国贸毕业外文文献及其翻译

China’s Competitive Performance: A Threat To East Asian Manufactured Exports?

There is growing concern in Southeast and East Asia about the competitive threat posed by China’s burgeoning exports, exacerbated by its accession to the WTO. The threat is not confined to labor-intensive products but spans the whole technological and skill range. At the same time, China is rapidly raising its imports from the region, and it is not clear whether its burgeoning exports will damage its neighbors. We examine the dime nsions of China’s competitive threat in the 1990s, benchmarking competitive performance by technology and market, and finds that market share losses are so far mainly in low technology products, with Japan being the most vulnerable market. We analyze market share changes and highlight product groups that are directly or indirectly exposed to a competitive threat. We examine intra-regional trade and find that China and its neighbors are raising high technology exports in tandem: the nature of the international production systems involved lead to complementarily rather than confrontation. China is thus acting as an engine of export growth for its neighbors in terms of direct trade. However, this will change as China moves up the value chain and takes on the activities that have driven East Asian export growth.

Introduction

Concern about China’s competitive threat is widespread (in developed economies like US as well as developing ones like Mexico), but is strongest in East and Southeast Asia. China’s burgeoning exports–backed by cheap and productive labor, a large stock of technical manpower, huge and diversified industrial sector, attractiveness to foreign investors, pragmatic use of industrial policy, and, now, freer access to world markets under WTO – lead to apocalyptic visions of export losses.2 China is most threatening to neighbors that rely primarily on low wages for their export advantage. However, as it upgrades its export structure, the more advanced economies (Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan) also fear for their competitiveness. The current hollowing out of their low-end manufacturing may soon extend to complex production, design, development and related services. Domestic markets are also threatened by China, but so far most attention seems to have been on exports.

Offsetting this threat are the promise of the giant Chinese market (WTO

accession is only one of several initiatives to liberalize regional trade) and the potential for collaboration with it in exporting to the rest of the world. Trade within the East Asian region is flourishing. China is a growing importer from the region of natural resources that it does not possess. It is also raisin g imports of manufactured products. Its advanced neighbors are selling it sophisticated consumer and producer goods, and using it as a base for processing exports to third countries. The multinational companies (MNCs) that now account for around half of Chinese exports (and far more of its high technology exports, UNCTAD,2002) are incorporating China into production systems spanning the region (‘fragmentation’ and‘segmentation’ are used to describe this phenomenon3), so promoting considerable intra-firm trade with other regional bases. China’s own enterprises are likely to specialize with respect to reg ional counterparts and so raise intra-industry trade in differentiated products. Perhaps worryingly for competitors in other regions, such integration can lead China to complement regional competitiveness as a whole, rather than substitute its exports for those of its neighbors.

It is difficult to assess, however, whether complementarily between China and the regional economies will fully offset its competitive threat. The dynamics and complexity of the interactions make it impossible to quantify the outcome, even to predict broad directions. The basic issue is whether China’s higher wage neighbors can move into more advanced export activities or functions rapidly enough to permit continued export expansion. If they can, they can continue with export-led growth. If they cannot, they will suffer export deceleration and/or a shift in specialization towards primary products or slow-growing segments of manufactured exports. The outcome, in other words, will depend on the relative growth of technological and other capabilities in Chinese and regional enterprises, with the former having such advantages as lower wages, larger scale economies, greater industrial depth, pools of technical skill and a proactive government. However, as East Asian countries differ widely in these factors (Lall, 2001), they face different kinds and intensity of competitive threat. The nature of the threat depends, moreover, on the organization of the production and marketing system: independent local firms are likely to compete more directl y than affiliates of the

same MNC spread over different countries in an integrated system.

This paper does not try to measure China’s competitive threat or its effects, but to map relative export performance in the 1990s by technology and destination and so assess where the threat appears most intense. We focus on major East Asian exporters5 and on exports to third markets, but we also analyses complementarities between China and East Asia, particularly in electronics, the region’s largest export and the one where MNC systems dominate. As the 1990s predate China’s WTO accession, we do not go into the implications of this accession; however, the analysis of competitive trends has implications for the evolution of future trade by the region as liberalization grows.

Background on Chinese export performance

Chinese manufactured exports grew by 16.9% per annum over 1990-2000, compared to 6.4% for the world, 12.0% for all developing countries and 10.3% for the rest of East Asia. Its share of world manufactured exports rose from 1.7% to 4.4% over the decade and continued rising rapidly. 6 Thus, by 2002 China accounted for 5.1% of world merchandise exports; it was then the fifth largest exporter (after USA, Germany, Japan and France, and ahead of the UK). China’s share of developing world manufactured exports rose from 11% to 20% over the 1990s and of the East Asian region excluding China from 18.7% to 41.8%. Its export gains (see below) spanned the entire technological spectrum, and were most dynamic in the complex end of the range, in products that have recently driven the export growth of the rest of East Asia.

This export surge is likely to be sustained for some time to come. China has ‘spare capacity’ in that its per capita exports are still relatively small,7 wages are much lower than in its main neighbors and it has large reserves of cheap and disciplined labor (though drawing it into exports will involve the cost of building links with the interior).8 More importantly, its advantages are not static (confined to cheap labor); they are upgrading rapidly. China is investing heavily in technology and advanced skills; for example, the share of the relevant age group enrolled in tertiary education rose from 9 percent in 1997 to 13 percent in 2000 (UNESCO website). It is exploiting the scale offered by its giant market to become competitive in capital-intensive activities beyond the reach of many

neighbors. It is using its diverse industrial base to deepen local content. It is drawing in export-oriented FDI at an impressive rate, using its market attractions to induce investors to raise local R&D and linkages; till now it has been able to impose performance requirements of the type soon to be banned under WTO rules.

WTO accession may constrain China’s ability to use indust rial policy (Nolan, 2001) but it will also open up new export opportunities, particularly in textiles and garments.9 Accession may also enhance its domestic competitiveness: it will improve the investment climate for FDI, make imported inputs cheaper (for enterprises outside special export regimes) and induce faster restructuring of domestic enterprises (Ianchovichinaetal, 2003, and Lemoyne and Unal-Kesenci, 2002).

Market share changes in major developed country markets

We analyze market shares of China and its neighbors in three major markets: Japan, the US and West Europe, according to technology categories (Annex Table 1). In terms of value, the most important market for China in 2000 is the US ($49 billion), followed by Japan ($36 billion) and West Europe ($38 billion). However, the rest of the world is almost as large a destination for Chinese exports as these together ($106 billion in 2000) and within this the rest of East Asia is larger than any major OECD market by itself ($74.6 billion).

The competitive position of each country can be analyzed in terms of the market share in 1990 and 2000 and the change over the decade. The annex table shows the following:

Total manufactured exports: China does best in Japan, followed at some distance by the US. In common with most neighbors, its market share gain is weakest in West Europe. Korea loses market shares in both Japan and US, while Taiwan loses only in the US. Hong Kong’s loses market shares in all markets, particularly in the US and Japan. Like Taiwan, Singapore loses only in the US. The new Tigers gain share in all markets. With the exception of Indonesia, with a rather tepid performance, the others all gain most share in the Japanese market. Resource based products: China again leads the region in terms of market share increases, with a pattern similar to that for total exports. However, Korea has a

large gain in Japan, in contrast to Taiwan and Singapore, which lose shares; the latter two also lose in the US. Thailand is a big gainer in Japan while Indonesia and the Philippines lose out in the US. Low technology products: China’s massive market share gains are again concentrated in Japan. The four mature Tigers generally suffer losses in market share, but Singapore sees an increase in Japanese market share. The best overall performance among the new Tigers is by Indonesia.

Medium technology products: While the Chinese pattern of success recurs, the new Tigers make significant gains in Japan and Korea incurs a significant loss. Taiwan and Singapore suffer losses in the US market. High technology exports: Taiwan again diverges from Korea in its performance in Japan, the former showing the second largest gain in the group (after China) and the latter the largest loss. In the US market, the situation is reversed, with Singapore joining Taiwan in losing market shares. Among the new Tigers, Malaysia and the Philippines are the big gainers in Japan, but the other two also benefit significantly. The Philippines is the second largest winner in the group in the US market. In sum, China’s main market share gains in the developed world are concentrated in Japan (though the US accounts for a larger dollar value of export growth). This is also true of its neighbors with the exceptions of Korea and Indonesia (Hong Kong was an all-round loser). To the extent that we can interpret market share changes to be causally related to China’s export surge, it would seem that the mature Tigers suffered the most from Chinese competition. The largest such loss is in low technology products, which is to be expected, but this not take into account the growth of LT exports by Korea and Taiwan to China. The relatively low gains by the lower-income new Tigers in LT may also reflect the impact of Chinese competition – without the offsetting increase in exports of intermediates to China.

Conclusions

China’s export surge has raised grave concerns in the region. While some of the apocalyptic predictions may have been overdone, it is certainly possible that rapid export growth by such a massive entrant will adversely affects export growth in its neighbors. As this analysis shows,however, the outcome is complex.

For a start, the rise in China’s exports is matched by that in its imports – within the region its import growth outpaces its export growth. With appropriate restructuring of activities to match new competitive needs, its neighbors should be able to maintain high rates of export growth.

There are two main drivers of regional exports to China. The first is to meet its burgeoning demand for imported products: primary products and resource-based manufactures that it cannot produce capital goods and intermediates for domestic -oriented production and more sophisticated consumer goods than its industry can currently provide. The second is to meet the needs of its export industries. This has two components: ‘processing’ activity in special economic zones that use imported inputs for export activities, and other exporters that also need imports. Processing activity is increasingly organized as part of integrated production systems, particularly its high technology segments, though some domestic oriented industries are also being plugged into this system as they realize scale and learning economies and become globally competitive. Both drivers are likely to continue into the foreseeable future, though their composition will change as Chinese and regional capabilities develop.

中国竞争力的表现：是对东亚制成品出口的威胁吗？

越来越多的东南亚和东亚地区关注中国出口的迅速增长所带来的竞争威胁，中国加入WTO后，更加剧了这种情况。这种威胁并不局限于劳动密集型产品，而是跨越整个技术和技能范围的产品，同时，中国正在迅速提高其在东南亚和东亚的进口，目前尚不清楚其是否其蓬勃发展的出口将是否损害其邻国的利益，本文研究了中国20世纪90年代中国竞争威胁的大小，市场竞争力表现的基准是技术和市场份额，研究发现，发现市场份额的损失迄今为止主要在低技术产品，日本是其最脆弱的市场。我们分析了市场份额的变化，直接或间接地突出了产品集群的竞争威胁。区域内贸易的研究表明，中国和其邻国同步提高了高技术产品的出口，参与国际生产系统的性质导致的是互补性，而不是对抗。因此，在直接贸易条件下，中国在出口增长方面是其邻国的领头人，但是，这将改变中国价值链的移动，带动东亚出口的迅速增长，

引言

中国竞争威胁论的担心是普遍存在的，（像发达国家中的美国和发展中国家的墨西哥等）作为东亚和南亚最大的出口国，中国的新兴出口凭借廉价的劳动生产力，大量的人力技术存量，巨大的和多元化的工业部门，吸引外国投资，以及优惠的产业政策，如今，加入WTO后，中国更加自由的进入国际市场，导致了出口损失末日的严重观点。中国依靠低工资的出口优势造成了对邻国的最大威胁。中国的出口结构升级以后，更多的发达经济体（新加坡，香港，南韩和台湾）也会担忧其强大的竞争力，当前其低端工业制成的漏洞将很快由其他复杂生产、设计和发展的产品以及相关的服务产业所填充。各个国家的国内市场也受到中国的威胁，但目前为止，主要关注的还是在出口方面。

弱化这种威胁论的是中国政府的承诺(加入WTO只是区域贸易自由化的若干举措之一)，和出口到世界各地的潜在合作。中国与东亚地区的贸易正在蓬勃发展，在这些地区进口其不具备自然资源的速度在快速增长。工业制成品的进口也在上升，发达的邻国向其销售消费制成品和生产制成品，并利用其作为向第三国产品出口的加工基地。多国公司（跨国公司），现在占到中国出口的一半（目前主要是高技术产品的出口，UNCTAD,2002）,不断融入中国生产系统的方方面面，（用'分裂'和'分割'是用来描述这种现象）,更好地促进了与其他区域企业之间的贸易。中国的国有企业有可能专业化同业生产，以此提高同业差异化产品的贸易。与其担心在其他地区的竞争对手，这种整合反而会导致中国以配合整个区域的竞争力，而不是替代

其邻国的出口。

但是，中国和各区域经济体的互补性是否能完全抵消其竞争威胁，这是难以估计的。动态性和复杂性的相互作用使其无法量化这个结果，我们甚至可以预知大方向。这里的基本问题是，中国高工资的邻国是否带来更先进的技术活动，而且能够迅地速继续扩大出口额。如果能，那么可以继续出口引致的经济增长，否则他们将受到出口减速和/或在对初级产品或工业制成品出口增长缓慢的部分进行专业化转变。换言之，产出将取决于技术和能力，中国和其他地区企业的相对增长，前者优势有工资较低，规模效益较大，产业深度更广，技术技能集群更大，以及一个积极的政府。然而，东亚国家在这些因素方面的差异很大，(Lall, 2001),他们面对着不同种类和密集度的竞争威胁。威胁的性质更多地体现在产品组织和营销系统，独立的当地企业可能比一体化系统中遍布不同国家的相同跨国公司分支机构的竞争更加直接。

本文并不试图衡量中国的竞争威胁或其影响力，而是衡量上世纪90年代由技术和目的评估找出相关产品出口竞争威胁最激烈的地方。我们专注于东亚的主要出口国和第三市场的出口，我们还分析了中国和东亚地区之间的互补性，特别是在电子产品方面，该地区是最大的出口方，而且跨国公司系统占主导地位。早在中国未进入WTO的90年代，我们没有阻止其进入的影响力，竞争力趋势的研究表明其对区域自由化增长引起的未来贸易变革是有影响的。

中国出口结构表现的背景

中国工业制成品年出口增长率超过1990-2000的16.9%，超出世界平均水平的6.4%,超过其余东亚发展中国家的10.3%，近几年中国的国际工业制成品的份额从1.7%上升到4.4%，并且在迅速增长，因此，到2002年中国占世界商品出口的5.1％; 是第五大出口国（仅次于美国，德国，日本和法国，并领先于英国），中国在发展中国家的工业制成品出口份额从20世纪90年代的11％上升到20％，东亚地区除中国以外，从18.7％上升到41.8％。中国出口的增长跨越了整个技术领域，在复杂产品以及目前对其余东亚国家的出口增长起主导作用的产品范围内最具影响。

出口激增可能需要一段时间来实现，中国的“闲置能力”导致人均资本出口额仍旧相对较小，工资比主要邻国要低，廉价的规范化的劳动量储存较大(虽然它们拉动了出口，但是带来了建立内部联动机制的成本)，最重要的是，这种优势不是静态的（限于廉价劳动力），是迅速升级的，中国正在加大技术和先进的技能的投资;例如，各年龄段的专业教育比例从1997年的9%上升到2000年的13%(UNESCO website). 中国利用其巨大的规模产出增加市场占有量，其资本密集型产品的竞争

力超出了许多邻近国家，利用其多元化的工业基础，以加深本国容量，发展原产地出口；外国直接投资以显著的速度，利用其市场吸引力减少投资者，以提高本国的溢出效应和联动机制，直到现在，已经能够以这种形式采取必要措施，但不久将在世贸组织规则下被禁止。

加入世界贸易组织可能会制约中国的产业政策的运用能力(Nolan, 2001)，但也能开发新的出口机会，特别是在纺织品和服装产业，加入WTO可以加强国内竞争力，提高外国直接投资的环境，使得进口产出更加便宜（企业产出尤其是境外企业），诱使国内企业加速重组(Ianchovichina et al, 2003, and Lemoine and Unal-Kesenci, 2002).

主要发展中国家市场份额的变化

我们依据技术类别分析了中国及其邻国在日本、美国和西欧三个主要市场的份额，在价值条件下，2000年中国最重要的市场是美国（490亿美元），其次是日本（$ 36亿美元）和西欧（380亿美元）。世界其他国家的出口总额与中国和这些国家的出口几乎是一样大了，（2000年106亿美元），在东亚其他地区的出口比任何主要的经合组织市场都要大（74..6亿美元）。

每一个国家的竞争地位，可以分析在市场份额在1990年和2000年过去十年的变化。附件表显示如下：

工业制成品的总出口额：中国在日本做的最好，接着是美国，稍微有一点差距，在与大多数邻国一样，其市场份额在西欧增加是最弱的。韩国失去在日本和美国的市场份额，而台湾仅在美国，香港失去了所有市场的份额，尤其是在美国和日本。与台湾类似，新加坡仅失去美国的份额，亚洲四小虎在所有市场上抢得份额。除印度尼西亚具有相当不温不火的表现外以外，其他国家在日本市场获得最大份额。

资源型产品：由于整体出口的格局类似，中国再次引领着区域市场份额增长，但是，韩国与台湾和新加坡相比之下，其在日本的份额获得大量增加，台湾和新加坡不仅仅失去了日本的市场，而且包括美国市场，泰国是日本的大赢家，而印尼和菲律宾失去了美国市场。

低技术产品：中国庞大的市场份额再次集中在日本，亚洲四小虎的市场份额普遍受到损失，但新加坡在日本市场份额却增加了，亚洲四小虎之间新的综合性能最好的是印度尼西亚。

中等技术产品：虽然中国模式再次发挥作用，但是亚洲四小虎在日本获得大量份额，韩国失去了其在日本的市场，台湾和新加坡在美国市场上遭受损失。

高技术产品：台湾再次从韩国偏离向日本的发展，前者显示是该组涨幅中位居

第二（仅次于中国），后者是最大的损失方，在美国市场上，情况正好相反，新加坡与台湾都失去市场份额。亚洲四小虎当中，马来西亚和菲律宾是在日本的大赢家，但其他两个国家也大大受益，菲律宾是美国市场的第二大赢家。

总的来说，中国的主要市场份额在发达国家中都集中在的日本（尽管出口增长的价值以美元计算），除过韩国和印度尼西亚，这也是其真正的邻国市场（香港是全方位失去市场）。在某种程度上，我们可以解释市场份额的变化是因为中国出口的激增，看来，亚洲四小虎从中国所遭受的竞争最大；最大的损失在低技术产品，这是可以预料的，但这没有考虑到的韩国和台湾对中国低技术产品的出口，低收入的亚洲四小虎相对过低的增量反映在中国竞争力的影响力上，其对中国中间产品的出口也没有抵消这些差额。

结论

中国出口的快速激增引起了广泛的关注，国威胁论的预言虽然是有可能的，但有些过激，通过大量参与可以加快出口的增长速度，但对邻国出口的增长产生严重的不利影响。研究表明，出口结构是复杂的，一开始，中国的出口是与进口相适应，后来，该地区的进口增长赶不上它的出口增长。随着结构的重组，为配合新的竞争需求而进行适当的调整，是其邻国能够维持出口高速增长。

区域经济体对中国的出口有两个驱动因素，首先是为了满足其迅速增长的对进口产品的需求：它不能生产初级产品和资源型制成品，目前可以提供资本产品和面向国内的生产以及更先进的工业消费品的中间产品；二是要满足其出口产业的需求，这由两个部分组成：专业化经济区域为出口而进行的“加工”活动不仅要使用进口投入，还需要其他进口国的出口产品。加工活动日益成为有组织的综合生产系统的一部分，尤其在高技术产业部分，国内一些主导产业也正在插入这个系统，因为他们实现了规模经济。向其他经济体学习，正在成为具有全球竞争力的势力。这两个主导因素尽管它们的组成将随着中国和区域能力的发展而变化，但仍可以预期未来。