欧盟竞争法：公权和私权的执行 EU Competition Law Lecture Public and Private Enforcement
反垄断法私人执行的优越性及其实现
反垄断法私人执行的优越性及其实现【摘要】反垄断法私人执行的立法和实践始于美国，现在已经成为大多数国家的必然选择。
反垄断法的私人执行具有自发性优势和比较优势两大优势，“赔偿功能”和“威慑功能”是私人执行“自发性优势”的主要体现，而“救济功能”和“指示功能”则是私人执行“比较优势”的主要表现。
为了充分实现反垄断法私人执行的优越性，在制度设计上应遵循“法律上可能，经济上有利”的原则。
为了促进我国反垄断法的有效实施，应引入私人执行制度，并在反垄断立法中对私人执行制度作出详细的规定。
【关键词】反垄断法；反垄断法私人执行；立法建议【正文】反垄断法的执行可以动用公共和私人两种资源，由此形成公共执行(public enforcement)和私人执行(private enforcement)两种执行方式。
反垄断法的公共执行是指反垄断主管机关以公共利益代表者的身份通过行使公权力来执行反垄断法，而私人执行则是指那些自身利益受到反竞争行为影响的法人或自然人通过向法院提起民事诉讼或通过仲裁等方式来执行反垄断法。
反垄断法的私人执行制度始于美国1890年的《谢尓曼法》，经过100多年的发展后，美国反托拉斯法的私人执行现在已经非常发达，每年有800多件案件，而且私人执行和公共执行案件的比例基本上维持在10：1左右的比例，也就是说私人执行案件占了整个反托拉斯执行案件的90%或更多。
受美国成功经验的影响，20世纪90年代末期特别是21世纪以来，已经有越来越多的国家深刻地认识到了私人执行在反垄断法执行中的重要作用和优越功能，欧盟、德国、英国、加拿大、日本等国家和地区还纷纷通过立法、修订或司法判决等多种途径从多个方面促进反垄断法的私人执行，反垄断法的私人执行已经成为大多数国家的必然选择。
从各国的实践情况来看，私人执行在反垄断法的执行体系中显示出了相当的优越性，很多私人当事人也乐于发动私人执行程序来保护自己的合法权益。
我国正在进行反垄断立法，并且已经提交全国人大进行审议。
欧盟1419-2006法律 关于废除班轮公会反垄断豁免权的文件
I(Acts whose publication is obligatory)COUNCIL REGULATION(EC)No1419/2006of25September2006repealing Regulation(EEC)No4056/86laying down detailed rules for the application of Articles85 and86of the Treaty to maritime transport,and amending Regulation(EC)No1/2003as regards the extension of its scope to include cabotage and international tramp services(Text with EEA relevance)THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,and in particular Article83thereof,Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament(1),Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee(2),After consulting the Committee of the Regions, Whereas:(1)Application of the rules on competition in the maritimetransport sector has been subject to the provisions ofRegulation(EEC)No4056/86(3)since1987.Regulation(EEC)No4056/86originally had two functions.Firstly,itcontained procedural provisions for the enforcement ofCommunity competition rules in the maritime transportsector.Secondly,it laid down certain specific substantivecompetition provisions for the maritime sector andnotably a block exemption for liner shippingconferences,allowing them to fix prices and regulatecapacity under certain conditions,the exclusion ofpurely technical agreements from the application ofArticle81(1)of the Treaty and a procedure for dealingwith conflicts of international law.It did not apply tomaritime transport services between ports in one or tothe same Member State(cabotage)and internationaltramp vessel services.(2)Council Regulation(EC)No1/2003of16December2002on the implementation of the rules on competitionlaid down in Articles81and82of the Treaty(4)amended Regulation(EEC)No4056/86to bringmaritime transport under the common competitionenforcement rules applicable to all sectors with effectfrom1May2004,with the exception of cabotage andinternational tramp vessel services.However,the specificsubstantive competition provisions relating to themaritime sector continue to fall within the scope ofRegulation(EEC)No4056/86.(3)The liner shipping conference block exemption providedfor in Regulation(EEC)No4056/86exempts from theprohibition of Article81(1)of the Treaty agreements,decisions and concerted practices of all or part of themembers of one or more liner conferences which fulfilcertain conditions.The justification for the blockexemption in essence assumes that conferences bringstability,ensuring exporters reliable services whichcannot be achieved by less restrictive means.However,a thorough review of the industry carried out by theCommission has demonstrated that liner shipping isnot unique as its cost structure does not differ substan-tially from that of other industries.There is therefore noevidence that the industry needs to be protected fromcompetition.EN28.9.2006Official Journal of the European Union L269/1(1)Opinion of4July2006(not yet published in the Official Journal).(2)Opinion delivered on5July2006(not yet published in the OfficialJournal).(3)OJ L378,31.12.1986,p.4.Regulation as last amended by the2003Act of Accession.(4)OJ L1,4.1.2003,p.1.Regulation as amended by Regulation(EC)No411/2004(OJ L68,6.3.2004,p.1).(4)The first condition for exemption under Article81(3)requires that the restrictive agreement contributes toimproving the production or distribution of goods orto promoting technical or economic progress.Asregards the efficiencies generated by conferences,linerconferences are no longer able to enforce the conferencetariff although they still manage to set charges andsurcharges which are a part of the price of transport.There is also no evidence that the conference systemleads to more stable freight rates or more reliableshipping services than would be the case in a fullycompetitive market.Conference members increasinglyoffer their services via individual service agreementsentered into with individual exporters.In addition,conferences do not manage the carrying capacity thatis available as this is an individual decision taken byeach carrier.Under current market conditions pricestability and the reliability of services are brought aboutby individual service agreements.The alleged causal linkbetween the restrictions(price fixing and supply regu-lation)and the claimed efficiencies(reliable services)therefore appears too tenuous to meet the firstcondition of Article81(3).(5)The second condition for exemption under Article81(3)is that consumers must be compensated for the negativeeffects resulting from the restriction of competition.Inthe case of hard core restrictions,such as horizontal pricefixing which occur when the conference tariff is set andcharges and surcharges are jointly fixed,the negativeeffects are very serious.However no clearly positiveeffects have been identified.Transport users considerthat conferences operate for the benefit of the leastefficient members and call for their abolishment.Conferences no longer fulfil the second condition ofArticle81(3).(6)The third condition for exemption under Article81(3)isthat the conduct must not impose on the undertakingsconcerned restrictions which are not indispensable to theattainment of its objectives.Consortia are cooperativeagreements between liner shipping lines that do notinvolve price fixing and are therefore less restrictivethan conferences.Transport users consider them toprovide adequate,reliable and efficient scheduledmaritime services.In addition the use of individualservice agreements has increased significantly in recentyears.By definition,such individual service agreementsdo not restrict competition and provide benefits toexporters as they make it possible to tailor specialservices.Furthermore,because the price is established inadvance and does not fluctuate for a predeterminedperiod(usually up to one year),service contracts cancontribute to price stability.It has therefore not beenestablished that the restrictions of competitionpermitted under Regulation(EEC)No4056/86(pricefixing and capacity regulation)are indispensable for theprovision of reliable shipping services to transport usersas these can be achieved by less restrictive means.Thethird condition under Article81(3)is therefore notsatisfied.(7)Finally,the fourth condition under Article81(3)requiresthat the conference should remain subject to effectivecompetitive constraints.In current market circumstancesconferences are present in nearly all major trade lanesand they compete with carriers grouped in consortia andwith independent lines.Whilst there may be pricecompetition on the ocean freight rate due to theweakening of the conference system there is hardly anyprice competition with respect to the surcharges andancillary charges.These are set by the conference andthe same level of charges is often applied by non-conference carriers.In addition,carriers participate inconferences and consortia on the same trade,exchangingcommercially sensitive information and cumulating thebenefits of the conference(price fixing and capacity regu-lation)and of the consortia(operational cooperation forthe provision of a joint service)block exemptions.Giventhe increasing number of links between carriers in thesame trade,determining the extent to which conferencesare subject to effective internal and external competitionis a very complex exercise and one that can only be doneon a case by case basis.(8)Liner shipping conferences therefore no longer fulfil thefour cumulative conditions for exemption under Article81(3)of the Treaty and the block exemption in respectof such conferences should therefore be abolished.(9)The exclusion from the prohibition of Article81(1)ofthe Treaty of purely technical agreements and theprocedure for dealing with conflicts of law which mayarise are also redundant.Those provisions shouldtherefore also be deleted.(10)In the light of the above,Regulation(EEC)No4056/86should be repealed in its entirety.ENL269/2Official Journal of the European Union28.9.2006(11)Liner conferences are tolerated in several jurisdictions.In this,as in other sectors,competition law is not applied in the same way worldwide.In light of the global nature of the liner shipping industry,the Commission should take the appropriate steps to advance the removal of the price fixing exemption for liner conferences that exist elsewhere whilst maintaining the exemption for opera-tional cooperation between shipping lines grouped in consortia and alliances,in line with the recommendations of the OECD Secretariat in 2002.(12)Cabotage and international tramp vessel services have been excluded from the rules implementing Articles 81and 82of the Treaty originally laid down in Regulation (EEC)No 4056/86and subsequently in Regulation (EC)No 1/2003.They are currently the only remaining sectors to be excluded from the Community competition implementing rules.The lack of effective enforcement powers for these sectors is an anomaly from a regulatory point of view.(13)The exclusion of tramp vessel services from Regulation (EC)No 1/2003was based on the fact that rates for these services are freely negotiated on a case by case basis in accordance with supply and demand conditions.However,such market conditions are present in other sectors and the substantive provisions of Articles 81and 82already apply to these services.No convincing reason has been brought forward to maintain the current exclusion of these services from the rules implementing Articles 81and 82of the Treaty.Similarly,although cabotage services often have no effect on intra Community trade,this does not mean that they should be excluded from the scope of Regulation (EC)No 1/2003from the outset.(14)As the mechanisms enshrined in Regulation (EC)No 1/2003are appropriate for applying the competitionrules to all sectors,the scope of that Regulation should be amended so as to include cabotage and tramp vessel services.(15)Regulation (EC)No 1/2003should therefore be amended accordingly.(16)Since Member States may need to adjust their interna-tional commitments in the light of the abolition of the conference system,the provisions of Regulation (EEC)No 4056/86relating to the liner conference block exemption should continue to apply to conferences satisfying the requirements of Regulation (EEC)No 4056/86on the date of entry into force of this Regu-lation for a transitional period,HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:Article 1Regulation (EEC)No 4056/86shall be repealed.However,Article 1(3)(b)and (c),Articles 3to 7,Article 8(2)and Article 26of Regulation (EEC)No 4056/86shall continue to apply in respect of liner shipping conferences satisfying the requirements of Regulation (EEC)No 4056/86on 18October 2006,for a transitional period of two years from that date.Article 2Article 32of Regulation (EC)No 1/2003shall be deleted.Article 3This Regulation shall enter into force on the 20th day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union .This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.Done at Brussels,25September 2006.For the Council The PresidentM.PEKKARINENEN28.9.2006Official Journal of the European Union L 269/3。
欧盟公司法导论 (4)
欧盟公司法导论欧盟公司法导论主要从其立法背景、欧盟法优先原则的讨论出发（第一部分），然后陈述了欧盟公司法的立法内容，尤其是对公司法指令的概论性导读（第二部分）。
最后对欧盟主要国家的公司法的发展历程趋势加以简要勾画。
此外，欧洲有许多跨国公司，所以也对跨国公司法的主要问题-冲突理论加以分析，以补充以上内容，使对欧盟及欧盟各国公司法和跨国公司法的内容有初步了解。
第一部分（一）欧盟公司法立法背景欧盟是建立在欧洲的欧洲煤炭与钢铁共同体（European Coal and SteelCommunity，简称“欧洲煤钢共同体”），欧洲经济共同体European Economic Community，简称EEC:欧共体）和欧洲原子能共同体（ European Atomic Enengy Community，简称:Euratom）之上的。
建立欧盟的建立是鉴于各国历经了二战，欧洲经济急待各国政府携手合作，以便重振经济。
1950年，当时的法国外长罗伯特·舒曼（Robert Schuman）提出一项由欧洲各国政府联合管理煤炭与钢铁生产的计划。
这个计划得到了欧洲一些国家的响应。
1951年4月18日，法国、前联邦德国、荷兰、意大利、比利时和卢森堡等6国在巴黎签署了《欧洲煤炭与钢铁共同体条约》（又称《巴黎条约》），正式成立了欧洲煤钢共同体。
随着形势的发展，上述6国又于1957年3月25日在罗马签署了《欧洲经济共同体条约》和《欧洲原子能共同体条约》（统称《罗马条约》。
在第一个《欧洲煤炭与钢铁共同体条约》这个条约的绪言中，还就建立该共同体的目的问题明确指出：条约是“通过建立一个经济共同体来维系他们的基本利益，以取代长期的敌对，并作为在长期以来被血腥冲突而分裂的人民中确立更为广泛和更为深入的共同体的基础。
”1973年1月1日，丹麦、爱尔兰和英国首批加人了上述3个共同体。
其后，1981年1月1日，希腊又加入了上述3个共同体。
欧洲公司法统一化新进展_简析欧盟委员会_欧洲私法公司条例草案_
程在实务界遭受冷遇的现状。 欧 洲 私 法 公 司 的 创 设 是 “ 欧 盟 小 商 业 法 案 （Small
Business Act of Europe）”措施的组成部分。 根据《草案》的 说明，虽然欧盟境内 99％的企业为中小型企业，但其中只 有 8％从事跨国业务，5％在境外设有子公司或分公司。 欧盟 创设欧洲私法公司的目的之一，在于“使中小型企业更容易 在单一市场内从事跨国经营，发掘其潜力，促进其成长”。 ⑨ 同时，这一新的公司形式还能为已经拥有或者正打算开展 跨国业务的大型公司提供便利，因为欧洲私法公司特别符 合投资者在多个成员国建立子公司的需求。 随着欧盟经济 一体化的日益加深，即便一些中型企业也越来越注重到其 他成员国开展业务。为了有效地控制外国业务的风险，投资 者往往愿意选择子公司而非分公司的形式。 但由于欧盟成 员国之间存在公司法的差异，母公司往往需要为了在不同 成员国设立多个子公司花费大量的时间和精力。 而如果欧
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全球视野
理论月刊 ２００９ 年第２ 期
洲私法公司能够出台，则各个子公司的设立与管理可以采 取统一的法律框架，从而极大地降低成本。
对于打算在欧盟多个成员国以有限责任公司形式开 展业务的中国投资者而言，欧洲私法公司也将是符合管理 效率最大化原则的选择。 本文希望通过对该《条例》最重要 的规定进行整合分析，不仅有助读者从理论上了解这一新 的公司形式，而且对预备前往欧洲的投资者也能起到参考 作用。
①欧洲私法公司的拉丁文名称为 Societas Privata Europaea，简称 SPE。 ②欧洲经济利益集团的英语为 European economic interest grouping， 简称 EEIP， 是欧盟 2137/85 号理事会决议通过的欧盟第一个超国 家公司形式。 ③欧洲公司的拉丁文为 Societas Europaea，简称 SE。 是欧盟 2157 ／ 2001 号理事会决议通过的超国家公司形式。 ④欧洲合作社的拉丁文为 Societas Cooperativa Europaea，简称 SCE。 是欧盟 1435 ／ 2003 号理事会决议创设的超国家公司形式。 ⑤《草案》的英文、法文、德文文本以及其他相关文件参见 www.europeanprivatecompany.eu。 ⑥例如德国安联保险公司、巴斯夫制药公司和保时捷汽车公司等。 ⑦欧洲公司的登记虽然由成员国登记机关进行， 但每个欧洲公司的登记都必须被公布在 《欧盟官方通讯》（Official Journal of European Union）上。 截至 2007 年 9 月，欧盟境内共登记了 64 家欧洲公司。 ⑧《条例》第 3 条第 1 款规定，欧洲私法公司具有独立的法律人格，股东风险以认缴的出资额为限对公司承担责任，而公司以其全部资产对 外承担责任，并且公司股份不可公开发行或交易。 因而欧洲私法公司就其实质而言是有限责任公司。 ⑨见《草案》英文文本第 2 页立法阐释。
竞争法(双语)02 The Concept of Undertaking
3. LEADING CASES FROM EU AND CHINA
EU Model
What are the answers from EU courts? p.3 pp.4-18
China Model
What are the answers from China juridical practices?
• Regardless of their legal status and the way in which they are financed
EU Model
• The relativity of the concept
– Focus on the activity rather than the form of the entity
– Anti unfair competition law
• Article 3 undertakings shall, in their supply of commodities produced and sold by them or services to consumers... (为消费者提供其生产、销售的商品或者提 供服务)
CONTENTS
1. MODELS OF DIFFERENT LEGIISLATION 2. THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH OF DEFINING UNDERTAKING 3. LEADING CASES FROM EU AND CHINA 4. SINGLE ECONOMIC ENTITY
Competition Law
CHAPTER 1 THE CONCEPT OF UNDERTAKING
Yu Ling Law School of JUFE
欧盟运行条约第101条
欧盟运行条约第101条欧洲共同体（简称“欧盟”）的运行条约第101条规定，欧洲共同体企业（ECE）只能通过与欧洲经济区内的其他企业形成同等条件的合作协议来调整市场秩序。
就像经济一样，这些协议应该根据公平竞争的原则而产生，而不是通过双边和三边协议来控制市场。
第101条提到，任何滋生不公平竞争的行为都是不允许的，而如果欧洲共同体企业需要在欧洲经济区内调整市场秩序，他们必须遵守欧盟法律规定的严格的规则，并且必须避免任何不公平的竞争行为，以确保欧洲内部市场的秩序和公平竞争。
第101条的主要目的是要防止任何可能影响欧洲经济的不公正的市场行为，以确保市场秩序和公平竞争的环境。
第101条是欧洲共同体企业确保欧洲经济区内的公平竞争环境的基础。
因此，它一直被认为是欧洲市场秩序的核心法规，承担着重要的责任。
首先，欧洲共同体企业必须遵守当地法律规定，不得弄虚作假，欺骗或使用不正当手段来影响市场秩序。
其次，企业必须遵守所有欧洲经济区内的贸易安排，以保护当地市场。
此外，欧洲共同体企业的任何调整市场管理的行为，包括对当地政策、条例、法规和决定的实施，都必须同时考虑欧洲经济区内的企业的利益。
此外，欧洲经济区内企业必须遵守所有有助于促进公平竞争市场秩序的欧洲政策与法规，同时也要确保其行为符合欧洲政策与法规的要求，以免影响市场秩序的平衡。
此外，对于欧洲经济区内的公司，如果他们有可能影响欧洲经济区内的报价格或价格平衡，欧洲经济区的竞争机构有权干预，阻止这种行为。
最后，任何欧洲共同体企业在欧洲经济区内调整市场秩序时，必须尊重欧洲政策与法规，同时也必须充分考虑欧洲经济区内其他企业的利益，并且考虑到当地经济、生态及社会环境的多样性，以确保欧洲经济区内的市场秩序和公平竞争的环境。
总之，欧洲共同体的运行条约第101条充分规定了企业在欧洲经济区内调整市场秩序时必须遵守的相关规定，并且它也对欧洲经济区内市场秩序和公平竞争环境有许多积极的影响。
它不仅促进了欧洲经济区内公平竞争的环境，也为欧洲经济区内的公司提供了一个具有竞争力的市场环境，以支持其发展和创新进步。
欧盟竞争法对竞争的理解
欧盟竞争法对竞争的理解欧盟任何条约都没有对竞争下定义，在煤钢经济共同体条约（CECA）中，仅仅指出竞争是这个新的共同体的追求的基本目标。
在CEE条约第2条的总目标中，竞争只是一个建设和巩固统一市场的工具。
而且，在实践中欧盟委员会、欧共体法院（CJCE）都没有定义竞争。
但是经济学家则把竞争定义为静态的竞争和动态的竞争。
1．静态解释市场是一个需求者和供货者的集合体，二者都希望根据不同的特点购买和销售一定数量的产品，如根据产品的价格、产品生产或销售的特定地点和特定日期等。
但商品的价格不是以独断的方式被固定下来，而是广大的需求者与相对少数的供货者之间讨价还价的结果，那么产品市场上就有竞争。
理论上讲，这种竞争会产生供求之间的价格平衡。
该价格平衡是在变化的价格中所获得一种价值，如购买者的需求数量与销售者的供货数量是相等的。
人们期待的正是通过竞争方法而达到这种平衡。
从理论上讲，在某些假设下，从消费者的观点上看，市场上所有的价格都是平衡的，那么这种经济状态才是人们所期望的。
实质上，这种情形即所谓的总体平衡，如果不通过处罚某些供货者就不可能满足消费者，因为供货者总想通过控制整个市场上的供给而获得高额利润。
竞争的充分展开通常是要付出一定的社会成本的，竞争中的优胜劣汰规则必然要牺牲部分市场主体的经济利益，导致一些不安定不稳定的因素增加社会成本开支。
因此，就会有价格的串通行为和对市场力量或市场支配地位的滥用问题。
竞争导致了价格在市场上的总体平衡，从这个意义上说，竞争看似静态的。
欧盟法可以从这个解释角度来解读。
特别是，当供货者不受约束地协商而固定价格时，竞争就不发挥作用了。
CE条约第81条对这种串通做了具体规定。
当生产者达一定规模很大地影响着同一市场其他企业价格的形成时，竞争也受到了限制。
CE条约第82条的规定是为了防范在欧盟市场上，在价格形成中对市场支配地位的滥用。
2．动态解释竞争不仅仅是一种获得价格平衡的方法，而且还是一个促生新的生产机构、消费机构、新的生产方式、新的产品和服务的过程。
欧盟的相关法律规定(3篇)
第1篇一、引言欧盟（European Union，简称EU）是一个由欧洲国家组成的政治和经济联盟。
自1957年成立以来，欧盟在政治、经济、法律等领域取得了显著的成就。
欧盟的法律规定对于成员国和欧盟机构都具有约束力，本文将详细介绍欧盟的相关法律规定。
二、欧盟法律体系概述1. 欧盟法律渊源欧盟法律渊源主要包括以下几类：（1）欧盟条约：欧盟的法律体系建立在一系列基本条约之上，如《罗马条约》、《马斯特里赫特条约》、《阿姆斯特丹条约》和《里斯本条约》等。
这些条约规定了欧盟的宗旨、组织结构、决策程序等基本框架。
（2）欧盟立法：欧盟机构根据条约授权制定的法规、指令和决定等。
其中，法规具有普遍约束力，适用于所有成员国；指令具有指导性，成员国需在规定时间内转化为国内法；决定则针对特定个案。
（3）欧盟法院判例：欧盟法院的判例对成员国具有约束力，是欧盟法律体系的重要组成部分。
（4）国际协定：欧盟与第三国签订的协定，如《欧洲经济伙伴关系协定》等。
2. 欧盟法律效力欧盟法律具有优先性，即在成员国法律与欧盟法律发生冲突时，应以欧盟法律为准。
此外，欧盟法律对成员国具有直接效力，即成员国无需将欧盟法律转化为国内法即可执行。
三、欧盟主要法律规定1. 欧盟基本权利欧盟基本权利包括个人权利、集体权利和社会权利。
这些权利在《欧洲联盟基本权利宪章》中得到明确规定，包括：（1）人身自由和尊严：禁止酷刑、禁止奴隶制和强迫劳动、禁止种族歧视等。
（2）言论自由和新闻自由：保障个人和媒体的言论自由、新闻自由。
（3）宗教自由：保障个人宗教信仰自由。
（4）平等权：禁止性别、种族、宗教、国籍、出生、残疾等歧视。
（5）社会权利：保障工作权、社会保障权、教育权等。
2. 欧盟内部市场欧盟内部市场是指成员国之间取消关税、配额等贸易壁垒，实现商品、服务、资本和劳动力的自由流动。
主要法律规定如下：（1）关税同盟：成员国之间取消关税，对第三国实行统一关税。
（2）货物自由流通：成员国之间取消货物进出口限制，实现货物自由流通。
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Court of Justice & Acquis (cont’d)
Acquis communautaire: • Principles of equivalence and of effectiveness – Indirect purchaser standing – Limitation periods – Access to evidence • Full compensation excludes caps for the amount of compensation • “Binding effect” of Commission decisions (Article 16(1) of Regulation 1/2003)
The relationship between public and private enforcement
Damages actions and cooperation mechanisms
Outline
• 1. Private enforcement and the EU right to damages – acquis communautaire and open questions • 2. Regulation 1/2003: mechanisms of cooperation between the Commission and national courts • 3. Case study – issues in private enforcement • 4. Policy developments: quantification and collective redress
1. Private enforcement and the EU right to damages acquis communautaire and open questions
1. Private enforcement and the EU right to damages acquis communautaire and open questis – damages actions
* Articles [101] and [102] produce direct effects in relations between individuals, and create rights that national courts must safeguard (BRT v Sabam, 1974) *Articles [101] and [102] are a matter of public policy which must be automatically applied by national courts (Eco Swiss, 1999) * Any individual can rely on a breach of Article [101] [and 102] EC before a national court (Courage v Crehan, 2001) *Any individual can claim compensation for the harm suffered where there is a causal relationship between that harm and the prohibited agreement or practice. (Manfredi, 2006) * In the absence of Community rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive directly from Community law, provided that such rules comply with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.
Court of Justice & Acquis
• Case C‐453/99 Courage and Crehan & Joined Cases C‐295/04 to C‐298/04 Manfredi “the full effectiveness of Article 101 […] would be put at risk if it were not open to any individual to claim damages for loss caused to him by a [such an infringement]” • Right to compensation for antitrust harm is guaranteed by the Treaty