补贴与反补贴措施协议

合集下载

对《WTO补贴与反补贴协议》的几点看法

对《WTO补贴与反补贴协议》的几点看法

消。 在该案例 中 , 作为发 展 中国 财政 支持措施 , 如免税期 、 提高 年 G T利益的抵 消或损伤及 AT

) 潜在 的资金 业 条件 下 不能获 得 的条件 、条 明 ,当此类 出 口补 贴 与其竞 争 、 移 ( 政府 为 款 和 优 惠 。 如 和发 展需 要不 相符 合时 ,要 求
保) b 政府应 ; .
补贴 有 出 口补 贴和生 产补 发展 中缔 约方 应努 力承 诺减 少
补 贴 措 施 协 议 对 补 贴 的 定 义
作 了进一 步 的解释 ,某 种行 为
是 否在主 体 、行 为和效 果三 个 方面 满足 条件 是判 别是 否构 成 补贴 的实 质性 条件 。行 为的 主 体必须是政府或其他公共机构 。
船 舶 工 业 技 术经 济 信 息 第 2 6 0期 ・ 6・ 2 0 02
们 应 当大 胆 运 用 世 贸 组 织 赋 予 和 认 识 。
份 解释性 的 出 口补 贴清 单 ,作
发展 中国家 的一切 权 力 。熟 悉
在 补贴 与反补贴 措施协 为该 法典 的附 件 。该 法典 对 国
掌握 并学 会运 用我 国颁 布的 反 议 》 制 定 之 前 ,世 贸 组 织 处 理 内补 贴也 作 了规定 ,在 承认 国
维普资讯
政策研 究

财 政 资 助 ;收 入 或价 格 支持 使实施 补贴 国的 初级 产 品给 予补 贴 ,但补 贴不
财 政 资 助 包 括 : 有 关 产 业 或 企 业 获 得 利 益 ,这 能 对 另一缔 约方 的 贸易或 生产
共 资金 ( 如赠款 、 种 利 益是 产业 或企业 在正 常商 造 成严 重损 害 。但也 进一 步声

WTO补贴与反补贴规则与案例

WTO补贴与反补贴规则与案例

WTO补贴与反补贴规则与案例WTO(世界贸易组织)补贴与反补贴规则是为了调整影响国际贸易的补贴行为,确保成员国之间的贸易公平性和公正性。

补贴规则旨在防止不合理的补贴导致贸易的扭曲和不利影响,并确保市场的公平竞争。

反补贴规则是一种应对其他成员国的补贴行为的机制,以防止由补贴导致的不公平竞争。

补贴是指政府向特定行业或企业提供的一种经济上有价值的财务支持,以促进该行业或企业的发展。

补贴可以采取直接支付、减免税收、贷款保证等形式,目的是为了提高该行业或企业的竞争力。

然而,过度的补贴可能导致不公平竞争,破坏市场平衡。

因此,WTO制定了一系列补贴规则来限制补贴的使用,并确保市场公平。

根据WTO的规定,补贴可以分为三类:1.非禁止补贴:这类补贴可以被接受,但在其使用上有一定限制。

例如,临时性补贴应该在相应期限内终止,以避免长期的贸易扭曲。

2.补偿性补贴:这类补贴是为了补偿由于自然灾害或其他原因造成的损失,确保受影响的产业能够继续生产和发展。

3.禁止补贴:这类补贴直接或间接地导致国际贸易失衡,破坏市场平衡,因此被禁止使用。

这包括出口补贴、进口替代补贴以及基于产品价格或输出数量的补贴等。

WTO也制定了一系列反补贴规则,旨在应对其他成员国的补贴行为。

反补贴举报案件通常通过“反补贴协议”的争端解决程序进行处理。

在这个程序中,受到补贴影响的成员国可以提起投诉,并经过一系列的争端解决程序来解决争议。

一个经典的补贴案例是欧盟与美国之间的飞机补贴争端。

在这个案例中,欧盟和美国相互指责对彼此的航空工业提供了非法补贴。

欧盟指责美国为波音公司提供了非法的出口补贴,而美国则指责欧盟为空中巴士提供了非法补贴。

这个争端持续了数十年,并导致了一系列的诉讼和对抗措施。

另一个例子是中国钢铁行业的补贴问题。

在过去几十年中,中国政府对钢铁行业提供了大量的补贴支持,导致中国钢铁产品的产量和出口量大幅增加。

这引发了国际贸易摩擦,世界许多国家纷纷采取了反倾销措施来应对中国的补贴行为。

补贴与反补贴措施

补贴与反补贴措施
补贴与反补贴措施
汇报人: 2023-12-19
目录
• 补贴概述 • 反补贴措施概述 • 补贴与反补贴措施的实践应用 • 补贴与反补贴措施的争议与挑
战 • 政策建议与对策研究
01
补贴概述
定义与分类
补贴定义
补贴是指政府或企业为减少资源消耗 、促进环境保护、提高生产效率或改 善社会福利而给予的经济援助。
02
反补贴措施概述

补贴的国际规则与标准
要点一
国际规则
世界贸易组织(WTO)制定了《补贴与反补贴措施协议》 (SCM协议),对成员国的补贴政策进行规范和管理。该 协议规定了禁止性补贴、可诉性补贴和不可诉补贴的认定 标准和程序。
要点二
标准
根据SCM协议,禁止性补贴是指对进口产品提供国内补贴 ,导致国内产品价格低于进口产品价格,从而对进口国造 成实质性损害或威胁的补贴。可诉性补贴是指虽然不直接 对进口产品提供国内补贴,但导致国内产品价格低于进口 产品价格,从而对进口国造成实质性损害或威胁的补贴。 不可诉补贴是指不会对进口国造成实质性损害或威胁的补 贴。
补贴分类
根据补贴的性质和目的,可以将补贴 分为禁止性补贴、可诉性补贴和不可 诉补贴。
补贴的目的与影响
目的
补贴的目的通常是为了实现特定的社会、经济或环境目标,如促进经济增长、 提高就业率、改善民生等。
影响
补贴对经济、社会和环境都会产生一定的影响。一方面,补贴可以促进企业发 展和创新,提高生产效率,改善社会福利;另一方面,过度补贴可能导致资源 浪费、环境污染、市场扭曲等问题。

国际贸易法中的补贴与反补贴措施

国际贸易法中的补贴与反补贴措施

国际贸易法中的补贴与反补贴措施国际贸易法是规范国际贸易关系的重要法律体系,其中补贴与反补贴措施是其中重要的内容之一。

补贴是指政府为了支持国内产业发展而提供的财政或其他形式的援助,反补贴措施则是其他国家采取的保护措施来对抗补贴。

本文将从补贴与反补贴的定义、补贴的形式、反补贴措施的目的及效果等多个角度来详细探讨国际贸易法中的补贴与反补贴措施。

一、补贴的定义补贴是指政府为了支持国内产业发展而提供的财政或其他形式的援助。

根据世界贸易组织(WTO)的规定,补贴可以包括直接补贴和间接补贴两种形式。

直接补贴指的是政府直接向受益企业或个人提供的财政援助,如补贴款、减免税收等。

间接补贴则是指政府通过其他方式对受益企业或个人提供的支持,如廉价贷款、税收减免等。

二、补贴的形式补贴的形式多种多样,根据其用途和方式可以分为生产性补贴和进口替代性补贴。

生产性补贴是指政府为了促进国内产业发展而提供的直接援助,如直接支付补贴款、提供免费土地等。

进口替代性补贴则是指政府为了减少进口而采取的支持措施,如对国内生产企业提供优惠条件、加强进口限制等。

三、反补贴措施的目的反补贴措施是其他国家为了保护自身利益而采取的措施,以对抗来自补贴国家的竞争优势。

其目的在于消除或减轻补贴国家对本国产业的不公平竞争。

常见的反补贴措施包括征收反倾销税、对进口产品进行数量限制以及采取技术壁垒等。

四、反补贴措施的效果反补贴措施旨在保护本国产业不受补贴国家的不公平竞争影响,但其效果也存在一定的争议。

一方面,反补贴措施可以帮助本国产业恢复竞争优势,保护就业和经济利益。

另一方面,过度使用反补贴措施可能造成产能过剩、市场壁垒增加以及国际贸易紧张局势升级等问题。

综上所述,国际贸易法中的补贴与反补贴措施是为了维护国际贸易秩序,避免不公平竞争而设立的。

补贴的形式多样,可以通过直接或间接方式对国内产业进行支持。

而反补贴措施旨在保护本国产业免受补贴国家的不公平竞争影响,但其效果需要在平衡各方利益的基础上进行考量。

《补贴与反补贴措施协定》的缺陷及其克服的开题报告

《补贴与反补贴措施协定》的缺陷及其克服的开题报告

《补贴与反补贴措施协定》的缺陷及其克服的开题报告
一、选题背景
世界贸易组织(WTO)通过《补贴与反补贴措施协定》对国际贸易补贴以及反补贴措施进行了约束。

然而,该协定在实施过程中出现了一些缺陷,限制了其对国际贸易的正常发展。

因此,对其缺陷进行深入的研究并提出克服措施,具有重要的意义。

二、研究目的
本研究旨在分析《补贴与反补贴措施协定》的缺陷及其克服的方法与措施,探讨国际贸易中补贴与反补贴措施的影响因素。

三、研究方法
本研究采用资料法、调查法以及分析法等方法,收集分析各种相关材料、文献并得出结论。

四、预计研究结果
1. 分析《补贴与反补贴措施协定》的缺陷,明确其对国际贸易的限制因素。

2. 探究如何提高协定的有效性和可操作性,以克服其缺陷。

3. 研究补贴与反补贴措施在国际贸易中的现状和趋向,为下一步的措施和政策提供参考。

五、参考文献
1. 《补贴与反补贴措施协定》
2. 韦伯,露丝.国际组织.三联书店,2018年。

3. 刘红.《WTO关于《补贴与反补贴措施协定》的评价及其对我国的启示》. 国际贸易问题,2017(5):15-19.。

补贴与反补贴措施协议

补贴与反补贴措施协议

可编辑ppt
9
四、不可诉补贴(第四部分:8-9条)
1、不可诉补贴的确认
不可诉补贴包括: (1)不属于专向性的补贴 (2)符合特定要求的专向性补贴 符合特定要求的专向性补贴应符合的条件是: 第一,研发补贴 第二,贫困落后地区补贴 第三,环保补贴
可编辑ppt
10
2、不可诉补贴的通知 不可诉补贴计划在实施之前必须通知补贴与反补
或购买货物。
可编辑ppt
2
3、对企业的收入与价格的支持
主要是指符合GATT16条基础上的任何补贴 (主要有有利于扩大出口的出口补贴和减 少从某些成员国进口的进口竞争补贴), 这种支持可能是由法律限定某一产品的最 低价格,也可能是为了维持物价的物资储 备制度。
可编辑ppt
3
4、专向性补贴 属于本协定约束的上述补贴是指符合专向性要求
7
3、严重侵害的界定 如果存在如下情形,则可视为严重侵害: (1)取代或阻碍补贴成员市场的进入。 (2)取代或阻碍第三国市场的进入。 (3)价格效果。 (4)市场份额变化。 4、严重侵害的确定者 严重损害由WTO争端解决机构(DSB)设立的专
家组确定。
可编辑ppt
8
5、可诉性补贴的救济 (1)磋商 (2)磋商请求的说明 (3)DSB解决 (4)DSB报告的执行
下不利影响,则属于可诉性补贴。
(1)损害另一成员的国内产业;
(2)使其他成员在多边贸易体制项下的利益丧失 或减损,特别是关税减让约束的利益;
(3)严重侵害另一成员的利益。
2、有可能造成严重侵害的补贴范围
(1)对一产品从价补贴总额超过5%;
(2)用于弥补某一产业承受的经营亏损的补贴;
(3)直接债务免除以可及编辑用ppt 于偿债的赠款。

补贴与反补贴措施协定

补贴与反补贴措施协定补贴是指政府提供给本国企业或产业的经济支持措施。

补贴可以帮助企业降低成本、提高竞争力,但同时也可能导致不公平竞争,损害其他国家的利益。

为了规范补贴的使用,贸易各方制定了一系列补贴与反补贴措施协定。

补贴与反补贴措施协定的一个重要目标是防止补贴导致的市场扭曲。

贸易各方通过协定共同约定了补贴的定义和分类标准,以及补贴措施对市场的影响。

例如,协定规定了一些常见的补贴形式,如直接补贴、贷款补贴和减免税收。

协定还规定了补贴的数量限制和使用期限,以避免长期的、无限额的补贴措施对市场产生过度影响。

协定还明确了反补贴措施的使用条件。

当贸易各方认为其中一国家提供了不公平的补贴,损害了其自身的利益时,可以采取反补贴措施。

这些措施包括征收针对特定进口产品的反倾销税和反补贴税。

贸易各方可以向世界贸易组织(WTO)提起贸易救济调查,对补贴措施进行评估,并在调查结果出台后采取相应的反补贴措施。

其次,补贴与反补贴措施协定促进了贸易各方之间的合作与沟通。

贸易各方通过协定确立了一个共同的框架,协调了各自的贸易政策和行动。

在贸易纠纷产生时,协定提供了争端解决机制,各方可以通过世界贸易组织的争端解决程序来解决争端,避免了单边行动和贸易战。

然而,补贴与反补贴措施协定仍然存在一些挑战和争议。

首先,协定的实施和执行存在一定的困难。

协定要求各国按照一定的程序进行行动,并确保相应的补贴措施符合协定的要求。

但是,贸易各方之间的利益冲突和不同的国内政治环境可能导致协定的执行存在障碍。

其次,补贴与反补贴措施协定可能给一些发展中国家带来不利影响。

这些国家通常依靠补贴来发展自己的经济和产业。

限制补贴可能会导致这些国家的产业竞争力下降,进一步加剧了贸易不平衡。

综上所述,补贴与反补贴措施协定对国际贸易起到了重要的规范和调节作用。

它保护了贸易的公平性,促进了贸易各方之间的合作与沟通。

然而,协定的执行和实施仍然存在障碍,需要各方共同努力,以实现更加公平、公正和可持续的国际贸易体系。

补贴与反补贴措施协议

补贴与反补贴措施协议协议名称:补贴与反补贴措施协议协议编号:[协议编号]起草日期:[起草日期]生效日期:[生效日期]甲方:[甲方名称]地址:[甲方地址]联系人:[甲方联系人]电话:[甲方电话]电子邮箱:[甲方邮箱]乙方:[乙方名称]地址:[乙方地址]联系人:[乙方联系人]电话:[乙方电话]电子邮箱:[乙方邮箱]鉴于:1. 甲方与乙方为达成本协议,同意就补贴与反补贴措施进行合作;2. 甲方拥有相关资源和资金,愿意提供补贴措施以促进乙方的发展;3. 乙方同意接受甲方的补贴措施,并承诺遵守相关反补贴措施。

基于上述约定,双方达成以下协议:第一条协议目的本协议的目的是明确甲方与乙方之间的补贴与反补贴措施,以促进乙方的发展并确保公平竞争。

第二条补贴措施1. 甲方将向乙方提供补贴措施,包括但不限于资金、设备、技术支持等,具体内容和方式由双方协商确定。

2. 甲方提供的补贴措施应符合相关法律法规的要求,并确保公平、透明、合理。

第三条反补贴措施1. 乙方同意接受甲方的反补贴措施,包括但不限于限制乙方使用其他竞争对手的补贴措施、限制乙方销售价格、限制乙方销售渠道等。

2. 甲方提供的反补贴措施应符合相关法律法规的要求,并确保公平、透明、合理。

第四条协议期限本协议自生效日期起生效,有效期为[协议期限]。

协议期满后,若双方未继续合作,则本协议自动终止。

第五条保密条款1. 双方同意对本协议中的商业机密和其他保密信息予以保密,并承诺不向任何第三方披露或泄露。

2. 除非获得对方事先书面同意,否则任何一方不得将本协议的任何内容用于商业推广或宣传。

第六条违约责任1. 若任何一方违反本协议的任何条款,守约方有权要求违约方赔偿损失,并有权终止本协议。

2. 双方同意,在违约方未履行补救义务的情况下,守约方有权向法院提起诉讼,要求违约方承担法律责任。

第七条争议解决1. 双方应本着友好合作的原则解决因本协议引起的任何争议。

2. 如双方无法通过协商解决争议,应提交至双方约定的仲裁机构进行仲裁,仲裁裁决为终局裁决,对双方具有约束力。

2024版世界贸易组织补贴和反补贴协定

20XX 专业合同封面COUNTRACT COVER甲方:XXX乙方:XXX2024版世界贸易组织补贴和反补贴协定本合同目录一览1. 定义与术语1.1 合同主体1.2 补贴1.3 反补贴1.4 世界贸易组织2. 补贴的种类2.1 直接补贴2.2 间接补贴2.3 条件性补贴2.4 其他形式的补贴3. 反补贴的措施3.1 反补贴调查3.2 反补贴税3.3 价格承诺3.4 取消补贴4. 补贴和反补贴的适用范围4.1 适用产品4.2 适用国家或地区4.3 例外情况5. 争端解决机制5.1 协商解决5.2 调解5.3 仲裁5.4 世界贸易组织争端解决机构6. 合同的生效、修改和终止6.1 生效条件6.2 修改程序6.3 终止条件7. 合同的解释和适用法律7.1 合同解释7.2 适用法律8. 合同的履行和监督8.1 履行义务8.2 监督和检查9. 违约责任9.1 违约行为9.2 违约责任9.3 违约解决方式10. 保密条款10.1 保密信息10.2 保密义务10.3 例外情况11. 不可抗力11.1 不可抗力事件11.2 不可抗力后果11.3 不可抗力通知和证明12. 争议解决12.1 争议类型12.2 争议解决方式12.3 争议解决地点和机构13. 合同的终止和解除13.1 终止条件13.2 解除程序13.3 终止或解除后的权利和义务14. 一般条款14.1 通知14.2 完整的协议14.3 合同的转让14.4 适用语言14.5 合同的修订日期第一部分:合同如下:1. 定义与术语1.1 合同主体1.2 补贴补贴是指一方(补贴提供方)向另一方(受补贴方)提供财政资助,或者提供除财政资助以外的任何形式的收入或者价格支持,导致受补贴方的出口或者进口在数量上增加。

1.3 反补贴反补贴是指进口国对于接受补贴的出口商品采取的一种反制措施,旨在消除或者减少补贴对进口国产业造成的损害。

1.4 世界贸易组织世界贸易组织(World Trade Organization,WTO)是负责监督国际贸易规则的国际组织,其目标是促进国际贸易的自由化和公平化。

WTO补贴与反补贴协议AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES

AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURESMembers hereby agree as follows:PART I: GENERAL PROVISIONSA rticle 1Definition of a Subsidy1.1For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if:(a)(1)there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within the territoryof a Member (referred to in this Agreement as "government"), i.e. where:(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans,and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loanguarantees);(ii)government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g.fiscal incentives such as tax credits)1;(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or purchases goods;(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directsa private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in(i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the government and thepractice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed bygovernments;or(a)(2)there is any form of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of GATT 1994;and(b) a benefit is thereby conferred.1.2 A subsidy as defined in paragraph 1 shall be subject to the provisions of Part II or shall be subject to the provisions of Part III or V only if such a subsidy is specific in accordance with the provisions of Article2.1In accordance with the provisions of Article XVI of GATT 1994 (Note to Article XVI) and the provisions of Annexes I through III of this Agreement, the exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by the like product when destined for domestic consumption, or the remission of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not be deemed to be a subsidy.A rticle 2Specificity2.1In order to determine whether a subsidy, as defined in paragraph 1 of Article 1, is specific to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries (referred to in this Agreement as "certain enterprises") within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, the following principles shall apply:(a)Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authorityoperates, explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain enterprises, such subsidy shallbe specific.(b)Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authorityoperates, establishes objective criteria or conditions2 governing the eligibility for, andthe amount of, a subsidy, specificity shall not exist, provided that the eligibility isautomatic and that such criteria and conditions are strictly adhered to. The criteriaor conditions must be clearly spelled out in law, regulation, or other official document,so as to be capable of verification.(c)If, notwithstanding any appearance of non-specificity resulting from the applicationof the principles laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b), there are reasons to believethat the subsidy may in fact be specific, other factors may be considered. Such factorsare: use of a subsidy programme by a limited number of certain enterprises, predominantuse by certain enterprises, the granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidyto certain enterprises, and the manner in which discretion has been exercised by thegranting authority in the decision to grant a subsidy.3 In applying this subparagraph,account shall be taken of the extent of diversification of economic activities withinthe jurisdiction of the granting authority, as well as of the length of time during whichthe subsidy programme has been in operation.2.2 A subsidy which is limited to certain enterprises located within a designated geographical region within the jurisdiction of the granting authority shall be specific. It is understood that the setting or change of generally applicable tax rates by all levels of government entitled to do so shall not be deemed to be a specific subsidy for the purposes of this Agreement.2.3Any subsidy falling under the provisions of Article 3 shall be deemed to be specific.2.4Any determination of specificity under the provisions of this Article shall be clearly substantiated on the basis of positive evidence.2Objective criteria or conditions, as used herein, mean criteria or conditions which are neutral, which do not favour certain enterprises over others, and which are economic in nature and horizontal in application, such as number of employees or size of enterprise.3In this regard, in particular, information on the frequency with which applications for a subsidy are refused or approved and the reasons for such decisions shall be considered.PART II: PROHIBITED SUBSIDIESA rticle 3Prohibition3.1Except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture, the following subsidies, within the meaning of Article 1, shall be prohibited:(a)subsidies contingent, in law or in fact4, whether solely or as one of several otherconditions, upon export performance, including those illustrated in Annex I5;(b)subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon theuse of domestic over imported goods.3.2 A Member shall neither grant nor maintain subsidies referred to in paragraph 1.A rticle 4Remedies4.1Whenever a Member has reason to believe that a prohibited subsidy is being granted or maintained by another Member, such Member may request consultations with such other Member.4.2 A request for consultations under paragraph 1 shall include a statement of available evidence with regard to the existence and nature of the subsidy in question.4.3Upon request for consultations under paragraph 1, the Member believed to be granting or maintaining the subsidy in question shall enter into such consultations as quickly as possible. The purpose of the consultations shall be to clarify the facts of the situation and to arrive at a mutually agreed solution.4.4If no mutually agreed solution has been reached within 30 days6 of the request for consultations, any Member party to such consultations may refer the matter to the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") for the immediate establishment of a panel, unless the DSB decides by consensus not to establish a panel.4.5Upon its establishment, the panel may request the assistance of the Permanent Group of Experts7 (referred to in this Agreement as the "PGE") with regard to whether the measure in question is a prohibited subsidy. If so requested, the PGE shall immediately review the evidence with regard to4This standard is met when the facts demonstrate that the granting of a subsidy, without having been made legally contingent upon export performance, is in fact tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings. The mere fact that a subsidy is granted to enterprises which export shall not for that reason alone be considered to be an export subsidy within the meaning of this provision.5Measures referred to in Annex I as not constituting export subsidies shall not be prohibited under this or any other provision of this Agreement.6Any time-periods mentioned in this Article may be extended by mutual agreement.7As established in Article 24.the existence and nature of the measure in question and shall provide an opportunity for the Member applying or maintaining the measure to demonstrate that the measure in question is not a prohibited subsidy. The PGE shall report its conclusions to the panel within a time-limit determined by the panel. The PGE's conclusions on the issue of whether or not the measure in question is a prohibited subsidy shall be accepted by the panel without modification.4.6The panel shall submit its final report to the parties to the dispute. The report shall be circulated to all Members within 90 days of the date of the composition and the establishment of the panel's terms of reference.4.7If the measure in question is found to be a prohibited subsidy, the panel shall recommend that the subsidizing Member withdraw the subsidy without delay. In this regard, the panel shall specify in its recommendation the time-period within which the measure must be withdrawn.4.8Within 30 days of the issuance of the panel's report to all Members, the report shall be adopted by the DSB unless one of the parties to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report.4.9Where a panel report is appealed, the Appellate Body shall issue its decision within 30 days from the date when the party to the dispute formally notifies its intention to appeal. When the Appellate Body considers that it cannot provide its report within 30 days, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay together with an estimate of the period within which it will submit its report. In no case shall the proceedings exceed 60 days. The appellate report shall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the appellate report within 20 days following its issuance to the Members.84.10In the event the recommendation of the DSB is not followed within the time-period specified by the panel, which shall commence from the date of adoption of the panel’s report or the Appellate Body’s report, the DSB shall grant authorization to the complaining Member to take appropriate9 countermeasures, unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request.4.11In the event a party to the dispute requests arbitration under paragraph 6 of Article 22 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU"), the arbitrator shall determine whether the countermeasures are appropriate.104.12For purposes of disputes conducted pursuant to this Article, except for time-periods specifically prescribed in this Article, time-periods applicable under the DSU for the conduct of such disputes shall be half the time prescribed therein.8If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting shall be held for this purpose.9This expression is not meant to allow countermeasures that are disproportionate in light of the fact that the subsidies dealt with under these provisions are prohibited.10This expression is not meant to allow countermeasures that are disproportionate in light of the fact that the subsidies dealt with under these provisions are prohibited.PART III: ACTIONABLE SUBSIDIESA rticle 5A dverse EffectsNo Member should cause, through the use of any subsidy referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 1, adverse effects to the interests of other Members, i.e.:(a)injury to the domestic industry of another Member11;(b)nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other Membersunder GATT 1994 in particular the benefits of concessions bound under Article II ofGATT 199412;(c)serious prejudice to the interests of another Member.13This Article does not apply to subsidies maintained on agricultural products as provided in Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture.A rticle 6Serious Prejudice6.1Serious prejudice in the sense of paragraph (c) of Article 5 shall be deemed to exist in the case of:(a)the total ad valorem subsidization14 of a product exceeding 5 per cent15;(b)subsidies to cover operating losses sustained by an industry;(c)subsidies to cover operating losses sustained by an enterprise, other than one-timemeasures which are non-recurrent and cannot be repeated for that enterprise and whichare given merely to provide time for the development of long-term solutions and toavoid acute social problems;11The term "injury to the domestic industry" is used here in the same sense as it is used in Part V.12The term "nullification or impairment" is used in this Agreement in the same sense as it is used in the relevant provisions of GATT 1994, and the existence of such nullification or impairment shall be established in accordance with the practice of application of these provisions.13The term "serious prejudice to the interests of another Member" is used in this Agreement in the same sense as it is used in paragraph 1 of Article XVI of GATT 1994, and includes threat of serious prejudice.14The total ad valorem subsidization shall be calculated in accordance with the provisions of Annex IV.15Since it is anticipated that civil aircraft will be subject to specific multilateral rules, the threshold in this subparagraph does not apply to civil aircraft.(d)direct forgiveness of debt, i.e. forgiveness of government-held debt, and grants to coverdebt repayment.166.2Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1, serious prejudice shall not be found if the subsidizing Member demonstrates that the subsidy in question has not resulted in any of the effects enumerated in paragraph 3.6.3Serious prejudice in the sense of paragraph (c) of Article 5 may arise in any case where one or several of the following apply:(a)the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the imports of a like product of anotherMember into the market of the subsidizing Member;(b)the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the exports of a like product of anotherMember from a third country market;(c)the effect of the subsidy is a significant price undercutting by the subsidized productas compared with the price of a like product of another Member in the same marketor significant price suppression, price depression or lost sales in the same market;(d)the effect of the subsidy is an increase in the world market share of the subsidizingMember in a particular subsidized primary product or commodity17 as compared tothe average share it had during the previous period of three years and this increasefollows a consistent trend over a period when subsidies have been granted.6.4For the purpose of paragraph 3(b), the displacement or impeding of exports shall include any case in which, subject to the provisions of paragraph 7, it has been demonstrated that there has been a change in relative shares of the market to the disadvantage of the non-subsidized like product (over an appropriately representative period sufficient to demonstrate clear trends in the development of the market for the product concerned, which, in normal circumstances, shall be at least one year). "Change in relative shares of the market" shall include any of the following situations: (a) there is an increase in the market share of the subsidized product; (b) the market share of the subsidized product remains constant in circumstances in which, in the absence of the subsidy, it would have declined; (c) the market share of the subsidized product declines, but at a slower rate than would have been the case in the absence of the subsidy.6.5For the purpose of paragraph 3(c), price undercutting shall include any case in which such price undercutting has been demonstrated through a comparison of prices of the subsidized product with prices of a non-subsidized like product supplied to the same market. The comparison shall be made at the same level of trade and at comparable times, due account being taken of any other factor affecting price comparability. However, if such a direct comparison is not possible, the existence of price undercutting may be demonstrated on the basis of export unit values.6.6Each Member in the market of which serious prejudice is alleged to have arisen shall, subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 of Annex V, make available to the parties to a dispute arising under Article 7, and to the panel established pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 7, all relevant information16Members recognize that where royalty-based financing for a civil aircraft programme is not being fully repaid due to the level of actual sales falling below the level of forecast sales, this does not in itself constitute serious prejudice for the purposes of this subparagraph.17Unless other multilaterally agreed specific rules apply to the trade in the product or commodity in question.that can be obtained as to the changes in market shares of the parties to the dispute as well as concerning prices of the products involved.6.7Displacement or impediment resulting in serious prejudice shall not arise under paragraph 3 where any of the following circumstances exist18 during the relevant period:(a)prohibition or restriction on exports of the like product from the complaining Memberor on imports from the complaining Member into the third country market concerned;(b)decision by an importing government operating a monopoly of trade or state tradingin the product concerned to shift, for non-commercial reasons, imports from thecomplaining Member to another country or countries;(c)natural disasters, strikes, transport disruptions or other force majeure substantiallyaffecting production, qualities, quantities or prices of the product available for exportfrom the complaining Member;(d)existence of arrangements limiting exports from the complaining Member;(e)voluntary decrease in the availability for export of the product concerned from thecomplaining Member (including, inter alia, a situation where firms in the complainingMember have been autonomously reallocating exports of this product to new markets);(f)failure to conform to standards and other regulatory requirements in the importingcountry.6.8In the absence of circumstances referred to in paragraph 7, the existence of serious prejudice should be determined on the basis of the information submitted to or obtained by the panel, including information submitted in accordance with the provisions of Annex V.6.9This Article does not apply to subsidies maintained on agricultural products as provided in Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture.A rticle 7Remedies7.1Except as provided in Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture, whenever a Member has reason to believe that any subsidy referred to in Article 1, granted or maintained by another Member, results in injury to its domestic industry, nullification or impairment or serious prejudice, such Member may request consultations with such other Member.7.2 A request for consultations under paragraph 1 shall include a statement of available evidence with regard to (a) the existence and nature of the subsidy in question, and (b) the injury caused to the18The fact that certain circumstances are referred to in this paragraph does not, in itself, confer upon them any legal status in terms of either GATT 1994 or this Agreement. These circumstances must not be isolated, sporadic or otherwise insignificant.domestic industry, or the nullification or impairment, or serious prejudice19 caused to the interests of the Member requesting consultations.7.3Upon request for consultations under paragraph 1, the Member believed to be granting or maintaining the subsidy practice in question shall enter into such consultations as quickly as possible. The purpose of the consultations shall be to clarify the facts of the situation and to arrive at a mutually agreed solution.7.4If consultations do not result in a mutually agreed solution within 60 days20, any Member party to such consultations may refer the matter to the DSB for the establishment of a panel, unless the DSB decides by consensus not to establish a panel. The composition of the panel and its terms of reference shall be established within 15 days from the date when it is established.7.5The panel shall review the matter and shall submit its final report to the parties to the dispute. The report shall be circulated to all Members within 120 days of the date of the composition and establishment of the panel’s terms of reference.7.6Within 30 days of the issuance of the panel’s report to all Members, the report shall be adopted by the DSB21 unless one of the parties to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report.7.7Where a panel report is appealed, the Appellate Body shall issue its decision within 60 days from the date when the party to the dispute formally notifies its intention to appeal. When the Appellate Body considers that it cannot provide its report within 60 days, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay together with an estimate of the period within which it will submit its report. In no case shall the proceedings exceed 90 days. The appellate report shall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the appellate report within 20 days following its issuance to the Members.227.8Where a panel report or an Appellate Body report is adopted in which it is determined that any subsidy has resulted in adverse effects to the interests of another Member within the meaning of Article 5, the Member granting or maintaining such subsidy shall take appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects or shall withdraw the subsidy.7.9In the event the Member has not taken appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects of the subsidy or withdraw the subsidy within six months from the date when the DSB adopts the panel report or the Appellate Body report, and in the absence of agreement on compensation, the DSB shall grant authorization to the complaining Member to take countermeasures, commensurate with the degree and nature of the adverse effects determined to exist, unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request.19In the event that the request relates to a subsidy deemed to result in serious prejudice in terms of paragraph 1 of Article 6, the available evidence of serious prejudice may be limited to the available evidence as to whether the conditions of paragraph 1 of Article 6 have been met or not.20Any time-periods mentioned in this Article may be extended by mutual agreement.21If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting shall be held for this purpose.22If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting shall be held for this purpose.7.10In the event that a party to the dispute requests arbitration under paragraph 6 of Article 22 of the DSU, the arbitrator shall determine whether the countermeasures are commensurate with the degree and nature of the adverse effects determined to exist.PART IV: NON-ACTIONABLE SUBSIDIESA rticle 8Identification of Non-A ctionable Subsidies8.1The following subsidies shall be considered as non-actionable23:(a)subsidies which are not specific within the meaning of Article 2;(b)subsidies which are specific within the meaning of Article 2 but which meet all of theconditions provided for in paragraphs 2(a), 2(b) or 2(c) below.8.2Notwithstanding the provisions of Parts III and V, the following subsidies shall be non-actionable:(a)assistance for research activities conducted by firms or by higher education or researchestablishments on a contract basis with firms if:24,25,26the assistance covers27 not more than 75 per cent of the costs of industrial research28or 50 per cent of the costs of pre-competitive development activity29, 30;23It is recognized that government assistance for various purposes is widely provided by Members and that the mere fact that such assistance may not qualify for non-actionable treatment under the provisions of this Article does not in itself restrict the ability of Members to provide such assistance.24Since it is anticipated that civil aircraft will be subject to specific multilateral rules, the provisions of this subparagraph do not apply to that product.25Not later than 18 months after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures provided for in Article 24 (referred to in this Agreement as "the Committee") shall review the operation of the provisions of subparagraph 2(a) with a view to making all necessary modifications to improve the operation of these provisions. In its consideration of possible modifications, the Committee shall carefully review the definitions of the categories set forth in this subparagraph in the light of the experience of Members in the operation of research programmes and the work in other relevant international institutions.26The provisions of this Agreement do not apply to fundamental research activities independently conducted by higher education or research establishments. The term "fundamental research" means an enlargement of general scientific and technical knowledge not linked to industrial or commercial objectives.27The allowable levels of non-actionable assistance referred to in this subparagraph shall be established by reference to the total eligible costs incurred over the duration of an individual project.28The term "industrial research" means planned search or critical investigation aimed at discovery of new knowledge, with the objective that such knowledge may be useful in developing new products, processes or services, or in bringing about a significant improvement to existing products, processes or services.29The term "pre-competitive development activity" means the translation of industrial research findings into a plan, blueprint or design for new, modified or improved products, processes or services whether intended for sale or use, including the creation of a first prototype which would not be capable of commercial use. It may further include the conceptual formulation and design of products, processes or services alternatives and initial demonstration or pilot projects, provided that these same projectsand provided that such assistance is limited exclusively to:(i)costs of personnel (researchers, technicians and other supporting staff employedexclusively in the research activity);(ii)costs of instruments, equipment, land and buildings used exclusively and permanently (except when disposed of on a commercial basis) for the researchactivity;(iii)costs of consultancy and equivalent services used exclusively for the research activity, including bought-in research, technical knowledge, patents, etc.;(iv)additional overhead costs incurred directly as a result of the research activity;(v)other running costs (such as those of materials, supplies and the like), incurred directly as a result of the research activity.(b)assistance to disadvantaged regions within the territory of a Member given pursuantto a general framework of regional development31 and non-specific (within the meaningof Article 2) within eligible regions provided that:(i)each disadvantaged region must be a clearly designated contiguous geographicalarea with a definable economic and administrative identity;(ii)the region is considered as disadvantaged on the basis of neutral and objective criteria32, indicating that the region's difficulties arise out of more than temporarycircumstances; such criteria must be clearly spelled out in law, regulation, orother official document, so as to be capable of verification;(iii)the criteria shall include a measurement of economic development which shall be based on at least one of the following factors:-one of either income per capita or household income per capita, or GDPper capita, which must not be above 85 per cent of the average for theterritory concerned;cannot be converted or used for industrial application or commercial exploitation. It does not include routine or periodic alterations to existing products, production lines, manufacturing processes, services, and other on-going operations even though those alterations may represent improvements.30In the case of programmes which span industrial research and pre-competitive development activity, the allowable level of non-actionable assistance shall not exceed the simple average of the allowable levels of non-actionable assistance applicable to the above two categories, calculated on the basis of all eligible costs as set forth in items (i) to (v) of this subparagraph.31A "general framework of regional development" means that regional subsidy programmes are part of an internally consistent and generally applicable regional development policy and that regional development subsidies are not granted in isolated geographical points having no, or virtually no, influence on the development of a region.32"Neutral and objective criteria" means criteria which do not favour certain regions beyond what is appropriate for the elimination or reduction of regional disparities within the framework of the regional development policy. In this regard, regional subsidy programmes shall include ceilings on the amount of assistance which can be granted to each subsidized project. Such ceilings must be differentiated according to the different levels of development of assisted regions and must be expressed in terms of investment costs or cost of job creation. Within such ceilings, the distribution of assistance shall be sufficiently broad and even to avoid the predominant use of a subsidy by, or the granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidy to, certain enterprises as provided for in Article 2.。

  1. 1、下载文档前请自行甄别文档内容的完整性,平台不提供额外的编辑、内容补充、找答案等附加服务。
  2. 2、"仅部分预览"的文档,不可在线预览部分如存在完整性等问题,可反馈申请退款(可完整预览的文档不适用该条件!)。
  3. 3、如文档侵犯您的权益,请联系客服反馈,我们会尽快为您处理(人工客服工作时间:9:00-18:30)。

补贴与反补贴措施协议
协议名称:补贴与反补贴措施协议
协议编号:[协议编号]
签署日期:[签署日期]
签署方:
[甲方名称]
地址:
联系人:
电话:
电子邮件:
[乙方名称]
地址:
联系人:
电话:
电子邮件:
背景:
鉴于甲方与乙方之间存在补贴与反补贴措施的问题,为了明确双方的权利和义务,保障公平竞争,特制定本补贴与反补贴措施协议(以下简称“协议”)。

一、定义
1.1 “补贴”指甲方向乙方提供的经济、财务或其他形式的支持,以促进乙方产品或服务的生产、销售或推广。

1.2 “反补贴措施”指乙方为应对甲方的补贴而采取的措施,包括但不限于提起贸易救济措施、反补贴调查等。

二、补贴的类型和条件
2.1 甲方同意向乙方提供以下补贴类型(具体补贴项目和金额详见附件1):
[补贴类型1]:
[补贴类型2]:
[补贴类型3]:
……
2.2 乙方在享受补贴时应满足以下条件:
a) 乙方产品或服务符合相关质量标准和法规要求;
b) 乙方提供真实、准确的相关信息和文件;
c) 乙方遵守相关法律法规和国际贸易规则;
d) 乙方不得违反本协议约定的其他义务。

三、反补贴措施的程序和条件
3.1 当乙方发现甲方存在补贴行为时,乙方有权采取适当的反补贴措施,并按照以下程序进行:
a) 乙方应书面通知甲方存在补贴行为,并提供相关证据;
b) 甲方应在收到通知后的[指定时间]内提供相关解释和证明;
c) 若甲方未能提供合理解释和证明,乙方有权采取适当的反补贴措施。

四、信息交流与合作
4.1 双方应保持及时、准确的信息交流,包括但不限于关于补贴和反补贴措施的信息。

4.2 双方应互相提供必要的协助和合作,以便更好地履行本协议。

五、保密条款
5.1 双方应对在履行本协议过程中所获得的对方商业、技术、财务等方面的信息予以保密,并不得向第三方披露。

5.2 本条款的保密义务在本协议终止后仍然有效,除非获得对方的书面同意。

六、争议解决
6.1 凡因履行本协议发生的争议,双方应通过友好协商解决。

6.2 若协商不能解决争议,双方同意将争议提交至[指定仲裁机构]进行仲裁,并接受仲裁裁决的最终结果。

七、协议的生效和终止
7.1 本协议自双方签署之日起生效,有效期为[有效期]。

7.2 任何一方如需提前终止本协议,应提前[提前通知期限]书面通知对方,并经双方协商达成一致。

八、其他条款
8.1 本协议的修改、补充或解释应经双方书面协商一致,并以书面形式作出。

8.2 本协议的附件为本协议的重要组成部分,与本协议具有同等法律效力。

8.3 本协议的任何修改、补充或放弃应经双方书面同意才能生效。

8.4 本协议未尽事宜由双方协商解决。

本协议一式两份,甲方和乙方各执一份,具有同等法律效力。

甲方签署:
签署日期:
乙方签署:
签署日期:。

相关文档
最新文档