Managerial Ties, Organizational Innovation, and Firm Performance in China

合集下载

the managerial discretion theory

the managerial discretion theoryThe Managerial Discretion TheoryIntroduction:The managerial discretion theory is a popular theory in the field of management that explains how managers have the ability to exercise discretion in decision-making and shape the direction of their organization. This theory suggests that managers have a significant impact on organizational outcomes and that their discretion in decision-making plays a crucial role in determining the success or failure of an organization. In this essay, we will explore the various aspects of the managerial discretion theory, including its origins, key concepts, applications, and criticisms. Origins of the Managerial Discretion Theory:The managerial discretion theory emerged during the late 1960s and early 1970s, in response to the dominance of the bureaucratic management approach. This approach emphasized the importance of rules, procedures, and hierarchy in decision-making, leaving little room for managerial discretion. Theorists such as Richard Cyert and James March challenged this approach by arguing that managers should be allowed to exercise discretion and use their judgment in decision-making, as they possess unique knowledge and expertise about the organization and its environment.Key Concepts of the Managerial Discretion Theory:The managerial discretion theory is based on several key concepts that help to explain how managers exercise discretion and shape organizational outcomes. These concepts include bounded rationality, goal ambiguity, resource dependence, and institutionalpressures.Bounded rationality refers to the limitation of human rationality in decision-making. According to Cyert and March, managers are not capable of making fully rational decisions due to cognitive limitations, time constraints, and incomplete information. Instead, managers rely on heuristics and biases to make decisions, which may not always result in the optimal outcome.Goal ambiguity refers to the lack of clarity and consensus among organizational members about organizational goals. This ambiguity provides managers with room for discretion in interpreting and pursuing organizational goals. Managers can prioritize certain goals over others and allocate resources accordingly, based on their own judgment and interpretation of the situation.Resource dependence theory suggests that managers exercise discretion to manage their organization's resource dependencies. Organizations rely on external resources, such as capital, labor, and technology, to function effectively. Managers must negotiate and make decisions to acquire and allocate these resources, which gives them significant discretion in shaping the organization's strategy and direction.Institutional pressures refer to the external social, cultural, and political forces that influence managerial discretion. Managers face pressures from various stakeholders, such as employees, customers, suppliers, government agencies, and the broader society. These pressures shape the decision-making process and can limit orexpand the manager's discretion.Applications of the Managerial Discretion Theory:The managerial discretion theory has been extensively applied in organizational research to understand managerial decision-making and its impact on organizational outcomes. Researchers have examined how managers exercise discretion in various contexts, including strategic decision-making, organizational change, innovation, and corporate governance.Strategic decision-making is a key area where managers exercise discretion. They make choices about the organization's competitive positioning, resource allocation, product development, and diversification. The managerial discretion theory suggests that managers' cognitive biases, heuristics, and interpretation of organizational goals will influence these decisions and their subsequent impact on organizational performance.Organizational change is another area where managerial discretion plays a crucial role. Managers have discretion in initiating and implementing change initiatives, such as restructuring, mergers, acquisitions, and downsizing. The success of these change efforts depends on the manager's ability to exercise discretion effectively, navigate internal and external pressures, and align the organization's goals with the change initiative.Innovation is an important driver of organizational success and competitiveness. Managers play a critical role in fostering innovation within their organizations by creating a supportive culture, allocating resources, and providing necessary autonomyfor employees. The managerial discretion theory suggests that managers with high levels of discretion are more likely to support and promote innovation within their organizations.Corporate governance is the system of rules, practices, and processes by which a company is directed and controlled. The managerial discretion theory has been applied to understand how managers exercise discretion in corporate governance decisions, such as executive compensation, board composition, and shareholder relationships. Managers can shape the governance structure to align their interests with those of shareholders or other stakeholders, depending on their level of discretion.Criticisms of the Managerial Discretion Theory:While the managerial discretion theory has made significant contributions to the field of management, it is not without its criticisms. Some scholars argue that the theory overemphasizes the role of individual managers and neglects the importance of structural and contextual factors. They contend that managers' discretion is constrained by organizational structures, external pressures, and industry dynamics, which limit their ability to shape organizational outcomes.Another criticism of the theory is that it assumes managers always act in the best interest of the organization. However, managers may have their biases, self-interests, and personal agendas that can influence their decision-making and compromise organizational outcomes. This criticism raises questions about the ethical implications of managerial discretion and the need for accountability mechanisms to ensure that managers exercisediscretion responsibly.Conclusion:The managerial discretion theory provides valuable insights into how managers exercise discretion in decision-making and shape organizational outcomes. It emphasizes the importance of managers' knowledge, judgment, and interpretation of organizational goals in driving success. While the theory has been widely applied and has contributed to our understanding of managerial behavior, it is not without its limitations and criticisms. Future research should address these criticisms and further refine the theory to enhance its applicability and validity.。

Ownership structure and firmperformance evidence from Israel

Publishers.Printed in the Netherlands.190BENI LAUTERBACH AND ALEXANDER V ANINSKY professional managers.This is why it is plausible to hypothesize that the modern diffuse-ownership corporations perform better than the traditional“closely held”business forms.Moderating factors exist.For example,closely heldﬁrms may issue minority shares to raise capital and expand operations.More importantly,modern corpora-tions face a severe new problem called the agency problem:there is a chance that the professional mangers governing the daily operations of theﬁrm would take actions against the best interests of the shareholders.This agency problem stems from the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation, and it troubled many economists before(e.g.,Berle and Means,1932;Jensen and Meckling,1976;Fama and Jensen1983).The conclusion was that there needs to exist a monitoring system or contract,aligning the manager interests and actions with the wealth and welfare of the owners(stockholders).Agency-type problems exist also in closely heldﬁrms because there are always only a few decision makers.However,given the personal ties between the owners and mangers in theseﬁrms,and given the much closer monitoring,agency problems in closely heldﬁrms seem in general less severe.The presence of agency problems weakens the central thesis that modern open-ownership corporations are more efﬁcient.It is possible that in some business sectors the costs of monitoring and bonding the manager would be excessive. It is also probable that in some cases the advantages of large-scale operations and professional management would be minor and insufﬁcient to outweigh the expected agency costs.Nevertheless,given the historical trend towards disperse-ownership corporations,we maintain the hypothesis that diffuse-ownershipﬁrms perform better than closely heldﬁrms.In our view,the trend towards diffuse-ownership corporations is rational and can be explained by performance gains.The paper is organized as follows.Section2offers a literature review.Section3 describes the data.Section4presents our methodology based on Data Envelopment Analysis.Section5summarizes the results,and Section6concludes.2.Ownership Structure and Firm PerformanceOne of the most important trademarks of the modern corporation is the separation of ownership and control.Modern corporations are typically run by professional executives who own only a small fraction of the shares.There is an ongoing debate in the literature on the impact and merit of the separation of ownership and control.Early theorists such as Williamson(1964) propose that non-owner managers prefer their own interests over that of the shareholders.Consequently,non-owner managedﬁrms become less efﬁcient than owner-managedﬁrms.The more recent literature reexamines this issue and prediction.It points out the existence of mechanisms that moderate the prospects of non-optimal and selﬁsh behavior by the manager.Fama(1980),for example,argues that the availability andOWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE191 competition in the managerial labor markets reduce the prospects that managers would act irresponsibly.In addition,the presence of outside directors on the board constrains management behavior.Others,like Murphy(1985),suggest that execu-tive compensation packages help align management interests with those of the shareholders by generating a link between management pay andﬁrm performance. Hence,non-owner managerﬁrms are not less efﬁcient than owner-managedﬁrms. Most interestingly,Demsetz and Lehn(1985)conclude that the structure of owner-ship varies in ways that are consistent with value maximization.That is,diffuse ownership and non-owner managedﬁrms emerge when they are more worthwhile.The empirical evidence on the issue is mixed(see Short(1994)for a summary). Part of the diverse results can be attributed to the difference across the studies in the criteria for differentiation between owner and non-owner manager controlledﬁrms. These criteria,typically based on percentage ownership by large blockholders,are less innocuous and more problematic than initially believed because,as demon-strated by Morck,Shleifer and Vishny(1988)and McConnell and Servaes(1990), the relation between percentage ownership andﬁrm performance is nonlinear. Further,percent ownership appears insufﬁcient for describing the control structure. Twoﬁrms with identical overall percentage ownership by large blockholders are likely to have different control organizations,depending on the identity of the large blockholders.In this study,we utilize the ownership classiﬁcation scheme proposed by Ang, Hauser and Lauterbach(1997).This scheme distinguishes between non-owner managedﬁrms,ﬁrms controlled by concerns,ﬁrms controlled by a family,and ﬁrms controlled by a group of individuals(partners).Obviously,the control struc-ture in each of theseﬁrm types is different.Thus,some new perspectives on the relation between ownership structure andﬁrm performance might emerge.3.DataWe employ data from a developing economy,Israel,where many forms of business organization coexist.The sample includes280public companies traded on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange(TASE)during1994.For each company we collect data on the1992–1994net income(proﬁts after tax),1994total assets,1994equity,1994 top management remuneration,and1994ownership structure.All data is extracted from the companiesﬁnancial reports except for the classiﬁcation ofﬁrms according to their ownership structure,which is based on the publications,“Holdings of Inter-ested Parties”issued by the Israel Securities Authority,“Meitav Stock Guide,”and “Globes Stock Exchange Yearbook,”The initial sample included allﬁrms traded on the TASE(about560at the time). However,sample size shrunk by half because:1)according to the Israeli Security Authority(the Israeli counterpart of the US SEC)only434companies provided reliable compensation reports;2)147companies have a negative1992–94average192BENI LAUTERBACH AND ALEXANDER V ANINSKY net income,which makes them unsuitable for the methodology we employ;and3) for7ﬁrms we could not determine the ownership structure.The companies in the sample represent a rich variety of ownership structures,as illustrated in Figure1.Nine percent of theﬁrms do not have any majority owner. Among majority ownedﬁrms,individuals(familyﬁrms or partnerships of indi-viduals)own72%and the rest are controlled by concerns.About half(49%)of the individually-controlledﬁrms are dominated by a partnership of individuals and the rest(51%)are dominated by families.Professional(non-owner)CEOs are found in about15%of the individually controlledﬁrms.4.Methodology:Data Envelopment AnalysisIn this study,we measure relative performance using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).Data Envelopment Analysis is currently a leading methodology in Opera-tions Research for performance evaluations(see Seiford and Thrall,1990),and previous versions of it have been used in Finance(by Elyasiani and Mehdian,1992, for example).The main advantage of Data Envelopment Analysis is that it is a parameter-free approach.For each analyzedﬁrm,DEA constructs a“twin”comparable virtual ﬁrm consisting of a portfolio of other sampleﬁrms.Then,the relative performance of theﬁrm can be determined.Other quantitative techniques such as regression analysis are parametric,that is it estimates a“production function”and assesses eachﬁrm performance according to its residual relative to theﬁttedﬁxed para-meters economy-wide production function.We are not claiming that parametric methods are inadequate.Rather,we attempt a different and perhaps moreﬂex-ible methodology,and compare its results to the standard regression methodology ﬁndings.Data Envelopment Analysis presents and solves the following linear program-ming problem for eachﬁrm:Maxβs.t.ni=1λi X ik≤X0k k=1...s ni=1λi Y ip≥βY0p p=1...riλi=1;λi≥0;β≥1where n is the number ofﬁrms in the sample,s is the number of inputs that the analyzedﬁrm(ﬁrm0)uses,and r is the number of outputs it produces.This LP problem seeks to generate for each existingﬁrm a comparable optimal virtualﬁrm.The optimalﬁrm is constructed as linear combinations of existingOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREANDFIRMPERFORMANCE193 Figure1.A classiﬁcation of the sample of publicly traded Israeliﬁrms by ownership structure.Theﬁrms are classiﬁed into a2(majority versus non-majority)×2(business/concern owned versus individual owners)×4(sole versus partnership of business concerns;non-family versus family)×4(non-family,partner versus non-partner as manager;Family,owner versus non-owner as manger)hierarchical tree of ownership structure.N indicates the number ofﬁrms in a particular classiﬁcation.194BENI LAUTERBACH AND ALEXANDER V ANINSKYFigure2.The efﬁcient frontier of a set ofﬁrms.actualﬁrms.Its output is higher or equal to that of the actualﬁrm it is compared to,yet its inputs are lower or equal to that of the respective actualﬁrm.Theﬁrst restriction above ensures that the inputs of the virtualﬁrm will not exceed the current inputs of the actualﬁrm it is compared to.The second restriction assures that outputs of the virtualﬁrm will not be less than that of the comparable actualﬁrm.The third restriction illustrates or constrains the virtualﬁrm to be a portfolio of existingﬁrms with weights between zero and stly,the combi-nation of the objective function and second restriction assures that the virtualﬁrm would be optimal in the sense that the virtualﬁrm would maximize outputs given the inputs or scale of the actualﬁrm it is compared to.After constructing a virtualﬁrm for each actualﬁrm,an efﬁcient frontier can de drawn(see Figure2)and a performance score can be computed.The performance ofﬁrm A is approximated by the ratio of its output and the respective virtualﬁrm output(IA/IO in Figure2).This ratio measures how much of its optimal output the ﬁrm currently produces,taking as given theﬁrm current inputs(or resources).It is noteworthy that aﬁrm can have a performance score of1.This is the case when theﬁrm is so proﬁtable that the optimal virtualﬁrm consists of thisﬁrm only(see Seiford and Thrall(1990)for details).The practical application of the DEA to our sample proceeds as follows.We deﬁne one output variable,the1992–94net income of the company,and four input factors:totalﬁrm assets,the ratio of equity to total assets,CEO pay,and the pay of the other four top managers.The choice of net income(proﬁts after tax)as the output variable by which the ﬁrm is judged follows the tradition of economists to view maximizing proﬁts asOWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE195 theﬁrm’s goal.In this study,we examine the bottom-line economic performance of theﬁrm.Hence,an output measure like net income appears natural.The use of total assets as an input variable controls for the size effect(larger ﬁrms typically have higher net income than smallﬁrms).The equity ratio vari-able represents expectation that given theﬁrm size,the higher the investments of stockholders(equity),the higher their return(net income).Finally,the CEO and top management compensation variables are controlling for the managers’input. One of our central points is that top managers’actions and skills affectﬁrm output. Hence,higher pay mangers(who presumably are also higher-skill)are expected to yield superior proﬁts.Rosen(1982)relates executives’pay and rank in the organization to their skills and abilities,and Murphy(1998)discusses in detail the structure of executive pay and its relation toﬁrm’s performance.The DEA analysis and the empirical estimation of the relative performance of different organizational forms are repeated in four separate subsets ofﬁrms: Investment companies,Industrial companies,Real-estate companies,and Trade and services companies.This sector analysis controls for the special business environment of theﬁrms and facilitates further examination of the net effect of ownership structure onﬁrm performance.5.Empirical Results5.1.A N OVERVIEWTable I presents means,medians,standard deviations,and minimal and maximal values of the variables examined.The average total assets of theﬁrms in the sample is561million NIS(where3NIS=1US Dollar),and common stocks comprise about52%of total assets.CEO mean compensation is722thousand NIS,and the next four top executives earn376thousand NIS on average.The average yearly net income of theﬁrms in1992–94is13.7million NIS.Table II reports means of our computed performance scores for the overall sample as well as for the followingﬁrm types:(1)ﬁrms with diffuse ownership where no individual or small group has a majority of votes;(2)ﬁrms controlled by business concerns;(3)ﬁrms controlled by a partnership(joint venture)of several business concerns;(4)ﬁrms with majority vote in the hands of a single individual or family;and(5)ﬁrms where a small group of individuals(partners)has the majority vote.Interestingly,partnership of individuals and family-controlledﬁrms are found to be least efﬁcient in generating net income.However,when the business sector of theﬁrm is accounted for,i.e.when performance scores are estimated relatively to otherﬁrms in the sector,only familyﬁrms appear as poor performers relative to the rest of theﬁrms.Another way to gain perspective on the relation of ownership structure and performance is to compare performance scores along the organizational-type tree depicted in Figure1.Table III reports the results.Signiﬁcant differences are found betweenﬁrms with and without a majority control group,betweenﬁrms with196BENI LAUTERBACH AND ALEXANDER V ANINSKY Table I.Descriptive statistics for the sample of280Israeliﬁrms aVariables Mean Median Standard Minimum MaximumdeviationTotal assets561,12275,9531,730,15212,17616,498,830 Average yearly net income13,6673,06437,15461411,279 in1992–94CEO pay722.0593.7496.4145.04,080.0 Average pay of the next4375.9321.5224.0121.11,620.0 top executivesLeverage(debt/total assets)0.480.460.240.000.99a All statistics are in thousand New Israeli Shekels(NIS)except for leverage which is a pure number. The data are collected from the1994company reports.Average exchange rate in1994is$! 3NIS.Table II.Performance scores ofﬁrms:The effect of ownership structure aOwnership structure Average performance in%relative to the efﬁcient frontier ofAllﬁrms Firms in the same sectorNon-majorityﬁrms47.056.7Concern-controlledﬁrms43.150.8Firms controlled by partnerships41.855.1of concernsFirms controlled by partnerships33.153.8of individualsFamily-controlledﬁrms27.844.3a Performance scores are estimated based on theﬁrm’s net income,and using Data Envelopment Analysis(see Section4).majority holdings depending on whether control is in the hands of a business concern or a few individuals,and between owner and non-owner managerﬁrms.In Table III,non-majorityﬁrms perform signiﬁcantly better than majority ownedﬁrms(47%vs.33.9%,respectively).However,not all majority-controlled ﬁrms lag behind.Firms controlled by concerns and joint ventures of concerns have a performance score above40%too.This suggests that companies owned by concerns do not face the same restrictions or problems as individually owned ﬁrms.One of the possible explanations for the concern-owned superiority over other majority-ownedﬁrms is that concern-ownedﬁrms are run by professional managers who can probably promote performance.The last pairwise compar-ison in Table III supports this contention by showing a signiﬁcant performanceOWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE197 Table III.The effect of ownership structure onﬁrm performance:Pairwise comparisons.The pairwise comparisons follow the ownership classiﬁcation tree outlined in Figure1,and signiﬁcant pairwise differences are marked with an“∗”.Performance is estimated based on theﬁrm’s net incomeCompared types of Number Average performance in%relative ownership structure of obser-to the efﬁcient frontier ofvations Allﬁrms Firms in the same sectorMajorityﬁrms25533.9∗49.7Non-majorityﬁrms2547.056.7Firms controlled by individuals18330.5∗48.8Concern controlled byﬁrms7242.752.2Sole concern owner5143.150.8Partnership of concerns2141.855.1Familyﬁrms9427.844.3Partnership of individuals8933.353.8Partnership with an owner manager7533.253.6Partnership with a professional manager1234.258.4Familyﬁrms with an owner manager7725.040.8Familyﬁrms with a professional manager1534.055.5Owner managerﬁrms15229.8∗47.5Non-owner managerﬁrms12441.754.3advantage of non-owner managedﬁrms(average performance score of41.7%)over owner-managerﬁrms(average performance score of29.8%).Replicating the pairwise comparisons using sector-adjusted performance scores somewhat blurs the previous results.In the sector-controlled column of Table III, none of the pairwise differences is statistically signiﬁcant(at the5%level).Never-theless,the phenomena identiﬁed in the overall sample remain:majority-owned ﬁrms perform worse than disperse-ownershipﬁrms,individually-controlledﬁrms perform worse than concern-controlledﬁrms,and owner managerﬁrms perform worse than professional-managerﬁrms.An overview of the sector-adjusted performance scores reveals that most forms of organizational structures score on average above50%.The only exception is the subsample of family controlledﬁrms that are managed by their owners and achieve a relatively low performance score of40.8%.198BENI LAUTERBACH AND ALEXANDER V ANINSKY5.2.T HE EFFECTS OF NON-OWNER MANAGERS AND OF MAJORITY CONTROLBY INDIVIDUALSThe main results of the empiricalﬁndings reviewed above are that majority control by a few individuals diminishesﬁrm performance,and that professional non-owner managers promote performance.To further examine these preliminary conclusions, we run regressions of PERF,the performance scores,on:a)INDIV–a dummy variable equal to1when theﬁrm is controlled by a family or a partnership of few individuals;b)PROFDUM–a dummy variable equal to1when theﬁrm Chief Executive Ofﬁcer is a professional non-owner manager;c)LEV–theﬁrm’s leverage or debt ratio;and d)SIZE–theﬁrm’s total assets.The last two variables are added for error-control purposes.It is possible that the DEA performance scores that take into accountﬁrm size and leverage(see the Methodology section)do not purge out completely these effects.Hence,leverage and size are added to the regression.The regression results are reported in Table IV.There are two mainﬁndings. First,the coefﬁcients of SIZE and LEV are positive and statistically signiﬁ-cant(at the1%level).It appears that larger and more leveragedﬁrms achieve higher performance scores.Second,the coefﬁcient of PROFDUM is positive and statistically signiﬁcant,and the coefﬁcient of INDIV is negative and some-times statistically signiﬁcant.Evidently,professional management increases the ﬁrm’s relative performance,and control by a few individuals tends to diminish performance.The conclusions about individual control and professional management are reinforced by two otherﬁndings.First,it appears thatﬁrms without professional managers andﬁrms controlled by individuals are more likely to exhibit negative net income.The proportion of individuals-controlledﬁrms omitted from the DEA analysis due to negative net income,35.8%,is larger than the proportion of negative net incomeﬁrms in the rest of the sample,29.2%.Similarly,35%(32%)of the ﬁrms with an owner-manager(non-owner professional manager,respectively)were omitted due to negative net income.These differences in proportions are,however, statistically insigniﬁcant.Second,Table IV also presents results of regressions of net income,NET INC,on leverage,size,professional manager dummy,and individual control dummy.The results are similar to those of the performance score regressions. The coefﬁcients of size,leverage,and professional-manager dummy are positive and statistically signiﬁcant(at the5%level),while the coefﬁcient of the control by individuals dummy is negative and statistically signiﬁcant.Again,it appears that professional non-owner management increases net income,while individual control by a family or a partnership of individuals decreases net income.An interesting observation is that the explanatory power of our four variables (size,leverage,and the two control-structure dummies)is higher in the net income regression(see Table IV).The adjusted R2’s of the net income and performanceOWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE199 Table IV.The effect of majority control by individuals and of owner-managers onﬁrm perform-ance.The table presents results of regressions of PERF,the performance score(in%),and NET INC,net income(in thousands of NIS),on:INDIV,a dummy variable equal to1when theﬁrmis controlled by a family or partnership of few individuals;PROFDUM,a dummy variable equal to1when theﬁrm’s Chief Executive Ofﬁcer is a professional non-owner manager;LEV,theﬁrm’s leverage or debt ratio,and SIZE,theﬁrm’s total assets(in thousands NIS).The regressions are run in the overall sample of280ﬁrms,and signiﬁcance levels(p-values)are shown in parentheses below the coefﬁcientsDependent Coefﬁcient of Adjusted-variable SIZE LEV INDIV PROFDUM R2PERF8.3·10−628.70.15(0.001)(0.001)PERF−10.816.40.10(0.004)(0.001)PERF 6.4·10−629.3−5.214.60.20(0.003)(0.002)(0.15)(0.001)NET INC0.035123880.79(0.001)(0.006)NET INC−24581125870.12(0.001)(0.009)NET INC0.03412603−447728240.83(0.001)(0.005)(0.02)(0.03)score regressions are0.83and0.20,respectively,This is not surprising.Size and leverage strongly and directly affect net income.However,performance scores,by their construction as ratios of net incomes,are less sensitive to size and leverage. (Recall that the performance score is deﬁned as the ratio ofﬁrm’s net income to an “almost identical inputs”virtual optimalﬁrm net income.)The similarity of the net income regression conclusions and the non-parametric DEA methodology performance score conclusions suggests that DEA does not generate bizarre results.Nevertheless,given its complexity,not much was gained by the DEA application in our study.Perhaps future studies can identify some speciﬁc unique contributions and insights offered by DEA.6.ConclusionsThe empirical analysis of280ﬁrms in Israel reveals that ownership structure impactsﬁrm performance,where performance is estimated as the actual net income of theﬁrm divided by the optimal net income given theﬁrm’s inputs.Weﬁnd that:200BENI LAUTERBACH AND ALEXANDER V ANINSKY 1.Out of all organizational forms,family owner-managedﬁrms appear least efﬁ-cient in generating proﬁts.When allﬁrms are considered,only familyﬁrms with owner managers have an average performance score of less than30%, and when performance is measured relative to the business sector,only family ﬁrms with owner-managers have an average score of less than50%.2.Non-owner managedﬁrms perform better than owner-managedﬁrms. Theseﬁndings suggest that the modern form of business organization,namely the open corporation with disperse ownership and non-owner managers,promotes performance.Critical readers may wonder how come“efﬁcient”and“less-efﬁcient”organiza-tional structures coexist.The answer is that we probably do not document a long-term equilibrium situation.The lower-performing family(and partnership-controlled)ﬁrms are likely,as time progresses,to transform into public-controlled non-majority owned corporations.A few reservations are in order.First,we do not contend that every company would gain by transforming into a disperse ownership publicﬁrm.For example,it is clear that start-up companies are usually better off when they are closely held. Second,there remain questions about the methodology and its application(Data Envelopment Analysis is not standard in Finance).Last,we did not show directly that transforming into a disperse ownership publicﬁrm improves performances. Future research should further explore any performance gains from the separation of ownership and control.AcknowledgementsWe thank two Journal of Management and Governance referees and the Editor, Massimo Warglien,for their constructive criticism and helpful comments.All remaining errors are our own.ReferencesAng,J.,S.Hauser and uterbach:1997,“Top Executive Compensation under Alternative Owner-ship and Governance Structure:Evidence from Israel”,Advances in Financial Economics3: 1–32.Berle,A.and G.Means:1932,The Modern Corporation and Private Property(New York: Macmillan).Demsetz,H.and K.Lehn:1985,“The Structure of Corporate Ownership:Causes and Consequences”,Journal of Political Economy93:1155–1177.Elyasiani,E.and S.Mehdian:1992,“Productive Efﬁciency Performance of Minority and Non-Minority-Owned Banks:A Non-Parametric Approach”,Journal of Banking and Finance16(5): 933–948.Fama,E.:1980,“Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm”,Journal of Political Economy88: 288–307.Fama,E.and M.Jensen:1983,“Separation of Ownership and Control”,Journal of Law and Economics26:301–325.OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE201 Jensen,M.and W.Meckling:1976,“Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”,Journal of Financial Economics4:305–360.McConnell,J.and H.Servaes:1990,“Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value”,Journal of Financial Economics27:595–612.Morck,R.,A.Shleifer and R.Vishny:1988,“Management Ownership and Market Valuation:An Empirical Analysis”,Journal of Financial Economics20:292–315.Murphy,K.:1985,“Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration:An Empirical Analysis”, Journal of Accounting and Economics7:11–42.Murphy,K.:1998,Executive Compensation,Working Paper(University of Southern California). Rosen,S.:1982,“Authority,Control and the Distribution of Earnings”,Bell Journal of Economics 13:311–323.Seiford,L.M.and R.M.Thrall:1990,“Recent Developments in DEA:The Mathematical Programming Approach to Frontier Analysis”,Journal of Econometrics46:7–38.Short,H.:1994,“Ownership,Control,Financial Structure and the Performance of Firms”,Journal of Economic Surveys8(3):203–249.Williamson,O.E.:1964,The Economics of Discretionary Behavior:Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm(Prentice-Hall).。

新媒体社交媒体营销外文翻译文献

文献信息：文献标题：Elements of strategic social media marketing: A holisticframework（战略性社交媒体营销要素：整体框架）国外作者：Reto Felix, Philipp A. Rauschnabel, Chris Hinsch文献出处：《Journal of Business Research》,2017,70:118-126字数统计：英文2632单词，15772字符；中文5082汉字外文文献：Elements of strategic social media marketing:A holistic frameworkAbstract Social media marketing is an integral element of 21st-centurybusiness. However, the literature on social media marketing remains fragmented and is focused on isolated issues, such as tactics for effective communication. The curr research a pplies a qualitative,theory-building a pproach to develop a strategicfour generic dimensions of strategic social m ediaframework that articulatesmarketing. Social m edia marketing scope represents a range from defenders t osocial media marketing c ulture includes the poles o f conservatism andexplorers,modernism, social media marketing structures fall between hierarchies and networks, and social m edia marketing governance ranges from autocracy t o anarchy. B yproviding a comprehensive conceptualization and definition of strategic social mediaframework that e xpands beyondmarketing, this r esearch proposes a n integrativeextant marketing theory. Furthermore, managers can apply the framework to position their organizations on these four dimensions in a manner consistent with their overa corporate mission and objectives.Key Words: Strategic social media marketing; Holistic framework; New media; Definition of social media marketing; Social media strategy; Digital marketing1.IntroductionUnderstanding the role of social media in the context of marketing is critical f both researchers and managers (e.g. Fong & Burton, 2008; Kumar, Bezawada,2013). Most existingRishika, Janakiraman, &Kannan, 2016; Schultz &Peltier,studies focus on particular issues, such as purchase behavior (Chang, Yu, & Lu, 2015 Kumar et al., 2016; Relling, S chnittka, Sattler, & Johnen, 2016), customerrelationshipmanagement (Trainor, Andzulis, R app, & Agnihotri, 2014), brandmanagement (Asmussen, Harridge-March, Occhiocupo, & Farquhar, 2013),innovation management (Gebauer, Füller, & Pezzei, 2013), and employee recruitment (Sivertzen,Nilsen, & Olafsen, 2013). W hile these s tudies detail advancements inspecialized areas of social media knowledge in a marketing and management context, extant literature does not provide a holistic framework for social media marketing the strategic level. This deficiency is surprising because both academics (Labrecqu vor dem Esche, Mathwick, Novak, & Hofacker, 2013; Schultz & Peltier, 2013; Yadav& Pavlou, 2014) and practitioners (Divol, Edelman, & Sarrazin, 2012) acknowledge new complexities accompanying these m edia and agree that r esearch into s ocialsocial mediastrategicmedia marketing n eeds to be reconceptualized.In a nutshell,marketing remains an untested user interaction paradigm (Naylor, Lamberton, & West, 2012) with little published academic research.The current article aims to address this theoretically and managerially importan research gap by exploring the following two research questions: How is strategicsocial m edia marketing defined a nd conceptualized? and What factors demandsocial media marketing s trategy?an organization'swhen constructingconsiderationSpecifically, this research attempts to define the continua on which critical strat social media marketing decisions lie and to integrate them into a holistic framewor2.MethodologyThe study e mployed a two-stage r esearch design. The first stage c onsisted ofin-depth interviews (Fontana & Frey, 1998) with seven European social m ediaexperience in socialmarketing e xperts who possess b oth national and internationalmedia marketing. Following a purposive sampling strategy (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), experts were recruited according to their job position, experience, and direct expos to social media marketing practices in real industry settings. Seeking depth rather tthe qualitative research breadth, the sample size instage 1 was commensurate with-richparadigm in which relatively small sample sizes are used to generate informationdata (Patton, 1990). A ll informants agreed t o audiotape the i nterviews (between 25and 60 min), which resulted in 117 pages of double-spaced, verbatim transcripts.procedure c onsisted of a qualitative The second stage o f the data collectionsurvey of social media marketing experts (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The survey data were used not for confirmation but as a new and independent qualitative data source with a focus on triangulating the information obtained through the depth interview and online surveys (Jack & Raturi, 2006). Respondents came from a list of 265 social media marketing experts identified through managerially focused magazines, through interviews in business magazines, or because they were mentioned as knowledgeable and experienced experts in personal communication. E-mail requests were sent to allexperts along with two reminders, which resulted in 50 returned surveys (responserate = 18.9%). Seven data s ets w ere eliminated because o f incomplete a nswers orbecause social media marketing plays a minor role in the respondents' daily work. The final sample consisted of 43 respondents (age: m = 37; SD = 9 years; 74% male; 88% European) with various backgrounds in their position and/or industry.Table 1 Summary of stage 2 informantsCompany size (employees)< 50 14 (32.6%)50–99 5 (11.6%)100–499 3 (7.0%)500–9998 (18.6%)1000–4999 6 (14.0%)5000–10,000 3 (7.0%)>10,000 4 (9.3%)Social media marketing experience (in years)Average: 6.4 years1–2 5 (11.6%)3–519 (44.2%)6–812 (27.9%)9 and more 7 (16.3%)Percentage of working time associated with social mediaAverage: 52.8%<20%7 (16.3%)20–3910 (23.3%)40–59 6 (14.0%)60–79 3 (7%)80–10015 (34.9%)n/a 2 (4.7%)Age (in years)Average: 37< 30 9 (20.9%)30–3919 (44.2%)40–4910 (23.3%)50–59 5 (11.6%)Self-reported experience in…Means aSocial Media 6.2Social Media Marketing 5.9Marketing 5.7Customer Management 4.7Advertising 5.2Communications/Public Relations 5.6How much experience do you have in the following areas? (1 = no experience at aall; 7 = highly experienced)Respondents were asked to (1) define s ocial m edia marketing, (2) discussself-selected best and worst practice examples of social media marketing, (3) discusssuccess factors and success m etrics, and (4) d escribe their ideal implementation of-selected organization. The survey employed commonsocial media marketing in a self& Mcbride, 2009), s uch as addingdesign t echniques (Smyth, Dillman, C hristian,large answer fields and asking respondents to be as specific as possible, to increrespondents' motivation to provide detail.3.FindingsFig. 1 shows the strategic social media marketing framework with its four central dimensions.Fig. 1. Strategic social media marketing framework.social media marketing s cope addresses the question whether companies First,use social media marketing p redominantly for communication with one or a fewstakeholders or comprehensively (both externally and internally) as a genuine tool f Defenders use social m edia marketing primarily a s a one-waycollaboration.rather than communication tool t o entertainconsumers or to inform stakeholders,groups. Conversely, explorers are interested in integrating employees or communityan authentic social media marketing c ollaborationinteractionsbased on reciprocalwith many different stakeholders such as clients, employees, suppliers, andgovernment agents.between conservatism, Second, social media marketing c ulture distinguishesapproach t owhich is represented by an encapsulated,mass advertisingtraditional,social media marketing, and modernism, which is characterized by a more permeable,open, and flexible social media marketing culture.Third, social media marketing structure addresses the organization and departmentalization of the social media marketing assignment in the firm. Hierarchieapproach with a clearly defined s ocial media marketingstand for a centralizedassignee. Networks represent an organizational structure in which all employees are responsible for social media marketing, and thus a dedicated social media marketing director is no longer necessary.Fourth, social m edia marketing governance refers t o how the companyestablishes rules and guidelines and how social media marketing responsibilities ar controlledin the company. The extreme position of autocracy describes a situationwith precise regulations on who in the company is allowed to interact on social medi platforms. Conversely, anarchy represents a situation without any such rules o rguidelines.The current research focuses on the extremes of each continuum, but, in general, firms likely choose (intentionally or unintentionally) a position somewhere between the poles o n each dimension. For example, c ompanies need to find a position onsocial media marketing g overnance t hat neither regulates everything employees areallowed to say nor leaves t hem without any guidance on which to base their responsibilitiesor behaviors. Fig. 1 also suggests that d ecisions on social mediageneral(e.g.,marketing s hould i ndeed b e guided by the firm's internalinfluencersvision, mission, corporate goals, corporate culture, available resources), which in should be in line with external i nfluencers (e.g., communities, competition,government regulation).4.Discussion and implicationsThis research addresses the absence of a holistic framework for strategicsocialreveals several approachesmedia marketing. A review of the marketing l iteraturemanagementregarding aspects of strategicmarketing s uch as customer r elationship(e.g., Payne & Frow, 2005) or marketing organization (Workman, Homburg, &Gruner, 1998). However, few articles address the strategic marketing of social mediaand none put forth a holistic social media marketing framework.While extant research related to social media marketing investigates social media mostly through the lens of a particular marketing problem (e.g. Fong & Burton, 2008; Kim & Ko, 2012; Kumar et al., 2016) or witha focus on customers and communication (e.g., Chang et al., 2015), t he findings of this s tudy reveal f ourgeneral social m edia marketing dimensions that firms should address when conceptualizing or managing their strategic social media marketing approach. As the findings indicate, these dimensions are interdependent, and companies should strive position themselves on the four dimensions in an integrated way, rather than treati them as isolated, independent decisions.4.1.A new definition of social media marketingThis research suggests a new definition of social media marketing: Social media-functional concept that uses social media marketing is an interdisciplinary and cross(often in combination with other communications channels) to achieve organizational goals by creating value for stakeholders. On a strategic level, social media marketi covers an organization's decisions about social media marketing scope (ranging from defenders to explorers), culture (ranging from conservatism to modernism), structurto networks), and governance (ranging from autocracy to(ranging from hierarchiesanarchy).4.2.Implications for social media marketing scopeSocial media marketing provides firms with an opportunity to use social media to with customers, employees, communities, and other stakeholdersbuild relationships(i.e., when they act as explorers). At the same time, firms may choose to view soci media as simply another c ommunications channel through which they can pushwhen they act as defenders). Though potentiallyinformation to customers (i.e.,approach does nottake advantage of thefor c ustomers, the defendercreating valuewithin the network of customers,opportunitiesfor building r eal relationshipsemployees, interest groups, the government, and other stakeholders, as propagated by modern relationshipmarketing (Payne & Frow, 2005). However, the explorerstakeholders in theapproach may require firms to redefine the role o f differentorganization.4.3.Implications for social media marketing cultureManagement and organizational behavior researchers (Zheng et al., 2010) as well as marketing academics and practitioners (Deshpandé & Farley, 2004) recognize the-financial firmimportance of culture and organizational climate for financial and non performance. The current research emphasizes t he importance o f culture for s ocialmedia marketing. Companies engaging in social media marketing must acknowledgethat stakeholders can take control of and manipulate social media content (Labrecque et al., 2013). Thus, companies should contemplate t he trade-offs between anwhich provides m oreencapsulated social media marketing c ulture (conservatism),connect a nd engageand consumers' desire tobrand constructs,control of importantwith firms displaying a more progressive, permeable culture (i.e., modernism).4.4.Implications for social media marketing structureExtant marketing research investigates how the elements of marketing should besuch as formalization,characteristics,organized a ccording t o a firm's structural(e.g.,Olson, S later, & Hult, 2005). C onsequently,and specializationcentralization,and organizationalsocial m edia marketing structure focuses on responsibilitiesemployed to configure social media marketing. Whereas social mediahierarchiesmarketing governance pertains to who can or should say what in social media, social media marketing structure focuses on who has the responsibility to post and interac in these m edia. A s the informants emphasized, firms s hould i ntegratesocial mediaThe informantsmarketing in a way that fits with their o verarching strategies.or asets o f benefits that c an emerge from either a hierarchicalidentifieddifferentnetworked structure. However, they recommended that specific decisions about who has the responsibility to interact online with customers, activists, and pundits sh be formally discussed in the organization.4.5.Implications for social media marketing governancerights, and Research on governance usually investigates the structures,responsibilities among different employees in organizations (Freeman & Reed, 1983).-discipline of corporate governance, Information technology (IT) governance, as a subfocuses on specifying which individuals have the responsibility for making decisions on the use of IT (Brown & Grant, 2005). Whereas IT governance traditionally focuses-related purposes, social media can potentially be used byon the use of IT for work(company-granted a ccess) or unofficial(personalany employee in either officialaccount access) capacities. Therefore, the applicability of IT governance research is limited u se when extended to social m edia marketing. S ome companies havedeveloped the idea of educating e mployees about the personal a nd firm-related consequences of “undesirable” social media use through social mediamarketingguidelines andguidelines(Linke &Zerfass, 2013). However, building social mediagovernance into a holistic framework for social media marketing is novel. The role o employees in promoting brands in other contexts (and thus increasing firm value) is(Morhart, Herzog, & Tomczak, 2009).well represented in the academic literatureWeber Shandwick's (2014) recent s tudy reveals a n emerging movement termed“employee activism” in which one-third of the surveyed respondentswere socialwho defended their employers and advocated f or the firm online.media activistsEmployees may be better able to understand the needs of consumers and products that can meet those needs, and they can effectively advocate and promote the firm online. These technologiesall employees to champion the firm. Forhave allowed v irtuallyNordstrom has policies to provide e mployees withexample, the fashion r etailerof social media marketingThis applicationand expectations.knowledge, d irection,governance can increase the overall social media marketing s uccess o f the firm (Nordstrom, 2015; Ross, Beath, & Sebastian, 2015).5.Limitations and future researchavenues forfruitfulSeveral limitationsto the current study s uggest p otentiallyapproach r eveals four d imensions o f strategicfuture research. First, the qualitativesocial media marketing and identifies the extreme points of each dimension. However,of differentto identify the impactfuture researchcould u se quantitative approachespositions on each of these dimensions. Research could also investigate the influenc of each dimension on firm or social media marketing p erformance. For example,studies could try to isolate the effect of each dimension on outcome variables such2013) or, m ore specifically,newconsumer–brand engagement (Schultz & Peltier,is themedia brand engagement (Hennig-Thurau et al., 2010). A second limitationover-representation of European (especially German) informants in the analyses. Prior research d iscusses cross-cultural differences in consumers' u se of social m edia(Bernoff &Li, 2008; World Newsmedia Network, 2015). Furthermore, extantresearch advocates for the adaptation of social media content to the targeted cult(Tsai &Men, 2012). T hus, caution should b ebased on differingconsumer profilestaken in extrapolating the framework to other cultural contexts. Future research mig determine w hether aspects of cultural or economic context add dimensions t o theapproaches r egardingproposed f ramework or whether they simply require differentthe four dimensions.Future research should also investigate how other characteristics, such as cultur the type of firm (e.g., B2B vs. B2C), the industry (e.g., financial services vs.“idealadvertising agency), company size, or available resources, influence a firm'ssocial media marketing. Finally,position” on each of the dimensions o f strategic-regulatory bodies (e.g.,future research could investigate the role of regulatory or selfon social media marketing g overnance a ndWord of Mouth Marketing A ssociation)how firms can create v alue and form core competencies b y superseding t hese requirements.6.ConclusionThis study sheds light on the complex nature of strategic social media marketingis too complex to be managed and executedSocial m edia marketing, in practice,-functional collaborations exclusively by a single individual or even department. Crossalong the four d imensions o f social media marketing a re necessary to successfullynavigate in this dynamic arena.中文译文：战略性社交媒体营销要素：整体框架摘要社交媒体营销是21世纪商业的一个组成部分。

高层梯队理论

Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top ManagersAuthor(s): Donald C. Hambrick and Phyllis A. MasonSource: The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Apr., 1984), pp. 193-206 Published by: Academy of ManagementStable URL: /stable/258434Accessed: 01/04/2010 11:00Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aom.Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@.Academy of Management is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Academyof Management Review.。

职业经理人-管理学罗宾斯第11版01 精品

Exhibit 1-8: Changes Facing Managers
Why Study Management?
• Universality of Management
– The reality that management is needed
• in all types and sizes of organizations • at all organizational levels • in all organizational areas • in all organizations, regardless of location
• Conceptual skills
– The ability to think and conceptualize about abstract and complex situations concerning the organization
Exhibit 1-6: Skills Needed at Different Managerial Levels
Exhibit 1-5: Mintzb Nhomakorabearg’s Managerial Roles
Skills Managers Need
• Technical skills
– Knowledge and proficiency in a specific field
• Human skills
– The ability to work well with other people
Exhibit 1-7: Important Managerial Skills
The Importance of Customers

员工建设性越轨行为对创新绩效的影响研究——基于管理者意义建构视角

则的背离和挑战[1]，往往会遭受领导与同事的误解、排斥、反对和不认可[10,11]，遇到重重阻力，难以形成有价值的成果。

因此，建设性越轨行为要形成创新性成果，关键在于管理者对越轨行为超规范性的理解、认知和阐释，并且能够将这种阐释在整个组织中推广，以解决越轨行为者与相关利益群体的认知冲突，解决越轨行为与组织规则的冲突，从而促进创新的实现。

本文将管理者对建设性越轨行为的理解和阐释过程看作一个意义建构过程[12]。

管理者从员工建设性越轨行为活动的线索中发现行为的意义和价值，建立意义阐释框架，即意义生成过程；接着管理者通过意义给赋的过程将建设性越轨行为的价值和意义在组织中进行推广，培育建设性越轨行为的支持性氛围，减少该行为遭遇的各种阻力，推动这种行为转化为创新业绩。

本文将从意义建构理论视角，研究管理层的意义建构行为在员工建设性越轨行为和创新绩效之间的中介效应，对于深入分析建设性越轨行为在潜在建设性和规则破坏性之间的平衡，具有非常重要的理论价值。

二、文献综述与假设提出（一）员工建设性越轨行为关于工作场所越轨行为的研究有两大分支[1]。

一部分学者通常将越轨行为定义为对组织有害的破坏性越轨行为（Destructive Deviance）[13,14]，而另一部分学者将其定义为违反组织规范以遵从超规范的建设性越轨行为（Constructive Deviance）[1-6]。

建设性越轨行为“通过违背组织重要规范而增进组织或/和组织成员福祉”[2]；或者“以可敬的方式违反相关利益群体规范”[4]。

建设性越轨行为的概念界定存在一些分歧。

一部分研究认为建设性越轨行为是涵盖式术语，包含组织公民行为、检举行为、建言行为、亲社会性违规行为等[1,6]，相关的研究在集合式构念基础上展开。

另外一些研究则认为建设性越轨是区别于前述相关概念的独立构念[2,4]，认为建设性越轨与前述概念相关，但却是完全不同的构念[3,5]。

其中建设性越轨要求员工积极主动，承担风险，为了组织的更大利益而从事违反规范的行为，而组织公民行为不涉及对规范的违背；检举行为可能会威胁到组织的权力结构和组织的声誉[15]；建言行为是对组织具有建设性、挑战权威的批评或改进意见表达，而非违反组织规范的行为；而亲社会规则违背是为了提升组织或利益相关者的福祉，有意违背组织正式的政策、规章或禁令的行为，不涉及对组织非正式规范的违背[3]。

组织行为学罗宾斯英文版PPT整理

Chapter1 Introduction to organizational behavior✓Organizational Behavior:The systematic study of the actions and attitudes that people exhibit within organizations✓Systematic Study of Determinants of Employee Performance:➢Actions or Behaviors：Productivity, Absenteeism, Turnover , Organizational citizenship➢Attitudes– Job Satisfaction: a. Possible link between satisfaction and productivityb.Satisfaction appears to be negatively related to absenteeism andproductivityc.Humanistic responsibility to provide employees with challenging,intrinsically rewarding, and satisfying job✓Organization: a. Consciously coordinated social unitb. Composed of two or more peoplec. Functions to achieve a common goal or set of goalsd. Formal roles define and shape the behavior of its members✓OB Encompasses Behavior in Diverse Organizations: Manufacturing:Service firms Schools Hospitals Churches Military units Charitable organizations Local, state, and federal government agencies✓Contributing Disciplines(Level of Analysis):➢Micro (individual): Psychology➢Macro (group processes and organization) : Sociology, Social Psychology, Anthropology, Political Science✓Toward an OB discipline P4 1.1✓Goals of Organizational Behavior: explanation, prediction, control✓Challenges and Opportunities: a.Increasing age of typical workerb.More women and minorities in the workplacec.Requirements to meet global competitiond.Severed loyalty bonds between employees and employers ✓What is Quality Management?➢Intense focus on customer→Outsiders -- purchasers of products and services→Insiders -- interact with and serve others in the organization➢Concern for continual improvement→Commitment to never be satisfied→“Very good” is not good enough→Quality can always be improved➢Improvement in quality of everything the organization does“Quality” applies not only to the final product, but to→How organization handles deliveries→How rapidly it responds to complaints→How politely the phones are answered➢Accurate measurement→Uses statistical techniques to measure every critical performance variable in operations➢Empowerment of employees→Involves people on the line in the improvement process→Teams are widely used as empowerment vehicles for finding and solving problems ✓ A Managerial Perspective：a. Improving People Skills b. Managing Work Force Diversityc. Responding to Globalizationd. Empowering Peoplee.Stimulating Innovation andChange f. Coping with “Temporariness” g. Helping Employee Balance Work-Life Conflicts h. Declining Employee Loyalty i. Improving Ethical Behavior✓Levels of OB Analysis: Individual Level Group Level Organization System Level Chapter2 Job Attitudes✓What the fundamental values of the organizational development can be found in the general manager’s approach to management? Respect, Support, Trust, Innovation ✓What contribution to the organization can be found in those values?A good work environment will be benefit to employees’ self-realization and theestablishment of team and learning organization.✓Attitude:Attitudes are evaluative statements or judgments concerning objects, people, or events. They reflect how we feel about something. When I say I like my job, I am expressing my attitude about work.✓Three components of Attitudes : Cognitive, Affective, Behavioral✓What are the Major Job Attitudes?➢Job Satisfaction: A positive feeling about the job resulting from an evaluation of its characteristics➢Job Involvement: Degree of psychological identification with the job where perceived performance is important to self-worth. High level of both job involvement andpsychological employment are positively related to organizational citizenship and jobperformance. High job involvement is also related to reduced absences and lowerresignation rates.➢Psychological Empowerment (PE): a. Belief in the degree of influence over the job, competence, job meaningfulness, and autonomy. b. Good leaders empower theiremployees by involving them in decisions, making them feel their work is important,and giving them discretion to do their own thing. c. Higher level of Job Involvement andPE are positively related to Organizational citizenship and job performance.✓other Major Job Attitudes:➢Organizational Commitment: Identifying with a particular organization and its goals and wishes to remain a member.✧The three forms of OC:Affective – emotional attachment to organization (e.g. pro-environmental firms)Continuance Commitment – economic value of staying with an org (e.g. high salary)Normative -moral or ethical obligations with employers (e.g. personal promise) There appears to be a positive relationship between organizational commitment andjob productivity.---has strong relation to performance, especially for new employees.---In general, affective commitment is most likely to relate to organizational outcomes such as performance and turnover.➢Perceived Organizational Support (POS)a.Degree to which employees believe the organization values their contributionand cares about their well-being.b.People perceive OS is higher when rewards are fair, employees are involved indecision-making, and supervisors are seen as supportive.c.High POS is related to higher OB outcomes (performance).➢Employee Engagementa. The degree of an individual’s involvement with, satisfaction with, and enthusiasm for the job.b. Engaged employees are passionate about their work and company.c. According to researches, they contribute high customer satisfaction, highprofits, and lower level turnover and accidents.✓Is there cognitive dissonance?--Your friends or relatives won’t disagree with you because of the close relation.--People do seek consistency among their attitudes and between their attitudes and their behavior. (E.g. I don’t marry her because love her.)✓The relationship between attitudes and behavior:a.Important attitudes reflect our fundamental values, self-interest, or identification withindividuals or groups we value. These attitudes tend to show a strong relationship to our behavior.b.The more you talk about your attitude on a subject, the more likely you are toremember it, and the more likely it to shape your behavior. (e.g. changing a job)c.Discrepancies between attitudes and behavior tend to occur when social pressures tobehave in certain ways hold exceptional power.d.The attitude-behavior relationship is likely to be much stronger if an attitude refers tosomething with which we have direct personal experience.✓the closer the match between attitude and behavior, the stronger the relationship Chapter3 Moods, Emotions and Organizational Behavior✓Why Were Emotions Excluded from OB Study?➢Myth of rationality – emotions were the antithesis of rationality and should not be seen in the workplace➢Belief that emotions of any kind are disruptive in the workplace✓Emotional Terminology:➢affect: A generic term that encompasses a broad range of feelings that people experience➢emotion: Intense feelings that are directed at someone or somethingShort termed and action-oriented.➢Mood: Feelings that tend to be less intense and longer-lasting than emotions and often lack a contextual stimulusP27 3.1✓The Basic Emotions:➢positive emotions→positive affect: The mood dimension consisting of positive emotions such as excitement, self-assurance, and cheerfulness at the high end with boredom,sluggishness, and tiredness at the low end.→negative affect: At zero input, when no stimulus is provided, most people experience a mildly positive mood. In fact, positive moods tend to be morecommon than negative ones.➢negative emotions➢negative affect: The mood dimension consisting of nervousness, stress, and anxiety at the high end with relaxation, tranquility, and poise at the low end.✓The Functions of Emotions:➢Emotions and Rationality: Emotions are critical to rational thought: they help in understanding the world around us.➢Evolutionary Psychology : Theory that emotions serve an evolutionary purpose: helps in survival of the gene pool. The theory is not universally accepted✓Sources of Emotions and Moods:➢Personality➢Day of the week and time of the day: More positive interactions will likely occur mid-day and later in the week➢Weather: no impact according to the research➢Stress: Increased stress worsens moods➢Social Activities: Physical, informal, and epicurean activities increase positive mood ➢Sleep: Lack of sleep increases negative emotions and impairs decision making➢Exercise: Mildly enhances positive mood➢Age: Older people experience negative emotions less frequently➢Gender: Women show greater emotional expression, experience emotions more intensely and display more frequent expressions of emotions. Could be due tosocialization✓Emotional Labor: An employee’s expression of organizationally desired emotions during interpersonal transactions at workEmotional dissonance is when an employee has to project one emotion while simultaneously feeling anotherFelt vs. Displayed Emotions:➢Felt Emotions: the individual’s actual emotions➢Displayed Emotions: the learned emotions that the organization requires workers to show and considers appropriate in a given job→Surface Acting is hiding one’s true emotions→Deep Acting is trying to change one’s feelings based on display rules ✓Emotional Intelligence:A person’s ability to:1)Be self-aware (to recognize his or her own emotions as experienced), 2)Detectemotions in others, and 3)Manage emotional cues and information.Moderately associated with high job performanceEmotional Intelligence on Trial➢The case for: a. Intuitive appeal – it makes sense b. EI predicts criteria that matter –positively correlated to high job performance c. Study suggests that EI isneurologically based➢The case against: a. EI is too vague a concept b. EI can’t be measured c. EI is so closely related to intelligence and personality that it is not unique when thosefactors are controlled✓OB Applications of Emotions and Moods➢Selection – Employers should consider EI a factor in hiring for jobs that demand a high degree of social interaction➢Decision Making – Positive emotions can increase problem-solving skills and help us understand and analyze new information➢Creativity – Positive moods and feedback may increase creativity✓More OB Applications of Emotions and Moods➢Motivation – Promoting positive moods may give a more motivated workforce➢Leadership – Emotions help convey messages more effectively➢Negotiation – Emotions may impair negotiator performance➢Customer Service – Customers “catch” emotions from employees, called emotional contagion✓Even More OB Applications of Emotions and Moods➢Job Attitudes – Emotions at work get carried home but rarely carry over to the next day ➢Deviant Workplace Behaviors – Those who feel negative emotions are more likely to engage in deviant behavior at work✓How Can Managers Influence Moods?➢Use humor to lighten the moment➢Give small tokens of appreciation➢Stay in a good mood themselves – lead by example➢Hire positive people✓Does the degree to which people experience emotions vary across cultures?Do people’s interpretations of emotions vary across cultures?Do the norms for the expressions of emotions differ across cultures?“YES” to all of the above!Chapter 5 Perception and Decision-making✓Perception：The process by which individuals organize and interpret their sensory impressions in order to give meaning to their environment✓Factors influencing perception：➢The perceiver：Attitudes，Motives，Interests，Experience，expectations➢The target：Novelty，Motion，Sound，Size，Background，proximity➢The Situation：Time，Work setting，Social setting✓Attribution Theory：trying to explain the ways in which we judge people differently, depending on the meaning we attribute to a given behavior.✓The three determining factors of attribution theory：➢Distinctiveness➢Consensus➢Consistency→Fundamental attribution error:1. When making judgments about the behavior of other people, we tend tounderestimate the influence of external factors and overestimate the influence ofinternal or personal factors2.Individuals and organizations tend to attribute their own successes to internal factors such as ability or effort, while putting the blame for failure on external factors such as bad luck or unproductive workers.3. Individuals whose intellectural and interpersonal abilieties are weakest are mostlikely to overestimate their performance and abilty.✓The Link Between Perception and Individual Decision making：Who makes decisions? What decisions to make?All the decisions are closed related to perceptions. (data collection and analysis)✓The Six Steps of Rational Decision-making model：➢Define the problem➢Identify the decision criterria➢Allocate weithgts to teh criteria➢Develop the alternatives➢Evaluate teh alternatives➢Select the best alternative➢Example:bicycle parking problem➢Bounded Rationality➢Intuitive decision making✓Common Biases and Erorrs in Decision Making：anchoring bias, confirmation bias, availabe bias, escalation of commitment, risk aversion, hindsight bias✓Organizatioal Constraints on Decision making: performance evaluation, reward systems, formal regulations, system-imposed time constraints, historical precdidents✓Three Ethical Decision Criteria:➢Utilitarianism（providing the greatest benefits for the greatest number功利主义，实用主义）➢Rights(respecting and protecting the basic rights of individuals,eg.right to privacy, free speech ,and due process)➢Justice(imposing and enforceing rules afaily and impartially to ensure justice or an equitalbe distribution of benefits and costs.) Comment on the three choices.✓Three-component Model of Creativity:➢Expertise(abilities, knowledge, proficiencies, and similar expertise )➢Creative thinking skills(personality ——creativity, the ability to use analogies, and the talent ot see the familiar in a different light)➢Intrinsic task motivation (interesting , involving , exciting, satisfying,persionally challengfing jobs, etc.)Chapter8 Groups✓Group: Two or more individuals, interacting and interdependent, who come together to achieve particular objectives. Groups can be either formal or informal, and further subclassified into command, task, interest, or friendship categories.✓Four Types of Groups:Command group, Task group, Interest group, Friendship group✓Why People Join Groups: (benefits)➢Security Reduce the insecurity of “standing alone”; feel stronger, fewer self-doubts, and more resistant to threats➢Status Inclusion in a group viewed by outsiders as important; provides recognition and status➢Self-esteem Provides feelings of self-worth to group members, in addition to conveying status to outsiders➢Affiliation Fulfills social needs. Enjoys regular interaction; can be primary source for fulfilling need for affiliation➢Power What cannot be achieved individually often becomes possible; power in numbers➢Goal achievement Some tasks require more than one person; need to pool talents, knowledge, or power to complete the job. In such instances, management may rely onthe use of a formal group✓Basic Group Concepts:➢Roles→Role research conclusions: a.People play multiple roles b.People learn roles from stimuli around them c.People can shift roles rapidly when the situation demandsd.People experience major role conflict between roles➢Norms: Acceptable standards of behavior within a group that are adopted and shared by the group’s members→The Hawthorne Studies→Conformity and the Asch Studies➢Cohesiveness: The degree to which members of the group are attracted to each other and motivated to stay in the group→Relationship of Cohesiveness to Productivity→Managers Can Encourage Cohesiveness: a.Make the group smaller b.Encourage agreement on group goals c.Increase the time spent together d.Increase thestatus and perceived difficulty of group membership→More Ways Managers Can Encourage Cohesiveness: a.Stimulate competition with other groups b.Give rewards to the group rather than members c.Physicallyisolate the group➢Size→How Size Effects a Group: a.Smaller groups are faster at completing tasks rge groups are consistently better at problem solving c.Social loafing - tendency toexpend less effort in a group than as an individual d.Increases in group size areinversely related to individual performance➢Composition: Diversity increases effectiveness due to the variety of viewpoints.Diversity promotes conflict, which stimulates creativity, which leads to improveddecision making. May take more time to work smoothly. May lead to turnover ➢Status: A prestige grading, position, or rank within the group. It may be formally imposed by the group, or informally acquired through characteristics such aseducation, age, gender, skill, or experience→Effects of High Status: a.Resist conformity or receive more freedom b.Do not need or care about social rewards c.Members must believe status hierarchy isequitable d.Inequities produce corrective behaviors and conflict✓Individual versus Group Decision Making:➢Individual: More efficient, Speed, No meetings, No discussion, Clear accountability, Consistent values➢Group: More effective, More information and knowledge, Diversity of views, Higher-quality decisions, Increased acceptance✓Symptoms of Group Think: a.Group members rationalize any resistance to their assumptionsb.Members pressure any doubters to support the alternative favored by the majorityc.Doubters keep silent about misgivings(doubts) and minimize their importanced.Groupinterprets members’ silence as a “yes” vote for the majorityVariables Influencing Group Think: Group’s cohesiveness, Leader’s behavior, Insulation from outsiders, Time pressures, Failure to follow methodical decision-making procedures✓GroupShift: A special case of groupthink. The decision of the group reflects the dominant decision-making norm that develops during the group discussion, whether shift is toward greater caution or more risk depends on the dominant prediscussion norm.✓Selecting the Best Decision-Making Technique:➢Brainstorming➢Nominal group technique➢Electronic meetingsChapter9 Teams✓Reasons for Team Popularity: a.Outperform on tasks requiring multiple skills, judgment, and experience b.Better utilization of employee talents c.More flexible and responsive to changing events d.Facilitate employee participation in operating decisions e.Effective in democratizing the organization and increasing employee motivation✓Work Group: A group who interacts primarily to share information and to make decisions to help one another perform within each member’s area of responsibility. Individuals work alone, not collectively, on a task. Performance is the summation of all of the group member’s individual contributions.✓Work Team:Generates positive synergy through coordinated effort. Their individual efforts result in a level of performance that is greater than the sum of those individual inputs.✓Comparing Work Groups and Work Teams P123 9.1✓Four Types of Teams P124 9.2➢Problem-Solving Teams: a.Share ideas or offer suggestions on how work processes and methods can be improved. b.Rarely given authority to unilaterally implement any oftheir suggested actions c.Typically composed of 5-12 hourly employees from thesame departmentExample: Quality Circles➢Self-Managed Work Teams: a.Collectively control pace of work b.Determine work assignments anize breaks d.Collectively choose inspection procedurese.Select their own members and evaluate each other’s performancef.Generallycomposed of 10-15 people➢Cross-Functional Teams: a.Members from diverse areas within and between organizations b.Exchange information c.Develop new ideas and solve problemsd.Coordinate complex projects f.Development is time-consuming due to complexity anddiversityExamples: Task Force and Committees➢Virtual Teams: Computer technology ties physically dispersed members together to achieve a common goal→Differentiating factors from other teams: Absence of para-verbal and non-verbal cues, Limited social context, Ability to overcome time and space constraints✓Creating Effective Teams:Effectiveness of teams is defined by:➢Objective measures of the team’s productivity➢Manager’s ratings of team performance➢Aggregate measures of member satisfactionA Team Effectiveness Model P126 9.3✓Turning Individuals into Team Players: To perform well as team members, individuals must be able to 1)Communicate openly and honestly 2)Confront differences and resolve conflicts 3)Sublimate personal goals for the good of the team✓The Challenge in Shaping Team Players:➢Greatest where... a.The national culture is highly individualistic b.Introduced into organizations that historically value c.individual achievement➢Less demanding... a.Where employees have strong collectivist values, such as Japan or Mexico b.In new organizations that use teams as their initial form for structuringwork✓Shaping Team Players:➢Selection: Ensure that candidates can fulfill their team roles in addition to having the technical skills required for the job➢Training: Provide workshops in problem-solving, communication, negotiation, conflict-management, coaching, and group-development skills➢Rewards: Rework reward systems to encourage cooperative efforts rather than competitive onesChapter 10 Communication✓Functions of Communication➢Control - both formal and informal➢Motivation - clarification and feedback➢Emotional expression - fulfillment of social needs➢Information - facilitating decision making✓The Communication ProcessSource, Encoding, Channel, decoding, Receiver✓Downward Communication：Assign goals，Provide job instructions，Inform employees of policies and procedures，Point out problems that need attention，Offer feedback about performance，Letters and email from leaders to members of the team✓Upward Communication：Provide feedback to higher-ups，Inform them of progress toward goals，Relay current problems，Keep managers aware of how employees feel，Ideas on how things can be improved✓Lateral Communication：Save time and facilitate coordination，Formally sanctioned or informally created，Enhance efficient and accurate transfer of information，Can create dysfunctional conflicts when formal vertical channels are breached✓Oral Communication：➢Advantage: Speed , Feedback➢Disadvantage: Potential for distorted message, Content at destination is different from the original✓Written Communication:➢Advantage: Provide a tangible and verifiable record, Can be stored for an indefinite period of time, Physically available for later reference, Well thought-out, logical, andclear➢Disadvantage: Time consuming, Lack of feedback, No guarantee how reader will interpret it✓Non-verbal Communication:➢Kinesics - Gestures, facial configurations, and other movements of the body➢Body movement -Body language adds to, and often complicates, verbal communication➢Intonations - Change the meaning of the message➢Facial expression -Characteristics that would never be communicated if you read a transcript of what is said➢Physical distance - Proper spacing is largely dependent cultural norms✓Formal Small-Group Networks P140 10.3✓Small-Group Networks and Effectiveness Criteria p140 10.4✓The Grapevine:Not controlled by management, Perceived as being more believable and reliable, Largely used to serve self-interest, Appear in response to situations: Important to us, Where there is ambiguity, Under conditions that arouse anxiety✓Computer-Aided Communication: Electronic mail (e-mail), Intranet and Extranet links, Videoconferencing✓Barriers to Effective Communication: Filtering, Selective Perception, Information Overload, Gender Styles, Emotions, Language✓ A Cultural Guide: Assume differences until similarity is proved, Emphasize description rather than interpretation or evaluation, Practice empathy, Treat your interpretation as a working hypothesis✓Improving Feedback Skills: 1. Focus on specific behaviors 2. Keep feedback impersonal 3.Keep feedback goal oriented 4. Make feedback well timed 5. Ensure understanding 6. Direct negative feedback toward behavior that is controllable by the recipient✓Improving Active Listening Skills: 1. Make eye contact 2. Exhibit affirmative head nods and appropriate facial expressions 3. Avoid distracting actions or gestures 4. Ask questions 5.Paraphrase 6. Avoid interrupting the speaker 7. Do not over talkChspter11 Leadership✓Leadership: Ability to influence a group toward the achievement of goals. The source of influence may be formal, provided by managerial rank in an organization. Non-sanctioned leadership(不具制裁力的领导) is the ability to influence that arises from outside of the formal structure of the organization.✓Trait Theories: Assumes that leaders are born, Characteristics that differentiate leaders from non-leaders, Personality traits in leaders that non-leaders do not possess, Characteristics of individuals who meet the definition of leader, Provides the basis of selecting the right person for leadership✓Traits Consistently Associated with Leadership:Drive and ambition, Desire to lead and influence others, Honesty and integrity, Self-confidence, Intelligence, In-depth technical knowledge✓Traits Alone Do Not Explain Leadership: Ignore situational factors. Leaders must take “the right actions”“The right actions” differ by situation✓Behavioral Theories: Assumes people can be trained to lead Researched the behaviors of specific leaders. Critical behavioral determinants of leadership. Specific behaviors identify leaders. Provides the basis of design for training programs✓Ohio State Studies:Sought to identify independent dimensions of leader behavior.Developed two categories of leadership behavior.:→Initiating structure - attempts to organize work, work relationships, and goals.→Consideration - concern for followers’ comfort, well-being, status, and satisfaction ✓University of Michigan Studies: Locate behavioral characteristics of leaders that appear related to measures of performance effectivenessTwo dimensions:→Employee-oriented - emphasize interpersonal relations→Production-oriented - emphasize the technical or task aspects of the job✓Limitations of Behavioral Theories:Did not identify consistent relationships between leadership behavior and group performance. Missing consideration of the situational factors that influence success and failure. Could not clarify situational factors✓Contingency Theories:➢Fiedler Leadership Model -Proper match of leader’s style of interacting with subordinates➢Path-Goal Model -Leader assists followers in attaining goals and ensures goals are compatible with overall objectives➢Leader-Participation Model - Leader behavior must adjust to reflect the task structure ✓Least-Preferred Co-Worker (LPC) Questionnaire: Individual’s basic leadership style is a key factor in leadership success. Assumed that individual leadership style is fixed,。

对外贸易对我国的影响八百字英语作文

对外贸易对我国的影响八百字英语作文In the global landscape of economic interdependence, international trade stands as a paramount force shaping the destinies of nations. For China, a titan in the realm of international commerce, the ramifications of external trade are profound and multifaceted, permeating every facet ofits socio-economic fabric. Here, we delve into the nuanced impact that international trade exerts upon the Middle Kingdom, navigating through its complexities and uncovering the underlying dynamics at play.To begin with, one cannot overlook the pivotal role that external trade plays in propelling China's economic engine. As the world's largest exporter, China's manufacturing prowess is intricately entwined with its trade relations. The influx of foreign demand for Chinese goods fuels production, drives industrial growth, and bolsters employment opportunities across the nation. The sprawling network of global supply chains, with China at its nucleus, underpins the intricate dance of commerce on a global scale, fostering mutual prosperity and interconnectedness amongnations.Moreover, the influx of foreign capital facilitated by international trade serves as a catalyst for China's economic development. Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, spurred by the allure of China's vast market and competitive production costs, infuse capital, technology, and managerial expertise into the domestic economy. This influx not only accelerates the modernization of industries but also fosters innovation and enhances productivity, positioning China as a formidable player in the global economic arena.On the flip side, however, China's reliance on external trade renders it vulnerable to fluctuations in the global market. The specter of protectionist policies, trade disputes, and geopolitical tensions looms large, casting a shadow of uncertainty over China's export-oriented economy. Escalating tariffs, trade barriers, or diplomatic rifts with trading partners can disrupt supply chains, dampen export volumes, and impede economic growth, underscoring the inherent risks associated with overreliance on externaltrade.Furthermore, the environmental toll exacted by China's export-driven growth model cannot be overstated. The insatiable appetite for natural resources, coupled with the relentless pursuit of economic expansion, has exacted a heavy toll on China's environment. Pollution, deforestation, and ecological degradation are the grim byproducts ofChina's industrial juggernaut, underscoring the imperative for sustainable development and green initiatives tomitigate the environmental footprint of international trade.In the realm of geopolitics, China's burgeoning trade ties wield profound implications for its diplomatic relationsand strategic interests. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a monumental infrastructure and investment project spanning continents, epitomizes China's ambitious foray into reshaping the global economic order. By forging strategic partnerships and fostering economic cooperation with countries along the BRI routes, China seeks to expand its sphere of influence, cultivate geopolitical alliances, and assert its status as a global superpower.In conclusion, the impact of international trade on China transcends mere economic considerations, permeating every facet of its socio-economic landscape. From driving economic growth and technological advancement to navigating geopolitical complexities and environmental challenges, the influence of external trade is omnipresent and multifaceted. As China charts its course in the ever-evolving global economy, striking a delicate balance between reaping the benefits of international trade and mitigating its inherent risks remains paramount in ensuring sustainable development and enduring prosperity.。

Family_Governance_and_Firm_Performance

Family Governance and Firm Performance: Agency, Stewardship, and CapabilitiesDanny Miller, Isabelle Le Breton-MillerAfter decades of being viewed as obsolete and problem ridden,recent research has begunto show that major,publicly traded family-controlled businesses (FCBs) actually out-perform other types of businesses.This article examines the nature of such family busi-nesses in an attempt to explain why some seem to do so well and others so poorly.Itbegins with four fundamental governance choices that distinguish among different kindsof family businesses:level and mode of family ownership,family leadership,the broaderinvolvement of multiple family members,and the planned or actual participation of latering precepts from agency and stewardship theory,it relates these dimen-sions to the nature of the resource-allocation decisions made by the business and capability development,which in turn have implications for ﬁnancial performance.Propositions are drawn about the drivers that make some family businesses great com-petitors—while leaving others at a disadvantage.The literature has been highly critical of family-controlled business (FCB) as an organizational form.FCBs,often rightly,are viewed as suffering from a dearth of professional management (Chandler,1990),destructive nepotism (Schulze, Lubatkin,& Dino,2001;Schulze,Lubatkin,Dino,& Buchholtz,2003),and exploitation of minority shareholders (Morck & Y eung,2003).Executive succession is another major problem as it may be determined by family whims rather than compe-tence (Le Breton-Miller,Miller,& Steier,2004). FCBs are also said to be plagued by inadequate access to capital due to the ever-increasing needs of a growing family (Chandler,1990) and because of skepticism by ﬁnancial markets (Claessens, Djankov,Fan,& Lang,2002).Although there is truth to such criticisms, recent systematic comparisons of FCBs and non-FCBs reveal that the former outperform along a great many dimensions (Allouche & Amann,1997; Anderson & Reeb,2003;McConaughy,Matthews,& Fialco,2001;Miller,Le Breton-Miller,Lester,& Cannella,2005;Simon,1996;Villalonga & Amit,in press).This article aims to tease out some of the drivers that make some major family businesses great competitors—while leaving others at a disadvantage.The focus here will be on four core governance dimensions:level and mode of family ownership,family leadership,the broader involve-ment of multiple family members,and the planned or actual participation of later genera-tions.Precepts and research in the areas of agency and stewardship theory suggest that each of these dimensions leads to different choices and ﬁrm capabilities that can have both positive and nega-tive implications for ﬁrm ﬁnancial performance. We shall generate propositions about those out-comes,and about the moderating conditions that determine their ultimate impact.I n this way we extend the work of Williamson (1999),Makadok (2003),and Hoopes and Miller (in press) by con-F AMILY B USINESS R EVIEW, vol. XIX, no. 1, March 2006 © Family Firm Institute, Inc.73necting the literatures on governance and capabilities,but here via the paths of agency and stewardship.Scope and DeﬁnitionsAs the research to which we refer pertains mostly to large and publicly traded family businesses, these are the focus of this article.Such companies represent anywhere from 20–70% of the largest companies in the world,depending on country of origin (La Porta,Lopes-Silanes,& Shleifer,1999). By a family business we mean one that is partly owned by one or more family members who together control at least 20% of the total votes outstanding (La Porta et al.,1999).By ﬁrm capabilities we mean distinctive com-petencies that would be difﬁcult for rivals to imitate within practical time and budget con-straints,and that lead to superior returns due to their capacity to increase prices or reduce costs (Teece,Pisano,& Shuen,1997).Typically,these capabilities are said to be valuable,rare,inim-itable,and hard to copy or substitute (Barney, 1991).They include hard assets;talents in innova-tion,manufacture,or marketing;valuable rela-tionships;and even advantages of corporate culture and organization (Barney & Hansen, 1994).By ﬁrm ﬁnancial performance we mean the ﬁnancial returns generated by the ﬁrm—typically measured by the returns on the assets or equity of the business—that are available to all public shareholders of the ﬁrm,family and otherwise, either via dividends or stock market returns. Where expected performance outcomes vary from the above,we will refer to those speciﬁcally. Agency, Stewardship,Capabilities, and Performance:A FrameworkAs noted,the two core domains we will draw on are agency theory and stewardship theory.The agency problem arises when a manager with superior information acts as agent for an owner, allowing that manager to exploit or expropriate business resources that would otherwise provide returns to the owner—the so called free-rider problem.The problem stems from the informa-tion asymmetries between the parties and from their different incentives (Ang,Cole,& Lin,2000; Demsetz,1988;Fama & Jensen,1983a,1983b). Family businesses differ in the degree to which they have to bear these costs,depending on their governance choices.Agency costs between owners and managerial agents can be advantageously low if there is a close alignment or even identity between the interests of owners and managers (Fama & Jensen,1983a,1983b).Another type of agency cost,however,can be higher within FCBs—that between minority owners and the major family owners who serve as their poten-tially exploitative de facto agents (Morck & Y eung, 2003;Villalonga & Amit,in press).Stewardship is another informative perspective from which to view the advantages and disadvan-tages of a family business.Stewardship theory posits that many leaders and executives aspire to higher purposes at their jobs—that they are not simply self-serving economic individuals,but often act with altruism for the beneﬁt of the organization and its stakeholders (Davis, Schoorman,& Donaldson,1997;Donaldson & Davis,1991;Fox & Hamilton,1994).The belief is that stewards are intrinsically motivated by higher-level needs to act for the collective good of their ﬁrms.They identify with the organization and embrace its objectives;they are committed to make it succeed,even at personal sacriﬁce (Davis,Schoorman,Mayer,& Tan,2000).These attitudes,we believe,will be especially prevalent among family businesses in which leaders are either family members or emotionally linked to the family.Such executives often commit deeply to the mission of the business,treasure its employees and stakeholders,and feel moti-vated to do their best for the owning family and the organizational collective (Miller & Le Breton-Miller,2005).This attitude in turn can engender far-sighted contributions that feed distinctive capabilities and produce superior ﬁnancial returns.Not all kinds of FCBs are likely to breed such stewardship in owners or their agents,Miller, Le Breton-Miller 74however,and FCBs under some kinds of gover-nance conditions are quite short-sighted.We will discuss how our dimensions of gover-nance can inﬂuence these agency and stewardship outcomes and,through them,the ﬁnancial perfor-mance of the ﬁrm—either directly or by shaping the resource allocation decisions and distinctive core competencies of the ﬁrm.Figure 1 presents a visual representation of our framework and Table 1 and the Appendix summarize our propositions. Proposition set P1 and parts of P2 cover familiar ground to demonstrate how our organizing framework explains established ﬁndings.Proposi-tion sets P2,P3,and P4 generate new conjectures from the framework.Where propositions have been developed elsewhere our arguments will be brief.Degree of Family Ownershipand ControlOne issue that confronts most public family busi-nesses is how much ownership and control to give to nonfamily members.This choice can inﬂuence the incentives and monitoring costs of owners, their strategic behavior,and ﬁnancial perfor-mance of the ﬁrm.Ownership Concentrationand Performance—The Positives Agency.Agency theorists argue that concentra-tion reduces monitoring costs because large owners have the incentive and often the expertise to monitor their managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).Given signiﬁcant shareholdings,family owners,too,will possess the incentive,power,and information to control their managers,thereby reducing free-rider agency costs and boosting returns (see Anderson & Reeb,2003;Morck, Shleifer,& Vishny,1988).Stewardship.According to stewardship propo-nents,managers and owners are driven by more than economic self-interest.Many wish to make a contribution to an organization’s mission, longevity,and stakeholders (Davis et al.,1997, 2000).I ndeed,family owners often have a deep emotional investment in their companies (Bubolz, 2001) as their family’s fortune,personal satisfac-tion,and even public reputation are tied to the business (Ward,2004).Therefore,they invest to strengthen the ﬁrm and its people (Hoopes & Miller,in press) (see our elaborations of Proposi-tions 2-2 and 4-1).Proposition 1-1.On average FCBs will outperform non-FCBs in ﬁnancial returns due to lower free-rider agency costs and superior attitudes of stewardship.The Downside of Too MuchFamily OwnershipOnce a party,family or otherwise,has enough ownership for unchallenged control,it can begin to abuse its power by taking resources out of the business (Claessens et al.,2002).I n this case,a major owner—a cohesive family coalition or its CEO representative—may serve as a poor de facto “agent”for the minority owners (Villalonga & Amit,in press).Thus some researchers have argued that family-dominated businesses are more apt to be characterized by extraordinary dividend payouts (DeAngelo & DeAngelo,2000),75Family Governance and Firm Performance: Agency, Stewardship, and CapabilitiesFigure 1Relating Governance to Performance in FCBs.entrenched managers (Gomez-Mejia,Nunez-Nickel,& Gutierrez,2001),few new products (Ellington & Deane,1996),little investment in new technologies (Chandler,1990),and a redistribu-tion of wealth from employees to the family (Burkart,Panunzi,& Shleifer,2002).All these ten-dencies can ultimately reduce core competencies and ﬁnancial returns of FCBs.Proposition 1-2.Beyond a threshold level,there will be a negative relationship of family ownership with ﬁnancial returns (thus overall an inverted U-shaped relationship).A punitive ownership threshold level may be one that is impractical for outside interests to exceed.Morck et al.(1988) have found that after a concentration level of 30%,stock market valua-tions begin to fall.The Presence of Signiﬁcant Nonfamily Directors and ShareholdersCosts of family ownership may be reduced by independent directors and inﬂuential sharehold-ers from outside the family (Anderson & Reeb,Miller, Le Breton-Miller76Table 1Agency and Stewardship Positives and Negatives of Governance Choices Governance ChoicesAgency PerspectiveStewardship Perspective Family Ownership & Control P1-1: Concentration—moderate Knowledge and incentive to monitor Emotional investment in the or complete family ownership*managerscompany and its peopleP1-2: Concentration >30%**Power and incentive to exploit minority shareholdersP1-3: Presence of strong Knowledge and incentive to monitor Nonfamily director-owners who independent directors or managers; better protection of serve as informed stewards blockholdersminority shareholdersP1-4: Family control with little Power and incentive to exploit Less personal attachment to the ownership, e.g., via super-minority shareholderscompany; especially if pyramiding shares or pyramiding occursFamily CEOP2-1 & P2-2: Family CEOAlignment of manager and owner Long-term tenures, learning and interests; knowledge to monitor farsighted investments;other managers and to run commitment to building businesscapabilityP2-3 & P2-4: Family CEO with Power to exploit minorityDiscretion to engage in risky,ownership control and no shareholders inside the family unorthodox, or dangerous strong outsidersor outbehaviorMultiple Family Managers or Owners P3-1: Multiple family members Broader knowledge and deeper Broader, more multifaceted on top management team monitoring capabilities stewardshipP3-2: Multiple family owners:Executive owner or agent able to Owner factions elevate local highly diffuse ownership or exploit other owners interests and carry into the contentious power blocs businessMultiple Generations in the Business P4-1: Multiple generations—Incentive to monitor Stewardship—conservative planned forﬁnancing, invest incompetencies, relationships,reputation, apprenticeships,and human resourcesP4-2: Multiple generations—actual Potential conﬂict: strong familyDilution of stewardship, succession owners exploit weak family ownersproblems, resource depletion*, **Nonitalicized rows present performance positives; italicized rows present negatives.2004).Such parties,if they are indeed indepen-dent,may contribute expertise and objectivity, provide alternative perspectives,and bring to bear critical information that a family might overlook. They can also serve as more objective monitors of family executives,help in locating and hiring better managers,improve resource-allocation decisions,and avoid expropriation ofﬁrm wealth by family members (Anderson & Reeb,2004; Dalton,Daily,Ellstand,& Johnson,1998).More-over,if these directors are signiﬁcant sharehold-ers,they have an added incentive to act as vigilant stewards over the resources of the company (Burkart,Gromb,& Panunzi,1997;Buckart et al., 2002;Claessens et al.,2002;Finkelstein & Hambrick,1996,p.226).Thus,again from both an agency and stewardship perspective:Proposition 1-3.Family ownership is less apt to be associated with poor ﬁnancial returns when there are independent directors and signiﬁcant nonfam-ily shareholders on the board.Control With Little OwnershipAgency costs may increase as the interests of dif-ferent classes of owners diverge.This can occur, for example,if there are special types of shares that provide control with little ownership (Bhattacharya & Ravikumar,2001;Morck & Y eung,2003).The temptation among those in control may be to run the business for personal gain,especially if they are able to keep a large per-centage of their assets outside the business.The use of holding companies for “pyramiding”pur-poses is another way families can gain control and exploit minority shareholders with little owner-ship.I n this case,there is too little alignment between the interests of the controlling owner and the other shareholders of the lower-tier ﬁrms. Stewardship problems may arise as well.Pyra-miding may put not only ﬁnancial but psycholog-ical distance between an organization and its family owners.Thus the family may be more apt to favor nepotism,sweetheart contracts,and lavish expenditures that beneﬁt themselves at the cost of other shareholders.Proposition 1-4.The lower the ratio of family own-ership to family control,the greater the incentive to exploit nonfamily shareholders and the weaker the attitude of stewardship,and thus the lower the ﬁnancial returns to the lower-tier ﬁrm.Family ManagementWhereas all family businesses are partly owned by families,only some are led and managed by them. Typically,this management takes the form of a founder or family descendent who acts as the CEO.Family management,we will argue,can reduce agency costs and increase attitudes of stewardship,thereby extending investment time horizons and building ﬁrm capabilities.But left unchecked,family management can be danger-ous,promoting leadership irresponsibility,expro-priation from minority shareholders,hubris,and excessive risk taking—in short,the antithesis of good stewardship.Propositions 2-1 and 2-2 address the agency and stewardship beneﬁts of having a family CEO.Propositions 2-3 and 2-4 discuss the respective downsides.A key assumption of this section,to be relaxed in the next,is that the family CEO has discretion to make major decisions without undue interfer-ence from other family members or owners.To simplify our analysis,we focus on the CEO posi-tion.However,we expect similar arguments to apply to ﬁrms run by a hands-on family chairman. Lower Free-Rider Agency CostsReductions in agency costs may be achieved by eliminating entirely the separation between owners and management—as when a major owner becomes the top manager.Subject to the qualiﬁcations above,and unlike nonfamily CEOs who are often driven by short-run motives,many owner-managers have the power,incentive,and knowledge to run the business well.The resulting reduction in free-rider agency costs is in and of itself associated with savings,and thus with surplus resources that can generate superior ﬁnancial returns (Hoopes & Miller,in press; Jayaraman,Khorana,Nelling,& Covin,2000).77Family Governance and Firm Performance: Agency, Stewardship, and CapabilitiesProposition 2-1.FCBs run by family top managers will have higher ﬁnancial returns than non-FCBs or FCBs run by outsiders.Stewardship EffectsPerhaps the most powerful beneﬁt associated with owner management derives from the steward-ship motivations of the leader.Leaders who are “insiders”—whose names are on the business and whose past,present,and future are tied to the reputation of their ﬁrm—may act as especially solicitous stewards (Bubolz,2001;Miller & Le Breton-Miller,2005).Their stewardship can man-ifest in lifelong commitment to the ﬁrm,assidu-ous management of organizational resources,and a host of competency creating investments (Davis et al.,1997).Lengthy job tenures.The average CEO tenure at family-run businesses is said to range between 15 and 25 years,while that of the typical public, non-FCB leader has reduced to three to four years (Le Breton-Miller et al.,2004;Mass Mutual,2003). Thus,family CEOs are usually quite secure in their jobs and operate with the expectation that they will be in ofﬁce for a long time.This alone will cause some of them to be farsighted stewards of the business (Davis et al.,1997).Moreover,as noted,because the family name,fortune,and rep-utation are at stake,and because they are there for the long run,family CEOs may be more commit-ted to the business and willing to do what is needed to make it strong (Donaldson & Davis, 1991).This may engender a number of strategic outcomes that bring superior returns.Avoiding the quick ﬁx.Managers who antici-pate lengthy tenures shun quick-ﬁx solutions. They are less apt than their shorter-term peers to make opportunistic,short-term decisions that may come back to haunt them later in their careers.They avoid potentially hazardous moves to boost revenues,such as acquisitions into areas beyond the ﬁrm’s expertise (Amihud & Lev,1999; Fox & Hamilton,1994).They also resist downsiz-ing expedients that may reduce costs but destroy morale and erode the ﬁrm’s human capital and knowledge base (Laverty,1996).Unlike many out-sider CEOs,family leaders are usually secure enough in their positions to resist being goaded into risky short-term expedients to impress the board with quarterly numbers (Jacobs,1991).Fa r sighted investment.Long family-CEO tenures may also be associated with long invest-ment time horizons and a willingness to commit resources toward the ultimate health of the busi-ness,even if this means sacriﬁcing in the short run (Hoopes & Miller,in press;James,1999;Laverty, 1996).To increase returns over a prospectively lengthy career,family CEOs may make quintes-sentially farsighted investments such as those in research and development,training,and state-of-the-art infrastructure.I ndeed,some evidence reveals that FCBs do outspend non-FCB peers in R&D (Weber et al.,2003) and in capital invest-ments in plant,equipment,and even information technology (Kang,2000).There is also evidence that large FCBs pay out lower dividends and rein-vest a higher percentage of proﬁts (Anderson, Mansi,& Reeb,2003;Daily & Dollinger,1992;Gallo & Vilaseca,1996).We expect that these ﬁndings will be especially strong in owner-managed family businesses.On-the-job ler and Shamsie (2001) and Henderson,Miller,and Hambrick (in press) found that CEOs continue to learn on the job for many years,and that the ﬁnancial performance of their ﬁrms only peaks after eight to ten years of tenure.This augurs well for the development of superior strategies and capabilities in FCBs whose family CEOs tend naturally to be at the job for a very long time.Firms with more frequent execu-tive turnover will ﬁnd such capabilities hard to match.Co e capability development.Due to these stewardship concerns,steep investments in the future,and refusal to be distracted by short-term expedients,family-managed FCBs will have aMiller, Le Breton-Miller 78better chance of developing distinctive core capa-bilities.Barney (1991),as noted,has argued that ﬁrms enjoy competitive advantage when they develop resources that are valuable,rare,inim-itable,and for which there are no ready substi-tutes.According to Dierickx and Cool (1991) and Teece et al.(1997),such resources and capabilities result from the orchestrated long-run investments in core competencies that we have just described. This farsighted,focused investment approach builds on path dependencies that keep a ﬁrm’s capabilities growing cumulatively,thereby making its learning trajectory especially tough for rivals to imitate (Miller,2003).Fast-tenure executives will ﬁnd such programmatic investments more difﬁcult to make.Proposition pared to their competitors, FCBs run by family CEOs are apt to manifest more beneﬁcial stewardship behaviors:speciﬁcally,fewer shortsighted acquisition and downsizing decisions and more R&D,training,and capital expenditures, and thus more distinctive capabilities that produce higher long-term ﬁnancial returns.The Downside of Owner-CEO Control:“The Organization Is Mine.”Family owner-CEOs sometimes are given an inor-dinate amount of discretion at the job,especially where they personally have voting control of the company.Often,these CEOs cannot be controlled effectively by directors,and are free to follow their instincts and impulses—unchecked.Agency issues of CEO control.Unfortunately, family CEOs with enough votes can abuse their power by extracting resources from the company or by hiring cronies or incompetent relatives (Faccio,Lang,& Y oung,2001;Morck & Y eung,2003; Schulze et al.,2001,2003).I n short,controlling CEOs can sometimes be poor de facto agents for other owners (Villalonga & Amit,in press). Proposition 2-3.Family CEOs with voting control are more apt to exploit minority shareholders than are family CEOs who are subject to inﬂuence from other family or nonfamily owners.This will mani-fest in lower ﬁnancial returns.Poo r stewa r dship.Controlling owner-CEOs may view their ﬁrms as personal ﬁefs.They have the discretion to act—or to resist acting—without board or top team intervention,and that can lead to risky decisions or,in the cases of lengthy tenures,strategic stagnation (Finkelstein & Ham-brick,1996),both of which may be hazardous. Proposition 2-4.Family CEOs with voting control are more apt to make hazardous decisions,for example,changing too rashly or too slowly. Involvement of Multiple FamilyOwners and ManagersAfter the ﬁrst two to three decades,most FCBs embrace multiple family members (Gersick, Davis,Hampton,& Lansberg,1997).It is impor-tant to distinguish between two types of family involvement:service on the top management team and ownership.The ﬁrst kind is more apt to produce superior ﬁnancial performance than the second,although key conditioning factors apply.Multiple Family Members on the Top Management TeamAs the power and independence of owner-CEOs can lead to excess,an inﬂuential sounding board is vital (Wiersema & Bantel,1992).The top team can serve as such a body,particularly if its managers are empowered to challenge the CEO. Family executives often do have that power in rare measure.Thus,top management teams (TMTs) with multiple family executives potentially have both agency and stewardship advantages.Agency advantages.Multiple family execu-tives bring to bear multifaceted expertise,and therefore broader knowledge,to monitor a variety of managerial and employee “agents.”At Coors and Nordstrom,three or four brothers served on the top management team—some with excep-79Family Governance and Firm Performance: Agency, Stewardship, and Capabilitiestional skills in operations,others in ﬁnance or marketing.These executives had both the incen-tive and the knowledge to diligently oversee their managers in each of these parts of the business (Miller & Le Breton-Miller,2005).When family members collectively have a diversity of experi-ence,their monitoring contributions can be espe-cially valuable (Finkelstein & Hambrick,1996,pp. 154–156).Multifaceted stewa r dship.Emotional and ﬁnancial attachments to the business make many family executives devoted managers—deeply con-cerned about the future of their enterprise.The fact that there are several such executives on the job allows them to make responsible,farsighted decisions in many areas of the company,and to socialize others to do the same.Moreover,family executives with common interests,mutual trust, and job security are in an ideal position to present frankly their points of view to the leader,thereby countering excesses or blind spots (Lansberg, 1999).Their family status lets them be honest without fear of adverse consequences to their careers (Bubolz,2001).Proposition 3-1.The presence of multiple family members on the top management team will corre-late positively with ﬁnancial performance.An important qualiﬁcation here is that family executives must get along.Where there are rival-ries,having multiple family managers will do more harm than good,especially given the difﬁculty of getting rid of incompetent owner-managers.Also,where the business lacks scale or resources,it may not be able to afford many family managers (Gersick et al.,1997).Another qualiﬁcation is that there not be too many family members involved in the business,as that opens the door for conﬂict and can drain funds. Multiple Family Owners: Intra-Family Ownership and Firm Financial PerformanceAlthough,on balance,having multiple family executives is expected to have a positive impact on the performance of a family business,there are particular distributions of ownership or voting power among family members that are likely to have a negative effect.Agency lapses.Apportioning company owner-ship among family members poses a number of challenges.The most obvious is where a CEO has voting control and can exploit minority owners or behave recklessly.However,having ownership too broadly dispersed can cause similar problems—especially if the owners cannot agree.In that case, a CEO,owner or not,may be able to seize the balance of power and act in a self-serving manner (Miller et al.,2005;Morck & Y eung,2003;Schulze et al.,2003).Here again,the agent is beyond the effective control of the owners.Stewardship erosion.A similar but even more common ownership distribution problem occurs when there are several contentious family block-holders whose votes enable them to cancel one another’s initiatives (Claessens et al.,2002;Ward, 2004).Such factionalism may parochialize owner interests.t may also give rise to factionalism among managers,making for an organization in which counterproductive power plays muddle policies and stymie effective action (Davis et al., 2000).Stewardship over the company is replaced by personal interests.Proposition 3-2.Financial returns will be eroded by a distribution of ownership that gives de facto control to a CEO (e.g.,due a highly diffuse distrib-ution of shares) or by a balanced distribution of power among contentious blockholders. Multiple Generationsin the Family BusinessAs an FCB prepares to incorporate later genera-tions,priorities and problems change (Gersick et al.,1997).The mere intention to include later gen-erations may strengthen attitudes of stewardship that drive diligent management ofﬁnances,repu-tation,and alliances with resource providers.I tMiller, Le Breton-Miller 80。

AACSB认证用简历-魏峰(中文版)

l 2001 年—2004 年管理学博士复旦大学 l 1998 年—2001 年教育学硕士陕西师范大学 l 1994 年—1998 年管理学学士河南师范大学
研究与教学领域 l 领导力、组织行为、创业创新
工作经历教学经历 l 2011— l 2008—2011 l 2006—2008 l 2004—2006 海外经历 l 2007/5—2007/5 l 2011/12-2013/2
年第 2 期转载 l 魏峰. 神州数码的艰难转型.经济导刊. 2006 年 11 期（案例研究） l 魏峰. 奥康成事在人.经济导刊. 2006 年 12 期（案例研究） l 魏峰. 富翁加工厂，路在何方. 中国房地产报. 2006-09-27.（案例研究）
l 魏峰、李秀娟. 双因素领导结构的验证及其对组织承诺的影响机制研究.管理世界. 2008, 5: 115-123.
l 李秀娟、魏峰. 打开领导有效性的黑箱：领导行为和领导下属关系研究.管理世界. 2006, 9: 87-93，《新华文摘》2006 年第 23 期全文转载
l 魏峰、李燚. 组织公正对组织心理契约违背与管理者行为关系的影响.管理科学学报. 2007, 6: 30-40.
l 魏峰、李燚、张文贤. 国内外心理契约研究的新进展.管理科学学报. 2005, 5: 82-89. l 李燚、魏峰、任胜钢. 组织心理契约违背对管理者 EVNL 行为的影响.管理科学学报. 2006,5:
88-96. l 李燚、魏峰. 领导理论的演化和前沿进展.管理学报. 2010, 4: 517-524 l 魏峰、任胜钢、李燚. 心理契约违背、满意度对管理者行为的影响机制.管理工程学报. 2008, 2:
435-457. l Hu, X., Kaplan, S., Wei, F.*, Vega, R. Employees’ Metaperceptions of Supervisor Ratings on Job

1、下载文档前请自行甄别文档内容的完整性，平台不提供额外的编辑、内容补充、找答案等附加服务。
2、"仅部分预览"的文档,不可在线预览部分如存在完整性等问题,可反馈申请退款(可完整预览的文档不适用该条件!)。
3、如文档侵犯您的权益，请联系客服反馈,我们会尽快为您处理(人工客服工作时间：9:00-18:30)。