笛卡尔1
笛卡尔《第一哲学沉思录》（二）
笛卡尔《第⼀哲学沉思录》（⼆）MEDITATION II.OF THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN MIND;AND THAT IT IS MORE EASILY KNOWNTHAN THE BODY.1. The Meditation of yesterday has filled my mind with so many doubts, that it is no longer in my power to forget them. Nor do I see, meanwhile, any principle on which they can be resolved; and, just as if I had fallen all of a sudden into very deep water, I am so greatly disconcerted as to be unable either to plant my feet firmly on the bottom or sustain myself by swimming on the surface. I will, nevertheless, make an effort, and try anew the same path on which I had entered yesterday, that is, proceed by casting aside all that admits of the slightest doubt, not less than if I had discovered it to be absolutely false; and I will continue always in this track until I shall find something that is certain, or at least, if I can do nothing more, until I shall know with certainty that there is nothing certain. Archimedes, that he might transport the entire globe from the place it occupied to another, demanded only a point that was firm and immovable; so, also, I shall be entitled to entertain the highest expectations, if I am fortunate enough to discover only one thing that is certain and indubitable.[L][F]2. I suppose, accordingly, that all the things which I see are false (fictitious); I believe that none of those objects which my fallacious memory represents ever existed; I suppose that I possess no senses; I believe that body, figure, extension, motion, and place are merely fictions of my mind. What is there, then, that can be esteemed true ? Perhaps this only, that there is absolutely nothing certain.[L][F]3. But how do I know that there is not something different altogether from the objects I have now enumerated, of which it is impossible to entertain the slightest doubt? Is there not a God, or some being, by whatever name I may designate him, who causes these thoughts to arise in my mind ? But why suppose such a being, for it may be I myself am capable of producing them? Am I, then, at least not something? But I before denied that I possessed senses or a body; I hesitate, however, for what follows from that? Am I so dependent on the body and the senses that without these I cannot exist? But I had the persuasion that there was absolutely nothing in the world, that there was no sky and no earth, neither minds nor bodies; was I not, therefore, at the same time, persuaded that I did not exist? Far from it; I assuredly existed, since I was persuaded. But there is I know not what being, who is possessed at once of the highest power and the deepest cunning, who is constantly employing all his ingenuity in deceiving me. Doubtless, then, I exist, since I am deceived; and, let him deceive me as he may, he can never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I shall be conscious that I am something. So that it must, in fine, be maintained, all things being maturely and carefully considered, that this proposition (pronunciatum ) I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time it is expressed by me, or conceived in my mind.[L][F]4. But I do not yet know with sufficient clearness what I am, though assured that I am; and hence, in the next place, I must take care, lest perchance I inconsiderately substitute some other object in room of what is properly myself, and thus wander from truth, even in that knowledge ( cognition ) which I hold to be of all others the most certain and evident. For this reason, I will now consider anew what I formerly believed myself to be, before I entered on the present train of thought; and of my previous opinion I will retrench all that can in the least be invalidated by the grounds of doubt I have adduced, in order that there may at length remain nothing but what is certain and indubitable. [L][F]5. What then did I formerly think I was? Undoubtedly I judged that I was a man. But what is a man? Shall I say a rational animal? Assuredly not; for it would be necessary forthwith to inquire into what is meant by animal, and what by rational, and thus, from a single question, I should insensibly glide into others, and these more difficult than the first; nor do I now possess enough of leisure to warrant me in wasting my time amid subtleties of this sort. I prefer here to attend to the thoughts that sprung up of themselves in my mind, and were inspired by my own nature alone, when I applied myself to the consideration of what I was. In the first place, then, I thought that I possessed a countenance, hands, arms, and all the fabric of members that appears in a corpse, and which I called by the name of body. It further occurred to me that I was nourished, that I walked, perceived, and thought, and all those actions I referred to the soul; but what the soul itself was I either did not stay to consider, or, if I did, I imagined that it was something extremely rare and subtile, like wind, or flame, or ether, spread through my grosser parts. As regarded the body, I did not even doubt of its nature, but thought I distinctly knew it, and if I had wished to describe it according to the notions I then entertained, I should have explained myself in this manner: By body I understand all that can be terminated by a certain figure; that can be comprised in a certain place, and so fill a certain space as therefrom to exclude every other body; that can be perceived either by touch, sight, hearing, taste, or smell; that can be moved in different ways, not indeed of itself, but by something foreign to it by which it is touched [and from which it receives the impression]; for the power of self-motion, as likewise that of perceiving and thinking, I held as by no means pertaining to the nature of body; on the contrary, I was somewhat astonished to find such faculties existing in some bodies.[L][F]6. But [as to myself, what can I now say that I am], since I suppose there exists an extremely powerful, and, if I may sospeak, malignant being, whose whole endeavors are directed toward deceiving me ? Can I affirm that I possess any one of all those attributes of which I have lately spoken as belonging to the nature of body ? After attentively considering them in my own mind, I find none of them that can properly be said to belong to myself. To recount them were idle and tedious. Let us pass, then, to the attributes of the soul. The first mentioned were the powers of nutrition and walking; but, if it be true that I have no body, it is true likewise that I am capable neither of walking nor of being nourished. Perception is another attribute of the soul; but perception too is impossible without the body; besides, I have frequently, during sleep, believed that I perceived objects which I afterward observed I did not in reality perceive. Thinking is another attribute of the soul; and here I discover what properly belongs to myself. This alone is inseparable from me. I am--I exist: this is certain; but how often? As often as I think; for perhaps it would even happen, if I should wholly cease to think, that I should at the same time altogether cease to be. I now admit nothing that is not necessarily true. I am therefore, precisely speaking, only a thinking thing, that is, a mind (mens sive animus), understanding, or reason, terms whose signification was before unknown to me. I am, however, a real thing, and really existent; but what thing? The answer was, a thinking thing. [L][F]7. The question now arises, am I aught besides? I will stimulate my imagination with a view to discover whether I am not still something more than a thinking being. Now it is plain I am not the assemblage of members called the human body; I am not a thin and penetrating air diffused through all these members, or wind, or flame, or vapor, or breath, or any of all the things I can imagine; for I supposed that all these were not, and, without changing the supposition, I find that I still feel assured of my existence. But it is true, perhaps, that those very things which I suppose to be non-existent, because they are unknown to me, are not in truth different from myself whom I know. This is a point I cannot determine, and do not now enter into any dispute regarding it. I can only judge of things that are known to me: I am conscious that I exist, and I who know that I exist inquire into what I am. It is, however, perfectly certain that the knowledge of my existence, thus precisely taken, is not dependent on things, the existence of which is as yet unknown to me: and consequently it is not dependent on any of the things I can feign in imagination. Moreover, the phrase itself, I frame an image (efffngo), reminds me of my error; for I should in truth frame one if I were to imagine myself to be anything, since to imagine is nothing more than to contemplate the figure or image of a corporeal thing; but I already know that I exist, and that it is possible at the same time that all those images, and in general all that relates to the nature of body, are merely dreams [or chimeras]. From this I discover that it is not more reasonable to say, I will excite my imagination that I may know more distinctly what I am, than to express myself as follows: I am now awake, and perceive something real; but because my perception is not sufficiently clear, I will of express purpose go to sleep that my dreams may represent to me the object of my perception with more truth and clearness. And, therefore, I know that nothing of all that I can embrace in imagination belongs to the knowledge which I have of myself, and that there is need to recall with the utmost care the mind from this mode of thinking, that it may be able to know its own nature with perfect distinctness.[L][F]8. But what, then, am I? A thinking thing, it has been said. But what is a thinking thing? It is a thing that doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses; that imagines also, and perceives. [L][F]9. Assuredly it is not little, if all these properties belong to my nature. But why should they not belong to it? Am I not that very being who now doubts of almost everything; who, for all that, understands and conceives certain things; who affirms one alone as true, and denies the others; who desires to know more of them, and does not wish to be deceived; who imagines many things, sometimes even despite his will; and is likewise percipient of many, as if through the medium of the senses. Is there nothing of all this as true as that I am, even although I should be always dreaming, and although he who gave me being employed all his ingenuity to deceive me? Is there also any one of these attributes that can be properly distinguished from my thought, or that can be said to be separate from myself? For it is of itself so evident that it is I who doubt, I who understand, and I who desire, that it is here unnecessary to add anything by way of rendering it more clear. And I am as certainly the same being who imagines; for although it may be (as I before supposed) that nothing I imagine is true, still the power of imagination does not cease really to exist in me and to form part of my thought. In fine, I am the same being who perceives, that is, who apprehends certain objects as by the organs of sense, since, in truth, I see light, hear a noise, and feel heat. But it will be said that these presentations are false, and that I am dreaming. Let it be so. At all events it is certain that I seem to see light, hear a noise, and feel heat; this cannot be false, and this is what in me is properly called perceiving (sentire), which is nothing else than thinking.[L][F]10. From this I begin to know what I am with somewhat greater clearness and distinctness than heretofore. But, nevertheless, it still seems to me, and I cannot help believing, that corporeal things, whose images are formed by thought [which fall under the senses], and are examined by the same, are known with much greater distinctness than that I know not what part of myself which is not imaginable; although, in truth, it may seem strange to say that I know and comprehend with greater distinctness things whose existence appears to me doubtful, that are unknown, and do not belong to me, than others of whose reality I am persuaded, that are known to me, and appertain to my proper nature; in a word, than myself. But I see clearly what is the state of the case. My mind is apt to wander, and will not yet submit to be restrained within the limits o truth. Let us therefore leave the mind to itself once more, and, according to it every kind of liberty [permit it to consider the objects that appear to it from without], in order that, having afterward withdrawn it from these gently and opportunely [ and fixed it on the consideration of its being and the properties it finds in itself], it may then be the more easily controlled.[L][F]11. Let us now accordingly consider the objects that are commonly thought to be [the most easily, and likewise] the most distinctly known, viz., the bodies we touch and see; not, indeed, bodies in general, for these general notions are usuallysomewhat more confused, but one body in particular. Take, for example, this piece of wax; it is quite fresh, having been but recently taken from the beehive; it has not yet lost the sweetness of the honey it contained; it still retains somewhat of the odor of the flowers from which it was gathered; its color, figure, size, are apparent ( to the sight); it is hard, cold, easily handled; and sounds when struck upon with the finger. In fine, all that contributes to make a body as distinctly known as possible, is found in the one before us. But, while I am speaking, let it be placed near the fire--what remained of the taste exhales, the smell evaporates, the color changes, its figure is destroyed, its size increases, it becomes liquid, it grows hot, it can hardly be handled, and, although struck upon, it emits no sound. Does the same wax still remain after this change? It must be admitted that it does remain; no one doubts it, or judges otherwise. What, then, was it I knew with so much distinctness in the piece of wax? Assuredly, it could be nothing of all that I observed by means of the senses, since all the things that fell under taste, smell, sight, touch, and hearing are changed, and yet the same wax remains. [L][F]12. It was perhaps what I now think, viz., that this wax was neither the sweetness of honey, the pleasant odor of flowers, the whiteness, the figure, nor the sound, but only a body that a little before appeared to me conspicuous under these forms, and which is now perceived under others. But, to speak precisely, what is it that I imagine when I think of it in this way? Let it be attentively considered, and, retrenching all that does not belong to the wax, let us see what remains. There certainly remains nothing, except something extended, flexible, and movable. But what is meant by flexible and movable ? Is it not that I imagine that the piece of wax, being round, is capable of becoming square, or of passing from a square into a triangular figure ? Assuredly such is not the case, because I conceive that it admits of an infinity of similar changes; and I am, moreover, unable to compass this infinity by imagination, and consequently this conception which I have of the wax is not the product of the faculty of imagination. But what now is this extension ? Is it not also unknown ? for it becomes greater when the wax is melted, greater when it is boiled, and greater still when the heat increases; and I should not conceive [clearly and] according to truth, the wax as it is, if I did not suppose that the piece we are considering admitted even of a wider variety of extension than I ever imagined, I must, therefore, admit that I cannot even comprehend by imagination what the piece of wax is, and that it is the mind alone ( mens, Lat., entendement,, F.) which perceives it. I speak of one piece in particular; for as to wax in general, this is still more evident. But what is the piece of wax that can be perceived only by the [understanding or] mind? It is certainly the same which I see, touch, imagine; and, in fine, it is the same which, from the beginning, I believed it to be. But (and this it is of moment to observe) the perception of it is neither an act of sight, of touch, nor of imagination, and never was either of these, though it might formerly seem so, but is simply an intuition (inspectio) of the mind, which may be imperfect and confused, as it formerly was, or very clear and distinct, as it is at present, according as the attention is more or less directed to the elements which it contains, and of which it is composed.[L][F]13. But, meanwhile, I feel greatly astonished when I observe [the weakness of my mind, and] its proneness to error. For although, without at all giving expression to what I think, I consider all this in my own mind, words yet occasionally impede my progress, and I am almost led into error by the terms of ordinary language. We say, for example, that we see the same wax when it is before us, and not that we judge it to be the same from its retaining the same color and figure: whence I should forthwith be disposed to conclude that the wax is known by the act of sight, and not by the intuition of the mind alone, were it not for the analogous instance of human beings passing on in the street below, as observed from a window. In this case I do not fail to say that I see the men themselves, just as I say that I see the wax; and yet what do I see from the window beyond hats and cloaks that might cover artificial machines, whose motions might be determined by springs ? But I judge that there are human beings from these appearances, and thus I comprehend, by the faculty of judgment alone which is in the mind, what I believed I saw with my eyes.[L][F]14. The man who makes it his aim to rise to knowledge superior to the common, ought to be ashamed to seek occasions of doubting from the vulgar forms of speech: instead, therefore, of doing this, I shall proceed with the matter in hand, and inquire whether I had a clearer and more perfect perception of the piece of wax when I first saw it, and when I thought I knew it by means of the external sense itself, or, at all events, by the common sense (sensus communis), as it is called, that is, by the imaginative faculty; or whether I rather apprehend it more clearly at present, after having examined with greater care, both what it is, and in what way it can be known. It would certainly be ridiculous to entertain any doubt on this point. For what, in that first perception, g was there distinct ? What did I perceive which any animal might not have perceived ? But when I distinguish the Oval from its exterior forms, and when, as if I had stripped it of its vestments, I consider it quite naked, it is certain, although some error may still be found in my judgment, that I cannot, nevertheless, thus apprehend it without possessing a human mind.[L][F]15. But finally, what shall I say of the mind itself, that is, of myself ? for as yet I do not admit that I am anything but mind. What, then! I who seem to possess so distinct an apprehension of the piece of wax, do I not know myself, both with greater truth and certitude, and also much more distinctly and clearly? For if I judge that the wax exists because I see it, it assuredly follows, much more evidently, that I myself am or exist, for the same reason: for it is possible that what I see may not in truth be wax, and that I do not even possess eyes with which to see anything; but it cannot be that when I see, or, which comes to the same thing, when I think I see, I myself who think am nothing. So likewise, if I judge that the wax exists because I touch it, it will still also follow that I am; and if I determine that my imagination, or any other cause, whatever it be, persuades me of the existence of the wax, I will still draw the same conclusion. And what is here remarked of the piece of wax, is applicable to all the other things that are external to me. And further, if the [notion or] perception of wax appeared to me more precise and distinct, after that not only sight and touch, but many other causes besides, rendered it manifest to my apprehension, withhow much greater distinctness must I now know myself, since all the reasons that contribute to the knowledge of the nature of wax, or of any body whatever, manifest still better the nature of my mind ? And there are besides so many other things in the mind itself that contribute to the illustration of its nature, that those dependent on the body, to which I have here referred, scarcely merit to be taken into account.[L][F]16. But, in conclusion, I find I have insensibly reverted to the point I desired; for, since it is now manifest to me that bodies themselves are not properly perceived by the senses nor by the faculty of imagination, but by the intellect alone; and since they are not perceived because they are seen and touched, but only because they are understood [ or rightly comprehended by thought ], I readily discover that there is nothing more easily or clearly apprehended than my own mind. But because it is difficult to rid one's self so promptly of an opinion to which one has been long accustomed, it will be desirable to tarry for some time at this stage, that, by long continued meditation, I may more deeply impress upon my memory this new knowledge.[L][F][LoD] [S] [P] [M 1] [M 3] [M 4] [M 5] [M 6]。
笛卡尔的天赋观念的内容
笛卡尔的天赋观念的内容【原创实用版】目录1.笛卡尔的天赋观念简介2.天赋观念的内容3.天赋观念的影响正文1.笛卡尔的天赋观念简介笛卡尔是法国著名的哲学家、数学家和科学家，他的思想对后世产生了深远的影响。
在他的哲学体系中，天赋观念是一个非常重要的组成部分。
天赋观念主张人类在出生时就拥有一定的知识与能力，这些知识与能力并非通过学习或经验获得，而是与生俱来的。
2.天赋观念的内容笛卡尔的天赋观念主要包括以下几个方面：(1) 知识：笛卡尔认为人类天生就具有一些基本的知识，这些知识不需要通过学习就能获得。
比如，人类天生就知道“我存在”，这便是笛卡尔所提出的“我思故我在”的名言。
此外，人类还天生知道一些基本的数学知识，如几何学等。
(2) 道德：笛卡尔认为人类天生具有道德意识，即对善恶的判断能力。
这种道德意识是与生俱来的，不需要通过教育或社会规范来灌输。
(3) 自然界知识：笛卡尔认为人类天生对自然界具有一定的认知能力，可以直观地感受到自然界的规律。
这种能力使人类能够直接认识到自然界的真实，而不需要通过实验和观察来获得。
3.天赋观念的影响笛卡尔的天赋观念对后世产生了很大的影响。
一方面，它为启蒙时代的哲学家们提供了理论支持，使得他们更加重视人的理性和天赋权利。
另一方面，天赋观念也为教育领域提供了新的启示，即教育应该注重发挥人的天赋潜能，而非单纯地灌输知识。
然而，笛卡尔的天赋观念也受到了一定程度的质疑。
一些学者认为，天赋观念过于强调人的天赋，忽视了社会环境对人的影响。
实际上，人的知识和能力往往是天赋与后天学习相结合的产物。
总之，笛卡尔的天赋观念对人类哲学、教育和社会发展产生了深远的影响。
哲学家笛卡尔的成就有哪些
哲学家笛卡尔的成就有哪些笛卡尔在哲学方面的成就笛卡尔被广泛认为是西方现代哲学的奠基人，他第一个创立了一套完整的哲学体系。
哲学上，笛卡尔是一个二元论者以及理性主义者。
笛卡尔认为，人类应该可以使用数学的方法——也就是理性——来进行哲学思考。
他相信，理性比感官的感受更可靠。
(他举出了一个例子：在我们做梦时，我们以为自己身在一个真实的世界中，然而其实这只是一种幻觉而已，参见庄周梦蝶)。
他从逻辑学、几何学和代数学中发现了4条规则：绝不承认任何事物为真，对于我完全不怀疑的事物才视为真理;必须将每个问题分成若干个简单的部分来处理;思想必须从简单到复杂;我们应该时常进行彻底的检查，确保没有遗漏任何东西。
笛卡尔将这种方法不仅运用在哲学思考上，还运用于几何学，并创立了解析几何。
由此，笛卡尔第一步认为怀疑就是出发点，感官知觉的知识是可以被怀疑的，我们并不能信任我们的感官。
笛卡尔强调科学的目的在于造福人类，使人成为自然界的主人和统治者。
他反对经院哲学和神学，提出怀疑一切的“系统怀疑的方法”。
所以他不会说“我看故我在”、“我听故我在”。
从这里他悟出一个道理：我们所不能怀疑的是“我们的怀疑”。
意指:我们无法去怀疑的，是我们正在“怀疑”这件事时的“怀疑本身”，只有这样才能肯定我们的“怀疑”是有真实性的，并非虚假的产物。
人们觉得理所当然或习以为常的事物，他却感到疑惑，由此他推出了著名的哲学命题——“我思故我在”(Cogito ergo sum)。
强调不能怀疑以思维为其属性的独立的精神实体的存在，并论证以广延为其属性的独立物质实体的存在。
笛卡尔的自然哲学观同亚里士多德的学说是完全对立的。
他认为，所有物质的东西，都是为同一机械规律所支配的机器，甚至人体也是如此。
同时他又认为，除了机械的世界外，还有一个精神世界存在，这种二元论的观点后来成了欧洲人的根本思想方法。
虽然笛卡尔证明了真实世界的存在，他认为宇宙中共有2个不同的实体，既思考(心灵)和外在世界(物质)，两者本体都来自于上帝，而上帝是独立存在的。
笛卡尔的观点
笛卡尔的观点：
1.怀疑主义：笛卡尔认为人在获取真知时必须要对自己的信念进行怀疑，因为
人的感知和认识常常受到偏见、错觉以及其他干扰的影响，而这些干扰会导致人的认识不准确。
因此，人需要以怀疑的态度来审视一切，从而排除错误和虚妄的信念。
2.存在唯一神学：笛卡尔认为存在唯一的上帝，并且上帝是绝对完美的、无限
的、智慧的和真实的。
他通过自己的《第一哲学沉思》一书，在证明上帝存在的过程中提出了“我思故我在”的经典论证，强调思考是不可否认的存在，这也成为他哲学体系的基础。
3.理性主义：笛卡尔认为人的知识来自于理性，而非经验。
他认为只有透过纯
粹的理性才能获得真正的知识，而不是通过感觉或经验。
笛卡尔的理性主义思想对后来的哲学、科学和数学等领域都有着深远的影响。
4.精神-物质二元论：笛卡尔认为精神和物质是两种完全不同的实体，分别属
于完全不同的领域，它们之间不存在任何联系或影响。
这一观点在当时的哲学史上造成了巨大的影响，并对后来的哲学和科学产生了深远的影响。
笛卡尔数学贡献
笛卡尔数学贡献
以《笛卡尔数学贡献》为标题，写一篇3000字的中文文章
法国数学家笛卡尔（René Descartes）被称为现代数学之父，是17世纪最伟大的数学家之一，也是现代数学的奠基者。
他最著名的贡献是发明了笛卡尔坐标系，它可以把几何图形及空间事物用数学的形式表示出来，对以后的数学有巨大影响。
此外，笛卡尔还有诸多贡献，包括方程的求解、设计几何图形、几何图形的描述、建立数学分析的理论框架等等。
笛卡尔被认为是有史以来解决几何问题的第一个明显的数学家，他的笛卡尔坐标系定义了每个点用坐标表示，可以把几何图形用数学方程表示出来。
笛卡尔把坐标轴画到了数学中，使空间可以用曲线或函数来描述，把几何问题转换为代数问题，从而把几何和代数紧密结合起来。
他的贡献极大地促进了几何学的发展，同时也为解决更多的数学问题提供了基础。
笛卡尔还取得了其他重大突破：他把几何图形和数学分析（利用数学解决问题）紧密结合起来，设计了一种新的计算方法来解决方程，提出了新的数学思想，如解析几何，把研究物理学问题转换为几何学问题，建立了现代数学框架。
除了以上提到的几何和方程，笛卡尔还探索过多种数学领域，比如统计学和概率论，他把自然现象用数学模型的方式表示出来，制定出规则，而这种规则也就成了把现象和规律关联起来的基础。
此外，笛卡尔还提出了一系列重要的概念，如熵和分枝因子，这些概念极大
地拓展了人们对概率问题的认识。
笛卡尔的贡献对于现代数学的发展至关重要。
他的贡献不仅仅在于发明了笛卡尔坐标系，而且还有很多，比如几何、方程式的解决、概率论探索、熵等概念的提出等等，他的贡献涵盖了几乎所有的数学领域，为现代数学的发展做出了巨大贡献。
?笛卡尔的名言名句（越学习，越发现自己的无知）
笛卡尔的名言名句（越学习，越发现自己的无知）“ 越学习,越发现自己的无知”，这是(法国)笛卡尔的名句，笛卡尔是伟大的哲学家、物理学家、数学家、生理学家，解析几何的创始人，是欧洲近代资产阶级哲学的奠基人之一，黑格尔称他为“现代哲学之父”。
作为世界著名的数学家笛卡尔，在学术的殿堂之中，可谓是成就斐然。
在笛卡尔的名言名句看，有一句“越学习，越发现自己的无知”，让我们看到这位大师对学习与谦虚的理解。
那么，关于笛卡尔的名言还有哪些，一起来了解下。
笛卡尔的名言名句（1）1、仅仅是具备出色的智力是不够的，注要的问题是如何出色地使用它。
——笛卡尔2、举动十分迁腐的人，只需始于循着邪道行进，就能够比分开邪道飞驰的人走在后面良多。
——笛卡尔3、支持的定见在两方面临于我都无益，一方面是使我晓得本人的错误，一方面是少数人看到的比一团体看到的更大白。
——笛卡尔4、我的努力求学没有得到别的好处，只不过是愈来愈发觉自己的无知。
（知识是无穷的，学习是无止境的，越努力的人，越会认识到自己的不足。
）5、读好书，有如探访著书的先贤，同他们促膝谈心，而且是一种精湛的交谈。
6、要以探求真理为毕生的事业。
（对真理的追求与探索，成为一生的事业，才会珍惜时间，珍惜有限的生命，为这一伟大的人生理想而努力奋斗。
）——笛卡尔笛卡尔的名言名句（2）1、一个为情感所支配，行为便没有自主之权，而受命运的宰割。
——笛卡尔2、读一切好的书，就是和许多高尚的人说话。
所有的好书，读起来就像和过去世界上最杰出的人们的谈话。
---笛卡尔3、犹豫不决才是最大的危害。
（一个人能否成功，与其性格有着很大的关系，一个做事果断的人，比较容易成功。
而一个总是犹豫不决的人，则会失去大好机会，最终一事无成。
） ---笛卡尔4、尊敬别人，才能让人尊敬。
（与人交往，一定要学会尊重别人，尊敬他人。
一个懂得尊敬别人的人，才会受到别人的尊敬。
）---笛卡尔5、在这个世界上，良知被分派得最为公道。
笛卡尔 哲学
笛卡尔哲学笛卡尔（René Descartes）是17世纪法国哲学家、数学家、物理学家，也是现代哲学的奠基人之一。
他的哲学体系对西方哲学产生了深远的影响，尤其是他著名的方法论和"我思故我在"的命题。
以下是笛卡尔哲学的主要特点和重要观点：怀疑主义和方法论怀疑：* 笛卡尔以怀疑主义为起点，质疑所有传统的观念和信仰。
他提出了方法论怀疑，即对所有可能怀疑的事物保持怀疑态度，只接受无法怀疑的真理。
"我思故我在"：* 笛卡尔的著名命题是"Cogito, ergo sum"（我思故我在）。
他通过怀疑一切，发现思考是不可怀疑的，因为怀疑本身需要思考。
这一命题成为他哲学体系的基石，同时也是近代哲学的一个标志。
分离心灵和物质：* 笛卡尔认为，心灵（思想）和物质（扩展）是两个完全不同的实体，无法相互归约。
这一观点被称为"心物二元论"，对后来的哲学和心理学有深远的影响。
物理学上的贡献：* 笛卡尔是一位数学家和自然科学家，他的代数几何对数学有重大影响。
他也提出了机械论的物理学观点，认为自然界的一切运动都可以归结为物质的机械运动。
上帝的存在和真实保证：* 笛卡尔提出了上帝存在的证明，他认为上帝是一个绝对存在的、无限的、完美的实体，而这一存在性保证了人类的认识是真实的。
他认为上帝不可能欺骗人类。
自然科学方法：* 笛卡尔强调数学和几何的运用，主张通过数学方法研究自然界，提倡通过数学建立科学知识的严密基础。
笛卡尔的哲学思想对现代哲学产生了深远的影响，他的方法论和对怀疑主义的回应为后来的哲学家提供了启示。
他的"我思故我在"成为近代哲学的经典命题，对认识论和存在论产生了深刻的影响。
伟大的数学家笛卡尔ppt课件
数学家的爱情
欧洲大陆爆发黑死病时，笛卡尔流浪到瑞典， 认识了瑞典一个小公国18岁的小公主克里斯汀，后 成为她的数学老师，日日相处使他们彼此产生爱慕 之心，公主的父亲国王知道了后勃然大怒，下令将 笛卡尔处死。
后来，因女儿求情将其流放回法国，克里斯汀公 主也被父亲软禁起来。
笛卡尔回法国后不久便染上重病，他日日给公主 写信，因被国王拦截，克里斯汀一直没收到笛卡尔的 信。
6
我思故我在
• 我思故我在是笛卡尔最有名的哲学命题,出自《方法论》。 字面意思 这句话简单的意思是“我思想，所以意识到我的存在。”笛 卡尔认为当我在怀疑一切时，却不能怀疑那个正在怀疑着的 “我”的存在。因为这个“怀疑”的本身是一种思想活动。 而这个正在思想着、怀疑着的“我”的本质也是一种思想活 动。注意这里的“我”并非指的是身心结合的我，而是指独 立存在的心灵。
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数学家的爱情
220、284的故事 220、284这两个数字的因式分解出来后，不加原数（220、284），把分解后的数 字相加，所得之和互等于对方，并且是所有数字中仅有的一组，是独一无二的。 220与284的因式分解分别为： 220：1 2 4 5 10 11 20 22 44 55 110 220， 1+2+4+5+10+11+20+22+44+55+110=284 284：1 2 4 71 142 284， 1+2+4+71+142=220
9
数学家的爱情
• 笛卡尔在给克里斯汀寄出第十三封信后就气绝身亡了，这第十三封信内容只 有短短的一个公式：r=a(1-sinθ）。国王看不懂，觉得他们俩之间并不是总 是说情话的，大发慈悲就把这封信交给一直闷闷不乐的克里斯汀，公主看到 后，立即明了恋人的意图，她马上着手把方程的图形画出来，看到图形，她 开心极了，她知道恋人仍然爱着她，原来方程的图形是一颗心的形状。这也 就是著 名的“心形线”。
笛卡尔
参见《第一哲学沉思集》
笛卡尔认为哲学必须是科学，必须具有清楚明白 无可置疑的基本特征。 经过思考，笛卡尔认为象数学、几何学那样，初 始公理一旦确定，就可以从这一原理出发演绎的 推论其他一切原理。如果公理可靠，整个知识体 系就是真实可靠的。 他认为只有找出一个无可置疑的第一原理，才能 推出整个哲学体系。
第一：通过怀疑寻找无可怀疑的基点，是唯一可行的 策略。相当于通过否定的方式寻求肯定的结论。
第二：我思故我在，是通过普遍怀疑而最终确定的唯 一的不正自明的无可置疑的第一原理，由此确立了理 性的地位，“我思”是一切知识的逻辑前提。（康德 将笛卡尔的原则解释为：“我思必须伴随着我的一切 表象”，“一切知识是人的知识”）
——《第一哲学沉思集》
首先，感觉经验是不可信的。一切建立在观察基础上的学科都是 不可靠的。如天文学、生理学、物理学。这些学科甚至连研究对 象是否存在都是不能证实的。
其次，甚至数学几何学也是不可信的。因为我们根据公理进行推 理的时候也会犯错。连创造世界的上帝也是可能是个骗子。
不仅如此，设想上帝不存在也是允许的。
这四条原则贯穿的是一种理性批判主义和一丝不苟的 科学精神。在这四条原则的基础上，笛卡尔建立了他 的理性演绎法
理性演绎法
——笛卡尔的理性演绎包括两个部分：直观和演绎
直观——这里不是感性直观，也不是神秘的直
觉，而是理智直观，他是一个清晰地周详的心灵 的无可置疑的概念，由理性之光突然而出。
演绎——从已经确知的基本原理出发进行的带
勒那·笛卡尔，欧洲文艺复 兴以来，第一个为人类争 取并保证理性权利的人。
笛卡尔<墓志铭>
这一名字在哲学殿堂里回响了三百多年，人们一直把 他供奉为欧洲近代哲学的始祖，理性主义的先驱。他 给哲学展示的不只是一个观点和结论，而是一个时代。
笛卡尔方法
笛卡尔方法《笛卡尔方法》又称“笛卡尔-拉格朗日分解定理”，是一种在线性规划中使用的数学算法，由法国数学家艾萨克笛卡尔于1685年提出。
笛卡尔方法的基本思想是将一个函数的最大值或最小值拆分成多个变量的最大值或最小值，每个变量都是前面所有变量的函数。
笛卡尔方法可以用来解决广泛的数学计算问题，例如最大化或最小化一个函数，求解一组不等式约束条件的最优解，求解多元方程组的最优解等。
笛卡尔方法是一种以函数极值为主题的数学优化方法，它是建立在拉格朗日多项式插值定理基础上的，具有极大的数学处理优势，它可以解决线性规划问题，而且能够完成更复杂的非线性规划任务。
笛卡尔方法的主要步骤包括：首先，根据最大化或最小化目标函数，将原始规划问题转化为一个给定约束条件下目标函数的极大值或极小值问题；其次，通过求解极大值或极小值来解决该问题，拉格朗日分解定理可以解决该问题；最后，根据给定的变量、约束条件和目标函数，解决该系统的最优解。
笛卡尔方法用于求解数学优化问题，可以有效地解决复杂的数学优化问题。
笛卡尔方法在建筑行业中的应用也越来越广泛，例如建筑材料优化设计、振动参数优化分析、楼/桥建筑优化设计、最优支撑布置等场景中可以使用笛卡尔方法。
例如，在按比例实现多种结构设计参数优化设计时，可以使用笛卡尔方法达到最优性能。
笛卡尔方法可以帮助建筑设计者更加准确地了解和把握建筑材料的性能，以制定最适合的构造方案，提高建筑物的使用寿命，减少设施投资并实现节能减排。
笛卡尔方法在其他领域的应用也很广泛，例如科学领域的计算机模拟和模型研究，社会经济学领域的公共规划和最优分配，人工智能领域的复杂系统优化和模式识别等，都可以使用笛卡尔方法。
笛卡尔方法在提供最优解的同时，也具有一定的局限性，它只适用于线性规划，只能处理有限变量，而且计算量很大，因此不适用于非线性规划问题。
因此，笛卡尔方法的应用范围有限，只有在线性规划问题存在时，才可以使用该方法求解。
总之，笛卡尔方法是一种在线性规划中使用的数学算法，通过将最大化或最小化目标函数转化为极大值或极小值问题，可以有效地求解复杂的线性规划问题，但它只适用于线性规划。
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勒内·笛卡尔(ren descartes,1596～1650)，这一名字在哲学的殿堂中回响了300多年。
人们一直把他供奉为近代欧洲哲学的始祖，理性主义的先驱。
他的哲学不仅展现了一个新的观点和结论，而且带来了一个新的时代。
"笛卡尔哲学有着一种超乎寻常的复杂性，它是如此地丰富，以致人们能够从中发现全部近代哲学的源泉。
17世纪形而上学的大家们(马勒伯朗士、斯宾诺莎、莱布尼茨)是通过反思笛卡尔的哲学来建立他们的体系的。
……洛克、贝克莱、休谟等人的哲学分析中有其笛卡尔主义的来源。
康德著名的'哥白尼式革命'，在某种意义上来讲，只是对笛卡尔给予的那个正在思维着一切被思对象的主体的至上性的一种复活。
黑格尔把笛卡尔看作英雄。
而更近一些的胡塞尔，把他的一本著作命名为《笛卡尔沉思集》。
"笛卡尔哲学是一个多种精神的统一体，作为方法论上的笛卡尔主义，它强调我们唯一能够信赖的是理性的证明；作为科学上的笛卡尔主义，它把我们思想的存在看作是最为确实的东西。
笛卡尔单哲学上的成就就足以惊世骇俗，然而他的研究领域远远超出了哲学的范围。
他创立了解析几何学、"反射和反射弧理论"，发现了光的折射定律，表述了物质不灭、运动量守恒以及宇宙的星云演化等光辉思想。
这些成就的任何一项都可以使他成为名垂史册的巨人。
笛卡尔作为近代欧洲理性主义的肇始者，他开创了哲学的新时代，他所运用的"盘古开天"之斧就是他的崭新的科学方法论和"我思"概念。
哲学必须从"我思"开始，即从"自我意识"开始，因而崇尚的是"理性"而不是权威。
康德的"哥白尼式革命"，不过是笛卡尔"我思"的至上性思想的一种更成熟的再现。
笛卡尔哲学对于我们既熟悉又陌生。
我们经常讲笛卡尔哲学，但却很少能够讲清笛卡尔哲学。
笛卡尔的新方法论到底是什么?"我思故我在"在哲学界有口皆碑，然而它真正的意义是什么呢?它在欧洲近代哲学中发挥了什么样的作用?对"天赋观念论"我们也人云亦云，然而到底它包括几层含义?笛卡尔对上帝存在的证明是不是对安瑟伦本体论证明的简单重复?心身(或称灵魂和肉体)关系问题是笛卡尔哲学的中心问题，然而这种心身区别的认识论意义是什么?笛卡尔怎样将它们分开，又怎样将它们统一起来的?在目前，我国哲学界对这一工作的探讨仍然较为薄弱。
因此，本书前言部分我们准备对笛卡尔哲学体系、方法论以及他的主要论点作一较为细致和全面的介绍，使人们对笛卡尔哲学的总体有一个完整的轮廓。
这对于理解笛卡尔论文的内容，把握其思想和实质将很有意义。
一、笛卡尔哲学的思想来源及时代背景笛卡尔的时代正是欧美科学突飞猛进的时代。
大约在笛卡尔出生的50年之前，哥白尼于1543年出版了六卷本的《天体运行论》，全面阐述了他的太阳中心说，指出地球每天自转一次，每年绕太阳周转一次。
这一学说摧毁了统治1000多年之久，被经院哲学作为"科学根据"的亚里士多德——托勒密的地球中心说。
同是在1543年，维萨里出版了《人体的构造》一书，他总结自己亲自对人体解剖观察的大量资料，系统地叙述了人体的构造，否定了基督教的上帝用男人身上的肋骨造女人、耶稣通过复活骨使死人复活的无稽之谈。
在天文学方面，伽利略以望远镜发现了金星的变像，他还发现了惯性定律、自由落体定律、抛物体定律、钟摆等时性定律和许多自然规律，将通过数学表达出来的这些定律运用于自然界，勾勒出一幅机械的世界蓝图。
自然科学的长足进步，打破了封建科学的自然观，对生活在这个时代的笛卡尔世界观的形成产生了重大的影响。
然而，在笛卡尔那个时代，欧洲盛行的是经院哲学和神学。
这一学派最初导源于亚里士多德，经过圣多玛斯的整理和其他学者的补充与诠释，而成为欧洲哲学的主流。
这一学派既然结合了亚里士多德、圣多玛斯，以及许许多多学者的智慧，自然有很高的价值，或者说包含了许多真理。
但是，到了17世纪，经院哲学似乎有退化的现象。
主要的问题变成了死的教条，不求进步，在细微末节上则辩论不休。
人们用来讽刺这个学派的例子是，"一个针尖上能够站立多少个天使?"他们用三段式的形式来训练辩论的技巧。
例如提出主张的人首先提出一个三段式，证明自己的主张。
对方提出一个三段式来反驳。
辩护人则借助区分来抗拒对方的论证，然后对方又提出一个三段式来反驳。
他们就依照这个固定的形式一直辩论下去。
如此的辩论形式是玩弄逻辑的技巧，对于增进知识没有太大的帮助。
同时，这个一成不变的形式，用久了不免令人厌烦。
面对这样一个传统哲学和传统方法，笛卡尔获得了一个观念，就是他要建立一个新的方法和一套新的哲学：他计划一次哲学的革命。
任何一种哲学都不能摆脱它的文化传统，正像植物不能离开土壤一样，它们或多或少是传统文化的一种分泌和积淀，因而能使我们看到人类思维过程的连续性。
然而，任何一种新的哲学的出现，又都是对传统文化的一种否定、一种革命。
它们是"物种遗传"中的一种突变、发展，从而又能使我们看到人类思想过程的间断和飞跃。
笛卡尔作为近代哲学的开创者，但他的哲学的内容仍然使我们清楚地看到，它有希腊的渊源、中古的遗风；它是在近代科学和文明的熏陶下，在法国这片特殊的土地上崛起的时代之子；历史的积淀和现实的创造织成了一张人类认识发展之网，笛卡尔哲学不过是这张网上的纽结。
笛卡尔思想受到了先哲们多方面的启迪。
柏拉图哲学对笛卡尔影响颇深。
笛卡尔看到，苏格拉底以前的希腊人凭着创造性的天才发明了几何学和算术科学，它们是能够获取无可怀疑知识的科学，是柏拉图哲学形成的条件。
而柏拉图本人也曾认为，只有牢牢地掌握了几何学知识，才有可能在更高的领域获取知识。
可以说，掌握几何学是研究哲学的基础。
如果说柏拉图学园入口处的碑铭是："不懂几何学者莫入"，那么笛卡尔哲学观就是在这里发端的。
笛卡尔把几何学作为哲学研究的基础和仿效的样板，使哲学达到几何学所能达到的那种确实性。
另外，在柏拉图的"回忆说"和笛卡尔的"天赋观念说"之间也存在着某种必然的联系。
柏拉图把世界二重化，认为除现实的现象世界之外还有一个理念世界，理念世界是原型，现实世界是理念世界的摹本。
人们对事物的认识不是对现实世界的反映，而是对理念的回忆。
柏拉图认为，灵魂在投生以前是生活在理念世界之中的，它对理念世界有着直接的认识。
但当它降生到人身后，由于肉体的阻碍而使它将原来对真理的认识遗忘了，只是在感官经验刺激下，人们才能将这些遗忘了的真理重新回忆起来。
因此，真正的认识，对于事物本质的认识，无非是对理念的回忆。
学习就是把沉睡在肉体中的灵魂重新唤醒，灵魂不死、灵魂转世成为柏拉图"回忆说"的基础。
笛卡尔将柏拉图的回忆说，改造成"天赋观念说"，认为人们具有与生俱来的天赋观念，它们是上帝赋予的永恒真理。
他把几何学的"公理"和逻辑学上的"同一律"、"矛盾律"、"排中律"以及"上帝"等观念都看作是天赋的，人心中固有的，只要经过一番学习，将灵魂和肉体分开来以后，就能将它们发现出来。
《第一哲学沉思》的主题就是论证上帝存在和灵魂切联系，那么最为密切的就属于奥古斯丁的哲学了。
他认为，真正的哲学是爱上帝的，真正的哲学只能和真正的宗教结合在一起，有了真正的宗教才有真正的哲学。
他给哲学确立的两个主题就是"灵魂"和"上帝"，哲学的任务就是要认识自我和认识上帝。
笛卡尔和奥古斯丁一样，把"灵魂"和"上帝"作为自己哲学的两大中心概念，把证明上帝存在和灵魂与肉体的区别确立为自己哲学的中心任务。
奥古斯丁通过柏拉图的理念获得了关于上帝的知识，把上帝看作是至真、至善、至美的永恒存在。
我们只有进入心灵、自我思维、自我反省，通过内心来体验上帝的存在；证明上帝的存在是靠一种神秘的直觉，而上帝不过是一个先验的概念。
笛卡尔就是把奥古斯丁的心灵直觉、柏拉图的理念和安瑟伦的本体论证明结合起来，证明上帝本身是存在着的。
关于人的存在，奥古斯丁认为，我的存在是通过我的思维来证明的，思维的确实性证明了自我存在的确实性，我在思维是千真万确的。
同时，我还会犯错误，这是思维出了毛病，从我犯错误就可以证明我存在；如果我不存在，决不会犯什么错误。
因此得出结论，"如果我犯错误，所以我存在"。
笛卡尔吸取了奥古斯丁的证明方法，也是从思维的存在来证明我的存在，提出了"我思，故我在"的命题。
我是一个思想的东西。
一个思想的东西，就是一个在怀疑、理解、肯定、否定、愿意、拒绝、想象和感觉的东西。
我怀疑一切，但是这个正在怀疑一切的我的存在是不能怀疑的。
因而，我在怀疑，所以我存在。
这可以说是笛卡尔"我思故我在"命题的思想渊源。
尽管笛卡尔本人的生活准则是："只求克服自己，不求克服命运；只求改变自己的欲望，不求改变世界的秩序。
"但笛卡尔刚出生时，持续36年的内战(1562～1598)还没有结束。
战争是宗教派别之间进行的殊死斗争，斗争的结果是亨利四世继承王位。
亨利四世的统治，给法国带来了繁荣与和平，使资本主义在一个时期中得到迅速发展。
虽然当时的资产阶级力量仍然弱小，不足以推翻封建制度，但"那时旧封建等级趋于衰亡，中世纪市民等级正在形成现代资产阶级，斗争的任何一方尚未压倒另一方。
"笛卡尔的二元论哲学就是这种社会状况的反映。
综观笛卡尔哲学发展的时代脉络，笛卡尔哲学来源于纵横两大方面。
从纵向看，是从柏拉图、奥古斯丁到笛卡尔；从横向看，直接影响笛卡尔的还有人文主义思潮、新教思潮、科学唯物主义以及法国当时的宗教、经济和政治斗争。
纵向、横向这两个向度构成了一个"笛卡尔坐标"，它标示出了笛卡尔哲学的生长点。
二、笛卡尔哲学体系及其形成过程笛卡尔要建立一个庞大的哲学体系，这就是他所描绘的人类知识之树。
"哲学的第一部分是形而上学，它包括知识的一些原理，在这些原理中要解释上帝的主要属性、灵魂的非物质性、在我们之中的全部清楚的和简单的观念。
第二部分是物理学，在其中，我们在发现物质事物的真正原则之后，就要一般地考察整个宇宙是怎样组成的，接着特别要考察地球的本性和最常被看作是和地球联系在一起的全部物体，像空气、水和火、磁石和其它矿物质的本性。