孟德斯鸠论法的精神英文全文
英文版论法的精神（上）2
In accusations of a deep and criminal nature, it is proper the person accused should have the privilege of choosing, in some measure, his judges, in concurrence with the law; or at least he should have a right to except against so great a number that the remaining part may be deemed his own choice. The other two powers may be given rather to magistrates or permanent bodies, because they are not exercised on any private subject; one being no more than the general will of the state, and the other the execution of that general will. But though the tribunals ought not to be fixed, the judgments ought; and to such a degree as to be ever conformable to the letter of the law. Were they to be the private opinion of the judge, people would then live in society, without exactly knowing the nature of their obligations. The judges ought likewise to be of the same rank as the accused, or, in other words, his peers; to the end that he may not imagine he is fallen into the hands of persons inclined to treat him with rigour. If the legislature leaves the executive power in possession of a right to imprison those subjects who can give security for their good behaviour, there is an end of liberty; unless they are taken up, in order to answer without delay to a capital crime, in which case they are really free, being subject only to the power of the law. But should the legislature think itself in danger by some secret conspiracy against the state, or by a correspondence with a foreign enemy, it might authorise the executive power, for a short and limited time, to imprison suspected persons, who in that case would lose their liberty only for a while, to preserve it for ever. And this is the only reasonable method that can be substituted to the tyrannical magistracy of the Ephori, and to the state inquisitors of Venice, who are also despotic. As in a country of liberty, every man who is supposed a free agent ought to be his own governor; the legislative power should reside in the whole body of the people. But since this is impossible in large states, and in small ones is subject to many inconveniences, it is fit the people should transact by their representatives what they cannot transact by themselves. The inhabitants of a particular town are much better acquainted with its wants and interests than with those of other places; and are better judges of the capacity of their neighbours than of that of the rest of their countrymen. The members, therefore, of the legislature should not be chosen from the general body of the nation; but it is proper that in every considerable place a representative should be elected by the inhabitants.8 The great advantage of representatives is, their capacity of discussing public affairs. For this the people collectively are extremely unfit, which is one of the chief inconveniences of a democracy. It is not at all necessary that the representatives who have received a general instruction from their constituents should wait to be directed on each particular affair, as is practised in the diets of Germany. True it is that by this way of proceeding the speeches of the deputies might with greater propriety be called the voice of the nation; but, on the other hand, this would occasion infinite delays; would give each deputy a power of controlling the assembly; and, on the most urgent and pressing occasions, the wheels of government might be stopped by the caprice of a single person. When the deputies, as Mr. Sidney well observes, represent a body of people, as in Holland, they ought to be accountable to their constituents; but it is a different thing in England, where they are deputed by boroughs. All the inhabitants of the several districts ought to have a right of voting at the election of a representative, except such as are in so mean a situation as to be deemed to have no will of their own. One great fault there was in most of the ancient republics, that the people had a right to active resolutions, such as require some execution, a thing of which they are absolutely incapable. They ought to have no share in the government but for the choosing of representatives, which is within their reach. For though few can tell the exact degree of men's capacities, yet there are none but are capable of knowing in general whether the person they choose is better qualified than most of his neighbours. Neither ought the representative body to be chosen for the executive part of government, for which it is not so fit; but for the enacting of laws, or to see whether the laws in being are duly executed, a thing suited to their abilities, and which none indeed but themselves can properly perform. In such a state there are always persons distinguished by their birth, riches, or honours: but were they to be confounded with the common people, and to have only the weight of a single vote like the rest, the common liberty would be their slavery, and they would have no interest in supporting it, as most of the popular resolutions would be against them. The share they have, therefore, in the legislature ought to be proportioned to their other advantages in the state; which happens only when they form a body that has a right to check the licentiousness of the people, as the people have a right to oppose anyencroachment of theirs. The legislative power is therefore committed to the body of the nobles, and to that which represents the people, each having their assemblies and deliberations apart, each their separate views and interests. Of the three powers above mentioned, the judiciary is in some measure next to nothing: there remain, therefore, only two; and as these have need of a regulating power to moderate them, the part of the legislative body composed of the nobility is extremely proper for this purpose. The body of the nobility ought to be hereditary. In the first place it is so in its own nature; and in the next there must be a considerable interest to preserve its privileges — privileges that in themselves are obnoxious to popular envy, and of course in a free state are always in danger. But as a hereditary power might be tempted to pursue its own particular interests, and forget those of the people, it is proper that where a singular advantage may be gained by corrupting the nobility, as in the laws relating to the supplies, they should have no other share in the legislation than the power of rejecting, and not that of resolving. By the power of resolving I mean the right of ordaining by their own authority, or of amending what has been ordained by others. By the power of rejecting I would be understood to mean the right of annulling a resolution taken by another; which was the power of the tribunes at Rome. And though the person possessed of the privilege of rejecting may likewise have the right of approving, yet this approbation passes for no more than a declaration that he intends to make no use of his privilege of rejecting, and is derived from that very privilege. The executive power ought to be in the hands of a monarch, because this branch of government, having need of despatch, is better administered by one than by many: on the other hand, whatever depends on the legislative power is oftentimes better regulated by many than by a single person. But if there were no monarch, and the executive power should be committed to a certain number of persons selected from the legislative body, there would be an end then of liberty; by reason the two powers would be united, as the same persons would sometimes possess, and would be always able to possess, a share in both. Were the legislative body to be a considerable time without meeting, this would likewise put an end to liberty. For of two things one would naturally follow: either that there would be no longer any legislative resolutions, and then the state would fall into anarchy; or that these resolutions would be taken by the executive power, which would render it absolute.。
英文版论法的精神-3
Book III. Of the Principles of the Three Kinds of Government1. Difference between the Nature and Principle of Government. Having examined the laws in relation to the nature of each government, we must investigate those which relate to its principle.There is this difference between the nature and principle1 of government, that the former is that by which it is constituted, the latter that by which it is made to act. One is its particular structure, and the other the human passions which set it in motion.Now, laws ought no less to relate to the principle than to the nature of each government. We must, therefore, inquire into this principle, which shall be the subject of this third book.2. Of the Principle of different Governments. I have already observed that it is the nature of a republican government that either the collective body of the people, or particular families, should be possessed of the supreme power; of a monarchy, that the prince should have this power, but in the execution of it should be directed by established laws; of a despotic government, that a single person should rule according to his own will and caprice. This enables me to discover their three principles; which are thence naturally derived. I shall begin with a republican government, and in particular with that of democracy.3. Of the Principle of Democracy. There is no great share of probity necessary to support a monarchical or despotic government. The force of laws in one, and the prince's arm in the other, are sufficient to direct and maintain the whole. But in a popular state, one spring more is necessary, namely, virtue.What I have here advanced is confirmed by the unanimous testimony of historians, and is extremely agreeable to the nature of things. For it is clear thatin a monarchy, where he who commands the execution of the laws generally thinks himself above them, there is less need of virtue than in a popular government, where the person entrusted with the execution of the laws is sensible of his being subject to their direction.Clear is it also that a monarch who, through bad advice or indolence, ceases to enforce the execution of the laws, may easily repair the evil; he has only to follow other advice; or to shake off this indolence. But when, in a popular government, there is a suspension of the laws, as this can proceed only from the corruption of the republic, the state is certainly undone.A very droll spectacle it was in the last century to behold the impotent efforts of the English towards the establishment of democracy. As they who had a share in the direction of public affairs were void of virtue; as their ambition was inffamed by the success of the most daring of their members;2 as the prevailing parties were successively animated by the spirit of faction, the government was continually changing: the people, amazed at so many revolutions, in vain attempted to erect a commonwealth. At length, when the country had undergone the most violent shocks, they were obliged to have recourse to the very government which they had so wantonly proscribed.When Sylla thought of restoring Rome to her liberty, this unhappy city was incapable of receiving that blessing. She had only the feeble remains of virtue, which were continually diminishing. Instead of being roused from her lethargy by C?sar, Tiberius, Caius Claudius, Nero, and Domitian, she riveted every day her chains; if she struck some blows, her aim was at the tyrant, not at the tyranny.The politic Greeks, who lived under a popular government, knew no other support than virtue. The modern inhabitants of that country are entirely taken up with manufacture, commerce, finances, opulence, and luxury.When virtue is banished, ambition invades the minds of those who are disposed to receive it, and avarice possesses the whole community. The objectsof their desires are changed; what they were fond of before has become indifferent; they were free while under the restraint of laws, but they would fain now be free to act against law; and as each citizen is like a slave who has run away from his master, that which was a maxim of equity he calls rigour; that which was a rule of action he styles constraint; and to precaution he gives the name of fear. Frugality, and not the thirst of gain, now passes for avarice. Formerly the wealth of individuals constituted the public treasure; but now this has become the patrimony of private persons. The members of the commonwealth riot on the public spoils, and its strength is only the power of a few, and the licence of many.Athens was possessed of the same number of forces when she triumphed so gloriously as when with such infamy she was enslaved. She had twenty thousand citizens3 when she defended the Greeks against the Persians, when she contended for empire with Sparta, and invaded Sicily. She had twenty thousand when Demetrius Phalereus numbered them4 as slaves are told by the head in a market-place. When Philip attempted to lord it over Greece, and appeared at the gates of Athens5 she had even then lost nothing but time. We may see in Demosthenes how difficult it was to awaken her; she dreaded Philip, not as the enemy of her liberty, but of her pleasures.6 This famous city, which had withstood so many defeats, and having been so often destroyed had as often risen out of her ashes, was overthrown at Ch?ronea, and at one blow deprived of all hopes of resource. What does it avail her that Philip sends back her prisoners, if he does not return her men? It was ever after as easy to triumph over the forces of Athens as it had been difficult to subdue her virtue.How was it possible for Carthage to maintain her ground? When Hannibal, upon his being made pr?tor, endeavoured to hinder the magistrates from plundering the republic, did not they complain of him to the Romans? Wretches, who would fain be citizens without a city, and be beholden for their riches to their very destroyers! Rome soon insisted upon having three hundred of their principal citizens as hostages; she obliged them next to surrender their arms and ships; and then she declared war.7 From the desperate efforts of thisdefenceless city, one may judge of what she might have performed in her full vigour, and assisted by virtue.4. Of the Principle of Aristocracy. As virtue is necessary in a popular government, it is requisite also in an aristocracy. True it is that in the latter it is not so absolutely requisite.The people, who in respect to the nobility are the same as the subjects with regard to a monarch, are restrained by their laws. They have, therefore, less occasion for virtue than the people in a democracy. But how are the nobility to be restrained? They who are to execute the laws against their colleagues will immediately perceive that they are acting against themselves. Virtue is therefore necessary in this body, from the very nature of the constitution.An aristocratic government has an inherent vigour, unknown to democracy. The nobles form a body, who by their prerogative, and for their own particular interest, restrain the people; it is sufficient that there are laws in being to see them executed.But easy as it may be for the body of the nobles to restrain the people, it is difficult to restrain themselves.8 Such is the nature of this constitution, that it seems to subject the very same persons to the power of the laws, and at the same time to exempt them.Now such a body as this can restrain itself only in two ways; either by a very eminent virtue, which puts the nobility in some measure on a level with the people, and may be the means of forming a great republic; or by an inferior virtue, which puts them at least upon a level with one another, and upon this their preservation depends.Moderation is therefore the very soul of this government; a moderation, I mean, founded on virtue, not that which proceeds from indolence and pusillanimity.5. That Virtue is not the Principle of a Monarchical Government. In monarchies, policy effects great things with as little virtue as possible. Thus in the nicest machines, art has reduced the number of movements, springs, and wheels.The state subsists independently of the love of our country, of the thirst of true glory, of self-denial, of the sacrifice of our dearest interests, and of all those heroic virtues which we admire in the ancients, and to us are known only by tradition.The laws supply here the place of those virtues; they are by no means wanted, and the state dispenses with them: an action performed here in secret is in some measure of no consequence.Though all crimes be in their own nature public, yet there is a distinction between crimes really public and those that are private, which are so called because they are more injurious to individuals than to the community.Now in republics private crimes are more public, that is, they attack the constitution more than they do individuals; and in monarchies, public crimes are more private, that is, they are more prejudicial to private people than to the constitution.I beg that no one will be offended with what I have been saying; my observations are founded on the unanimous testimony of historians. I am not ignorant that virtuous princes are so very rare; but I venture to affirm that in a monarchy it is extremely difficult for the people to be virtuous.9Let us compare what the historians of all ages have asserted concerning the courts of monarchs; let us recollect the conversations and sentiments of people of all countries, in respect to the wretched character of courtiers, and we shall find that these are not airy speculations, but truths confirmed by a sad and melancholy experience.Ambition in idleness; meanness mixed with pride; a desire of riches without industry; aversion to truth; flattery, perfidy, violation of engagements, contempt of civil duties, fear of the prince's virtue, hope from his weakness, but, above all, a perpetual ridicule cast upon virtue, are, I think, the characteristics by which most courtiers in all ages and countries have been constantly distinguished. Now, it is exceedingly difficult for the leading men of the nation to be knaves, and the inferior sort to be honest; for the former to be cheats, and the latter to rest satisfied with being only dupes.But if there should chance to be some unlucky honest man10 among the people. Cardinal Richelieu, in his political testament, seems to hint that a prince should take care not to employ him.11 So true is it that virtue is not the spring of this government! It is not indeed excluded, but it is not the spring of government.6. In what Manner Virtue is supplied in a Monarchical Government. But it is high time for me to have done with this subject, lest I should be suspected of writing a satire against monarchical government. Far be it from me; if monarchy wants one spring, it is provided with another. Honour, that is, the prejudice of every person and rank, supplies the place of the political virtue of which I have been speaking, and is everywhere her representative: here it is capable of inspiring the most glorious actions, and, joined with the force of laws, may lead us to the end of government as well as virtue itself.Hence, in well-regulated monarchies, they are almost all good subjects, and very few good men; for to be a good man12 a good intention is necessary,13 and we should love our country, not so much on our own account, as out of regard to the community.7. Of the Principle of Monarchy. A monarchical government supposes, as we have already observed, pre-eminences and ranks, as likewise a noble descent. Now since it is the nature of honour to aspire to preferments and titles, it is properly placed in this government.Ambition is pernicious in a republic. But in a monarchy it has some good effects; it gives life to the government, and is attended with this advantage, that it is in no way dangerous, because it may be continually checked.It is with this kind of government as with the system of the universe, in which there is a power that constantly repels all bodies from the centre, and a power of gravitation that attracts them to it. Honour sets all the parts of the body politic in motion, and by its very action connects them; thus each individual advances the public good, while he only thinks of promoting his own interest.True it is that, philosophically speaking, it is a false honour which moves all the parts of the government; but even this false honour is as useful to the public as true honour could possibly be to private persons.Is it not very exacting to oblige men to perform the most difficult actions, such as require an extraordinary exertion of fortitude and resolution, without other recompense than that of glory and applause?8. That Honour is not the Principle of Despotic Government. Honour is far from being the principle of despotic government: mankind being here all upon a level, no one person can prefer himself to another; and as on the other hand they are all slaves, they can give themselves no sort of preference.Besides, as honour has its laws and rules, as it knows not how to submit; as it depends in a great measure on a man's own caprice, and not on that of another person; it can be found only in countries in which the constitution is fixed, and where they are governed by settled laws.How can despotism abide with honour? The one glories in the contempt of life; and the other is founded on the power of taking it away. How can honour, on the other hand, bear with despotism? The former has its fixed rules, and peculiar caprices; but the latter is directed by no rule, and its own caprices are subversive of all others.Honour, therefore, a thing unknown in arbitrary governments, some of which have not even a proper word to express it,14 is the prevailing principle in monarchies; here it gives life to the whole body politic, to the laws, and even to the virtues themselves.9. Of the Principle of Despotic Government. As virtue is necessary in a republic, and in a monarchy honour, so fear is necessary in a despotic government: with regard to virtue, there is no occasion for it, and honour would be extremely dangerous.Here the immense power of the prince devolves entirely upon those whom he is pleased to entrust with the administration. Persons capable of setting a value upon themselves would be likely to create disturbances. Fear must therefore depress their spirits, and extinguish even the least sense of ambition.A moderate government may, whenever it pleases, and without the least danger, relax its springs. It supports itself by the laws, and by its own internal strength. But when a despotic prince ceases for one single moment to uplift his arm, when he cannot instantly demolish those whom he has entrusted with the first employments,15 all is over: for as fear, the spring of this government, no longer subsists, the people are left without a protector.It is probably in this sense the Cadis maintained that the Grand Seignior was not obliged to keep his word or oath, when he limited thereby his authority.16It is necessary that the people should be judged by laws, and the great men by the caprice of the prince, that the lives of the lowest subject should be safe, and the pasha's head ever in danger. We cannot mention these monstrous governments without horror. The Sophi of Persia, dethroned in our days by Mahomet, the son of Miriveis, saw the constitution subverted before this resolution, because he had been too sparing of blood.17History informs us that the horrid cruelties of Domitian struck such a terror into the governors that the people recovered themselves a little during hisreign.18 Thus a torrent overflows one side of a country, and on the other leaves fields untouched, where the eye is refreshed by the prospect of fine meadows.10. Difference of Obedience in Moderate and Despotic Governments. In despotic states, the nature of government requires the most passive obedience; and when once the prince's will is made known, it ought infallibly to produce its effect.Here they have no limitations or restrictions, no mediums, terms, equivalents, or remonstrances; no change to propose: man is a creature that blindly submits to the absolute will of the sovereign.In a country like this they are no more allowed to represent their apprehensions of a future danger than to impute their miscarriage to the capriciousness of fortune. Man's portion here, like that of beasts, is instinct, compliance, and punishment.Little does it then avail to plead the sentiments of nature, filial respect, conjugal or parental tenderness, the laws of honour, or want of health; the order is given, and, that is sufficient.In Persia, when the king has condemned a person, it is no longer lawful to mention his name, or to intercede in his favour. Even if the prince were intoxicated, or non compos, the decree must be executed;19 otherwise he would contradict himself, and the law admits of no contradiction. This has been the way of thinking in that country in all ages; as the order which Ahasuerus gave, to exterminate the Jews, could not be revoked, they were allowed the liberty of defending themselves.One thing, however, may be sometimes opposed to the prince's will,20 namely, religion. They will abandon, nay they will slay a parent, if the prince so commands; but he cannot oblige them to drink wine. The laws of religion are of a superior nature, because they bind the sovereign as well as the subject. Butwith respect to the law of nature, it is otherwise; the prince is no longer supposed to be a man.In monarchical and moderate states, the power is limited by its very spring, I mean by honour, which, like a monarch, reigns over the prince and his people. They will not allege to their sovereign the laws of religion; a courtier would be apprehensive of rendering himself ridiculous. But the laws of honour will be appealed to on all occasions. Hence arise the restrictions necessary to obedience; honour is naturally subject to whims, by which the subject's submission will be ever directed.Though the manner of obeying be different in these two kinds of government, the power is the same. On which side soever the monarch turns, he inclines the scale, and is obeyed. The whole difference is that in a monarchy the prince receives instruction, at the same time that his ministers have greater abilities, and are more versed in public affairs, than the ministers of a despotic government.11. Reflections on the preceding Chapters. Such are the principles of the three sorts of government: which does not imply that in a particular republic they actually are, but that they ought to be, virtuous; nor does it prove that in a particular monarchy they are actuated by honour, or in a particular despotic government by fear; but that they ought to be directed by these principles, otherwise the government is imperfect.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------1. This is a very important distinction, whence I shall draw many consequences; for it is the key of an infinite number of laws.2. Cromwell.3. Plutarch, Pericles; Plato, in Critias.4. She had at that time twenty-one thousand citizens, ten thousand strangers, and four hundred thousand slaves. See Athen?us, vi.5. She had then twenty thousand citizens. See Demosthenes in Aristog.6. They had passed a law, which rendered it a capital crime for any one to propose applying the money designed for the theatres to military7. This lasted three years.8. Public crimes may be punished, because it is here a common concern; but private crimes will go unpunished, because it is the common interest not to punish them.9. I speak here of political virtue, which is also moral virtue as it is directed to the public good; very little of private moral virtue, and not at all of that virtue which relates to revealed truths. This will appear better in v. 2.10. This is to be understood in the sense of the preceding note.11. We must not, says he, employ people of mean extraction; they are too rigid and morose. — Testament Polit., 4.12. This word good man is understood here in a political sense only.13. See Footnote 1.14. See Perry, p. 447.15. As it often happens in a military aristocracy.16. Ricaut on the Ottoman Empire. I, ii.17. See the history of this revolution by Father du Cerceau.18. Suetonius, Life of Domitian, viii. His was a military constitution, which is one of the species of despotic government.19. See Sir John Chardin.20. Ibid.。
第三专题 孟德斯鸠《论法的精神》32页PPT
《论法的精神》的作用和影响广泛而深远。在历史上，它充当了资产阶级早 期的政治纲领，为其提供了政治法律原则。法国1789年的《人和公民和权利 宣言》和1791年的《人权宣言》当中众多的政治法律条文，都是《论法的精 神》所阐述过的。
《论法的精神》中很多闪光的思想为同时代的和后来的政治家和思想家所接 受，被凝结为一些西方国家的宪法精神，尤其是“三权分立”的共和政体的 主张，成为很多国家的政治现实。美国的开国元勋们深悉《论法的精神》， 1787年生效的《美利坚合众国宪法》使分权理论第一次在实践中得到完全的 运用。
在巴黎，他出入贵族沙龙，广交学界名流，和一大批启蒙思想家都有或 深或浅的友谊；在旅途中，他积极交往各国开明人士，自学获取思想营 养；在英国，他看到了应该如何设计保障公民政治自由的政治法律制度 蓝本。
《论法的精神》这样的政治法律理论巨著，是孟德斯鸠一生思考和探索 的学术成果，是他全部精力和心血的结晶。正如孟德斯鸠在完稿之后发 出的喟然长叹：“我毕生精力，耗尽在《论法的精神》一书上面。”
主要思想
一、法、人类法、自然法 二、政治自由与基本法 三、政治自由和特别法
一、 法、人类法、自然法
法的精神所用的“法”字，是含有法、法则、法律、 规律等多种含义。根据孟德斯鸠的界定：“从最广泛 的意义来说，法是由事物的本性所产生出来的必然关 系。在这个意义上，一切存在物都有它们的法。”显 然，这里的法是广义的，指的是世界上万事万物存在 和运动的规律、法则。
《波斯人信札》 《罗马盛衰原因论》 《论法的精神》
研究方法： 1、多国别的比较研究 2、大范围的比较研究 3、大时间跨度的历史比较研究
写作背景
孟德斯鸠一生以探索政治自由为己任，《论法的精神》是他倾毕生心血 绘制的保障公民政治自由的最终方案。决定他这样做的，是他所处的时 代和他自身的成长经历。
英文版论法的精神（下）24
Book XVIII. Of Laws in the Relation They Bear to the Nature of the Soil 1. How the Nature of the Soil has an Influence on the Laws. The goodness of the land, in any country, naturally establishes subjection and dependence. The husbandmen, who compose the principal part of the people, are not very jealous of their liberty; they are too busy and too intent on their own private affairs. A country which overflows with wealth is afraid of pillage, afraid of an army. "Who is there that forms this goodly party?" said Cicero to Atticus;1 "are they the men of commerce and husbandry? Let us not imagine that these are averse to monarchy — these to whom all governments are equal, as soon as they bestow tranquillity." Thus monarchy is more frequently found in fruitful countries, and a republican government in those which are not so; and this is sometimes a sufficient compensation for the inconveniences they suffer by the sterility of the land. The barrenness of the Attic soil established there a democracy; and the fertility of that of Laced?monia an aristocratic constitution. For in those times Greece was averse to the government of a single person, and aristocracy bore the nearest resemblance to that government. Plutarch says2 that the Cilonian sedition having been appeased at Athens, the city fell into its ancient dissensions, and was divided into as many parties as there were kinds of land in Attica. The men who inhabited the eminences would, by all means, have a popular government; those of the flat, open country demanded a government composed of the chiefs; and they who were near the sea desired a mixture of both. 2. The same Subject continued. These fertile provinces are always of a level surface, where the inhabitants are unable to dispute against a stronger power; they are then obliged to submit; and when they have once submitted, the spirit of liberty cannot return; the wealth of the country is a pledge of their fidelity. But in mountainous districts, as they have but little, they may preserve what they have. The liberty they enjoy, or, in other words, the government they are under, is the only blessing worthy of their defence. It reigns, therefore, more in mountainous and rugged countries than in those which nature seems to have most favoured. The mountaineers preserve a more moderate government, because they are not so liable to be conquered. They defend themselves easily, and are attacked with difficulty; ammunition and provisions are collected and carried against them with great expense, for the country furnishes none. It is, then, a more arduous, a more dangerous, enterprise to make war against them; and all the laws that can be enacted for the safety of the people are there of least use. 3. What Countries are best cultivated. Countries are not cultivated in proportion to their fertility, but to their liberty; and if we make an imaginary division of the earth, we shall be astonished to see in most ages deserts in the most fruitful parts, and great nations in those where nature seems to refuse everything. It is natural for a people to leave a bad soil to seek a better, and not to leave a good soil to go in search of worse. Most invasions have, therefore, been made in countries which nature seems to have formed for happiness; and as nothing is more nearly allied than desolation and invasion, the best provinces are most frequently depopulated, while the frightful countries of the north continue always inhabited, from their being almost uninhabitable. We find by what historians tell us of the passage of the people of Scandinavia along the banks of the Danube that this was not a conquest, but only a migration into desert countries. These happy climates must therefore have been depopulated by other migrations, though we know not the tragic scenes that happened. "It appears by many monuments of antiquity," says Aristotle,3 "that the Sardinians were a Grecian colony. They were formerly very rich; and Aristeus, so famed for his love of agriculture, was their law-giver. But they have since fallen to decay; for the Carthaginians, becoming their masters, destroyed everything proper tor the nourishment of man, and forbade the cultivation of the lands on pain of death." Sardinia was not recovered in the time of Aristotle, nor is it to this day. The most temperate parts of Persia, Turkey, Muscovy, and Poland have not been able to recover perfectly from the devastations of the Tartars. 4. New Effects of the Fertility and Barrenness of Countries. The barrenness of the earth renders men industrious, sober, inured to hardship, courageous, and fit for war; they are obliged to procure by labour what the earth refuses to bestow spontaneously. The fertility of a country gives ease, effeminacy, and a certain fondness for the preservation of life. It has been remarked that the German troops raised in those places where the peasants are rich, as, for instance, in Saxony, are not so good as the others. Military laws may provide against this inconvenience by a more severe discipline. 5. Of the Inhabitants of Islands. The inhabitants of islands have a higher relish for liberty than those of the continent. Islands are commonly of small extent;4 one part of the people cannot be so easily employed to oppress the other; the sea separates them from great empires; tyranny cannot so well support itself within a small compass: conquerors are stopped bythe sea; and the islanders, being without the reach of their arms, more easily preserve their own laws. 6. Of Countries raised by the Industry of Man. Those countries which the industry of man has rendered habitable, and which stand in need of the same industry to provide for their subsistence, require a mild and moderate government. There are principally three of this species: the two fine provinces of Kiang-nan and Tsekiang in China; Egypt, and Holland. The ancient emperors of China were not conquerors. The first thing they did to aggrandise themselves was what gave the highest proof of their wisdom. They raised from beneath the waters two of the finest provinces of the empire; these owe their existence to the labour of man. And it is the inexpressible fertility of these two provinces which has given Europe such ideas of the felicity of that vast country. But a continual and necessary care to preserve from destruction so considerable a part of the empire demanded rather the manners of a wise than of a voluptuous nation, rather the lawful authority of a monarch than the tyrannic sway of a despotic prince. Power was, therefore, necessarily moderated in that country, as it was formerly in Egypt, and as it is now in Holland, which nature has made to attend to herself, and not to be abandoned to negligence or caprice. Thus, in spite of the climate of China, where they are naturally led to a servile obedience; in spite of the apprehensions which follow too great an extent of empire, the first legislators of this country were obliged to make excellent laws, and the government was frequently obliged to follow them. 7. Of human Industry. Mankind by their industry, and by the influence of good laws, have rendered the earth more proper for their abode. We see rivers flow where there have been lakes and marshes: this is a benefit which nature has not bestowed; but it is a benefit maintained and supplied by nature. When the Persians5 were masters of Asia, they permitted those who conveyed a spring to any place which had not been watered before to enjoy the benefit for five generations; and as a number of rivulets flowed from Mount Taurus, they spared no expense in directing the course of their streams. At this day, without knowing how they came thither, they are found in the fields and gardens. Thus, as destructive nations produce evils more durable than themselves, the actions of an industrious people are the source of blessings which last when they are no more. 8. The general Relation of Laws. The laws have a very great relation to the manner in which the several nations procure their subsistence. There should be a code of laws of a much larger extent for a nation attached to trade and navigation than for people who are content with cultivating the earth. There should be a much greater for the latter than for those who subsist by their flocks and herds. There must be a still greater for these than for such as live by hunting. 9. Of the Soil of America. The cause of there being such a number of savage nations in America is the fertility of the earth, which spontaneously produces many fruits capable of affording them nourishment. If the women cultivate a spot of land around their cottages, the maize grows up presently; and hunting and fishing put the men in a state of complete abundance. Besides, black cattle, as cows, buffaloes, &c., thrive there better than carnivorous beasts. The latter have always reigned in Africa. We should not, I believe, have all these advantages in Europe if the land was left uncultivated; it would scarcely produce anything besides forests of oaks and other barren trees. 10. Of Population in the Relation it bears to the Manner of procuring Subsistence. Let us see in what proportion countries are peopled where the inhabitants do not cultivate the earth. As the produce of uncultivated land is to that of land improved by culture, so the number of savages in one country is to that of husbandmen in another: and when the people who cultivate the land cultivate also the arts, this is also in such proportions as would require a minute detail. They can scarcely form a great nation. If they are herdsmen and shepherds, they have need of an extensive country to furnish subsistence for a small number; if they live by hunting, their number must be still less, and in order to find the means of life they must constitute a very small nation. Their country commonly abounds with forests, which, as the inhabitants have not the art of draining off the waters, are filled with bogs; here each troop canton themselves, and form a petty nation. 11. Of savage and barbarous Nations. There is this difference between savage and barbarous nations: the former are dispersed clans, which for some particular reason cannot be joined in a body; and the latter are commonly small nations, capable of being united. The savages are generally hunters; the barbarians are herdsmen and shepherds. This appears plain in the north of Asia. The people of Siberia cannot live in bodies, because they are unable to find subsistence; the Tartars may live in bodies for some time, because their herds and flocks may for a time be reassembled. All the clans may then be reunited, and this is effected when one chief has subdued many others; after which they may do two things — either separate, or set out with a design to make a great conquest in some southern empire. 12. Of the Law of Nations among People who do not cultivate the Earth. As these people do not live in circumscribedterritories, many causes of strife arise between them; they quarrel about waste land as we about inheritances. Thus they find frequent occasions for war, in disputes in relation either to their hunting, their fishing, the pasture for their cattle, or the violent seizing of their slaves; and as they are not possessed of landed property, they have many things to regulate by the law of nations, and but few to decide by the civil law. 13. Of the Civil Laws of those Nations who do not cultivate the Earth. The division of lands is what principally increases the civil code. Among nations where they have not made this division there are very f e w c i v i l l a w s . / p > p b d s f i d = " 75 " > 0 0 T h e i n s t i t u t i o n s o f t h e s e p e o p l e m a y b e c a l l e d m a n n e r s r a t h e r t h a n l a w s . / p > p b d s f id = " 7 6 " > 0 0 A m o n g s u c h n a t i o n s a s t he s e t h e o l d m e n , w h o r e m e m b e r t h i n g s p a s t , h a v e g r e a t a u t h o r i t y ; t h e y c a n n o t t h e r e b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d b y w e a l t h , b u t b y w i s d o m a n d v a l o u r . / p > p bd s f i d = " 7 7 " > 0 0 T he s e p e o p l e w a n d e r a n d d i s p e r s e t h e m s e l v e s i n p a s t u r e g r o u n d s o r i nf o re s t s . M a r r i a g e c a n n o t t h e r e h a v e t h e s e c u r i t y w h i c h i t h a s a m o n g u s , w h e r e i t i sf i x e d b y t h e h a b i t a t i o n , a n d w h e r e t h e w i f e c o n t i n u e s i n o n e h o u s e ; t h e y m a y t h e n m o r e e a s i l y c h a ng e th ei r w i v e s , p o s s e s s m a n y , a n d s o m e t i m e s m i x i n d i f f e r e n t l y l i k e b r u t e s . / p > p b d s f i d = " 7 8 " > 0 0 N a t i o n s o f h e r d s m e n a n d s h e p h e r d s c a n n o t l e a v e t h e i r c a t t l e , w h i c h a r e t h e i r s u b s i s t e n c e ; n e i t h e r c a n t h e y s e p a r a t e t h e m s e l v e s f r o m t h e i r w i v e s , w h o l o o k a f t e r t h e m . A l l t h i s o u g h t , t h e n , t o g o t o g e t h e r , e s p e c i a l l y a s l i v i n g g e n e r a l l y i n a f l a t o p e n c o u n t r y , w h e r e t h e r e a r e f e w p l a c e s o f c o n s i d e r a b l e s t r e n g t h , t h e i r w i v e s , t h e i r c h i l d r e n , t h e i r f l o c k s , m a y b e c o m e t h e p r e y o f t h e i r e n e m i e s . / p > p b d s f i d = " 7 9 " > 0 0 T h e l a w s r e g u l a t e t h e d i v i s i o n o f p l u n d e r , a n d g i v e , l i k e o u r S a l i c l a w s , a p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e f t . / p > p b d s f i d = " 8 0 " > 0 0 1 4 . O f t h e p o l i t i c a l S t a t e o f t h e P e o p l e w h o d o n o t c u l t i v a t e t h e L a n d . T h e s e p e o p l e e nj o y g r e a t l i b e r t y ; f o r a s t h e y d o n o t c u l t i v a t e t h e e a r t h , t h e y a r e n o t f i x e d : t h e y a r e w a n d e r e r s a n d v a g a b o n d s ; a n d i f a c h i e f s h o u l d d e p r i v e t h e m o f t h e i r l i b e r t y , t h e y w o u l d i m m e d i a t e l y g o a n d s e ek i t u n d e r a n o t h e r , o r r e t i r e i n t o t h e w o o d s , a n d t h e r el i v e w i t h t h e i r f am i l i e s . T h e l i b e r t y o f t h e m an i s so g r e a t a m o n g t h e s ep e o p l e t h a t i t n e c e s s a r i l y d r a w s a f t e r i t t h a t o f t h e c i t i z e n . / p > p b d s f i d = " 8 1 " > 0 0 1 5 . O f P e o p l e w h o k n o w t h e U s e o f M o n e y . A r i s t i p p u s , b e i n g c a s t a w a y , s w a m a n d g o t s a f e l y t o t h e n e x t s h o r e , w h e r e , b e h o l d i n g g e o m e t r i c a l f i g u r e s t r a c e d i n t h e s a n d , h e w a s s e i z e d w i t h a t r a n s p o r t o f j o y , j u d g i n g t h a t h e w a s a m o n g G r e e k s , a n d n o t i n a n a t i o n o f b a r b a r i a n s . / p > p b d s f i d = " 8 2 " > 0 0 S h o u l d y o u e v e r h a p p e n t o b e c a s t b y s o m e a d v e n t u r e a m o n g a n u n k n o w n p e o p l e ; u p o n s e e i n g a p i e c e o f m o n e y y o u m a y b e a s s u r e d t h a t y o u h a v e a r r i v e d i n a c i v i l i s e d c o u n t r y . / p > p b d s f i d = " 8 3 " > 0 0 T h e c u l t u r e o f l a n d s r eq u ir est h eu s e o f m o n e y . T h i s c u l t u r e s u p p o s e s m a n y i nv e n t i o n s a n d m a n y d e g r e e s o f k n ow l e d g e ;a n d w e a l w a y s s e e i n g e n u i t y , t h e a r t s , a n d a s e n s e o f w a n t m a k i n g t h e i r p r o g r e s s w i t h a n e q u a l p a c e . A l l t h i s c o n d u c e s t o t h e e s t ab l i s h m e n t o f a s i g n o f v a l u e . / p > p b d s f i d = " 8 4 " > 0 0 T o r r e n t s a n d e r u p t i o n s h a v e m a d e t h e d i sc o v e r y t h a t m e t a l s a r e c o n t a i n ed i n t he b o w e l s of t h e e a r t h . 6 W h e n o n c e t h e y h a v e b e e n s e p a r a t e d , t h e y h a v e e a s i l y b e e n a p p l i e d t o t h e i r p r o p e r u s e . / p > p b d s f i d = " 8 5 " > 0 0 1 6 . O f C i v i l L a w s a m o ng P e o p l e wh o k n o w n o t t h e U s e o f M o n e y . W h e n a p e o p l e h a v e n o t t h e u s e o f m o n e y , t h e y a r e s e l d o m a c q u ai n t e d w i t h a n y o t h e r i nj u s t i c e t h a n t h a t w h i c h a r i s e s f r o m v i o l e n c e ; a n d t h e w e ak , b y u n i t i n g , d e f e n d t h e m s el v e s f r om i t s e f f e c t s . T h e y h a v eno t h i n g t h e r e b u tp o l i t i c a l r e g u l a t i o n s . B u t w h e r e m o n e y i s e s t a b l i s h e d , t h e y a r e s u b j e c t t o t h a t i n j u s t i c e w h i c h p r o c e e d s f r o m c r a f t a n i n j u s t i c e t h a t m a y b e e x e r c i s e d i n a t h o u s a n d w a y s . H e n c e t h e y a r e f o r c e d t o h a v e g o o d c i v i l l a w s , w h i c h s p r i n g u p w i t h t h e n e w p r a c t i c e s o f i n iq u i t y . / p > p b d s f i d = " 8 6 " > 0 0 I n c o u n tr i es w h e r et h e y h a v e n o s p e c i e , t h e r o b b e r t a k e s o n l y b a r e m o v a b l e s , w h i c h h a v e n o mu t u a l r e s e m b l a n c e . B u t w h e r e t h e y m a k e u s e o f m o n e y , t h e r o b b e r t a k e s t h e s i g n s , a n d t h e s e a l w a y s r e s e m b l e e a c h o t h e r . I n t h e f o r m e r n o t h i n g c a n b e c o n c e a l e d , b e c a u s e t h e r o b b e r t a k e s a l o n g w i t h h i m t h e p r o o f s o f h i s c o nv i c t i o n ; b u t i n t h e l a t t e r i t i s q u i t e t h e c o n t r a r y . / p > p b d s f i d = " 8 7 " > 0 0 1 7 . O f p o l i t i c a l L aw s a m o n g N a t i o n s w h o h a v e n o t t h e U s e o f M o n e y . T h e g r e a t e s t s e c u r i t y o f t h e l i b e r t i e s o f a p e o p l e w h o d o n o t c u l t i v a t e t h e e a r t h i s t h e i r n o t k n o w i n g t h e u s e o f m o n e y . W h a t i s g a i n e d b y h u n t i n g , f i s h i n g , o r k e e p i n g h e r d s o f c a t t l e c a n n o t b e a s s e m b l e d i n s u c h g r e a t q u a n t i t y , n o r b e s u f f i c i e n t l y p r e s e r v e d , f o r o n e m a n t o f i n d h i m s e l f i n a c o n d i t i o n t o c o r r u p t m a n y o t h e r s : b u t w h e n , i n s t e a d o f t h i s , a m a n h a s a s i g n o f r i c h e s , h e m a y o b t a i n a l a r g e q u a n t i t y o f t h e s e s i g n s , a n d d i s t r i b u t e t h e m a s h e p l e a s e s . / p > p b d s f i d = " 8 8 " > 0 0 T h e p e o p l e w h o h a v e n o m o n e y h a v e b u t f e w w a n t s ; a n d t h e s e a r e s u p p l i e d w i t h e a s e , a n d i n a n e q u a l m a n n e r .E q u a l i t y i s t h e n u n a v o i d a b l e ; a n d h e n c e i t p r o c e e d s t h a t t h e i r c h i e f s a r e n o t d e s p o t i c . / p > p b d s f i d = " 8 9 " > 0 0 I f w h a t t r a v e l l e r s t e l l u s b e t r u e , t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f a n a t i o n o f L o u i s i a n a , c a l l e d t h e N a t c h e s , i s a n e x c e p t i o n t o t h i s . T h e i r c h i e f d i s p o s e s o f t h e g o o d s o f a l l h i s s u b j e c t s , a n d o b l i g e s t h e m t o w o r k a n d t o i l , a c c o r d i n g t o h i s p l e a s u r e . 7 H e h a s a p o w e r l i k e t h a t o f t h e g r a n d s i g n i o r , a n d t h e y c a n n o t e v e n r e f u s e h i m t h e i r h e a d s . W h e n t h e p r e s u m p t i v e h e i r e n t e r s t h e w o r l d , t h e y d e v o t e a l l t h e s u c k i n g c h i l d r e n t o h i s s e r v i c e d u r i n g h i s l i f e . O n e w o u l d i m a g i n e t h a t t h i s i s t h e g r e a t S e s o s t r i s . H e i s t r e a t e d i n h i s c o t t a g e w i t h a s m u c h c e r e m o n y a s a n e m p e r o r o f J a p a n o r C h i n a . / p > p b d s f i d = " 9 0 " > 0 0 1 8 . O f t h e P o w e r o f S u p e r s t i t i on . T h e p r e j u d i c e s o f s u p e r s t i t i o n a r e s u p e r i o r t o a l l o t h e r s , a n d h a v e t h e s t r o n g e s t i n f l u e n c e o n t h e h u m a n m i n d . T h u s , t h o u g h t h e s a v a g e n a t i o n s h a v e n a t u r a l l y n o k n o w l e d g e o f d e s p o t i c t y r a n n y , s t i l l t h e y f e e l t h e w e i g h t o f i t . T h e y a d o r e t h e s u n ; a n d i f t h e i r c h i e f h a d n o t i m a g i n e d t h a t h e w a s t h e b r o t h e r o f t h i s g l o r i o u s l u m i n a r y , t h e y w o u l d h a v e t h o u g h t h i m a w r e t c h l i k e t h e m s e l v e s . / p >。
孟德斯鸠与与《论法的精神》
孟德斯鸠与《论法的精神》作者：何志鹏《光明日报》（ 2016年07月19日11版）【经典重温】孟德斯鸠是何许人也？孟德斯鸠（1689—1755）是个启蒙时代的法国人，原名很长（Charles de Secondat，Baron de Montesquieu），所以很多人都不记得。
他在政治哲学史上享有不可忽视、不容撼动的地位，不过遗憾的是，迄今他还未能进入法国人民供奉其最崇敬的历史人物的“先贤祠”。
孟德斯鸠是一位历史学家，写过《罗马盛衰原因论》，是一位政论家，写过《波斯人信札》，不过他最为人知的著作，当属《论法的精神》。
在100多年前，即1904—1907年，严复先生即以《法意》为名，将这本书译介到中国；而现在，已经有了数种全面和选编的中译本。
《论法的精神》都说了些啥？孟德斯鸠生活的年代，学科的划分并不细致，作家们写东西也都是天马行空，乘着思维的翅膀，飞到东来飞到西。
如果读过格劳秀斯的《论战争与和平法》、霍布斯的《利维坦》、洛克的《政府论》，对于此种写作风格就不会陌生，甚至可以说，孟德斯鸠在控制发散思维进行写作方面，已经很节制了。
《论法的精神》是一部政治哲学的著作，而不是一部纯粹意义上的法律书。
书里不仅讨论了一般意义上的法的含义、法律与存在的物之间的关系、自然法和人为法，不同的政体（君主、贵族、共和）的性质、各自涉及的法律、各自遵行的原则、各自的教育模式，各种政体下的法律规则与法律程序，而且还像博物馆一样列举了很多时代、很多国家的法律，其中还特别提到了当时的中华帝国。
书中广泛涉及经济贸易、婚姻家庭、生活方式，可以说充分显示了作者的丰富知识和广阔的视野。
在很多部分，孟德斯鸠还通过地理环境来解释一个地域的社会制度，纵使不完全合宜，也是很有启示意义的。
但是这本书的名望显然不是因为博收广取而来的。
作为西方政治学的一部经典，它在当时思想所能及的范围内，细致地讨论了自由、民主、平等的问题。
他明确地指出，自由是一种能做法律许可的任何事的权利，而不是无限制的自由。
英文版论法的精神（8）
Book XXIV. Of Laws in relation to Religion Considered in Itself, and in its Doctrines 1. Of Religion in General. As amidst several degrees of darkness we may form a judgment of those which are the least thick, and among precipices which are the least deep, so we may search among false religions for those that are most conformable to the welfare of society; for those which, though they have not the effect of leading men to the felicity of another life, may contribute most to their happiness in this. I shall examine, therefore, the several religions of the world, in relation only to the good they produce in civil society, whether I speak of that which has its root in heaven, or of those which spring from the earth. As in this work I am not a divine but a political writer, I may here advance things which are not otherwise true than as they correspond with a worldly manner of thinking, not as considered in their relation to truths of a more sublime nature. With regard to the true religion, a person of the least degree of impartiality must see that I have never pretended to make its interests submit to those of a political nature, but rather to unite them; now, in order to unite, it is necessary that we should know them. The Christian religion, which ordains that men should love each other, would, without doubt, have every nation blest with the best civil, the best political laws; because these, next to this religion, are the greatest good that men can give and receive. 2. A Paradox of M. Bayle's. M. Bayle has pretended to prove1 that it is better to be an Atheist than an Idolater; that is, in other words, that it is less dangerous to have no religion at all than a bad one. "I had rather," said he, "it should be said of me that I had no existence than that I am a villain." This is only a sophism founded on this, that it is of no importance to the human race to believe that a certain man exists, whereas it is extremely useful for them to believe the existence of a God. From the idea of his non-existence immediately follows that of our independence; or, if we cannot conceive this idea, that of disobedience. To say that religion is not a restraining motive, because it does not always restrain, is equally absurd as to say that the civil laws are not a restraining motive. It is a false way of reasoning against religion to collect, in a large work, a long detail of the evils it has produced if we do not give at the same time an enumeration of the advantages which have flowed from it. Were I to relate all the evils that have arisen in the world from civil laws, from monarchy, and from republican government, I might tell of frightful things. Were it of no advantage for subjects to have religion, it would still be of some, if princes had it, and if they whitened with foam the only rein which can restrain those who fear not human laws. A prince who loves and fears religion is a lion, who stoops to the hand that strokes, or to the voice that appeases him. He who fears and hates religion is like the savage beast that growls and bites the chain which prevents his flying on the passenger. He who has no religion at all is that terrible animal who perceives his liberty only when he tears in pieces and when he devours. The question is not to know whether it would be better that a certain man or a certain people had no religion than to abuse what they have, but to know what is the least evil, that religion be sometimes abused, or that there be no such restraint as religion on mankind. To diminish the horror of Atheism, they lay too much to the charge of idolatry. It is far from being true that when the ancients raised altars to a particular vice, they intended to show that they loved the vice; this signified, on the contrary, that they hated it. When the Laced?monians erected a temple to Fear, it was not to show that this warlike nation desired that he would in the midst of battle possess the hearts of the Laced?monians. They had deities to whom they prayed not to inspire them with guilt; and others whom they besought to shield them from it. 3. That a moderate Government is most agreeable to the Christian Religion, and a despotic Government to the Mahometan. The Christian religion is a stranger to mere despotic power. The mildness so frequently recommended in the Gospel is incompatible with the despotic rage with which a prince punishes his subjects, and exercises himself in cruelty. As this religion forbids the plurality of wives, its princes are less confined, less concealed from their subjects, and consequently have more humanity: they are more disposed to be directed by laws, and more capable of perceiving that they cannot do whatever they please. While the Mahometan princes incessantly give or receive death, the religion of the Christians renders their princes less timid, and consequently less cruel. The prince confides in his subjects, and the subjects in the prince. How admirable the religion which, while it only seems to have in view the felicity of the other life, continues the happiness of this! It is the Christian religion that, in spite of the extent of the empire and the influence of the climate, has hindered despotic power from being established in Ethiopia, and has carried into the heart of Africa the manners and laws of Europe. The heir to the empire of Ethiopia2 enjoys a principality and gives to other subjects an example of love and obedience. Not far thence may we see the Mahometan shutting up the children of the King of Sennar, at whose death the council sends to murder them, in favour of the prince who mounts the throne. Let us set before our eyes, on the one hand, the continual massacres of the kings and generals of the Greeks and Romans, and, on the other, the destruction of people and cities by those famous conquerors Timur Beg and Jenghiz Khan, who ravaged Asia, and we shall see that we owe to Christianity, in government, a certain political law; and in war, a certain law of nations — benefits which human nature can never sufficiently acknowledge. It is owing to this law of nations that among us victory leaves these great advantages to the conquered, life, liberty, laws, wealth, and always religion, when the conqueror is not blind to his own interest. We may truly say that the people of Europe are not at present more disunited than the people and the armies, or even the armies among themselves were, under the Roman empire when it had become a despotic and military government. On the one hand, the armies engaged in war against each other, and, on the other, they pillaged the cities, and divided or confiscated the lands. 4. Consequences from the Character of the Christian Religion, and that of the Mahometan. From the characters of the Christian and Mahometan religions, we ought, without any further examination, to embrace the one and reject the other: for it is much easier to prove that religion ought to humanise the manners of men than that any particular religion is true. It is a misfortune to human nature when religion is given by a conqueror. The Mahometan religion, which speaks only by the sword, acts still upon men with that destructive spirit with which it was founded. The history of Sabbaco,3 one of the pastoral kings of Egypt, is very extraordinary. The tutelar god of Thebes, appearing to him in a dream, ordered him to put to death all the priests of Egypt. He judged that the gods were displeased at his being on the throne, since they commanded him to commit an action contrary to their ordinary pleasure; and therefore he retired into Ethiopia. 5. That the Catholic Religion is most agreeable to a Monarchy, and the Protestant to a Republic. When a religion is introduced and fixed in a state, it is commonly such as is most suitable to the plan of government there established; for those who receive it, and those who are the cause of its being received, have scarcely any other idea of policy than that of the state in which they were born. When the Christian religion, two centuries ago, became unhappily divided into Catholic and Protestant, the people of the north embraced the Protestant, and those of the south adhered still to the Catholic. The reason is plain: the people of the north have, and will for ever have, a spirit of liberty and independence, which the people of the south have not; and therefore a religion which has no visible head is more agreeable to the independence of the climate than that which has one. In the countries themselves where the Protestant religion became established, the revolutions were made pursuant to the several plans of political government. Luther having great princes on his side would never have been able to make them relish an ecclesiastical authority that had no exterior pre-eminence; while Calvin, having to do with people who lived under republican governments, or with obscure citizens in monarchies, might very well avoid establishing dignities and preferments. Each of these two religions was believed to be perfect; the Calvinist judging his most conformable to what Christ had said, and the Lutheran to what the Apostles had practised. 6. Another of M. Bayle's Paradoxes. M. Bayle, after having abused all religions, endeavours to sully Christianity: he boldly asserts that true Christians cannot form a government of any duration. Why not? Citizens of this profession being infinitely enlightened with respect to the various duties of life, and having the warmest zeal to fulfil them, must be perfectly sensible of the rights of natural defence. The more they believe themselves indebted to religion, the more they would think due to their country. The principles of Christianity, deeply engraved on the heart, would be infinitely more powerful than the false honour of monarchies, than the humane virtues of republics, or the servile fear of despotic states. It is astonishing that this great man should not be able to distinguish between the orders for the establishment of Christianity and Christianity itself; and that he should be liable to be charged with not knowing the spirit of his own religion.When the legislator, instead of laws, has given counsels, this is because he knew that if these counsels were ordained as laws they would be contrary to the spirit of the laws themselves. 7. Of the Laws of Perfection in Religion. Human laws, made to direct the will, ought to give precepts, and not counsels; religion, made to influence the heart, should give many counsels, and few precepts. When, for instance, it gives rules, not for what is good, but for what is better; not to direct to what is right, but to what is perfect, it is expedient that these should be counsels, and not laws: for perfection can have no relation to the universality of men or things. Besides, if these were laws, there would be a necessity for an infinite number of others, to make people observe the first. Celibacy was advised by Christianity; when they made it a law in respect to a certain order of men, it became necessary to make new ones every day, in order to oblige those men to observe it.4 The legislator wearied himself, and he wearied society, to make men execute by precept what those who love perfection would have ex e c u t e d a s c o u n s e l . b r b d s f i d = " 1 0 4 " > b r b d s f i d = " 1 0 5 " > 0 0 8 . O f t h e C o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m o r a l L a w s a nd t h o se of R e l ig i o n . I n a c o u n t r y s o u n f o r t u n a t e a s t oh a v e a r e li g i o n t h a t G o d h a s n o t r e v e a le d , i t i s n e c e s s a r yf o r i t t o b e ag r e e a b l e t o m o r a l i t y ; b e c a u s e e v e n a f a l s e r e l i g i o n i s th e b e s t s e c u ri t y w e c a n h a v e o f t h e p r o b i t y o f m e n . b r b d s f i d = " 1 0 6 " > b r b d s f i d = " 1 0 7 " > 0 0 T h e p r i n c i p a l p o i n t s o f r e l i g i o n o f t h e i n h a b i t a n t s o f P e g u 5 a r e , n o t t o c o m m i t m u r d e r , n o t t o s t e a l , t o a v o i d u n c l e a n l i n e s s , n o t t o g i v e t h e l e a s t u n e a s i n e s s t o t h e i r n e i g h b o u r , b u t t o d o h i m , o n t h e c o n t r a r y , a l l t h e g o o d i n t h e i r p o w e r . W i t h t h e s e r u l e s t h e y t h i n k t h e y s h o u l d b e s a v e d i n a n y r e l i g i o n w h a t s o e v e r . H e n c e i t p r o c e e d s t h a t t h o s e p e o p l e , t h o u g h p o o r a n d p r o u d , b e ha v e w i t h g e n t l e n e s s a n d c o m p a s s i o n t o t h e u n h a p p y .b r b d s f i d = " 1 0 8 " > b r b d s f i d = " 1 0 9 " > 00 9 . O f t h e E s s e n e s . T h e E s s e n e s 6 m a d e a v o w t o o b s e r v e j u s t i c e t o m a n k i n d , t o d o n o i l l t o a n y p e r s o n , u p o n w h a t s o e v e r a c c o u n t , t o k e e p f a i t h w i t h a l l t h e w o r l d , t o h a t e i n j u s t i c e , t o c o m m a n d w i t h m o d e s t y , a l w a y s t o s i d e w i t h t r u t h , a n d t o f l y f r o m a l l u n l a w f u l g a i n . b r b d s f i d = " 1 1 0 " > b r b d s f i d = " 1 1 1 " > 0 0 1 0 . O f t h e S e c t o f S t o i c s . T h e s e v e r a l s e c t s o f p h i l o s o p h y a m o n g t h e a n c i e n t s w e r e a s p e c i e s o f r e l i g i o n . N e v e r w e r e a n y p r i n c i p l e s m o r e w o r t h y o f h u m a n n a t u r e , a n d m o r e p r o p e r t o f o r m t h e g o o d m a n , t h a n t h o s e o f t h e S t o i c s ; a n d i f I c o u l d f o r a m o m e n t c e a s e t o t h i n k t h a t I a m a C h r i s t i a n , I s h o u l d n o t b e a b l e t o h i n d e r m y s e l f f r o m r a n k i n g t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e s e c t o f Z e n o a m o n g t h e m i s f o r t u n e s t h a t h a v e b e f a l l e n t h e h u m a n r a c e . b r b d s f i d = " 1 1 2 " > b r b d s f i d = " 1 1 3 " > 0 0 I t c a r r i e d t o e x c e s s o n l y t h o s e t h i n g s i n w h i c h t h e r e i s t r u e g r e a t n e s s t h e c o n t e m p t o f p l e a s u r e a n d o f p a i n . b r b d s f i d = " 1 1 4 " > b r b d s f i d = " 1 1 5 " > 0 0 I t w a s t h i s s e c t a l o n e t h a t m a d e c i t i z e n s ; t h i s a l o n e t h a t m a d e g r e a t m e n ; t h i s a l o n e g r e a t e m p e r o r s . b r b d s f i d = " 1 1 6 " >。
英文版论法的精神（上）1
Book XI. Of the Laws Which Establish Political Liberty, with Regard to the Constitution 1. A general Idea. I make a distinction between the laws that establish political liberty, as it relates to the constitution, and those by which it is established, as it relates to the citizen. The former shall be the subject of this book; the latter I shall examine in the next. 2. Different Significations of the word Liberty. There is no word that admits of more various significations, and has made more varied impressions on the human mind, than that of liberty. Some have taken it as a means of deposing a person on whom they had conferred a tyrannical authority; others for the power of choosing a superior whom they are obliged to obey; others for the right of bearing arms, and of being thereby enabled to use violence; others, in fine, for the privilege of being governed by a native of their own country, or by their own laws.1 A certain nation for a long time thought liberty consisted in the privilege of wearing a long beard.2 Some have annexed this name to one form of government exclusive of others: those who had a republican taste applied it to this species of polity; those who liked a monarchical state gave it to monarchy.3 Thus they have all applied the name of liberty to the government most suitable to their own customs and inclinations: and as in republics the people have not so constant and so present a view of the causes of their misery, and as the magistrates seem to act only in conformity to the laws, hence liberty is generally said to reside in republics, and to be banished from monarchies. In fine, as in democracies the people seem to act almost as they please, this sort of government has been deemed the most free, and the power of the people has been confounded with their liberty. 3. In what Liberty consists. It is true that in democracies the people seem to act as they please; but political liberty does not consist in an unlimited freedom. In governments, that is, in societies directed by laws, liberty can consist only in the power of doing what we ought to will, and in not being constrained to do what we ought not to will. We must have continually present to our minds the difference between independence and liberty. Liberty is a right of doing whatever the laws permit, and if a citizen could do what they forbid he would be no longer possessed of liberty, because all his fellow-citizens would have the same power. 4. The same Subject continued. Democratic and aristocratic states are not in their own nature free. Political liberty is to be found only in moderate governments; and even in these it is not always found. It is there only when there is no abuse of power. But constant experience shows us that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it will go. Is it not strange, though true, to say that virtue itself has need of limits? To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the very nature of things that power should be a check to power. A government may be so constituted, as no man shall be compelled to do things to which the law does not oblige him, nor forced to abstain from things which the law permits. 5. Of the End or View of different Governments. Though all governments have the same general end, which is that of preservation, yet each has another particular object. Increase of dominion was the object of Rome; war, that of Sparta; religion, that of the Jewish laws; commerce, that of Marseilles; public tranquillity, that of the laws of China:4 navigation, that of the laws of Rhodes; natural liberty, that of the policy of the Savages; in general, the pleasures of the prince, that of despotic states; that of monarchies, the prince's and the kingdom's glory; the independence of individuals is the end aimed at by the laws of Poland, thence results the oppression of the whole.5 One nation there is also in the world that has for the direct end of its constitution political liberty. We shall presently examine the principles on which this liberty is founded; if they are sound, liberty will appear in its highest perfection. To discover political liberty in a constitution, no great labour is requisite. If we are capable of seeing it where it exists, it is soon found, and we need not go far in search of it. 6. Of the Constitution of England. In every government there are three sorts of power: the legislative; the executive in respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive in regard to matters that depend on the civil law. By virtue of the first, the prince or magistrate enacts temporary or perpetual laws, and amends or abrogates those that have been already enacted. By the second, he makes peace or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public security, and provides against invasions. By the third, he punishes criminals, or determines the disputes that arise between individuals. The latter we shall call the judiciary power, and the other simply the executive power of the state. The political liberty of the subject is a tranquillity of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite the government be so constituted as one man need not be afraid of another. When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression. There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals. Most kingdoms in Europe enjoy a moderate government because the prince who is invested with the two first powers leaves the third to his subjects. In Turkey, where these three powers are united in the Sultan's person, the subjects groan under the most dreadful oppression. In the republics of Italy, where these three powers are united, there is less liberty than in our monarchies. Hence their government is obliged to have recourse to as violent methods for its support as even that of the Turks; witness the state inquisitors,6 and the lion's mouth into which every informer may at all hours throw his written accusations. In what a situation must the poor subject be in those republics! The same body of magistrates are possessed, as executors of the laws, of the whole power they have given themselves in quality of legislators. They may plunder the state by their general determinations; and as they have likewise the judiciary power in their hands, every private citizen may be ruined by their particular decisions. The whole power is here united in one body; and though there is no external pomp that indicates a despotic sway, yet the people feel the effects of it every moment. Hence it is that many of the princes of Europe, whose aim has been levelled at arbitrary power, have constantly set out with uniting in their own persons all the branches of magistracy, and all the great offices of state. I allow indeed that the mere hereditary aristocracy of the Italian republics does not exactly answer to the despotic power of the Eastern princes. The number of magistrates sometimes moderates the power of the magistracy; the whole body of the nobles do not always concur in the same design; and different tribunals are erected, that temper each other. Thus at Venice tlie legislative power is in the council, the executive in the pregadi, and the judiciary in the quarantia. But the mischief is, that these different tribunals are composed of magistrates all belonging to the same body; which constitutes almost one and the same power. The judiciary power ought not to be given to a standing senate; it should be exercised by persons taken from the body of the people7 at certain times of the year, and consistently with a form and manner prescribed by law, in order to erect a tribunal that should last only so long as necessity requires. By this method the judicial power, so terrible to mankind, not being annexed to any particular state or profession, becomes, as it were, invisible. People have not then the judges continually present to their view; they fear the office, but not the magistrate.。
2020西方法律思想史课程大纲
中国海洋大学本科生课程大纲课程属性：公共基础/通识教育/学科基础/专业知识/工作技能，课程性质：必修、选修一、课程介绍1.课程描述（中英文）：西方法律思想史课程将介绍自古希腊罗马以来西方思想家对法、国家和法治的基本观点和理论，重点掌握古代、中世纪以及近代、当代西方主要法学思潮，提高学生在学习法学理论时科学认识和辨别西方法学理论、思潮的能力，使学生对西方法律思想史有一个比较系统的了解，有助于分析问题和解决有关问题。
本课程应指定学生有计划的阅读西方著名思想家的原著，深刻把握西方法学思潮的历史意义和现实意义。
This course will introduce the basic views and theories of western thinkers on law, country and rule of law since ancient Greece and Rome, focusing on mastering the main legal trends of ancient times, medieval swells and modern and contemporary western. It will improve students' ability to scientifically understand and distinguish western legal theories and thoughts when studying legal theory, so that students have a systematic understanding of the history of western legal thought, which is helpful to analyze and solve relevant problems. This course should specify students to read the original works of famous western thinkers in a planned part of the program, and grasp the historical and practical significance of western legal thought.- 1 -2.设计思路：本课程引导法学专业学生全面了解各历史时期西方法律思想，揭示其发展脉络，重点评述著名思想家的法律思想及其著作，对当代西方法学思潮发展趋势，特别是对从古典自然法学到新自然法学、实证主义法学、社会学法学等法学流派进行深入研究。