1 委托代理理论

Problems:
1.conflict goals: expensive for the principle to verify what
the agent is actually doing;
2.different attitudes towards risk/goals: principle and agent
The positivist
Proposition 1: When the contract between the
principal and agent is outcome based, the agent is more likely to behave in the interests of the principal. Proposition 2: When the principal has information to verify agent behavior, the agent is more likely to behave in the interests of the principal.
沪市A股十大权重股公司的股权结构
大股东 董事会 小股东 经营者
小股东
董事会
经营者
股权集中化
大股东情况之一： 国有企业，国家是大股东，导致内部人控制。比如：陈久霖搞垮中航油事件
大股东情况之二： 大股东和小股东之间的利益冲突。
由于股权结构集中度决定着公司控制权的分布，进而决定了所有者与 经营者之间的委托代理关系的性质，因而股权结构是决定现代公司治 理结构的基础。 股权集中化存在不可忽视的风险，具体有三种手法： 手法1——以庞大的集团先注册登记一个公司，由集团注入资产推动 股份公司上市融资，集团顺利当地成为上市公司第一大股东，然后上 市公司通过配股、分红等各种方式将资源回送给集团，而上市公司最 后经常只剩下一个债务负担相当沉重的 “壳”，这个债务“壳”由中 小股东一起来负担。 手法2——大股东勒令上市公司为其提供债务担保或质押，结果大股 东将担保或质押来的资源挥霍殆尽，作为担保或质押方的上市公司最 终成为大股东的债务偿还人。 手法3——通过大量的关联方交易或重组，将集团的劣质资产，或者价 值很低的资产通过所谓的评估跃身一变成为优绩资产，转让给上市公 司，以抵冲集团对上市公司的欠款或直接套回上市公司的资金。比如： 三九医药大股东及关联方占用公司25亿。 另一方面，除了考虑大股东“利益输送”风险之外，还需警惕“热心 主张”的风险，大股东很可能按照自己认为的符合全体股东利益的决 策轻松通过某项议案。
Think about the relationship between a stockholder and a
manager, what would happen between them?
Owner
Manager
Agency Theory
Principal---Agent
Assumptions: 1. about people: self-interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion 2.about organization: goals conflict among members; 3. about information: information asymmetry
Where are the agency problem?
Andersen
. Chief
Financial Officer
financial reporting
Executives
Shareholders
委托代理和公司治理
中美股权结构比较
第一大股东持股比例约为5%，几乎看不到持股超过10%的大股东
Recommend Reading:
Jensen, M. &W. Meckling (1976). Theory of the firm:
Managerial behavior, agency costs, and capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3:305-360.
The Principal-agent
The focus of the principal-agent literature is on
determining the optimal contract, behavior versus outcome, between the principal and the agent. involves careful specification of assumptions, which are followed by logical deduction and mathematical proof.
prefer different actions.
Questions what kind of contract is more efficient to relieve the agent problem? more specifically, is the behavior-oriented contact(e.g. salaries, hierarchical governance) more efficient than an outcome-oriented contact (e.g. commissions, stock options, transfer of property right, market governance)?
Agency Theory
?
Required reading:
Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and
review. Academy of Management Review, 14: 57- 74.
What is an agency problem?
The positivist
identifying situations in which the principal and
agent are likely to have conflicting goals and then describing the governance mechanisms that limit the agent's self-serving behavior. Positivist
Proposition 6: The risk aversion of the principanegatively related to behavior-based con-tracts and positively related to outcome-based contracts. Proposition 7: The goal conflict between principal and agent is negatively related to behavior-based contracts and positively related to out-come-based contracts. Proposition 8: Task programmability is positively related to behavior-based contracts and negatively related to outcome-based contracts. Proposition 9: Outcome measurability is negatively related to behavior-based contracts and positively related to outcome-based contracts. Proposition 10: The length of the agency relationship is positively related to behavior-based contracts and negatively related to outcome-based contracts.
The Principal-agent
Proposition 3: Information systems are positively
related to behavior-based contracts and negatively related to outcome-based contracts. Proposition 4: Outcome uncertainty is positively related to behavior-based contracts and negatively related to outcome-based contracts. Proposition 5: The risk aversion of the agent is positively related to behavior-based contracts and negatively related to outcome-based con-tracts.
the bankruptcy of the Enron Corporation, an American energy company based in Houston, Texas, and the dissolution of Arthur Andersen, which was one of the five largest audit and accountancy partnerships in the world. In addition to being the largest bankruptcy reorganization in American history at that time, Enron was attributed as the biggest audit failure. Enron was formed in 1985. Several years later, when Jeffrey Skilling was hired, he developed a staff of executives that, through the use of accounting loopholes, special purpose entities, and poor financial reporting, were able to hide billions in debt from failed deals and projects. Chief Financial Officer Andrew Fastow and other executives not only misled Enron's board of directors and audit committee on high-risk accounting practices, but also pressured Andersen to ignore the issues.