日本央行决策决定机制

DECISION-MAKING AT THE BANK OF JAPAN
GEOFFREY P.
MILLER*
The Bank ofJapan (BOJ), one of the most important economic and legal institutions in the world, presents a fascinating puzzle to those interested in the economic and legal organization of international finance.' Several of the BOJ's peer institutions-notably, the German Bundesbank and the U.S. Federal Reserve Board-have long enjoyed a degree of independence from the "political" branches of the government. 2 Other central banks in both the developed and the developing
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LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
world are gaining legal independence, and the new European central bank, if it is established, will enjoy similar autonomy.3 Yet the BOJ operates under a wartime charter, enacted in 1942, which subjects the Bank and its Governor to the apparently plenary control of the Ministry of Finance (MOF).4 Based on legal form, the BOJ has been one of the least independent central banks in the developed world, and trails even many developing countries.5 In 1997, as this is being written, Japan is preparing to revise its central bank law to create a higher degree of formal legal independence. 6 Yet, as will be seen, there is reason to doubt that the new law will fundamentally alter the balance of power between the BOJ and MOF, although it does represent an important change, the effects of which are difficult to predict with certainty.7 Why does the pattern observed in Japan differ in this regard from much of the rest of the developed world?
INDEPENDENCE AND REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITIES: THE BANK OF JAPAN AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE
(NYU Salomon Brothers Center for the Study of Financial Institutions Monograph No. 1989-2, 1989). For a more recent study, see CARL E. WALSH, INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: IS JAPAN REALLY AN OUTIER? (Bank ofJapan Discussion Paper 96-E-31, 1996). 2. For a survey of these institutions, now slightly dated, see JOHN GOODMN, CENTRAL BANK-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN MAJOR OECD COUNTRIES, S. PRT. No. 102-38 (1991) (describing government-central bank relations in Canada, France, Germany, ItalyJapan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). The literature on central bank independence is by now quite extensive. Recent books include FORREST CAPIE ET AL., THE FUTURE OF CENTRAL BANKING: THE TERCENTENARY SYMPOSIUM OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND (1994); ALEX CUKIERMAN, CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY, CREDIBILITY, AND INDEPENDENCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE (1992);JOHN B. GOODMAN, MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY: THE POLITICS OF CENTRAL BANKING IN WESTERN EUROPE (1992). The periodical literature is vast; important recent contributions include Alberto Alesina & Roberta Gatti, Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost, AM. ECON. REV., May 1995, at 196; Alberto Alesina & Lawrence H. Summers, CentralBank Independenceand MacroeconomicPerformance:Some ComparativeEvidence, 25J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 151 (1993); Ben Bernanke & Frederic Mishkin, CentralBankBehaviorand from Six IndustrializedCountries,in 1992 NBER MACROECOthe Strategy of Monetary Policy: Observations NOMICS ANNUAL 183 (1992); Alex Cukierman, Rapid Inflation: DeliberatePolicy or Miscalculation,29 CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER CONF. SERIES ON PUB. POL'Y 11 (1988); Alex Cukierman et al., Seigniorageand PoliticalInstability, 82 AM. ECON. REv. 537 (1992); Alex Cukierman et al., Central Bank Independence,
* Professor of Law, New York University, and Director, New York University Law School
Center for the Study of Central Banks. Some of the research for this paper was conducted while the author was a Visiting Scholar at the Bank ofJapan, May-July 1995. 1 would like to thankJ. Mark Ramseyer and participants at the Macroeconomics Seminar at the Center for Economic Research, University of Tilburg, the Netherlands, for comments on an earlier draft. This Article is based, in part, on extensive interviews and discussions with prominent current and former officials of Japanese government in interviews conducted on an off-the-record basis. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bank ofJapan or any of its officials. 1. For an informative background on the Bank and its history, see MASAAKI NAKAO & AKINARI HoRn, THE PROCESS OF DECISION-MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF MONETARY POLICY INJAPAN (Bank ofJapan Special Paper No. 198, 1991); THEJAPANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 305-44 (Yoshio Suzuki ed., 1987). For an earlier study that considers the role of the Bank ofJapan and compares it to the U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, see THOMAS F. CARGILL, CENTRAL BANK