穆勒——《功利主义》
功利主义
约翰·穆勒《功利主义》目录第一章绪论第二章功利主义的含义第三章论功利原则的最终约束力第四章论功利原则能够得到何种证明第五章论功利与正义的联系术语对照表第一章绪论行为对错的标准究竟是什么，这个问题虽然争议不断，却始终没有取得多少实质性的进展。
就目前的人类知识状况来看，没有什么比这种情形更加出乎人的意料之外了，也没有什么比这种情形更加能够表明，自哲学诞生以来，“至善”[1]的问题或者说是道德基础的问题，始终被认为是思辨领域中的主要问题，使得多少聪明才俊为它苦思冥想，因它而分成各个门派，相互攻讦，争论不休。
两千多年以前，青年苏格拉底在倾听了老年普罗塔哥拉[2]的见解之后，就主张功利主义的理论而反对当时所谓智者的流行道德（假如柏拉图所著的“对话”是根据真实的谈话撰写的），可是到了两千多年之后的今天，同样的讨论却仍在继续，哲学家们仍然分列于同样的战斗旗帜之下，无论是思想家还是一般人，在这个问题上看来都仍然没有更加接近于取得一致意见。
[1] 原文为拉丁文summum bonum，英文的意思是“highest good”或“good at the top”。
——译者注[2] Protagoras（前485一前410），古希腊哲学家，智者学派的代表人物，名言为“人是万物的尺度”。
——译者注诚然，各门科学的第一原理都存在着这类混乱的情形和不确定性，有时还存在着类似的争议，哪怕是它们之中最确定无疑的科学亦即数学也不例外；然而，这种情形并没有严重地损害各门科学的结论的可信性，一般来说确实毫无损害。
这看来有悖常理，其实道理很简单，因为一门科学的详细学说通常并不是从它的所谓第一原理推演出来的，其证据也并不依赖于它的所谓第一原理。
假如科学的详细学说都是从它的所谓第一原理推演出来的，其证据都要依赖于它的所谓第一原理，那么就没有比代数更不可靠的科学了，也没有比代数的结论更不充分的科学结论了；因为那些由最杰出的教师写下来的代数基本原理，就像英国法律一样充满了随意性，并且像神学一样神秘，而代数的可靠无疑，没有一点是来自平时教给学生的代数基本原理的。
穆勒《功利主义》读书笔记
边沁式的功利主义穆勒的功利主义哲学是对边沁的功利主义哲学的一种改良。
边沁首次对近代功利主义进行了一个比较全面的阐述。
边沁认为，感觉经验是道德知识在内的一切知识的最根本而又真实的基础，因此，伦理道德也不能不建立在为人类经验所认可的人的趋乐避苦的本性和自我利益的追求的基础上。
简而言之，边沁认为我们追求的是幸福或者快乐的最大化。
边沁认为道德的最高原则就是幸福最大化。
这种最大化来源于人的两种感受，快乐与痛苦，当快乐减去痛苦就是我们追求的幸福。
这种边沁式功利主义的最好例证，就是被人们广泛应用于生活各个方面的得失分析。
得失分析将花费与带来的利益进行金钱的价值衡量。
如果获得的收益高于损失，那么这种方案就被认为是可以给人们带来利益的。
利益的多少是之后考虑的事情，总体带来利益的结果本身就符合边沁功利主义的思想。
边沁的功利最大化思想简洁明了容易被人接受，但是这种思想却受到了一种观点的强烈批评：假使承认功利最大化的思想，但是，我们并不能将每一种快乐或者痛苦都转化成价值来进行衡量。
换言之，我们不能在同一尺度上比较和衡量所有的价值和物品。
边沁将所有的价值都纳入一个衡量尺度。
快乐就是快乐，痛苦就是痛苦。
评判一种体验与其他相比是更好还是更坏的唯一基础，就是它所产生的快乐或痛苦的强度和持久度。
换言之，快乐或者痛苦并没有质的区别，唯一的区别就是量的区别。
图片高级快乐和低级快乐针对边沁将所有快乐和痛苦都纳入一个衡量尺度的批评。
穆勒在《功利主义》中对边沁的功利主义进行了修正。
穆勒认为我们可以区分高级快乐和低级快乐，即我们不仅仅评估快乐的数量和强度还评估快乐的质量。
可是如何在两种快乐之间进行区分呢？换句话说，高级快乐与低级快乐的衡量标准是什么？穆勒在《功利主义》中解释为：对于两种快乐而言，如果所有或几乎所有体验过这两种快乐的人，都对其中某一种表现出明确的偏好，而不顾及任何道德责任感去偏爱它，那么这种快乐就是更加值得追求的快乐。
这种衡量方式是对边沁功利主义哲学的修正，同时这种修正是以边沁功利主义的欲望为基础，按欲望的偏好来区分高级快乐和低级快乐。
功利主义穆勒.ppt
可见，穆勒在坚持个人主义这一自由主义最高准则的同时有注意到 了社会公共的利益。
有限干预思想
穆勒反对政府干预，他认为政府干预本身是强制性的，课征干预 所用的税款也是强制的；政府干预会增加政府职能，会增加政府 权力同时会增加政府的工作和责任；私人经营的效率更高；反对 政府干预可以使人民养成共同行动的习惯。他指出“一般应实行 自由放任原则，除非某种巨大利益要求违背这一原则，否则，违 背这一原则必然带来弊害”。 但是穆勒同时指出不干预原则在在以下几种情况下不适用，应该 让政府进行有必要的干预：初等教育、社会弱势群体、永久性契 约、规定劳动时间、利他行为、公益服务与社会事务。 他指出“被普遍承认的政府职能具有广范围，行使这些职能所以 依据的共同理由除了增进普遍的便利之外，不可能找到任何其他 理由；也不可能用任何普遍适用的准则来限制政府干预，除非政 府干预能带来很大便利，否则决不允许政府干预”。
有限救济思想
穆勒认为，社会财富的增长必须有利于使民众从中得 到幸福，因此，应该实行有效的财富再分配，以实现 社会公平。如果民众从社会财富的增长中得不到一点 好处，这种增长就没有任何重要意义。 他不赞成自然竞争状态，他主张人与人之间应该相互 帮助，社会应该对贫困人口实行救济。
为了达到对穷人救济的目的可以采取两种方法：一是 由国家实施的大规模殖民，二是提供可以开垦的公有 土地以便形成小土地所有者。
主要思想
有限自由思想
政治主张：作为自由主义的著名代表，穆勒将自由放在十分重要 的位置，但他认识到不可能存在完全的自由主义。于是他认为对 于自己的身和心，个人是最高主权者；另一方面他又强调自由的 有限性，认为个人自由“必须不使自己成为他人的妨碍”。 穆勒认为：社会利益不能与个人利益发生矛盾，在某些情况下， 公众的当前利益会通过忽视个人权利来实现。个人利益必须必须 以理性的个人的负责人的生活为基础，公众的永久利益是与个人 权利结合在一起的。他相信“凡是能促进最大多数人最大幸福的 行动就是正义的”、“作为终极标准的功利必须是以人类的永久 利益为基础的最广泛意义上的功利”。
从《功利主义》看穆勒之幸福论
从《功利主义》看穆勒之幸福论摘要：围绕穆勒《功利主义》关于幸福的论证，论文对功利主义幸福论之逻辑进行了系统的解读，揭示了功利主义视域下幸福论的内涵。
穆勒之幸福论从功利主义的价值准则即追求最大多数人的最大幸福、幸福是可得的、幸福是作为一个整体而被欲求这三个方面展开铺陈。
笔者认为，《功利主义》对人类社会的发展产生过积极作用，但其幸福论在一定程度上对人类社会的继续发展产生了负面影响。
对此我们必须进行深刻的探讨和反思。
关键词：儒家；幸福；穆勒；功利主义穆勒在《功利主义》中，围绕着“功利”构筑了一个关于幸福的逻辑整体，从三个层面展开：其一，功利主义的价值准则是追求最大多数人的最大幸福；其二，幸福是可得的；其三，幸福是作为一个整体而被欲求的，其他一切或是幸福的组成部分，或是达到幸福的手段。
一、最多数人的最大幸福探究人类思想史上的道德标准为何难以定论，不可忽视的是相较于以客观存在为研究对象的自然科学具有一种确定性，人文学科却是以人的目的为标准，故人类所有行为均屈从于目的，由于人类的行为目的往往出于各自不同的利益，使得是非善恶标准差异化、多元化、不确定化。
由此，穆勒认为，唯有找到人类共同追寻的目的，才能为人类的行为提供是非善恶标准。
“最大幸福原则”就是穆勒为人类行为找到的终极目的。
“这一终极目标在功利主义理论中被视为人类行为的目的，它必然也是整个道德的标准，故也可以将其定义为人类行为的准则。
”①为了证明最大幸福原则，他将“幸福”进行分类，并认为公共幸福的实现高于个人幸福的实现。
穆勒主张“功利”为最大幸福之根本，“最大幸福原理：需要坚持旨在促进幸福的行为即为‘是’，与幸福背道而驰的行为即为‘非’。
幸福意味着预期中的快乐，意味着痛苦的远离；不幸福则代表了痛苦，代表了快乐的缺失”。
②快乐和痛苦就像硬币的两个面一样构成了最大幸福。
“追求快乐，摆脱痛苦是人唯一渴望达到的目的。
”③减少或避免痛苦是实现幸福的途径之一，也是最大限度地增加幸福净余额的重要手段。
穆勒——功利主义
约翰斯图尔特密尔（John Stuart Mill，1806年5月20日—1873年5月8日），也译作约翰斯图亚特穆勒，英国著名哲学家和经济学家，19世纪影响力很大的古典自由主义思想家。
他支持边沁的功利主义。
边沁的功利主义对穆勒的思想的影响也是不容忽视的一个重要方面。
边沁同穆勒之父是知交,穆勒从小就常常拜访边沁,逐渐接受了边沁的功利主义学说,这对穆勒的经济思想的形成和发展有深远影响。
穆勒从法国返回后,其父曾打算让他学习法律,以便日后从事律师工作,一方面指导他学习罗马法,一方面让他阅读介绍边沁学说的书籍。
这使他的思想产生了很大变化,据穆勒自己说,边沁的功利主义立法原理将此前的道德立法理论完全推翻了。
在穆勒看来,边沁功利主义关于“最大多数人的最大利益”的原理尤其具有重要意义,因为它既表明了人类道德行为的动力不是个人的自私利益,而是最大多数人的最大幸福；也表明道德伦理的是非标准应是效果,而不是动机,这效果就是最大多数人的最大利益。
功利主义的这些原理成为穆勒观察问题的根本观念和哲学思想。
1823年穆勒发起组织了一个研讨边沁功利主义的学会。
约翰.穆勒（1806——1873），他倒是个非常务实的人，在他的作品中大多是以经验主义立场来论述他的功利主义思想，我们看不出他有任何形而上的困惑，只求行之有效，所以他本身的这种特性让他的学说在近代产生了无比重要的影响，使得功利主义学说有力地渗透到各个领域，我在这里只是简单介绍一下奠定他近代功利主义创始人之一的伦理学名著《功利主义》中的部分重要思想。
他立论的根据是“最大幸福原理”即人生的终极目的，就是在数量和质量上尽可能多的满足大多数人的幸福（难怪尼采要不厌其烦的骂他）。
他的所有论述都是根据这一原理展开的。
可以想到，他本人并不承认道德原则是先验自明的，“一切第一原理，我们知识的第一前提以及我们行为的第一前提，都是无法得到推理证明。
”（*第四章论功利原则能够得到何种证明）他所注重的是道德的社会功用，并且强调个人要在什么样情况下考虑自己或他人的利益，“任何人（百分之九十九点九的人）只有在例外时，才有能力大规模地增加幸福，换言之，才有能力成为一个公众的施主；唯有在这样的时刻，才能要求他考虑公众的功利；而在任何其他的情况下，他必须加以考虑的只是私人的功利，只是少数几个人的利益或幸福。
《功利主义》约翰 穆勒
UTILITARIANISMBy John Stuart Mill 1863Chapter 1General Remarks.THERE ARE few circumstances among those which make up the present condition of human knowledge, more unlike what might have been expected, or more significant of the backward state in which speculation on the most important subjects still lingers, than the little progress which has been made in the decision of the controversy respecting the criterion of right and wrong. From the dawn of philosophy, the question concerning the summum bonum, or, what is the same thing, concerning the foundation of morality, has been accounted the main problem in speculative thought, has occupied the most gifted intellects, and divided them into sects and schools, carrying on a vigorous warfare against one another. And after more than two thousand years the same discussions continue, philosophers are still ranged under the same contending banners, and neither thinkers nor mankind at large seem nearer to being unanimous on the subject, than when the youth Socrates listened to the old Protagoras, and asserted (if Plato's dialogue be grounded on a real conversation) the theory of utilitarianism against the popular morality of the so-called sophist.It is true that similar confusion and uncertainty, and in some cases similar discordance, exist respecting the first principles of all the sciences, not excepting that which is deemed the most certain of them, mathematics; without much impairing, generally indeed without impairing at all, the trustworthiness of the conclusions of those sciences. An apparent anomaly, the explanation of which is, that the detailed doctrines of a science are not usually deduced from, nor depend for their evidence upon, what are called its first principles. Were it not so, there would be no science more precarious, or whose conclusions were more insufficiently made out, than algebra; which derives none of its certainty from what are commonly taught to learners as its elements, since these, as laid down by some of its most eminent teachers, are as full of fictions as English law, and of mysteries as theology. The truths which are ultimately accepted as the first principles of a science, are really the lastresults of metaphysical analysis, practised on the elementary notions with which the science is conversant; and their relation to the science is not that of foundations to an edifice, but of roots to a tree, which may perform their office equally well though they be never dug down to and exposed to light. But though in science the particular truths precede the general theory, the contrary might be expected to be the case with a practical art, such as morals or legislation. All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, it seems natural to suppose, must take their whole character and colour from the end to which they are subservient. When we engage in a pursuit, a clear and precise conception of what we are pursuing would seem to be the first thing we need, instead of the last we are to look forward to. A test of right and wrong must be the means, one would think, of ascertaining what is right or wrong, and not a consequence of having already ascertained it.The difficulty is not avoided by having recourse to the popular theory of a natural faculty, a sense or instinct, informing us of right and wrong. For- besides that the existence of such- a moral instinct is itself one of the matters in dispute- those believers in it who have any pretensions to philosophy, have been obliged to abandon the idea that it discerns what is right or wrong in the particular case in hand, as our other senses discern the sight or sound actually present. Our moral faculty, according to all those of its interpreters who are entitled to the name of thinkers, supplies us only with the general principles of moral judgments; it is a branch of our reason, not of our sensitive faculty; and must be looked to for the abstract doctrines of morality, not for perception of it in the concrete. The intuitive, no less than what may be termed the inductive, school of ethics, insists on the necessity of general laws. They both agree that the morality of an individual action is not a question of direct perception, but of the application of a law to an individual case. They recognise also, to a great extent, the same moral laws; but differ as to their evidence, and the source from which they derive their authority. According to the one opinion, the principles of morals are evident a priori, requiring nothing to command assent, except that the meaning of the terms be understood. According to the other doctrine, right and wrong, as well as truth and falsehood, are questions of observation and experience. But both hold equally that morality must be deduced from principles; and the intuitive school affirm as strongly as the inductive, that there is a science of morals. Yet they seldom attempt to make out a list of the a priori principles which are toserve as the premises of the science; still more rarely do they make any effort to reduce those various principles to one first principle, or common ground of obligation. They either assume the ordinary precepts of morals as of a priori authority, or they lay down as the common groundwork of those maxims, some generality much less obviously authoritative than the maxims themselves, and which has never succeeded in gaining popular acceptance. Yet to support their pretensions there ought either to be some one fundamental principle or law, at the root of all morality, or if there be several, there should be a determinate order of precedence among them; and the one principle, or the rule for deciding between the various principles when they conflict, ought to be self-evident.To inquire how far the bad effects of this deficiency have been mitigated in practice, or to what extent the moral beliefs of mankind have been vitiated or made uncertain by the absence of any distinct recognition of an ultimate standard, would imply a complete survey and criticism, of past and present ethical doctrine. It would, however, be easy to show that whatever steadiness or consistency these moral beliefs have, attained, has been mainly due to the tacit influence of a standard not recognised. Although the non-existence of an acknowledged first principle has made ethics not so much a guide as a consecration of men's actual sentiments, still, as men's sentiments, both of favour and of aversion, are greatly influenced by what they suppose to be the effects of things upon their happiness, the principle of utility, or as Bentham latterly called it, the greatest happiness principle, has had a large share in forming the moral doctrines even of those who most scornfully reject its authority. Nor is there any school of thought which refuses to admit that the influence of actions on happiness is a most material and even predominant consideration in many of the details of morals, however unwilling to acknowledge it as the fundamental principle of morality, and the source of moral obligation. I might go much further, and say that to all those a priori moralists who deem it necessary to argue at all, utilitarian arguments are indispensable. It is not my present purpose to criticise these thinkers; but I cannot help referring, for illustration, to a systematic treatise by one of the most illustrious of them, the Metaphysics of Ethics, by Kant. This remarkable man, whose system of thought will long remain one of the landmarks in the history of philosophical speculation, does, in the treatise in question, lay down a universal first principle as the origin and ground of moral obligation; it is this: "So act, thatthe rule on which thou actest would admit of being adopted as a law by all rational beings." But when he begins to deduce from this precept any of the actual duties of morality, he fails, almost grotesquely, to show that there would be any contradiction, any logical (not to say physical) impossibility, in the adoption by all rational beings of the most outrageously immoral rules of conduct. All he shows is that the consequences of their universal adoption would be such as no one would choose to incur.On the present occasion, I shall, without further discussion of the other theories, attempt to contribute something towards the understanding and appreciation of the Utilitarian or Happiness theory, and towards such proof as it is susceptible of. It is evident that this cannot be proof in the ordinary and popular meaning of the term. Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof. Whatever can be proved to be good, must be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted to be good without proof. The medical art is proved to be good by its conducing to health; but how is it possible to prove that health is good? The art of music is good, for the reason, among others, that it produces pleasure; but what proof is it possible to give that pleasure is good? If, then, it is asserted that there is a comprehensive formula, including all things which are in themselves good, and that whatever else is good, is not so as an end, but as a mean, the formula may be accepted or rejected, but is not a subject of what is commonly understood by proof. We are not, however, to infer that its acceptance or rejection must depend on blind impulse, or arbitrary choice. There is a larger meaning of the word proof, in which this question is as amenable to it as any other of the disputed questions of philosophy. The subject is within the cognisance of the rational faculty; and neither does that faculty deal with it solely in the way of intuition. Considerations may be presented capable of determining the intellect either to give or withhold its assent to the doctrine; and this is equivalent to proof.We shall examine presently of what nature are these considerations; in what manner they apply to the case, and what rational grounds, therefore, can be given for accepting or rejecting the utilitarian formula. But it is a preliminary condition of rational acceptance or rejection, that the formula should be correctlyunderstood. I believe that the very imperfect notion ordinarily formed of its meaning, is the chief obstacle which impedes its reception; and that could it be cleared, even from only the grosser misconceptions, the question would be greatlysimplified, and a large proportion of its difficulties removed. Before, therefore, I attempt to enter into the philosophical grounds which can be given for assenting to the utilitarian standard, I shall offer some illustrations of the doctrine itself; with the view of showing more clearly what it is, distinguishing it from what it is not, and disposing of such of the practical objections to it as either originate in, or are closely connected with, mistaken interpretations of its meaning. Having thus prepared the ground, I shall afterwards endeavour to throw such light as I can upon the question, considered as one of philosophical theory.Chapter 2What Utilitarianism Is.A PASSING remark is all that needs be given to the ignorant blunder of supposing that those who stand up for utility as the test of right and wrong, use the term in that restricted and merely colloquial sense in which utility is opposed to pleasure. An apology is due to the philosophical opponents of utilitarianism, for even the momentary appearance of confounding them with any one capable of so absurd a misconception; which is the more extraordinary, inasmuch as the contrary accusation, of referring everything to pleasure, and that too in its grossest form, is another of the common charges against utilitarianism: and, as has been pointedly remarked by an able writer, the same sort of persons, and often the very same persons, denounce the theory "as impracticably dry when the word utility precedes the word pleasure, and as too practicably voluptuous when the word pleasure precedes the word utility." Those who know anything about the matter are aware that every writer, from Epicurus to Bentham, who maintained the theory of utility, meant by it, not something to be contradistinguished from pleasure, but pleasure itself, together with exemption from pain; and instead of opposing the useful to the agreeable or the ornamental, have always declared that the useful means these, among other things. Yet the common herd, including the herd of writers, not only in newspapers and periodicals, but in books of weight and pretension, are perpetually falling into this shallow mistake. Having caught up the word utilitarian, while knowing nothing whatever about it but its sound, they habitually express by it the rejection, or the neglect, of pleasure in some of its forms; of beauty, of ornament, or of amusement. Nor is the term thus ignorantly misapplied solely in disparagement, but occasionally in compliment;as though it implied superiority to frivolity and the mere pleasures of the moment. And this perverted use is the only one in which the word is popularly known, and the one from which the new generation are acquiring their sole notion of its meaning. Those who introduced the word, but who had for many years discontinued it as a distinctive appellation, may well feel themselves called upon to resume it, if by doing so they can hope to contribute anything towards rescuing it from this utter degradation.** The author of this essay has reason for believing himself to be the first person who brought the word utilitarian into use. He did not invent it, but adopted it from a passing expression in Mr. Galt's Annals of the Parish. After using it as a designation for several years, he and others abandoned it from a growing dislike to anything resembling a badge or watchword of sectarian distinction. But as a name for one single opinion, not a set of opinions- to denote the recognition of utility as a standard, not any particular way of applying it- the term supplies a want in the language, and offers, in many cases, a convenient mode of avoiding tiresome circumlocution.The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. To give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory, much more requires to be said; in particular, what things it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure; and to what extent this is left an open question. But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded- namely, that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.Now, such a theory of life excites in many minds, and among them in some of the most estimable in feeling and purpose, inveterate dislike. To suppose that life has (as they express it) no higher end than pleasure- no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit- they designate as utterly mean and grovelling; as a doctrine worthy only of swine, to whom the followers of Epicurus were, at a very early period, contemptuously likened; and modernholders of the doctrine are occasionally made the subject of equally polite comparisons by its German, French, and English assailants.When thus attacked, the Epicureans have always answered, that it is not they, but their accusers, who represent human nature in a degrading light; since the accusation supposes human beings to be capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable. If this supposition were true, the charge could not be gainsaid, but would then be no longer an imputation; for if the sources of pleasure were precisely the same to human beings and to swine, the rule of life which is good enough for the one would be good enough for the other. The comparison of the Epicurean life to that of beasts is felt as degrading, precisely because a beast's pleasures do not satisfy a human being's conceptions of happiness. Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification. I do not, indeed, consider the Epicureans to have been by any means faultless in drawing out their scheme of consequences from the utilitarian principle. To do this in any sufficient manner, many Stoic, as well as Christian elements require to be included. But there is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation. It must be admitted, however, that utilitarian writers in general have placed the superiority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, etc., of the former- that is, in their circumstantial advantages rather than in their intrinsic nature. And on all these points utilitarians have fully proved their case; but they might have taken the other, and, as it may be called, higher ground, with entire consistency. It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moralobligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties. Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs. They would not resign what they possess more than he for the most complete satisfaction of all the desires which they have in common with him. If they ever fancy they would, it is only in cases of unhappiness so extreme, that to escape from it they would exchange their lot for almost any other, however undesirable in their own eyes. A being of higher faculties requires more to make him happy, is capable probably of more acute suffering, and certainly accessible to it at more points, than one of an inferior type; but in spite of these liabilities, he can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence. We may give what explanation we please of this unwillingness; we may attribute it to pride, a name which is given indiscriminately to some of the most and to some of the least estimable feelings of which mankind are capable: we may refer it to the love of liberty and personal independence, an appeal to which was with the Stoics one of the most effective means for the inculcation of it; to the love of power, or to the love of excitement, both of which do really enter into and contribute to it: but its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity, which all human beings possess in one form or other, and in some, though by no means in exact, proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts with it could be, otherwise than momentarily, an object of desire to them.Whoever supposes that this preference takes place at a sacrifice of happiness- that the superior being, in anything like equal circumstances, is not happier than the inferior- confounds the two very different ideas, of happiness, and content. It is indisputable that the being whose capacities of enjoyment are low, has the greatest chance of having them fully satisfied; and a highly endowed being will always feel that any happiness which he can look for, as the world is constituted, is imperfect. But he can learn to bear its imperfections, if they are at all bearable; and they will not make him envy the being who is indeed unconscious of the imperfections, but only because he feels not at all the good which those imperfections qualify. It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.It may be objected, that many who are capable of the higher pleasures, occasionally, under the influence of temptation, postpone them to the lower. But this is quite compatible with a full appreciation of the intrinsic superiority of the higher. Men often, from infirmity of character, make their election for the nearer good, though they know it to be the less valuable; and this no less when the choice is between two bodily pleasures, than when it is between bodily and mental. They pursue sensual indulgences to the injury of health, though perfectly aware that health is the greater good.It may be further objected, that many who begin with youthful enthusiasm for everything noble, as they advance in years sink into indolence and selfishness. But I do not believe that those who undergo this very common change, voluntarily choose the lower description of pleasures in preference to the higher. I believe that before they devote themselves exclusively to the one, they have already become incapable of the other. Capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant, easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance; and in the majority of young persons it speedily dies away if the occupations to which their position in life has devoted them, and the society into which it has thrown them, are not favourable to keeping that higher capacity in exercise. Men lose their high aspirations as they lose their intellectual tastes, because they have not time or opportunity for indulging them; and they addict themselves to inferior pleasures, not becausethey deliberately prefer them, but because they are either the only ones to which they have access, or the only ones which they are any longer capable of enjoying. It may be questioned whether any one who has remained equally susceptible to both classes of pleasures, ever knowingly and calmly preferred the lower; though many, in all ages, have broken down in an ineffectual attempt to combine both.From this verdict of the only competent judges, I apprehend there can be no appeal. On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures, or which of two modes of existence is the most grateful to the feelings, apart from its moral attributes and from its consequences, the judgment of those who are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as final. And there needs be the less hesitation to accept this judgment respecting the quality of pleasures, since there is no other tribunal to be referred to even on the question of quantity. What means are there of determining which is the acutest of two pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations, except the general suffrage of those who are familiar with both? Neither pains nor pleasures are homogeneous, and pain is always heterogeneous with pleasure. What is there to decide whether a particular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain, except the feelings and judgment of the experienced? When, therefore, those feelings and judgment declare the pleasures derived from the higher faculties to be preferable in kind, apart from the question of intensity, to those of which the animal nature, disjoined from the higher faculties, is suspectible, they are entitled on this subject to the same regard.I have dwelt on this point, as being a necessary part of a perfectly just conception of Utility or Happiness, considered as the directive rule of human conduct. But it is by no means an indispensable condition to the acceptance of the utilitarian standard; for that standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether; and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, and that the world in general is immensely a gainer by it. Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of character, even if each individual were only benefited by the nobleness of others, and his own, so far as happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction from the benefit. But the bare enunciation of such an absurdity as this last, renders refutationsuperfluous.According to the Greatest Happiness Principle, as above explained, the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of other people), is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality; the test of quality, and the rule for measuring it against quantity, being the preference felt by those who in their opportunities of experience, to which must be added their habits of self-consciousness and self-observation, are best furnished with the means of comparison. This, being, according to the utilitarian opinion, the end of human action, is necessarily also the standard of morality; which may accordingly be defined, the rules and precepts for human conduct, by the observance of which an existence such as has been described might be, to the greatest extent possible, secured to all mankind; and not to them only, but, so far as the nature of things admits, to the whole sentient creation.Against this doctrine, however, arises another class of objectors, who say that happiness, in any form, cannot be the rational purpose of human life and action; because, in the first place, it is unattainable: and they contemptuously ask, what right hast thou to be happy? a question which Mr. Carlyle clenches by the addition, What right, a short time ago, hadst thou even to be? Next, they say, that men can do without happiness; that all noble human beings have felt this, and could not have become noble but by learning the lesson of Entsagen, or renunciation; which lesson, thoroughly learnt and submitted to, they affirm to be the beginning and necessary condition of all virtue.The first of these objections would go to the root of the matter were it well founded; for if no happiness is to be had at all by human beings, the attainment of it cannot be the end of morality, or of any rational conduct. Though, even in that case, something might still be said for the utilitarian theory; since utility includes not solely the pursuit of happiness, but the prevention or mitigation of unhappiness; and if the former aim be chimerical, there will be all the greater scope and more imperative need for the latter, so long at least as mankind think fit to live, and do not take refuge in the simultaneous act of suicide recommended under certain conditions by Novalis. When, however, it is thus positively asserted to be impossible that human life should be happy, the assertion, if not something like a verbal quibble, is at least an。
功利主义读书报告
《功利主义》读书报告一、书名：《功利主义》（徐大建译）出版社：上海人民出版社，2008年版二、种类：专著三、作者：[英]约翰·斯图加特·穆勒（1806—1873）又译作密尔翻译：徐大建四、主要内容：分两大部分本书，序言和正文，下面是本书的主要内容：（一）译者序：作者对功利主义的起源与发展做了主要概括，包括近现代西方学者对古典功利主义的批判和发展，如西季威克、黑尔、罗斯特等。
除此之外，作者还重点对正文内容做了分章概括，并提出来自己的观点。
（二）正文：正文主要分四章内容：1、“功利主义的含义”首先对功利主义的基本观点做了全面的澄清。
穆勒指出，“行为的对于错，与它们增进幸福或造成不行的倾向成正比。
所谓幸福，是指幸福和免除痛苦；所谓不幸，是指痛苦和丧失快乐”。
即判定行为对错的唯一最终道德标准是看行为是否能够增进认得幸福或快乐。
并提出“唯有快乐和免除痛苦是值得欲求的目的”。
在此基础上，对“幸福”或“快乐”的概念做了进一步澄清。
穆勒认为，功利主义所谓的幸福或快乐不是指动物的幸福或快乐，而是指人的幸福或快乐，即在经验基础上的理智快乐，而非单纯的感官的快乐。
关于功利主义与传统道德之间的关系，穆勒指出判断行为的正当与否的标准，不是行为者自己的幸福，而是一切相关的人们的幸福，所以他说功利主义不反对自我牺牲，但反对把自我牺牲看作善事。
因为“一种幸福如果没有增进或不会增进幸福的总量，那么就是浪费。
”2、功利主义的道德标准这一章中，穆勒提出功利主义的道德标准对人们的约束力既有外在的，又有内在的。
他意识到边沁过分强调外在的道德制裁，而他则提出内在的即良心这种感情，并指出良心是在做出违反行为后，由感情转化成的一种悔恨的特殊感情。
3、功利主义道德标准的证明关于功利主义道德标准的证明问题，穆勒的大致思路是要么根据原理推理，要么是诉诸实施，而功利主义的原理只能依靠后者，即“我认为，要证明任何东西值得欲求，唯一可能的证据是人们实际上欲求它。
《功利主义》读书报告3
《功利主义》读书报告20141303031 广告1401 林曼纯一、《功利主义》的结构从《功利主义》的目录来看，这本书包含6个部分，绪论、功利主义的含义、论功利主义的最终约束力、论功利主义原则能够得到何种证明、论功利与正义的联系、术语对照表。
二、《功利主义》的作者《功利主义》是19世纪英国著名哲学家，经济学家，政治评论家约翰·穆勒撰写的伦理学名著。
于1861年在《弗雷泽杂志》发表，1863年以单性本出版。
晚清末年，穆勒的政治学著作《论自由》（严复翻译为《群己权界论》）1859年出版。
方法学名著《逻辑学体系》（严复翻译《穆勒名学》）1843年出版。
20世纪初就开始影响中国的思想界。
还有其他方面的著作如《政治经济学原理》（1848，商务印书馆）《代议制政府》（1861，商务印书馆）。
可见穆勒是一个百科全书式的人才，在伦理学，经济学，社会学等领域皆有所研究。
让我最惊讶的是，穆勒既没有受过正规教育，更没有上过大学，他的全部教育都是在家里（父亲教导）完成的。
他的学习经历让人惊叹。
3岁，古希腊文8岁，拉丁文，欧几里得几何学，代数学12岁，经院逻辑学13岁，政治经济学（亚当斯密，李嘉图）14-15岁，化学和植物学，探讨高深的数学问题，精通法语所以他比一般的同龄人早熟25年。
除此之外，他的工作经历及学术研究经历也让人惊叹。
17岁，东印度公司高级职员；52岁退休。
工作35年。
他在35年的工作时间里，利用空闲的时间，取得了很大的学术研究成果。
读《功利主义》这本书的理由读这本书，了解现代西方文明。
三、其他的思想流派自由主义的三种派别：自由平等主义；自由至上主义和功利主义。
从方法论的角度：两个思想流派：契约论学派；功利主义学派。
1.（思想流派）契约论学派：合乎道德和制度就是合乎正义。
尊重和不侵犯他人的基本人权。
为什么呢？因为处于平等地位的人都会同意这一点。
每个人的理性是相同的。
学派代表是：罗尔斯《正义论》，洛克，康德。
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功利主义、Utilitarianism英、约翰斯图亚特穆勒（叶建新译）1、一门学科中的具体原理通常并非从该学科的基本原理推断而来，也不依赖基本原理来加以印证。
The detailed doctrines of a science are not usually deduced from, nor depend for their evidence upon ,what are called its first principles.2、一切行为均出于某种目的，故行为准则势必屈从于行为目的并完全体现出目的的种种特性。
All actions is for the shake of some end, and rules of action, it seems natural to suppose, must take their whole character and colour from the end to which they are subservient.3、将功利置于快乐面前时显得不切实际的枯燥乏味，而将快乐置于功利面前时又显得过于现实的奢靡享乐。
As impracticably dry when the word utility precedes the word pleasure, and as too practically voluptuous when the word pleasure precedes the word utility.4、接受功利原理或最大幸福原理为道德根本，就需要坚持旨在促进幸福的行为即为“是”，与幸福背道而驰的行为即为“非”这一信条。
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals ,utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, hold that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.5、比起动物的欲望，人有着更高一级的官能，当人意识到自己的这些官能之后，就不会把什么东西都当作幸福。
Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious of them ,do not regard anything as happiness.6、拥有更高官能的人比之其他人需要更多的东西才能获得幸福感，因而更容易遭受痛苦，而且痛苦的程度往往更加剧烈。
A being of higher faculties requires more to make him happy, is capable probably of more acute suffering, and is certainly accessible to it at more points, than one of an inferior type.7、一种令人满足的生活，其构成要素有二：宁静和兴奋。
The main constituents of a satisfied life appear to be two, either of which by itself is often found sufficient for the purpose: tranquility, and excitement.8、有些人外在的运命相对不如人意，无法发现足够的乐趣来使他们的生活富有意义，但个中原因通常是他们只专注于自我而不在乎他人。
When people who are tolerably fortunate in their outward lot do not find in life sufficient enjoyment to make it valuable to them, the cause generally is, caring for nobody but themselves.9、人类发展的内在要求绝不是让人成为自私自利之徒，只专注于可怜的自我存在而对其他一切麻木不仁，而是在于某种更高的追求，即充分体现人何以为人的实质。
As little is there an inherent necessity that any human being shouldbe a selfish egotist, devoid of every feeling or care but those which centre in his own miserable individuality.10、除了自私，另一个令生活乏善可陈的重要原因便是缺乏智力层面的开发。
Next to selfishness, the principal cause which makes life unsatisfactory, is want of mental cultivation.11、伦理告诉我们什么是我们的义务以及通过何种检验标准来知道我们的义务，但没有一种伦理体系要求我们一切行为的唯一动机都必须出于一种义务感。
It is the business of ethics to tell us what are our duties, or by what test we may know them, but no system of ethics requires that the sole motive of all we do shall be a feeling of duty.12、关于行为的节制——即人们出于道德的考虑而克制自己不去做某些事，尽管在特定情况下做这些事的结果反而可能是有益的——作为一个有才智的行为者，应当清醒地意识到行为是分层次的，倘若在实践中一概而论，则一般而言是有害的，而这正是对行为进行克制的义务所在。
In the case of abstinences indeed——of things which people forbear to do, from moral consideration, though the consequences in the particular case might be beneficial——it would be unworthy of an intelligent agent not to be consciously aware that the action is of a class which, if practiced generally, would be generally injurious, and that is the ground of the obligation to abstain from it.13、毫无疑问，在已知的伦理标准中没有哪一种标准对行为善恶的评判是基于行为者的善恶，更不会建立在考虑行为者是和蔼、勇敢、仁慈之人还是相反之徒的基础之上——这样的考虑与对行为的评价无关，而是与对人的评价有关。
For certainly no known ethical standard decides an action to be good or bad because it is done by a good or a bad man, still less because done by an amiable, a brave, or a benevolent man, or the contrary.14、任何一种行为准则都不可能完善到将所有行为一网打尽的程度，任何一种行为都不可能被界定为永远符合道德义务或者始终应当遭到谴责。
Which all doctrines do, that have been believed by sane persons.15、唯有被教育和舆论所崇尚的习惯性道德，才会在人们的头脑里形成一种本身带有强制性的情感。
For the customary morality, that which presents itself to the mind with the feeling of being in itself obligatory.16、当我们追求一件事物时，我们似乎首先就要对该物心中有个明确清晰的概念，而不是最后才想到。
When we engage id a pursuit, a clear and precise conception of what we are pursuing would seem to be the first thing we need, instead of the last we are to look forward to.17、情感消失时，义务也随之消失。
When the feeling ceases the obligation ceases.18、幸福是值得渴望的，也是唯一作为目的值得渴望的东西，其他任何东西如果说值得渴望那也仅仅是作为实现幸福这一目的的手段。
The happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things being only desirable as means to that end.19、每个人的幸福对他自己而言是一种善，普遍幸福则是所有人整体上的一种善。
Each person’s happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.20、幸福的成分多种多样，每一种本身都值得渴望，而不仅仅是作为一个整体时才值得渴望。
The ingredients of happiness are very various, and each of them is desirable in itself, and not merely when considered as swelling an aggregate.21、金钱的价值完全存在于它所购买的商品身上。
Its worth is solely that the things which it will buy.22、除了幸福，事实上不存在其他任何被渴望的东西。