of a certain country, or countries, as a site for an international oriented investment and the actual investment that has taken place. This is particularly true where the investment from the developed countries is in the form of of high-risk high-risk high-risk sector sector sector specific specific specific capital capital capital such such such as as as provided provided provided by by by private private private equity equity equity funds. funds. funds. The The potential potential of of of some some some countries countries countries in in in attracting attracting attracting private private private equity equity equity funds funds funds is is is not not not being being being fully fully realized realized due due due to to to the the the absence absence absence of of of an an an appropriate appropriate appropriate financial financial financial system. system. system. A A A well well well developed developed financial financial system system system is is is necessary necessary necessary to to to enhance enhance enhance the the the import import import of of of sector sector sector specific specific specific (high-risk) (high-risk) capital, a necessary condition for FFDI. As As the the the financial financial financial structure structure structure of of of a a a country country country changes changes changes (as (as (as the the the country country country grows), grows), grows), it it it is is suggested by Levine in his first question that different types of FDI can be accommodated. The development of FDI in China is an evidence of this process. Yet, as it is proposed in Levine’s second question, the financial markets of countries with similar similar rate rate rate of of of growth growth growth develop develop develop in in in different different different pace pace pace and and and in in in a a a different different different way. way. way. There There There are are long-term economic growth advantages of adopting certain p atterns of development patterns of development for the financial market of a given country. In many cases FDI and FFDI do depend on on relatively relatively relatively transparent transparent transparent and and and enforceable enforceable enforceable corporate corporate corporate governance. governance. governance. Morck, Morck, Morck, Wolfenzon, Wolfenzon, and and Y eung Y eung (2005) (2005) (2005) demonstrated demonstrated demonstrated that that that economic economic economic entrenchment entrenchment entrenchment has has has a a a high high high price price price in in foregone growth opportunities. There There are are are three three three related related related problems problems problems in in in creating creating creating a a a domestic domestic domestic financial financial financial system system system for for private equity and venture capital investments: How How to to to mobilize mobilize mobilize the the the type type type and and and the the the quantity quantity quantity of of of savings savings savings (capital) (capital) (capital) appropriate appropriate appropriate for for such investments where most of the capital should be imported from the major capital markets of the world? How How to to to generate generate generate credible credible credible information information information and and and trust? trust? trust? How How How to to to monitor monitor monitor management management and to exert corporate control? The The only only only feasible feasible feasible way way way to to to accommodate accommodate accommodate private private private equity equity equity and and and venture venture venture capital capital investments in emerging markets is to import sector specific high-risk capital from the US and other major capital markets. The term sector specific capital recognizes the fact that capital is not a unified factor of production (in the same way that there are different types of labor there are different types of capital). High-risk sector specific capital capital relates relates relates to to to the the the portfolio portfolio portfolio of of of the the the investors investors investors and and and to to to the the the relational relational relational capital capital capital of of of the the specific financial intermediaries (i.e., the private equity funds). Most of the high-risk capital in the world is coming from large institutional investors in the US and it is a part part of of of their their their assets’ assets’ assets’ management management management program. program. program. (A (A (A good good good example example example of of of how how how such such such capital capital relates to the total portfolio is the investment policy of CALPERS the largest pension fund in the US). Due to internal and external regulations, financial institutions cannot make make investment investment investment unless unless unless there there there is is is an an an acceptable acceptable acceptable level level level of of of transparency transparency transparency and and and corporate corporate governance governance in in in the the the country country country where where where the the the money money money is is is invested. invested. invested. Whether Whether Whether such such such a a a process process process is is possible in a given developing country and what are the chances that if implemented it will succeed is a very important question. Horii, Ohdoi, and Yamamoto (2005) deal with with this this this issue. issue. issue. They They They address address address the the the question question question why why why some some some developing developing developing countries countries countries are are are less less successful than others in adopting technologies and more effective financial markets techniques. To quote Horii et al. (2005, p. 2): “A fundamental question is why some countries are stuck with poor performance even though it results in primitive financial ma markets rkets rkets and and and unproductive unproductive unproductive technologies”. technologies”. technologies”. They They They conclude conclude conclude that that that in in in some some some cases cases cases the the expected expected increase increase increase in in in the the the income income income inequality inequality inequality due due due to to to the the the financial financial financial led led led technological technological changes deters people f rom from from adopting financial, legal, adopting financial, legal, a nd political and political reforms reforms that will that will lead to financial, business, and economic development. Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) provide somewhat different answer, also focusing on income distribution but from a point of view of economic entrenchment and rent seeking behavior. Nowhere the relationship between finance, growth, and international business is more more pronounced pronounced pronounced than than than in in in the the the impressive impressive impressive development development development of of of the the the private private private equity equity equity funds funds devoted for investment in emerging markets. Table 1 presents data on the growth of private equity funds raised for investment in emerging markets by regions. The amounts of money raised by private equity funds dedicated for investments in emerging markets went went up tremendously in up tremendously in t he last five the last five y ears. More importantly years. More importantly significant amounts were were invested invested to support domestic companies in in emerging emerging markets markets to to to become become become more more more competitive competitive competitive in in in the the the global global global markets markets markets by by by providing providing providing their their their own own brands of products to the world’s consumers. Lenovo is a case in point when a major investment investment by by by three three three American American American private private private equity equity equity funds funds funds (Texas (Texas (Texas Pacific Pacific Pacific Group, Group, Group, General General Atlantic, and Newbridge Capital) was made in a Chinese company with the purpose of making Lenovo a leading competitor in the global market. 译文：金融类对外直接投资：私募股权投资在新兴市场全球化企业中的角色一、简介国际商业和经济发展密切相关。

私募股权与人力资本风险外文文献翻译中英文最新

私募股权与⼈⼒资本风险外⽂⽂献翻译中英⽂最新外⽂⽂献翻译原⽂及译⽂标题：私募股权与⼈⼒资本风险外⽂翻译2019⽂献出处：Manfred Antoni, Ernst Maug, Stefan Obernberger.[J]Journal of Financial Economics，Volume 133, Issue3，September 2019，Pages 634-657译⽂字数：3900 多字英⽂Private equity and human capital riskManfred Antoni，Ernst Maug，Stefan ObernbergerAbstractWe study the human capital effects of private equity buyouts in Germany. We conduct atched-sample difference-in-differences estimations at the establishment and at the individual employee level with more than 152 thousand buyout employees and a carefully matched control group. Buyouts are followed by a reduction in overall employment and an increase in employee turnover. Employees of buyout targets experience earnings declines equivalent to 2.8% of median earnings in the fifth year after the buyout. Managers and older employees fare far worse after buyouts compared with the average target employee, even though they are not more likely to lose their jobs at the target compared with other employees. We argue that the employees most negatively affected after buyouts are those who are less likely to find new employment, not those who are most likely to lose their jobs. Evidence exists of a reduction in administrative staff and more hiring for jobs that require IT skills.Keywords: Private equity, Restructuring, Human capital risk,Buyouts, WagesIn this paper, we analyze the human capital risk associated with private equity (PE) buyouts in Germany. The social costs associated with private equity restructuring have been the subject of emotional debates. The head of the German Social Democratic Party once compared buyout firms with “swarms of locusts” who “descend on companies, graze, and then move on,” suggesting that private equity firms make short-term profits by imposing large costs on employees. Discussions in other countries created similar sentiments.The literature in finance and economics has conventionally regarded private equity buyouts as vehicles for improving firms’governance and operating performance, facilitating growth and creative destruction, and, more recently, modernizing firms’technology.4 From this modernization perspective, private equity buyouts create value by fashioning leaner firms and enhancing growth through organizational, operational, and technological improvements. Critics argue that shareholders gain in private equity buyouts at the expense of other stakeholders, in particular, the government through lower taxes, and employees. This transfer-of- wealth view echoes the critical stance articulated in the public debate. Shleifer and Summers (1988) provide a theoretical foundation for this view and suggest that investor-led restructurings do not create value but simply transfer wealth from employees and other stakeholders toshareholders by reneging on implicit contracts.We contribute to this debate by analyzing 511 private equity buyouts in Germany between 2002 and 2008. Germany is fairly representative for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regarding employment protection legislation (EPL), making it a well- suited laboratory for studying this matter. We perform matched- sample difference-in-differences analyses at the establishment level and the individual level. We first match each target establishment to multiple control establishments and then we match each target employee to another employee from one of the matching control establishments. Matching at both levels is performed based on a rich set of establishment, job, and employee characteristics. We conduct analyses at the establishment level and the individual level over a five-year period after the buyout.We ask two questions: How do job growth, separations, and hiring at the establishment level develop after buyouts? Are buyouts associated with human capital risk for the employees of target firms? We ask both questions for all employees in our sample and for groups of employees who could be particularly vulnerable to or who could benefit from restructuring. The twoquestions we ask are related but distinct. PE firms may increase employee turnover without reducing overall establishment-level employment, and some of the employees who are replaced and losetheir jobs with the target perhaps do not find new employment. We find this to be the case for older workers, who lose their jobs at target establishments at almost exactly the same rate as younger workers but experience significantly larger losses of long-term employment and wages. Hence, it is important to distinguish firm-level decisions and individual outcomes, because some groups, e.g., low-paid workers, seem to find new employment easily, whereas others, such as older workers, often remain unemployed.Buyout establishments reduce their employment by 8.96% more compared with the control group in the period up to five years after the buyout. This effect can be decomposed into an increase in the separation rate of 18.75% and an increase in the hiring rate of 9.79%. About half of the increase in departures from buyout targets results in replacements and the other half in job destruction. The investigation of deal-level growth, separation, and hiring rates shows a strong and positive correlation between hiring rates and separation rates and almost half of the buyouts are followed by a period of increased employee turnover. Moreover, we often find higher separation rates and higher hiring rates for the same groups of employees. Private equity firms restructure firms by reducing employment and by replacing employees. In our sample, they employ both strategies at about the same rate. The increase in hiring is largely concentrated in the first years after the buyout, whereas most of theseparations happen in later years. We may observe separations later because buyout firms want to increase profitability toward the end of their investment horizon to achieve better sales prices. Alternatively, the evaluation of targets’ operations and the implementation of restructuring strategies could simply take time. We find, at the individual level, a downward trend in employee earnings after private equity buyouts. The average buyout target employee loses € 980 in annual earnings after five years compared with the matched control group, which is 2.8% of median earnings in our sample.The individual-level analyses identify three groups of employees whose post-buyout losses are significantly larger than those of the average buyout employee: white-collar workers, managers, and older employees. Our discussion of employee groups is guided by three sets of explanations of buyout-related changes in employment and wages: (1) organizational streamlining, (2) technological modernization, and (3) transfers of wealth. We begin with organizational streamlining, i.e., the notion that buyout investors reduce administrative staff and layers of management. White-collar workers experience higher separation rates with less replacement in the short term and significantly higher losses of employment and earnings compared with other employees, consistent with the notion that buyout investors streamline firms by reducing administrative staff. For managers, we find very strong results at theindividual level, but not at the establishment level, which suggests that buyout firms do not systematically reduce layers of middle management. We thus attribute the adverse development for managers to their difficulties in finding new employment, not the human resource policies of buyout investors.Next, we turn to the argument that buyouts foster technological modernization. Private equity firms can implement new technologies, either because target managers resist change or because private equity investors have additional technological expertise. As a result, buyout targets can undergo faster technological modernization than control firms. We are careful to distinguish different notions of technological change, each of which has specific and sometimes different implications for employees. Proponents of the skill-biased technological change (SBTC) hypothesis (Katz, Autor, 1999, Autor, Levy, Murnane, 2003) argue that technological change is biased against lower-skilled jobs and increases wage inequality. Separation rates for low-wage workers are almost twice as high as those for the sample as a whole. They are not displaced by those with higher wage levels, but by other low-wage employees. The net rate of job growth for low-wage workers is not unusually low, whereas turnover is unusually high. Individual-level results even show that low- wage employees lose less after buyouts than other employees, suggesting that skill-biased technological change does not determine individual。

股权融资论文中英文资料外文翻译文献

中英文资料外文翻译文献Chinese Listed Companies Preference to Equity Fund:Non-Systematic FactorsAbstractThis article concentrates on the listed companies’ financing activities in China, analyses the reasons that why the listed companies prefer to equity fund from the aspect of non-systematic factors by using western financing theories, such as financing cost, types and qualities of the enterprises’ assets, profitability, industry factors, shareholding structure factors, level of financial management and society culture, and concludes that the preference to equity fund is a reasonable choice to the listed companies according to Chinese financing environment. At last, there are some concise suggestions be given to rectify the companies’ preference to equity fund.Keywords: Equity fund, Non-systematic factors, financial cost1. IntroductionThe listed companies in China prefer to equity fund, According to the statistic data showed in <China Securities Journal>, the amount of the listed companies finance in capital market account to 95.87 billions in 1997, among which equity fund take the proportion of 72.5%, and the proportion is 72.6% in 1998 and 72.3% in 1999, on the other hand, the proportion of debt fund to total fund is respective 17.8%, 24.9% and 25.1% in those three years. The proportion of equity fund to total fund is lower in the developed capital market than that in China. Take US for example, when American enterprises need to fund in the capital market, they prefer to debt fund than equity fund. The statistic data shows that, from 1970 to 1985, the American enterprises’ debt fund financed occupied the 91.7% proportion of outside financing, more than equity fund. Yan Dawu etc. found that, approximately 3/4 of the listed companies preferred to equity fund in China. Many researchers agree upon that the listed companies’ outside financing following this order: first one is equity fund, second one is convertible bond, third one is short-term liabilities, last one is long-term liabilities. Many researchers usually a nalyze our national listed companies’ preference to equity fund with the systematic factors arising in the reform of our national economy. They thought that it just because of those systematic facts that made the listed companies’ financial activities betr ay to western classical financing theory. For example, the “picking order” theory claims that when enterprise need fund, they should turn to inside fund (depreciation and retained earnings) first, and then debt fund, and the last choice is equity fund. In this article, the author thinks that it is because of the specific financial environment that activates the enterprises’ such preference, and try to interpret the reasons of that preference to equity fund by combination of non-systematic factors and western financial theories.2. Financings cost of the listed company and preference toequity fundAccording to western financing the theories, capital cost of equity fund is more than capital cost of debt fund, thus the enterprise should choose debt fund first, then is the turn to equity fund when it fund outside. We should understand that this conception of “capital cost” is taken into account by investors, it is somewhat opportunity cost of the investors, can also be called expected returns. It contains of risk-free rate of returns and risk rate of returns arising from the investors’ risk investment. It is different with financing cost in essence. Financing cost is the cost arising from enterprises’ financing activities and using fund, we can call it fund co st. If capital market is efficient, capital cost should equal to fund cost, that is to say, what investors gain in capital market should equal to what fund raisers pay, or the transfer of fund is inevitable. But in an inefficient capital market, the price of stock will be different from its value because of investors’ action of speculation; they only chase capital gain and don’t want to hold the stocks in a long time and receive dividends. Thus the listed companies can gain fund with its fund cost being lower than capital cost.But in our national capital market, capital cost of equity fund is very low; it is because of the following factors: first, the high P/E Ratio (Price Earning Ratio) of new issued shares. According to calculation, average P/E Ratio of Chinese listed companies’ shares is between 30 and 40, it also is maintained at 20 although drops somewhat recently. But the normal P/E Ratio should be under 20 according to experience. We can observe the P/E was only 13.2 from 1874 to 1988 in US, and only 10 in Hong Kong. High P/E Ratio means high share issue price, then the capital cost of equity fund drops even given the same level of dividend. Second, low dividend policy in the listed companies, capital cost of equity fund decided by dividend pay-out ratio and price of per share. In China, many listed companies pay little or even no dividends to their shareholders. According to statistic data, there were 488 listed companies paid no dividend to their shareholders in 1998, 58.44 percents of all listed companies, there were 590, 59.83 percents in 1999, even 2000 in which China Securities Regulatory Commission issue new files to rule dividend policy of companies, there were only 699 companies which pay dividends, 18.47 percents more than that in 1999, but dividend payout ratio deduce 22%. Thus capital cost of equity is very low. Third, there is no rigidity on equity fund, if the listed companies choose equity fund, they can use the fund forever and has no obligation to return this fund. Most of listed companies are controlled by Government in China, taking financing risk into account, the major stockholders prefers to equity fund. The management also prefer equity fund because its lower fund cost and needn’t to be paid off, then their position will be more stable than financing in equity fund. We can conclude from the above analysis that cost of equity fund is lower than cost of debt fund in Chinese listed companies and the listed companies prefer to such low-cost fund.3. Types and qualities of assets in listed companies andpreference to equity fundStatic Trade-off Theory tells us, the value of enterprise with financial leverage is decided by the value of self-owned capital; value arising from tax benefit, cost offinancial embarrassment and agency cost. Cost of financial embarrassment and agency cost are negative correlative to the types and qualities of companies’ assets, if the enterprise has more intangible assets, more assets with lower quality, it will has lower liquidity and its assets have lower mortgage value. When this kind of enterprise faces to great financial risk, it will have no way to solve its questions by selling its assets. Furthermore, because care for the ability of turning into cash of the mortgage assets, the creditors will high the level of rate and lay additional items in financial contract to rule the debtor’s action, all of those will enhance the agency cost and deduce the companies value. Qualcomm is supplier of wireless data and communication service in America, it is the inventor and user of CDMA and it also occupies the technology of HDR. The market value of its share is 1120 billions dollars at the end of March, 2000, but the quantities of long-term liabilities is zero. Why? Some reasons may be that there are some competitors in the market who own analogous technologies and the management of Qualcomm Company takes conservative attitude in financing activities. But the most important factor may be Qualcomm Company owns a mass of intangible assets which will have lower conve rtibility and the company’s value will decline when it has no enough money to pay for its debt.Many listed companies in China are transformed from the national enterprises. In the transformation, these listed companies take over the high-quality assets of the national enterprises, but with the development of economy, some projects can not coincide with the market demand and the values of relative assets decline. On the other hand, there are many intangible assets in new high-tech companies. State-owned companies and high-tech companies are the most parts of the capital market. We can conclude that the qualities of listed companies’ assets are very low. This point is supported by the index of P/B (Price-to-Book value) which is usually thought as one of the most important indexes which can weigh the qualities of the listed companies’ assets. According to statistic data coming from Shenzhen Securities Information Company, by the end of November 14, 2003, there were 412 companies whose P/B is less than 2, take the 30% proportions of total listed companies which issue A-share in China, among them, there were 150 companies whose P/B is less than 1.53, and weighted average P/B of the stock market is 2.42. Lower qualities of assets means more cost may be brought out from debt fund and lower total value of the listed companies. Thus the listed companies prefer to equity fund when need outside financial support in China.4. Profitability and preference to equity fundFinancial Leverage Theory tells us that a small ch ange in company’s profit may make great change in company’s EPS (Earnings per share). Just like leverage, we can get an amplified action by use of it. Debt fund can supply us with this leverage, by use of debt fund, these companies which have high level of profitability will get higher level of EPS because debt fund produces more profit for shareholders than interest shareholder shall pay. On the contrary, these companies which have low level of profitability will get lower level of EPS by use of debt fund because debt fund can not produce enough profit for shareholder to fulfill the demand of paying off the interests. Edison International Company has steady amount of customers and many intangible assets, these supply it with high level of profitability and ability to gain debt fund, its debt account to 67.2% proportions of its total assets in 1999.Listed companies in developed countries or regions always have high level of profitability. Take US for example, there are many listed companies which haveexcellent performance in American capital market when do business, such as J.P Morgan, its EPS is $11.16 per share in 1999. Besides it, GM, GE, Coca Cola, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Dell etc. all always are profitable. In Hong Kong, most of those companies whose stock included in Hang Sang Index have the level of EPS more than 1 HKD, many are more than 2 HKD. Such as Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited, its EPS is 7.66 HKD. But listed companies do not have such excellent performance in profitability in China inland. Their profitability is common low. Take the performance of 2000 for example, the weighted average EPS of total listed companies is only 0.20 Yuan per share, and the weighted average P/B is 2.65 Yuan per share, 8.55 percents of these listed companies have negative profit. With low or no profit, the benefit nixes, listed companies’ preference to equity fund is a reasonable phenomenon. Can be gained from debt fund is very little; the listed companies can even suffer from the financial distress caused by debt fund. So with the consideration of shareholders’ interest, the listed companies prefer to equity fund when need outside financial support in China.5. Shareholding structure factors and preference to equityfundListed companies not only face to external financing environmental impacts, but also the structure of the companies shares. Shareholding structure of Chinese listed companies shows characteristics as followed: I. Ownership structure is fairly complex. In addition to the public shares, there are shares held with inland fund and foreign stocks, state-owned shares, legal person shares, and internal employee shares, transferred allotted shares, A shares, B shares, H shares And N shares, and other distinction. From 1995 to 2003, Chinese companies’ outstandin g shares of the total equity share almost have no change, even declined slightly. II. There are different prices, dividends, and rights of shares issued by same enterprise. III. The over-concentration of shares. We use the quantity of shares of the three major shareholders who top the list of shareholders of the listed companies to measure the concentration of stock. We study he concentration of stock of these companies which issue new share publicly in the years from 1995 to 2003 and focus on the situation of Chinese listed companies over the same period. The results showed that: from 1995 to 2003, the company-Which once transferred or allotted shares-whose top three shareholders’ shareholding ratio are generally higher than the average level of all the listed companies, and most of these company's top three shareholders holding 40 percent or higher percent of companies’ shares. In some years, the maximum number even is more than 90 percent, indicating that the company with the implementation of transferred and allotted shares have relatively high concentration rate of shares and major shareholders have absolute control over it. In short, transferring allotting shares and the issuance of additional shares have a certain relevance to the company’s concentration of ownership structure; the company's financing policy is largely controlled by the major shareholders.Chinese listed companies’ special shareholding structure effects its financing action. Because stockholders of the state-owned shares, legal person shares, social and outstanding shares, foreign share have a different objective function, their modes offinancing preferences vary, and their preference affect the financing structure of listed companies. Controlling shareholders which hold state-owned shares account for the status of enterprises and carry out financing decisions in accordance with their own objective function. When the objective function conflict with the other shareholders benefit, they often damage the interests of other shareholders by use of the status of controlling. As the first major shareholders of the companies, government has multiple objectives, not always market-oriented, it prefers to use safe fund such as equity fund to maintain the value of state-owned assets, thus resulting in listed company’s preference to equity financing. Debt financing bring business with greater pressure to pay off the par value and interests. Therefore, the state-owned companies are showing a more offensive attitude to debt fund, again because of Chinese state-controlled listed companies have the absolute status in all listed company.From: International Journal of Business and Management; October, 2009.中国上市公司偏好股权融资：非制度性因素摘要本文把重点集中于中国上市公司的融资活动，运用西方融资理论，从非制度性因素方面，如融资成本、企业资产类型和质量、盈利能力、行业因素、股权结构因素、财务管理水平和社会文化，分析了中国上市公司倾向于股权融资的原因，并得出结论，股权融资偏好是上市公司根据中国融资环境的一种合理的选择。

金融学融资融券中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照翻译Margin Trading Bans in Experimental Asset MarketsAbstractIn financial markets, professional traders leverage their trades because it allows to trade larger positions with less margin. Violating margin requirements, however, triggers a margin call and open positions are automatically covered until requirements are met again. What impact does margin trading have on the price process and on liquidity in financial asset markets? Since empirical evidence is mixed, we consider this question using experimental asset markets. Starting from an empirically relevant situation where margin purchasing and short selling is permitted, we ban margin purchases and/or short sales using a 2x2 factorial design to a allow for a comparative static analysis. Our results indicate that a ban on margin purchases fosters efficient pricing by narrowing price deviations from fundamental value accompanied with lower volatility and a smaller bid-ask-spread. A ban on short sales, however, tends to distort efficient pricing by widening price deviations accompanied with higher volatility and a large spread.Keywords: margin trading, Asset Market, Price Bubble, Experimental Finance1.IntroductionHowever, regulators can only have a positive impact on the life-cycle of a bubble, if they know how institutional changes affect prices in financial markets. Note that regulation is a double-edged sword since decision errors may lead from bad to worse. Given the systemic risk posed by speculative bubbles and their long history, it may be surprising how little attention bubbles have received in the literature and how little understood they are. This ignorance is partly due to the complex psychological nature of speculative bubbles but also due to the fact that the conventional financial economic theory has ignored the existence of bubbles for a long-time. But even if theories on bubble cycles have empirical relevance, it is clear that the issues surrounding the formation and the bursting of bubbles cannot be analyzed with pencil and paper. Conclusions on bubble cycles must be backed with quantitative data analysis. Given the limited number of observed empirical market crashes and their non-recurring nature, an experimental analysis of bubble formation involving controlled and replicable laboratory conditions seems to be a promising way to proceed.The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the related literature, Section 0 presents the details of the experimental design and section IV reports the data analysis. In section V, we summarize our findings and provide concluding remarks.2. Leverage in asset marketsDo margin requirements have any effects on market prices? Fisher (1933) and also Snyder (1930) mentioned the importance of margin debt in generating price bubbles when analyzing the Great Crash of 1929. The ability to leverage purchases lead to a higher demand, ending up in inflated prices. The subsequently appreciated collateral allowed to leverage purchases even more. This upward price spiral was fueled by an expansion of debt. From the end of 1924, brokers’loans rose four and one-half times (by $6.5 billion) and in the final phase broker’s borrowings rose at more than 100% a year until the bubble crashed. Then, after the peak of the bubble, a debt spiral was initiated. Investors lost trust and started to sell assets. Excess supply deflated prices resulting in a depreciation of collateral. Triggered margin calls lead to forced asset sales pushing supply even further. An increase in defaults on debt, and short sales exacerbated supply and finally assets were being sold at fire sale prices. It only took 6 weeks to extinguish half of the total of brokers’credit. Finally, in 1934, the U.S. Congress established federal margin authority to prevent unjustifiable increases or decreases in stock demand since margin requirements can prevent dramatic price fluctuations by limiting leveraged trades on both sides of the stock market: extremely optimistic margin purchasers and extremely pessimistic short sellers.Recent experimental evidence suggests short sale constraints to increase prices. Ackert et al. (2006)and Haruvy and Noussair (2006) find prices to deflate–even below fundamental value in the latter study –while King, Smith, Williams, and Van Boening (1993) find no effect. In a setting with information asymmetries, Fellner and Theissen (2006) find higher prices with short sale constraints but not depending on the divergence of opinion as predicted by Miller (1977). In a setting with smart money traders, Bhojraj, Bloomfield, and Tayler (2009) report short selling to exacerbate overpricing, even though it reduces equilibrium price levels. Hauser and Huber (2012) find short selling constraints with two dependent assets to distort price levels. Our design deviates from the previous studies in several but one important way: We use a more empirically relevant facility in that traders have to provide collateral facing the threat of margin calls.3. Implementing Margin Purchasing and Short SellingWe conducted four computerized treatments utilizing a 2x2 factorial design as displayed in Table II. Starting from an empirically relevant situation where margin purchases Traders execute margin purchases when they purchase shares by using loan, collateralized with shareholdings evaluated at the current market value.11 In this case, traders make a bull market bet, i.e. they borrow cash to buy shares, wait for the price to rise and sell them with a profit. However, a decline in prices depreciates collateral while keeping loan constant. When prices fall below a certain threshold, such that the loan exceeds the value of the shareholdings (i.e. debt > equity), a margin call is triggered. Immediately, i) the trader’s buttons are disabled, ii) outstanding orders are cancelled, and iii) the computer starts selling shares at the current market price until margin requirements are met again or untilall shares have been sold.12 Traders execute short sales when they sell shares without holding them in their inventory, collateralized with sufficient cash at hand.13 In this case, traders make a bear market bet, i.e. they borrow shares to sell them in the market, wait for the price to decline, buy them back with a profit and return them. Note that the amount of debt equals the total amount the trader has to pay to buy back the outstanding shares. Thus, an increase in prices increases debt and reduces collateral (cash minus value of outstanding shares), simultaneously. When prices exceed a certain threshold, such that the amount to buy back outstanding shares exceeds collateral (i.e. debt > equity), a margin call is triggered. Immediately, i)the trader’s buttons are disabled, ii) outstanding orders are cancelled, and iii) the computer starts buying shares at the current market price until margin requirements are met again or until all short positions have been covered. Note that short sellers have to pay dividends for their short positions at the end of each period.14 After period 15, both long and short positions are worthless.15 In any case, a margin callcan lead to bankruptcy. However, the consequences of a margin call hold even during bankruptcy, i.e. outstanding positions continuously being closed although subjects are bankrupt. This is different to any other asset market experiment considering leverage4. Margin traders tend to make less money than othersBy leveraging purchases and sales, traders take more risks to be able to make more money. But do margin traders make more money at all? To evaluate this question, we classify traders into types, i.e. margin traders, who trade on margin at least once, and others. Table X shows the average end- of round-earnings within types for each treatment along with the number of subjects. The spearman rank correlation between type and end of round earnings is negative in both rounds and in all three treatments. The coefficient is significantly different from zero only in MP|NoSS and NoMP|SS when subjects are once experienced . Subjects, who executed both margin purchases and short sales in MP|SS earned less than subjects who refrained from trading on margin. This is significant only for inexperienced subjects . One final note on the distribution of earnings. Comparing the treatments by evaluating the dispersion of earnings using the coefficient of variation , we find that the average CV in the NoMP|NoSS is lower than any other treatment Although not statistically significant, the results indicate that it is less risky to participate in markets with margin bans than in the markets where margintrading is permitted.5. ConclusionIn an attempt to halt the decline in asset values, recent regulatory measures temporarily banned short sales in financial markets. To assess the impact of banning leveraged trading on market mispricing is a complicated task when being reliant on data from real world exchanges only. it is unclear if possible price increases following a ban on short sales would come from new long positions or from covered short positions, and the announcement of such measures affects an uncontrolled reaction of the market. Owed to the uncontrolled uncertainties in the real world, asset mispricing can be measured only with weak confidence.In comparison to other experimental studies where limits to margin debt and short sales are rare, our design involves margin requirements comparable to the real world. Highly levered investors face margin calls that lead to forced liquidation of positions, affecting a reinforcement of the swings of the market. We have studied the impact of leverage on individual portfolio decisions to find an increase in risk taking characterized by higher concentrations of risky assets eventually resulting in individual bankruptcies. Thus, our experimental results are in line with theories of margin trading by Irvine Fischer (1933) and by recent heterogeneous agents models (Geanakoplos 2009) which conjecture such effects on asset pricing and portfolio decisions. As in any laboratory experiment, the results are restricted to the chosen parameters. The baselineSmith et al. (1988) asset market design has been challenged in recent studies (e.g. Kirchler et al. 2011), arguing that some subjects are confused about the declining fundamental value and believe that prices keep a similar level in the course of time. So it would also be interesting to investigate the effects of bans Jena Economic Research Papers 2012 - 05826 of margin purchases and short sales, to see if our treatment effects can be repeated in an environment with non-decreasing fundamental values. However, recent experiments by Hauser and Huber (2012) show similar effects using multiple asset markets with a complexsystem of fundamental values but without margin calls. It would also be interesting to see how margin requirements change performance in multiple sset markets. We leave these open questions to future research.ReferencesAbreu, D., and M.K. Brunnermeier, 2003, Bubbles and crashes, Econometrica 71, 173–204.Ackert, L., N. Charupat, B. Church and R. Deaves, 2006, Margin, Short Selling, and Lotteries in Experimental Asset Markets, Southern Economic Journal 73, 419–436. Adrangi, B. and A. Chatrath, 1999, Margin Requirements and Futures Activity: Evidence from the Soybean and Corn Markets, Journal of Futures Markets, 19, 433-455. Alexander, G.J, and M.A Peterson, 2008, The effect of price tests on trader behavior and market quality: An analysis of Reg SHO, Journal of Financial Markets 11, 84–111.Bai, Y., E.C Chang, and J. Wang, 2006, Asset prices under short-sale constraints, Mimeo. Beber, A., and M. Pagano, 2010, Short-Selling Bans around the World: Evidence from the 2007-09 Crisis, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers TI 10-106 / DSF 1.Bernardo, A. and I. Welch, 2002, Financial market runs, NBER Working Papers 9251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.Bhojraj, S., R.J Bloomfield, and W.B Tayler, 2009, Margin trading, overpricing, and synchronization risk, Review of Financial Studies 22, 2059–2085.Blau, B. M., B. F. Van Ness, R. A. Van Ness, 2009, Short Selling and the Weekend Effect for NYSE Securities, Financial Management 38 (No. 3). 603-630Boehmer, E., Z.R Huszar, and B.D Jordan, 2010, The good news in short interest, Journal of Financial Economic 96, 80–97.Boehme, R.D, B.R Danielsen, and S.M Sorescu, 2006, Short-sale constraints, differences of opinion, and overvaluation, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 41, 455–487.融资融券禁令在实验资产市场摘要在金融市场，因为专业的交易者杠杆交易允许以较少的保证金进行更大的交易。

金融学专业私募股权投资资料外文翻译文献

金融学专业私募股权投资资料外文翻译文献外文题目：Financial Foreign Direct Investment: The Role of Private Equity Investments in the Globalization of Firms fromEmerging Markets原文：1. IntroductionInternational business and economic development are closely related. When applying to emerging markets, foreign direct investment (FDI) and development economics are two sides of the same coin. In terms of the classical OLI model of the economics of international business, the multinational enterprises (MNE) brings into play the ownership advantage while the governments of emerging markets bring into play the location advantage (Dunning 2000). For most part, the economics and the strategy of international business focused on the MNE while economic geography from Koopman (1957) to Krugman (1991) and later (as well as development economics) have focused on the country in which the investment takes place.This paper brings together international business development economics andinternational trade to gain better insights into an important and fascinating phenomenon in the arena of international business –the recent growth of private equity investments in emerging markets. The tremendous growth of private equity investments in emerging markets is evident from the data presented in Table 1. The total went up almost ten times, from about $3.5B to more than $33B in the period 2003-2006. Emerging Asia led the emerging markets with $19.4B raised in 2006 by 93 funds; about a third of the money that was raised by these funds went to China and India.The main argument that is presented and discussed in this paper is that private equity investments in emerging markets is another expression of foreign direct investment (FDI) where firms from the developed countries export specific factors of production (their ownership advantage) to small countries and emerging markets (new locations) as a way to generate value to all stakeholders. The firms in the developed countries in this case are specialized financial institutions (private equity funds) (Yoshikawa et al. 2006) and the factor of production that they export is high-risk sector specific capital. We dubbed this form of FDI as financial foreign direct investment (FFDI), but the process and the rational are the same as in the classical FDI analysis. FFDI (synonymous–but not restricted to–for private equity throughout this paper) is a subset of FDI that is solely devoted–as the name implies–for investments in private firms in purpose of generating high return on- investment over a relatively short period (5-7 years). The term “short” is relative and in comparison with the typical investment periods of the investors of private equity funds (e.g., pension funds, endowment funds and the like). At the extreme, i.e., in venture capital investments, investors take into account upfront that some of their investments will be written off at the prospects that few will generate return that will more than compensate those sunk investments (hence the “high-r isk” referral). Sector specific capital is a general phenomenon. In many industries such investment is more than mere financial investment and is augmented by specific information that the investor may posses in the form of managerial expertise, deal structuring specialty, networking capabilities and the like. In the case of the high-risk capital industry there is a need to bridge the gap between the risk perception of the investment project by theentrepreneurs or the “insiders” and the investors (most often risk-averse investors), the “outsiders”. This is accomplished by a combination of validation processes and screening mechanisms that are engaged by the private equity funds. In this regard they act as financial and risk intermediaries (Coval/Thakor 2005, provide an analytical framework for this approach). The value of the general partners of private equity funds depends on the quality of the risk intermediation that they perform for their investors. This makes them credible and reliable processors of information.Table 1: Emerging Markets Private Equity Funds Raising, 2003-2006 (US$ Millions)Emerging Asia CEERussiaLatham Sub-SaharaAfricaMiddle-EastAfricaMultipleRegionsTotal2003 2,200 406 417 NA 350 116 3,489 2004 2,800 1,777 714 NA 545 618 6,454 2005 15,446 2,711 1,272 791 1,915 3,630 25,765 2006 19,386 3,272 2,656 2,353 2,946 2,580 33,193 Source: EMPEA (Emerging Markets Private Equity Association) 2007.The discussion and the analysis presented in this paper draw on three different bodies of literature; the literature of finance and growth from development economics, (Levine 1997, 2004), the literature on comparative advantage in the discussion of patterns of trade (Deardorff 2004) and the literature of imperfect contracts in micro economics and in financial economics (Hart 2001, Zingales 2000).Financial foreign direct investment as practiced by private equity funds can be a powerful contributor to economic and business growth in emerging markets. FFDI changes the scene of international business as it contributes to a change in the relations between firms in developed countries and firms in the emerging markets. The unique relatively short term nature of a private equity investment makes it an appropriate instrument for the transition period that the world of international business is experiencing regarding the role of emerging markets and the role of China and India in particular. This is so because the short term nature of private equity investments allows firms in emerging markets for sufficient time for transfer ofinformation and learning and yet allow the local stakeholders to resume full ownership once the process is completed.The relations between the development economics literature on finance and growth and the international business literature is presented and discussed in the next section of the paper. It is shown that the two bodies of literatures are quite related once one penetrates the specific lingo employed by each one of them. The problems in the institutional setting and the lack of sufficient development of the capital markets in most emerging markets are overcome by creating specific international alliances that generate local comparative advantage. In section three, the concept of local comparative advantage (Deardorff 2004) is used for better understanding of FFDI. The perfect and efficient financial market of the Modern Theory of Finance is replaced by a set of imperfect contracts negotiated and renegotiated between domestic firms in emerging markets and private equity funds from the US and other major capital markets. This issue is discussed and analyzed in section four of the paper. Private equity funds drew a fair amount of criticism lately. The potential of private equity investment in emerging markets is discussed in section five of the paper. The conclusions of the study are briefly discussed in section six, the last section of the paper.2. Finance, Growth and International BusinessIn a survey paper on the relations between financial development and economic growth Levine (1997) states that: “…the development of financial markets and institutions are critical and inextricable part of the growth process”. He continues and says that: “…financial development is a good predictor of future rates of econom ic growth, capital accumulationand technological change. Moreover, cross-country, case study, industry- and firm- level analyses document extensive periods when financial development-or the lack thereof-crucially affect the speed and the pattern of econom ic development”, (Levine 1997, p. 689). Levine makes two other important points; first that the discussion of finance and developments takes place outside the state-contingent world of Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959) and the discussion takes place in an incomplete world with imperfect (monopolistic) competition. The second point is that there arethree main research questions in the field of finance and development that needs more attention. (1) Why does financial structure change as countries grow? (2) Why do countries at similar stages of economic development have different looking financial systems? and (3) are there longterm economic growth advantages to adopting legal and policy changes that create one type of financial system vis-à-vis another?The three research questions raised by Levine deal with different aspects of the location of foreign direct investment. In particular, the three research questions deal with the gap between the potential of a certain country, or countries, as a site for an international oriented investment and the actual investment that has taken place. This is particularly true where the investment from the developed countries is in the form of high-risk sector specific capital such as provided by private equity funds. The potential of some countries in attracting private equity funds is not being fully realized due to the absence of an appropriate financial system. A well developed financial system is necessary to enhance the import of sector specific (high-risk) capital, a necessary condition for FFDI.As the financial structure of a country changes (as the country grows), it is suggested by Levine in his first question that different types of FDI can be accommodated. The development of FDI in China is an evidence of this process. Yet, as it is proposed in Levine’s second question, the financial markets of countries with similar rate of growth develop in different pace and in a different way. There are long-term economic growth advantages of adopting certain patterns of development for the financial market of a given country. In many cases FDI and FFDI do depend on relatively transparent and enforceable corporate governance. Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) demonstrated that economic entrenchment has a high price in foregone growth opportunities.There are three related problems in creating a domestic financial system for private equity and venture capital investments:How to mobilize the type and the quantity of savings (capital) appropriate for such investments where most of the capital should be imported from the major capital markets of the world?How to generate credible information and trust? How to monitor managementand to exert corporate control?The only feasible way to accommodate private equity and venture capital investments in emerging markets is to import sector specific high-risk capital from the US and other major capital markets. The term sector specific capital recognizes the fact that capital is not a unified factor of production (in the same way that there are different types of labor there are different types of capital). High-risk sector specific capital relates to the portfolio of the investors and to the relational capital of the specific financial intermediaries (i.e., the private equity funds). Most of the high-risk capital in the world is coming from large institutional investors in the US and it is a part of their assets’ management program. (A good example of how such capital relates to the total portfolio is the investment policy of CALPERS the largest pension fund in the US). Due to internal and external regulations, financial institutions cannot make investment unless there is an acceptable level of transparency and corporate governance in the country where the money is invested. Whether such a process is possible in a given developing country and what are the chances that if implemented it will succeed is a very important question. Horii, Ohdoi, and Yamamoto (2005) deal with this issue. They address the question why some developing countries are less successful than others in adopting technologies and more effective financial markets techniques. To quote Horii et al. (2005, p. 2): “A fundamental question is why some countries are stuck with poor performance even though it results in primitive financial ma rkets and unproductive technologies”. They conclude that in some cases the expected increase in the income inequality due to the financial led technological changes deters people from adopting financial, legal, and political reforms that will lead to financial, business, and economic development. Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) provide somewhat different answer, also focusing on income distribution but from a point of view of economic entrenchment and rent seeking behavior.Nowhere the relationship between finance, growth, and international business is more pronounced than in the impressive development of the private equity funds devoted for investment in emerging markets. Table 1 presents data on the growth of private equity funds raised for investment in emerging markets by regions.The amounts of money raised by private equity funds dedicated for investmentsin emerging markets went up tremendously in the last five years. More importantly significant amounts were invested to support domestic companies in emerging markets to become more competitive in the global markets by providing their own brands of products to the world’s consumers. Lenovo is a case in point when a major investment by three American private equity funds (Texas Pacific Group, General Atlantic, and Newbridge Capital) was made in a Chinese company with the purpose of making Lenovo a leading competitor in the global market.译文：金融类对外直接投资：私募股权投资在新兴市场全球化企业中的角色一、简介国际商业和经济发展密切相关。

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中英文资料翻译Chinese Listed Companies Preference to Equity Fund:Non-Systematic FactorsAbstractThis article concentrates on the listed companies’ financing activities in China, analyses the reasons that why the listed companies prefer to equity fund from the aspect of non-systematic factors by using western financing theories, such as financing cost, types and qualities of the enterprises’ assets, profitability, industry factors, shareholding structure factors, level of financial management and society culture, and concludes that the preference to equity fund is a reasonable choice to the listed companies according to Chinese financing environment. At last, there are some concise suggestions be given to rectify the companies’ preference to equity fund.Keywords: Equity fund, Non-systematic factors, financial cost1. IntroductionThe listed companies in China prefer to equity fund, According to the statistic data showed in <China Securities Journal>, the amount of the listed companies finance in capital market account to 95.87 billions in 1997, among which equity fund take the proportion of 72.5%, and the proportion is 72.6% in 1998 and 72.3% in 1999, on the other hand, the proportion of debt fund to total fund is respective 17.8%, 24.9% and 25.1% in those three years. The proportion of equity fund to total fund is lower in the developed capital market than that in China. Take US for example, when American enterprises need to fund in the capital market, they prefer to debt fund than equity fund. The statistic data shows that, from 1970 to 1985, the American enterprises’ debt fund financed occupied the 91.7% proportion of outside financing, more than equity fund. Yan Dawu etc. found that, approximately 3/4 of the listed companies preferred to equity fund in China. Many researchers agree upon that the listed companies’ outside financing following this order: first one is equity fund, second one is convertible bond, third one is short-term liabilities, last one is long-term liabilities. Many researchers usually analy ze our national listed companies’ preference to equity fund with the systematic factors arising in the reform of our national economy. They thought that it just because of those systematic facts that made the listed companies’ financial activities betray t o western classical financing theory. For example, the “picking order” theory claims that when enterprise need fund, they should turn to inside fund (depreciation and retained earnings) first, and then debt fund, and the last choice is equity fund. In this article, the author thinks that it is because of the specific financial environment that activates the enterprises’ such preference, and try to interpret the reasons of that preference to equity fund by combination of non-systematic factors and western financial theories.2. Financings cost of the listed company and preference toequity fundAccording to western financing the theories, capital cost of equity fund is more than capital cost of debt fund, thus the enterprise should choose debt fund first, then is the turn to equity fund when it fund outside. We should understand that this conception of “capital cost” is taken into account by investors, it is somewhat opportunity cost of the investors, can also be called expected returns. It contains of risk-f ree rate of returns and risk rate of returns arising from the investors’ risk investment. It is different with financing cost in essence. Financing cost is the cost arising from enterprises’ financing activities and using fund, we can call it fund cost. If capital market is efficient, capital cost should equal to fund cost, that is to say, what investors gain in capital market should equal to what fund raisers pay, or the transfer of fund is inevitable. But in an inefficient capital market, the price of stock will be different from its value because of investors’ action of speculation; they only chase capital gain and don’t want to hold the stocks in a long time and receive dividends. Thus the listed companies can gain fund with its fund cost being lower than capital cost.But in our national capital market, capital cost of equity fund is very low; it is because of the following factors: first, the high P/E Ratio (Price Earning Ratio) of new issued shares. According to calculation, average P/E Ratio of Chinese listed companies’ shares is between 30 and 40, it also is maintained at 20 although drops somewhat recently. But the normal P/E Ratio should be under 20 according to experience. We can observe the P/E was only 13.2 from 1874 to 1988 in US, and only 10 in Hong Kong. High P/E Ratio means high share issue price, then the capital cost of equity fund drops even given the same level of dividend. Second, low dividend policy in the listed companies, capital cost of equity fund decided by dividend pay-out ratio and price of per share. In China, many listed companies pay little or even no dividends to their shareholders. According to statistic data, there were 488 listed companies paid no dividend to their shareholders in 1998, 58.44 percents of all listed companies, there were 590, 59.83 percents in 1999, even 2000 in which China Securities Regulatory Commission issue new files to rule dividend policy of companies, there were only 699 companies which pay dividends, 18.47 percents more than that in 1999, but dividend payout ratio deduce 22%. Thus capital cost of equity is very low. Third, there is no rigidity on equity fund, if the listed companies choose equity fund, they can use the fund forever and has no obligation to return this fund. Most of listed companies are controlled by Government in China, taking financing risk into account, the major stockholders prefers to equity fund. The management also prefer equity fund because its lower fund cost and needn’t to be paid off, then their position will be more stable than financing in equity fund. We can conclude from the above analysis that cost of equity fund is lower than cost of debt fund in Chinese listed companies and the listed companies prefer to such low-cost fund.3. Types and qualities of assets in listed companies andpreference to equity fundStatic Trade-off Theory tells us, the value of enterprise with financial leverage is decided by the value of self-owned capital; value arising from tax benefit, cost offinancial embarrassment and agency cost. Cost of financial embarrassment and agency cost are negative correlative to the types and qualities of companies’ assets, if the enterprise has more intangible assets, more assets with lower quality, it will has lower liquidity and its assets have lower mortgage value. When this kind of enterprise faces to great financial risk, it will have no way to solve its questions by selling its assets. Furthermore, because care for the ability of turning into cash of the mortgage assets, the creditors will high the level of rate and lay additional items in financial contract to rule the debtor’s action, all of those will enhance the agency cost and deduce the companies value. Qualcomm is supplier of wireless data and communication service in America, it is the inventor and user of CDMA and it also occupies the technology of HDR. The market value of its share is 1120 billions dollars at the end of March, 2000, but the quantities of long-term liabilities is zero. Why? Some reasons may be that there are some competitors in the market who own analogous technologies and the management of Qualcomm Company takes conservative attitude in financing activities. But the most important factor may be Qualcomm Company owns a mass of intangible assets which will have lower convertib ility and the company’s value will decline when it has no enough money to pay for its debt.Many listed companies in China are transformed from the national enterprises. In the transformation, these listed companies take over the high-quality assets of the national enterprises, but with the development of economy, some projects can not coincide with the market demand and the values of relative assets decline. On the other hand, there are many intangible assets in new high-tech companies. State-owned companies and high-tech companies are the most parts of the capital market. We can conclude that the qualities of listed companies’ assets are very low. This point is supported by the index of P/B (Price-to-Book value) which is usually thought as one of the most important indexes which can weigh the qualities of the listed companies’ assets. According to statistic data coming from Shenzhen Securities Information Company, by the end of November 14, 2003, there were 412 companies whose P/B is less than 2, take the 30% proportions of total listed companies which issue A-share in China, among them, there were 150 companies whose P/B is less than 1.53, and weighted average P/B of the stock market is 2.42. Lower qualities of assets means more cost may be brought out from debt fund and lower total value of the listed companies. Thus the listed companies prefer to equity fund when need outside financial support in China.4. Profitability and preference to equity fundFinancial Leverage Theory tells us that a small change in company’s profit may make great change in company’s EPS (Earnings per share). Just like leverage, we can get an amplified action by use of it. Debt fund can supply us with this leverage, by use of debt fund, these companies which have high level of profitability will get higher level of EPS because debt fund produces more profit for shareholders than interest shareholder shall pay. On the contrary, these companies which have low level of profitability will get lower level of EPS by use of debt fund because debt fund can not produce enough profit for shareholder to fulfill the demand of paying off the interests. Edison International Company has steady amount of customers and many intangible assets, these supply it with high level of profitability and ability to gain debt fund, its debt account to 67.2% proportions of its total assets in 1999.Listed companies in developed countries or regions always have high level of profitability. Take US for example, there are many listed companies which haveexcellent performance in American capital market when do business, such as J.P Morgan, its EPS is $11.16 per share in 1999. Besides it, GM, GE, Coca Cola, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Dell etc. all always are profitable. In Hong Kong, most of those companies whose stock included in Hang Sang Index have the level of EPS more than 1 HKD, many are more than 2 HKD. Such as Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited, its EPS is 7.66 HKD. But listed companies do not have such excellent performance in profitability in China inland. Their profitability is common low. Take the performance of 2000 for example, the weighted average EPS of total listed companies is only 0.20 Yuan per share, and the weighted average P/B is 2.65 Yuan per share, 8.55 percents of these listed companies have negative profit. With low or no profit, the benefit nixes, listed companies’ preference to equity fund is a reasonable phenomenon. Can be gained from debt fund is very little; the listed companies can even suffer from the financial distress caused by debt fund. So with the consideration of shareholders’ interest, the listed companies prefer to equity fund when need outside financial support in China.5. Shareholding structure factors and preference to equityfundListed companies not only face to external financing environmental impacts, but also the structure of the companies shares. Shareholding structure of Chinese listed companies shows characteristics as followed: I. Ownership structure is fairly complex. In addition to the public shares, there are shares held with inland fund and foreign stocks, state-owned shares, legal person shares, and internal employee shares, transferred allotted shares, A shares, B shares, H shares And N shares, and other distinction. From 1995 to 2003, Chinese companies’ outstanding sh ares of the total equity share almost have no change, even declined slightly. II. There are different prices, dividends, and rights of shares issued by same enterprise. III. The over-concentration of shares. We use the quantity of shares of the three major shareholders who top the list of shareholders of the listed companies to measure the concentration of stock. We study he concentration of stock of these companies which issue new share publicly in the years from 1995 to 2003 and focus on the situation of Chinese listed companies over the same period. The results showed that: from 1995 to 2003, the company-Which once transferred or allotted shares-whose top three shareholders’ shareholding ratio are generally higher than the average level of all the listed companies, and most of these company's top three shareholders holding 40 percent or higher percent of companies’ shares. In some years, the maximum number even is more than 90 percent, indicating that the company with the implementation of transferred and allotted shares have relatively high concentration rate of shares and major shareholders have absolute control over it. In short, transferring allotting shares and the issuance of additional shares have a certain relevance to the company’s concentration of ownership structure; the company's financing policy is largely controlled by the major shareholders.Chinese listed companies’ special shareholding structure effects its financing action. Because stockholders of the state-owned shares, legal person shares, social and outstanding shares, foreign share have a different objective function, their modes offinancing preferences vary, and their preference affect the financing structure of listed companies. Controlling shareholders which hold state-owned shares account for the status of enterprises and carry out financing decisions in accordance with their own objective function. When the objective function conflict with the other shareholders benefit, they often damage the interests of other shareholders by use of the status of controlling. As the first major shareholders of the companies, government has multiple objectives, not always market-oriented, it prefers to use safe fund such as equity fund to maintain the value of state-owned assets, thus resulting in listed company’s preference to equity financing. Debt financing bring business with greater pressure to pay off the par value and interests. Therefore, the state-owned companies are showing a more offensive attitude to debt fund, again because of Chinese state-controlled listed companies have the absolute status in all listed company.From: International Journal of Business and Management; October, 2009.中国上市公司偏好股权融资：非制度性因素摘要本文把重点集中于中国上市公司的融资活动，运用西方融资理论，从非制度性因素方面，如融资成本、企业资产类型和质量、盈利能力、行业因素、股权结构因素、财务管理水平和社会文化，分析了中国上市公司倾向于股权融资的原因，并得出结论，股权融资偏好是上市公司根据中国融资环境的一种合理的选择。