制度经济学

Copyright @ 1979 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any fomt resmwd.Βιβλιοθήκη 250DOUGLASS
C. NORTH
endeavor. Public choice theory--economics applied to politics-has at best had only a modest success in.explaining political decision-making. “Interest group” politics including logrolling-the basic concept of public choice theory-cannot effectively explain voting behavior; ideological considerations appear to account for a great many political and judicial decisions (North, 1978). Further, the questions that must be asked are at a different level than the day-to-day political decision-making process. For the economic historian the key problems are to explain the kind of property rights that come to be specified and enforced by the state and, equally, to explain the effectiveness of enforcement. The most interesting challenge to the economic historian is to account for changes in the structure and enforcement of property rights over time. II At the outset one is bedeviled by an inability to define precisely what a state is. Where, for example, does the medieval manor belong on the continuum from the voluntary organization to the state? For the purposes of this paper, a state is an organization with a comparative advantage in violence, extending over a geographic area. The essence of property rights is the right to exclude; and an organization which has a comparative advantage in violence is in the position to specify and enforce property rights. In contrast to the theories frequently advanced in the literature of political science, sociology, and anthropology, here the key to understanding the state involves the potential use of violence to gain control over resources. In effect, one cannot develop a useful analysis of the state divorced from property rights. l Two general types of explanation for the state exist: (1) a contract theory and (2) a predatory or exploitation theory. Contract theories of the state have a long history. Recently they have been resurrected by neoclassical economists because they are a logical extension of the theorem of exchange in which the state plays the role of wealth maximizer for society. In the absence of a state, economic growth of any kind would be impossible. A contract which limits each man’s activity relative to others is an essential precondition for economic growth. In consequence, the contract theory approach offers an explanation for the development of efficient property rights that would promote economic growth.2 The exploitation or predatory theory of the state is held by a remarkably varied collection of social scientists, including Marxists (at least in their analysis of the capitalist state) and some neoclassical economists. This view considers the state to be the agency of a group or class; its
This essay has had a long gestation period and over the past nine years earlier versions have been presented at a meeting of the Public Choice Society at Yale and at a number of university colloquia. I am particularly indebted to Tom Borcherding, Elisabeth Case, Chris Hall, and Roger Nell for suggestions that have improved content and clarity of exposition. 249 0014-4983/79/030249-l 1$02.Ol%‘O
EXPLORATIONS
IN
ECONOMIC
HISTORY
16, 249-259 (1979)
A Framework
for Analyzing
DOUGLASS
the State in Economic
C. NORTH University of Washington
History
Department
of Economics,
I The creation of a state is an essential precondition for economic growth. The state, however, is the source of man-made economic decline. This paradox should have made the study of the state central to economic history: Models of the state should be an explicit part of any analysis of secular changes. They are not, and-though economic history is the poorer for it-for good reason. Theorizing about the state has been a favorite pastime of scholars for centuries, and the long path of historical research is strewn with the bones of theories of the state developed by historians and political scientists; one may justly inquire whether another effort by an economist can fare any better. There are reasons for a cautiously optimistic answer. Modern extensions of neoclassical economic theory have proven to be powerful tools of analysis; in recent years they have been applied to a variety of political issues, with some degree of success (Baumol, 1962; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Downs, 1957; Niskanen, 1971; Breton, 1974). Neoclassical theory conceived of as a theory of choice has provided at the very least a disciplined and logically consistent approach to these issues-something that has been notably lacking in much of the past literature on the subject. This theory offers the promise of developing refutable propositions about nonmarket decision-making. Moreover, recent research into economic organization has revealed its close kinship with political organization. A satisfactory theory of the firm would be a long step toward the development of a theory of the state (Coase, 1937; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Yet as we develop some preliminary propositions about the state, we should be cautious about the limits of neoclassical theory for such an