文献研读：上市公司过度投资行为的研究(最终版)5.7

Financial Management 上市公司过度投资行为的研究Key word: OverinvestmentTeam members:Zhan Yu, Liang Ce, Wu Na andGao WanlingA.相关英文文献（5篇）B.相关中文文献（5篇）C.总结目录CONTENTS[A]英文文献About: Overinvestment英文文献 About: Overinvestment12345Jensen M. 1986. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers. American Economic Review, 76: 323～329 Conyon M, K Murphy. 2000. The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the U. S. and the U. K. Economic Journal, 110:640～671Vogt S. 1994. The Cash Flow / Investment Relationship: Evidence from U. S. Manufacturing Firms. FinancialManagement, 23: 3～20Shleifer ,A. and R. W.Vishny , 1997. A Survey of Corporate Governance. Journal of finance 52 ( 2) : 737-782.Scott Richardson, 2006. Over-investment of free cash flow. Review of Accounting Studies, 11(2):159-189.OutlineⅠ. Jensen M.Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers.1ThemeThe motivation to overinvestment.2The raise of the problem(1) Agency theory ;(2) Conflicting interests between the corporate managers and the shareholder;(3) The payout of cash to shareholders creates major conflicts that have received little attention.3Explanation(1)Payouts to shareholders reduce the resources under managers' control , thereby reducing managers' power, and making it more likely they will incur the monitoring of the capital markets which occurs when the firm must obtain new capital. (see M. Rozeff, 1982; F. H. Easterbrook, 1984). (2)Managers have incentives to cause their firms to grow beyond the optimal size. Growthincreases managers' power by in-creasing the resources under their control. It is also associated with increases in managers' compensation , because changes in compensation are positively related to the growth in sales(see Kevin Murphy, 1985). (3) Risk diversification1.Free cash flow?Cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net present values when discountedat the relevant cost of capital.2. Overinvestment?4The way to avoid this kind of behavior(1) Paying cash dividend. (2) Issuing Debt.a. Reduce the agency costs of free cash flow by reducing the cash flow available for spending at the discretion of managers.b. Set up the required organizational incentives to motivate managers and to help them overcome normal organizational resistance to retrenchment which the payout of free cash flow often requires.c. Increased leverage also has costs. As lever-age increases, the usual agency costs of debt rise, including bankruptcy costs. The optimal debt-equity ratio is the point at which firm value is maximized, the point where the marginal costs of debt just offset the marginal benefits.5Aspects need to be improved“The agency cost of free cash flow is consistent with a wide range of data for which there has been no consistent explanation . I have found no data which is inconsistent with the theory , but it is rich in predictions which are yet to be tested.”Ⅰ. Jensen M.Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers.The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the U. S. and the U. K.1 ThemeEmpirical proof of the motivation to overinvestment.2 Data DescriptionThe primary data source is the annual report in the U.K., and the proxy statement in the U.S.3 Research Method(1) Data Statistics(2) Regression(Data Sources: Conyon M, K Murphy. 2000. The Prince and the Pauper? CEOPay in the U. S. and the U. K. Economic Journal, page 646 )The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the U. S. and the U. K.(1)Data StatisticsTable 1 provides summary statistics for the level andcomposition of fiscal 1997 CEO pay, by company size, and industry, and country. Total pay is defined as the sum of salaries, bonuses, benefits, other cash pay, grant-date values of share options, and grant-date value of LTIP shares( discounted, where appropriate, for performance contingencies).4Conclusion5Aspects need to be improvedThe source of detailed disclosure on the compensation practices are limited.More data in different markets and research is needed to be done and to be tested on this topic.The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the U. S. and the U. K.3Research Method(2)RegressionThe best-documented empirical finding in the executive compensation literature is the consistency of the relation between CEO and company size, typically measured as the elasticity of cash compensation to company revenues.ln(1997 CEO Pay)=α+ηln(1997 Sales)Existing empirical studies of executive compensation have consistently documented that company size and industry are the two most important factors determining levels of CEO pay. Generally, the relationship is positively correlated.So it’s inferred that the executives may overinvest in order to get more return.Ⅲ. Vogt S.The Cash Flow / Investment Relationship: Evidence from U. S. Manufacturing Firms.1 ThemeThe existence proof of overinvestment.2 The raise of the problemFree Cash FlowThis section shows the effect that free cash flow has on a firm's Q value whenmonitoring management decisions is costly. The model is then expanded to show how dividends (a means of eliminating free cash flow) affect Tobin's Q. Consequently, cash flow should explain investment spending for these firms and should also be associated with low values of marginal Q.3 DataThe data used in this study come from 359 manufacturing firms for which the COMPUSTAT tapes have complete data from the years 1973 to 1990.5Aspects need to be improvedNewer firms for which complete data were not available over the sample period may have greater asymmetric information problems, and thus show pecking order behavior. General conclusions about the overall behavior of firms must be drawn considering the sample.4Results(1) The Cash Flow/Capital Spending Relationship.These results support the findings that both agency problems and asymmetric information may influence firm behavior. The results are also consistent with the hypotheses that large firms are most likely to suffer agency problems , while small firms are likely to suffer information problems. (2) The Cash Flow/R & D Relationship.A plausible alternative explanation, however, is that the intangible nature of R & D spending makes it difficult to monitor, which raises the potential for overinvestment when cash flow is available.Ⅲ. Vogt S.The Cash Flow / Investment Relationship: Evidence from U. S. Manufacturing Firms.A Survey of Corporate Governance.1 ThemeThe way to avoid overinvesting.2 The raise of the problemThe authors turn to the two most common approaches to corporate governance, both of which rely on giving investors some power.(1)Legal Protection.(2)Large Investors.3 Explanation(1) Shareholders.a. A substantial minority shareholder.b. Large Shareholders.(2)Large Creditors.4SummaryInstitutional investors have interest driven participation in corporate governance. Therefore, institutional investors will have the motivation to control strong, they can make managers tend to maximize shareholder value enhancement, avoid excessive investment.5(1) Strengthening the internal management of enterprises. (2) Make the internal rules.(3) Actively communicate with investors.A Survey of Corporate Governance.Further studyOver-investment of free cash flow.1 ThemeProviding evidence on firm level overinvestment of free cash flow and the way to avoid this kind of behavior.2 An Accounting-Based Framework(1)Explanations for a positive relation between investment expenditure and cash flow(2)Primary hypothesis: Firms with positive free cash flow over-invest.(3)A framework to measure the constructs of free cash flow and over-investment(4)Expectation model for firm level investment decisions(5)Uses of free cash flow3 Proof(1)DataFinancial statement data of active and non-active securities in the U.S. stockmarket,1988-2002. Source: The Compustat annual database.(2) Descriptive statisticsRobustness tests and limitations for the primary hypothesis4 Another discussion: If of a large set of governance mechanisms mitigates the over-investment of free cash flow?6Further studyConsider abnormal investment more generally.i.e. Using this framework to examine the impact of accounting information systems on 5Conclusion(1) Over-investment is a common problem for publicly traded US firms. For non-financial firms during the period 1988–2002, the average firm over-invests 20 percent of its available free cash flow.(2) The majority of free cash flow is retained in the form of financial assets. For each additional dollar of free cash flow the average firm in the sample retains 41 cents as either cash or marketable securities.(3) There is little evidence that free cash flow is distributed to external stakeholders , thereby creating the potential for retained free cash flow to be over-invested in the future.(4)Supplemental analysis found only weak evidence that governance structures are effective in mitigating the extent of over-investment. Over-investment of free cash flow.英文文献 About: Overinvestment12345Jensen M.The motivation to overinvestment.Conyon M, K Murphy. Empirical proof of themotivation to overinvestment.Vogt S.The existence proof of overinvestment.Shleifer ,A. and R. W. Vishny .The way to avoid overinvesting.Scott Richardson. Providing evidence on overinvestment and the way to avoid this kind of behavior.Summary[B]中文文献About: Overinvestment中文文献 About: Overinvestment12345何金耿,丁加华. 上市公司投资决策行为的实证分析[J]. 证券市场导报,2001,09:44-47. 唐雪松,周晓苏,马如静. 上市公司过度投资行为及其制约机制的实证研究[J]. 会计研究,2007,07:44-52.刘昌国. 公司治理机制、自由现金流量与上市公司过度投资行为研究[J]. 经济科学,2006,04:50-58.潘敏,金岩. 信息不对称、股权制度安排与上市企业过度投资[J]. 金融研究,2003,01:36-45.李维安,姜涛. 公司治理与企业过度投资行为研究——来自中国上市公司的证据[J]. 财贸经济,2007,12:56-61.OutlineⅠ. 过度投资是什么？1 企业的实际投资水平( L i , t ) 对适度投资水平( L*i , t ) 的偏离来刻度企业投资行为扭曲的尺度( L S i , t ),令 L S i , t = L i , t - L*i , t )如果L S i , t > 0 表示i 企业第t 期存在过度投资, L S i , t < 0 则表示企业第期存在投资不足。