肯尼思.华尔兹《国际政治理论》
本书简介：肯尼思.华尔兹的《国际政治理论》一书从国际体系出发，在分离和还原的工作基础上，建构了国际政治的系统——结构研究框架，从而提出了华尔兹著名的“结构现实主义”理论。
在这一理论中，通过精简和细致严谨的推演，华尔兹为我们呈现了国际社会中各行为体的位置以及互动关系。
并且指出各行为体的活动是由国际结构所呈现的压力所决定的。
本书是当代国际政治领域影响最大的一部著作之一，也是引用频率最高的著作之一，已成为国际政治领域的经典著作。
本书共分9章。
第一章阐述了理论究竟是什么，以及演绎理论较之归纳理论的优点。
第二、三、四章批评了还原主义方法为什么不能够解释国际政治结果，第五章阐明政治结构是如何产生的，第六章考察了无政府状态的特性以及国家在系统中预期的可能变化，第七、八、九章则对国际政治的结构理论进行检验，这三章比较了不同的国际系统，并对系统结构发生变化时，行为与结果会有什么样的差异进行了阐述。
按照作者所言，本书试图解决三个问题。
第一，试图对已有的重要国际政治理论进行批判性考察；第二，力图建立一种新的国际政治理论；第三，对新建立的理论进行检验。
读过肯尼思•华尔兹《国际政治理论》后的一些感想
探析单元属性、动机及互动对结构的影响
华尔兹在定义系统结构时，抽象掉了单元属性把国家可能有什么样的政治领袖、社会和经济制度及意识形态信仰等因素抛开，且认为结构的决定因素只是S•F•纳达尔所指出的联系的一个方面，即单元在彼此的联系中所处的地位（即如何排列和定位），而忽视了单元的互动。
但我认为，尽管结构是根据单元的排列方式来加以定义的，并且结构是随着单元排列方式的改变而改变的，然而我们不可否认的是，单元排列方式的形成存在及变动有其本身单元层次的原因，就是被华尔兹在定义结构时忽略掉的单元的属性、动机及单元之间的互动。
本文就单元的属性、动机及互动是如何影响单元的排列方式进而影响结构的存在及变动这一问题发表以下几点认识。
1尽管结构从表面看只是由单元的排列方式决定的，但不能因此而忽视造成这种排列方式的原因，这时我们就不能不提到单元的性质、动机及相互之间的互动。
例如冷战期间的两极体系，美苏成为世界的两极，这已是既定事实。
鉴于这一事实，我们必须承认美苏这两个单元呈现的这种特殊的排列方式而造成了两极结构。
但是美苏是如何崛起成为两极的问题，是不可回避的，也是解释两极格局如何形成不可缺少的。
当然一种结构的形成及确立不是一蹴而就的，是一个量变的过程，期间单元属性、行为及互动就显现出巨大的解释力。
美苏成为两极始于二战后，二战也就成了它的直接原因，那么二战是如何爆发的这一问题就应被解释。
二战爆发的原因错综复杂，但其中一个最重要的原因就是，新兴崛起的德日法西斯鉴于国家利益的考虑而同老牌的殖民帝国争夺势力范围的战争，国家利益、国家动机在其中的作用不可忽视。
当然其中希特勒的个人因素不能不让人联想到单元中政治领袖的作用，而日本天皇之强大动员能力也源于大和民族中军国主义传统和民族性格，在二战迫在眉睫之际，英法居然还要对德国实行绥靖政策，这其中有反共产主义苏联的意识形态在作怪，而二战后，美苏为何由战时盟友反目成仇而成为战后对手，一方面是由于共同敌人法西斯的消亡，共同利益消失而导致合作的根基动摇，而另一方面，也与美苏两国国内各自的相互敌视的意识形态斗阵有关。
2华尔兹认为在单元排列方式发生变动时，结构会随之变动。
但是单元的排列方式为什么会变动、在什么情况下才会变动，这就很自然的归因于单元层次的变动。
为什么冷战期间的两极格局如此稳固而没有被打破，美苏两大国也没有发生直接的正面冲突。
有人认为冷战期间的和平源于水晶球效应，即核恐怖下的和平，各国都看到了一旦核战
争爆发将没有胜利者，只能是同归于尽，因此各方只能克制保持和平。
但是这一核恐怖下的和平本身就是单元互动的结果，核武器的产生时源于单元间的互动，即国家间的战争，武器一是为了巩固国防，二是为了打赢战争，战争的扩大导致武器的升级，美国为了减少伤亡和早日结束战争，而发明运用核武器，而日本长崎和广岛遭到核武器打击之后的惨象，给这一水晶球提供了第一张恐怖画面。
再如1962年的古巴导弹危机中，假设这一危机是通过武力方式解决的，带给人类的将是第三次世界大战，结果可能是美胜苏败、美败苏胜或者是两败俱伤，总之这场战争必定会造成美苏势力的消长进而改变两极格局。
但很幸运这一危机得到了和平化解，其中起作用的不仅仅是各国关于国际利益的考虑和上文提到的水晶球效应，还有在战争一触即发之计，两国领导人的理性决策，这其中两国领导人的个人作用就不得不被人重视。
3结构的静态表现是相对的、暂时的，而结构的动态特征则是绝对的、永恒的，这无不与单元性质动机的变动和单元互动的展开有关。
从宏观的层面去看结构的变动和更迭是比较明显的，历史经历了罗马治下的和平、英国治下的和平、美国治下的和平。
权力的转移，霸权国家的变动，及主要单元排列方式的变动无疑会引起结构的变动。
如西方比较公认的霸权国家，16世纪的西班牙，17世纪的荷兰，18世纪的法国，19世纪的英国及20世纪的美国，这些霸权国的交替出现都导致了国际结构的变动，但是它们的崛起到称霸确是以单元层次的各种因素为基础的。
时期支配国主要权力资源
16世纪
西班牙黄金、殖民地贸易、雇佣军、王朝联系
17世纪荷兰贸易、资本市场、海军
18世纪法国人口、乡村工业、公共管理、陆军
19世纪英国工业、政治凝聚力、财经和信贷、海军、自由规范、岛国位置
20世纪美国经济规模、科技领先地位、普世性文化、军事实力和联盟、自由国际机制跨国传播文化
（此图摘自约瑟夫奈的《软实力》一书）
4最后，我将结合中国崛起来谈谈对这一问题的认识，中国能否崛起并替代美国成为下一任世界的领导国，这将关系到现在单元排列方式和位置的变动。
中国何时崛起、以什么样的方式崛起，是各国关注的焦点，分析中国崛起中受到的各种阻力，我们便能知道，单元层次的因素及单元的互动是如何起作用的。
（1）霸权建立的基本条件：一是实力、二是意愿。
即便中国有能力成为代替美国的世界主导国，但中国政府一再表态“中国永不称霸”，中国没有成为西方国家所谓霸权国家的意愿。
这也是与中国儒家的“中庸之道”以及“和为贵”的民族传统和民族性格分不开的，是国家属性不可或缺的一部分。
（2）中国要真正成为世界霸主，必须在经济政治文化军事、硬实力和软实力方面处于世界的领先地位，虽然中国近几年的经济处于强势发展势头，但是这一形势将会持续多久以及这背后到底蕴藏着多少危机，还是未知数；市场经济制度也遭到某些西方国家的质疑；军事力量方面，现在根本无法与拥有全球军事投放能力的美国相比；而我国的政治体制也时常遭到国际反共分子的攻击，且主权问题尚存，台湾钓鱼岛南海诸岛主权问题尚有争端；国内民族分裂势力存在等等一系列国内因素都是中国崛起不得不解决的问题。
（3）美国作为现在的唯一超级大国，将崛起中的中国视为其全球霸权的挑战国，遏制中国将是美国对待中国问题上一个长期的政策和手段，尽管两国的贸易发展迅速；而日本印度等
亚洲大国也不希望看到自己身边崛起如此一个大国，并因此产生了不安全感。
所以竭力去拉拢美国以制衡中国，但期间各国经贸合作及文化交流也不断发展，总体上呈现互制与互惠并存，单元之间互动频繁。
因此结构本身就是以单元的存在为基础的，若单元不存在，则结构便无从说起；而结构的存在和变动虽是单元排列方式的最直接的反应，但是单元排列方式的本身存在及变动是以单元属性、动机及互动为前提的。
肯尼思·华尔兹的《国际政治理论》评析
A Probe into Kenneth N. Waltz's Theory of
International Politics
作者： 刘文祥;宋芳
作者机构： 湖北大学法学院,湖北武汉430062
出版物刊名： 湖北大学学报：哲学社会科学版
页码： 279-281页
主题词： 经典现实主义;结构现实主义;系统;权力;无政府状态
摘要：国际政治中的现实主义理论是这一学科知识谱系中最有影响力的理论.而肯尼思·华尔兹的<国际政治理论>则是新现实主义(或结构现实主义)理论的力作.本文通过对<国际政治理论>的介绍和分析,试图对国际政治中的这一重要流派进行深入探讨,诠释肯尼思·华尔兹对国际政治理论的贡献.。
肯尼思.华尔兹《国际政治理论》
本书简介：肯尼思.华尔兹的《国际政治理论》一书从国际体系出发，在分离和还原的工作基础上，建构了国际政治的系统——结构研究框架，从而提出了华尔兹著名的“结构现实主义”理论。
在这一理论中，通过精简和细致严谨的推演，华尔兹为我们呈现了国际社会中各行为体的位置以及互动关系。
并且指出各行为体的活动是由国际结构所呈现的压力所决定的。
本书是当代国际政治领域影响最大的一部著作之一，也是引用频率最高的著作之一，已成为国际政治领域的经典著作。
本书共分9章。
第一章阐述了理论究竟是什么，以及演绎理论较之归纳理论的优点。
第二、三、四章批评了还原主义方法为什么不能够解释国际政治结果，第五章阐明政治结构是如何产生的，第六章考察了无政府状态的特性以及国家在系统中预期的可能变化，第七、八、九章则对国际政治的结构理论进行检验，这三章比较了不同的国际系统，并对系统结构发生变化时，行为与结果会有什么样的差异进行了阐述。
按照作者所言，本书试图解决三个问题。
第一，试图对已有的重要国际政治理论进行批判性考察；第二，力图建立一种新的国际政治理论；第三，对新建立的理论进行检验。
读过肯尼思•华尔兹《国际政治理论》后的一些感想探析单元属性、动机及互动对结构的影响华尔兹在定义系统结构时，抽象掉了单元属性把国家可能有什么样的政治领袖、社会和经济制度及意识形态信仰等因素抛开，且认为结构的决定因素只是S•F•纳达尔所指出的联系的一个方面，即单元在彼此的联系中所处的地位（即如何排列和定位），而忽视了单元的互动。
但我认为，尽管结构是根据单元的排列方式来加以定义的，并且结构是随着单元排列方式的改变而改变的，然而我们不可否认的是，单元排列方式的形成存在及变动有其本身单元层次的原因，就是被华尔兹在定义结构时忽略掉的单元的属性、动机及单元之间的互动。
本文就单元的属性、动机及互动是如何影响单元的排列方式进而影响结构的存在及变动这一问题发表以下几点认识。
1尽管结构从表面看只是由单元的排列方式决定的，但不能因此而忽视造成这种排列方式的原因，这时我们就不能不提到单元的性质、动机及相互之间的互动。
《国际政治理论》读书笔记
《国际政治理论》读书笔记第一篇：《国际政治理论》读书笔记《国际政治理论》读书笔记《国际政治理论》作者是肯尼斯华尔兹，本书的出版标志着结构现实主义学派的确立。
书中，作者首先花了很大篇幅去阐述“什么是理论？”并检验已有的重要理论和方法，然后修正现存理论的缺陷从而构建结构现实主义理论，最后又对结构现实主义理论的适用性进行检验。
作者首先指出许多国际政治学者未能厘清“规律”“理论”等词的科学应用规则，导致词汇的错用、滥用，这就导致了理论的瑕疵与缺陷。
作者所认为的国际政治理论应当是高度抽象的，不能将理论希望解释的东西添加到理论中去。
一种符合科学哲学标准的理论，其概念和假说必须客观、精确、和可测量。
“规律”是对事实的一种观察，而“理论”则是对规律的解释，或者说是为了解释事实而进行的思辨过程。
作者反对将理论视为关于某一特定行为或现象规律的结合或系列，他认为这一做法只能收集到更多数据并从中总结出更多的关联性，但不能给出任何对原因的解释。
也就是说这种方法得到的所谓的理论其实质仅仅是规律。
因此作者反对归纳法，因为归纳法只能解决问题的片段，而将这些片段相加并不能给出任何对事物的解释，因为要被认知的课题是无穷的，我们无从知道该将哪部分相加，也无法得知这种相加是否合适。
同时，理论与现实相关，然而理论本身需要独立于现实世界。
事实不决定理论，对同一个事实可以有多个理论适用，理论可以被不断替换，而现实世界的规律将永久保持不变。
关于检验理论的方法程序上，作者在给出检验程序的同时认为最大的问题在于要用足够清晰可信的方式来发现和表述理论，以使检验值得进行。
而国际政治领域内现实却是很少有理论能够清晰并符合逻辑地定义其术语，指明各理论变量间的关系。
国际政治是一个过于复杂且庞大的领域，作者认为仅用还原方法不足以构建一个有力的解释，因而需要采用一种系统分析的方法。
作者以霍布森-列宁帝国主义经济理论为例讨论了还原主义理论方法的局限性。
作者通过自己的理论检验程序对霍布森-列宁帝国主义经济理论的三个基本假设在逻辑上提出质疑，并用史实和现实观察反驳了这三个基本假设，也就是说霍布森-列宁帝国主义经济理论本质上是一个经济性的理论而不是政治性的理论，而列宁的帝国主义战争论和资本主义灭亡论根植在其经济理论之上，从而也就否定了这一理论在逻辑上的有效性。
国际政治理论华尔兹读书报告
国际政治理论华尔兹读书报告许多国家今天都在努力应对突发的国际政治问题，而对于国际政
治理论框架的发展，华尔兹提出了一些独特而重要的观点，本文试图
通过回顾华尔兹关于国际政治理论的论文，来介绍他的思想。
华尔兹曾专注于探索早期以及现代国际政治概念的深层次本质。
他的论文探讨了国际政治的关键概念，如国家权力、国家利益、权力
秩序和政策流动。
他指出，国际政治是一个复杂的体系，它不仅涉及
国家的政策和行为，还涉及国家之间的关系。
接下来，华尔兹将视野放到国际关系的模式上。
他认为，政府应
该确保国家间形成“适度的权力平衡”，以使国家不会轻易控制其他
国家。
他将权力平衡分为两个维度：“仪式”平衡和“财政”平衡。
财政平衡的核心思想是拥有类似的投资和国际技术能力的国家可能更
有可能促成双边之间的和平与友谊。
华尔兹还讨论了国际关系的“政治经济学”视角。
他认为，国家
之间的经济责任应该受制于政治意图。
这一概念受到了现代贸易协定
所建立，可以防止个别国家发生贸易滥用，促使国家遵守要求和守则，
保持相互尊重。
此外，华尔兹也认为，全球主义是国家能够利用国际
合作来解决他们自身的问题的有效途径。
总的来说，华尔兹的工作开辟了对国际政治理论的一个新的领域，他深刻地改变了我们对国际关系的理解。
他为提出平衡概念、国际政
治经济学和全球主义的可行性贡献了新的思考。
华尔兹的理论定义了
国际政治的核心思想，让我们能够更好地理解现代国际政治状况。
无政府秩序与均势——肯尼思·沃尔兹《国际政治理论》第五、六章解读
三大界 定要素
1、排列原则
2、单元的特性 3、能力的分配
国内政治是按照等级秩序排列的，各单元之间——机 构和组织——为上下级关系。
形式不同的各部分在国内政治结构中具有不同的功能。
• 将国际政治描述为一个竞争的领域，国家的命运取决 于对其他国家行为的反应。
• 均势趋势将持续下去：会被破坏但又周而复始地形成。
谢谢~
理论界对均势理论的评价褒贬不一，存在三点误解。
均势理论产生的两个条件：无政府秩序以及系统由谋 求自身生存的行为体构成。
政治系统的结构决定政治行为体是选择彼此制衡还是 “追随强者”（bandwagon）。
无政府状态下，安全是国家的最高目标，因此国家不 会过分追求权力的最大化而加盟较强的一方，其主要 目的是为了维持自身在系统中的地位，导致均势的产 生。
结构中单元的地位随着它们相对能力的变化而变化。 即使规定的功能保持不变，但随着相对能力的变化， 单元彼此间的关系也将改变。
国际系统内各部分的关系是平等的。没有一国有权发 号施令，任何一国也不必加以服从
“尽管国际组织确实存在而且数量还在不断增加， 但是，超国家机构只有在具有了某些国家的特性和能 力的情况下才能有效发挥作用。”
无政府状态下安全是国家的最高目标因此国家不会过分追求权力的最大化而加盟较强的一方其主要目的是为了维持自身在系统中的地位导致均势的产将国际政治描述为一个竞争的领域国家的命运取决于对其他国家行为的反应
《国际政治理论》 肯尼思·沃尔兹
系统由结构和互动的单元组成。
结构是全系统范围内的组成部分，使得系统能够被视 为一个整体。
国际政治系统理论的真正架构浅析肯尼思沃尔兹的结构现实主义
国际政治系统理论的真正架构浅析肯尼思沃尔兹的结构现实主义一、本文概述本文旨在对肯尼思·沃尔兹（Kenneth Waltz）的结构现实主义理论进行深入的分析和探讨，揭示其在国际政治系统理论中的真正架构。
肯尼思·沃尔兹作为新现实主义学派的代表人物之一，其理论在国际关系学界具有深远的影响。
本文将从结构现实主义的理论基础、核心观点及其对国际政治系统的解释等方面展开论述，以期对读者提供一个全面而深入的理解。
本文将介绍结构现实主义的理论基础，包括其哲学基础、核心概念以及与其他理论的比较。
结构现实主义强调国际政治系统的结构性特征，认为国际政治的本质在于国家间的权力分配和互动关系。
这种权力分配和互动关系形成了国际政治的结构，从而决定了国家在国际政治中的行为和结果。
本文将重点论述肯尼思·沃尔兹的结构现实主义的核心观点。
沃尔兹认为，国际政治系统的结构是由国家间的相对实力分布所决定的，这种相对实力分布决定了国家在国际政治中的地位和影响力。
同时，沃尔兹也强调了国际政治系统的无政府状态和自助体系，认为这种无政府状态和自助体系是国际政治系统的基本特征，对国家的行为和国际政治的发展产生着深远的影响。
本文将探讨结构现实主义对国际政治系统的解释力。
结构现实主义认为，国际政治系统的结构是国家行为和国际政治发展的决定性因素，这种结构性的解释为我们理解国际政治提供了重要的视角。
结构现实主义也指出了国际政治系统中的一些重要现象，如均势、霸权稳定论等，为我们分析国际政治提供了有力的工具。
本文将对肯尼思·沃尔兹的结构现实主义进行深入的分析和探讨，以期为读者提供一个全面而深入的理解。
通过本文的论述，读者将更加深入地理解国际政治系统理论的结构现实主义架构，从而更好地认识国际政治的本质和规律。
二、肯尼思·沃尔兹的结构现实主义概述肯尼思·沃尔兹（Kenneth Waltz）的结构现实主义是当代国际政治理论中的一股重要力量。
国际政治理论
肯尼斯·华尔兹在1979年出版发行了他的《国际政治理论》一书，从而拉开了国际政治学新的一页。
这本书被称为新现实主义的开山之作，并且在二十多年的时间里成为该领域被征引频率最高的著作之一。
华尔兹的贡献在于，首先他将结构主义分析方法引入国际政治学研究，并且建立了一套纯粹的系统理论，较之以前的学者，他的结构主义运用的更为精确，从而使得结构与系统的观念成为理论研究的基础，并为"无政府状态"这一概念赋予了新的含义；第二，华尔兹继承了现实主义的传统和理论假设，是继汉斯·摩根索之后现实主义理论的大师；第三，华尔兹的研究引出了80年代国际政治学的大争论，在这场争论中，如基欧汉等人，将结构理论和自由主义传统结合起来，逐渐发展出了新自由主义理论，在随后，由于制度经济学，尤其是博弈论方法的引进，新自由主义的国际政治理论逐渐与以华尔兹为代表的新现实主义理论分庭抗礼。
直到90年代初，建构主义理论的出现才打破了这种二分天下的局面。
而这一局面的出现，与华尔兹密不可分。
本书可以大致分三部分，首先，在这本书的一开始，作者用了大量的篇幅阐明一个符合国际政治学要求的理论应该是什么样子，并且做了大量的说明。
之后作者提出了自己的理论，也就是结构理论的框架，并结合现实主义的假设发展出一种新的现实主义理论。
在书的最后部分，作者将自己的理论运用于国际经济、军事和国际事务管理，并且考察了结构如何在这些领域中发生变化。
本文重点在于前两部分。
在第一部分，作者首先区分了规律和理论，分析了将理论看作规律的集合所造成的混乱，分析了归纳法在寻找规律时的积极作用，并指出其在理论建设中的局限。
他提出"我们所认识的现实本身只是长久以来在脑海中经过构建和在构建所形成的精巧的概念。
现实产生于我们对无限材料的选择和组织。
如何选取材料以及如何安排，关键的问题在于找出归纳法所必遵守的准则。
"如果说"规律指恒定不变的或可能存在的因果联系"那么，理论的作用是解释这种联系因何存在。
国际政治理论PPT
主讲人：李京 专业：政治学
作者简介
肯尼思· 华尔兹 名字又被翻译做沃尔兹 1924年6月生于美国密歇根州安阿伯 1950年和1954年在哥伦比亚大学分别获得政治学硕士和博士学位， 先后在哥伦比亚大学、加州大学伯克利分校等校任教。曾担任美国对 外政策委员会委员、美国政治学会会长等职，并荣获"詹姆斯· 麦迪逊 政治科学杰出学术贡献奖"。 1994年退休，为加州大学伯克利分校政治学系终身荣誉教授。其主要 著作有《人、国家与战争》(1959)《对外政策和民主政治》(1967) 《国际政治理论》(1979)。其中《国际政治理论》一书自出版以来便 被誉为"当代经典"，迄今为止是国际关系学界影响最大、引用率最高 的著作。
谢谢观看！
第二章还原主义理论
ቤተ መጻሕፍቲ ባይዱ
1“还原主义理论”：集中讨论了几个采用不同研究方法的理论，来思
索不同类型理论的可能性与局限性。
2 还原主义理论认为：国家内部力量产生外部后果，国际系统也只不过
被视为一种后果而已。
3 还原方法：为了解释某一集团的行为，从而对其组成成员的心理进行
研究的方法，其实质是通过研究各组成部分来理解整体。
内容要点
1.
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3. 4. 5.
6.
7. 8. 9.
规律与理论 还原主义理论 系统方法与理论 还原方法与系统方法 政治结构 无政府秩序与均势 结构性原因与经济效果 结构性原因与军事效果 国际事务管理
第一章规律与理论
理论定义：
一，它被视为关于某一特定行为或现象的规律的集合或系列。但理论并非 只是规律的集合，而是对规律的解释，二者之间有着本质的区别。规律指出 恒定不变的或可能存在的因果联系，而理论则解释这种联系为何存在。 二，即理论解释规律，规律有别于理论，区别之一就在于规律可以被发现， 而理论只能被构建。如果假设得到确认，便被称之为规律。而理论只能通过 简化来建立，简化使发挥作用的基本要素得到彰显，并揭示出必然的因果联 系和相互依赖关系。
对华尔兹《国际政治理论》的批判与思考
对华尔兹《国际政治理论》的批判与思考提要：华尔兹的代表作之一《国际政治理论》是新现实主义产生的标志，在整个西方国际关系理论发展史上具有极其重要的意义和价值，它不仅为国际政治理论提供了一个新的理论视角和分析方式，更主要的是将以往的传统现实主义体系化，使其成为一门真正的理论。
本文试图对华尔兹的这部经典代表作进行批判和思考，指出华尔兹《国际政治理论》的深刻意义正是来自于对它的批判而引出对国际政治理论本体论的思考，正是基于这种国际政治研究视角的转化才促进了当今西方国际政治理论的百花齐放的繁荣景况。
关键词：结构现实主义；简化；本体论。
1979年，肯尼思·华尔兹《国际政治理论》发表，提出了以国际系统结构为研究中心的结构现实主义，即新现实主义。
华尔兹的结构现实主义理论的提出对西方国际关系理论建设产生了重大影响，它不仅为国际政治理论提供了一个新的理论视角和分析方式，更主要的是将以往的传统现实主义体系化，使其成为一门真正的理论。
而正是基于对华尔兹结构现实主义理论的批判与反思，使国际关系理论响着更为深广的方向发展。
本文试图对华尔兹结构现实主义理论的批判进行梳理，旨在引起人们对结构现实主义理论进一步重视与研究。
一、华尔兹论述中的问题华尔兹认为”在国际政治中，决策是在最低层次做出的，很少产生于其他层次”紧接着又说”在垂直和水平二分法中，国际结构是水平的”[1]既然是水平的、横向与同质的，那么华尔兹在此的”最低层次”是什么？既然有最低层次，那么就必然有相较之的高层次，既然层次有高低之分，国际结构还能称职为”水平”吗？华尔兹认为均势理论能对均势的反复出现做出解释，关于反复就有一个频率问题，什么样的频率能证明均势理论的可信度呢？华尔兹认为”应当以每15年作为一个时间段，考察在此期间各国的政策与外交，来审视该理论能否解释并广泛的预测各国的行为与反应”[2]为什么是15年？以这个时间段作为反复频率划分的依据是什么？华尔兹没有提供一个令人信服的解释，如果对反复的标准没有一个确切定义的话，仅以反复作为验证标准，同样可以证明其他理论，如霸权理论，也是反复出现的；在15世纪是荷兰、19世纪是美国。
21沃尔兹
21. Waltz肯尼思·沃尔兹于1979年出版的《国际政治理论》（A Theory of International Politics）是新现实主义（结构现实主义）的宣言书，它标志着一个既不同于科学行为主义又有别于经典现实主义的新学派的诞生。
自那时以来，新现实主义的各种观点及其变迁和新自由主义的批评，无一不是同沃尔兹的这篇名著联系在一起的。
沃尔兹从国际政治的无政府状态这一基本前提出发，构建起一套全新的、系统的、以国际政治结构这个概念为核心的国际关系理论。
沃尔兹明确宣布了他所代表的新现实主义与摩根索所代表的经典现实主义的区别。
他说，摩根索始终关注强权，而他则看重安全；前者从人和国家的行为及其相互作用的单位层次上去理解国际关系，而他则从国际政治的单位和结构两个层次及其相互关系上去探求国际关系的规律，因此，他所展示的国际关系是多层次的、系统的、但以结构为核心的。
沃尔兹进一步指出，国际体系本质上是一个“自助”的体系，各权势不等的国家都在追求安全，从而不可避免在产生了“安全困境”，也导致战争一再爆发。
沃尔兹说，就此而言，战争是正常的现象。
他还通过对历史上的国际体系的分析，得出结论认为，控制国际冲突和战争，应靠由两个大国构成的两极体系，因为这个体系似乎是比较稳定的。
本篇选自《国际政治理论》，主要讨论了新现实主义的理论框架。
Theory of International PoliticsI defined domestic political structures first by the principle according to which they are organized or ordered, second by the differentiation of units and the specification of their functions, and third by the distribution of capabilities across units. Let us see how the three terms of the definition apply to international politics.Ordering PrinciplesStructural questions are questions about the arrangements of the parts of a system. The parts of domestic political systems stand in relations of super- and subordination. Some are entitled to command; others are required to obey. Domestic systems are centralized and hierarchic. The parts of international-political systems stand in relations of coordination. Formally, each is the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchic. The ordering principles of the two structures are distinctly different, indeed, contrary to each other. Domestic political structures have governmental institutions and offices as their concrete counterparts. International politics, in contrast, has been called “politics in the absence of government”. International organizations do exist, and in even-growing numbers. Supranational agents able to act effectively, however, either themselves acquire some of the attributes and capabilities of states, as did the medieval papacy in the era of Innocent III1, or they soon reveal their inability to act in important ways except with the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the principal states concerned with the matters at hand. Whatever elements118of authority emerge internationally are barely once removed from the capability that provides the foundation for the appearance of those elements. Authority quickly reduces to a particular expression of capability. In the absence of agents with system-wide authority, formal relations of super- and subordination fail to develop.The first term of a structural definition states the principle by which the system is ordered. Structure is an organizational concept. The prominent characteristic of international politics, however, seems to be the lack of order and of organization. How can one think of international politics as being any kind of an order at all? The anarchy of politics internationally is often referred to. If structure is an organizational concept, the terms “structure” and “anarchy” seem to be in contradiction. If international politics is “politics in the absence of government”, what are we in the presence of? In looking for international structure, one is brought face to face with the invisible, an uncomfortable position to be in.The prob1em is this: how to conceive of an order without an order and of organizational effects where formal organization is lacking. Because these are difficult questions, I shall answer them through analogy with microeconomic theory. Reasoning by analogy is helpful where one can move from a domain for which theory is well developed to one where it is not. Reasoning by analogy is permissible where different domains are structurally similar.Classical economic theory developed by Adam Smith and his followers, is micro-theory. Political scientists tend to think that micro-theory is theory about small-scale matters, a usage that ill accords with its established meaning. The term “micro” in economic theory indicates the way in which the theory is constructed rather than the scope of the matters it pertains to. Microeconomic theory describes how an order is spontaneously formed from the self-interested acts and interactions of individual units—in this case, persons and firms. The theory then turns upon the two central concepts of the economic units and of the market. Economic units and economic markets are concepts, not descriptive realities or concrete entities. This must be emphasized since from the early eighteenth century to the present, from the sociologist Auguste Comte2 to the psychologist George Katona3, economic theory has been faulted because its assumptions fail to correspond with realities. Unrealistically, economic theorists conceive of an economy operating in isolation from its society and polity. Unrealistically, economists think of the acting unit, the famous “economic man”, as a single-minded profit maximizer. They single out one aspect of man and leave aside the wondrous variety of human life. As any moderately sensible economist knows, “economic man” does not exist. Anyone who asks businessmen how they make their decisions will find that the assumption that men are economic maximizers grossly distorts their characters. The assumption that men behave as economic men, which is known to be false as a descriptive statement, turns out to be usefu1 in the construction of theory.Markets are the second major concept invented by microeconomic theorists. Two119general questions must be asked about markets: How are they formed? How do they work? The answer to the first question is this: The market of a decentralized economy is individualist in origin, spontaneously generated, and unintended. The market arises out of the activities of separate units—persons and firms—whose aims and efforts are directed not toward creating an order but rather toward fulfilling their own internally defined interests by whatever means they can muster. The individual unit acts for itself. From the co-action of like units emerges a structure that affects and constrains all of them. Once formed, a market becomes a force in itself, and a force that the constitutive units acting singly or in small numbers cannot control. Instead, in lesser or greater degree as market conditions vary, the creators become the creatures of the market that their activity gave rise to. Adam Smith's great achievement was to show how self-interested, greed-driven actions may produce good social outcomes if only political and socia1 conditions permit free competition. If a laissez-faire economy is harmonious, it is so because the intentions of actors do not correspond with the outcomes their actions produce. Each would like to work less hard and price his product higher. Taken together, all have to work harder and price their products lower. Each firm seeks to increase its profit; the result of many firms doing so drives the profit rate downward. Each man seeks his own end, and, in doing so, produces a result that was no part of his intention. Out of the mean ambition of its members, the greater good of society is produced.The market is a cause interposed between the economic actors and the results they produce. It conditions their calculations, their behaviors, and their interactions. It is not an agent in the sense of A being the agent that produces outcome X. Rather it is a structural cause. A market constrains the units that comprise it from taking certain actions and disposes them toward taking others.International-political systems, like economic markets, are formed by the co-action of self-regarding units. International structures are defined in terms of the primary political units of an era, be the city-states, empires, or nations. Structures emerge from the coexistence of states. No state intends to participate in the formation of a structure by which it and others will be constrained. International-political systems, like economic markets, are individualist in origin, spontaneously generated, and unintended. In both systems, structures are formed by the co-action of their units. Whether those units live, prosper, or die depends on their own efforts. Both systems are formed and maintained on a principle of self-help that applies to the units. To say that the two realms are structurally similar is not to proclaim their identity. Economically, the self-help principle applies within governmentally contrived limits. Market economies are hedged about in ways that channel energies constructively. One may think of pure food-and-drug standards, antitrust laws, securities and exchange regulations, laws against shooting a competitor, and rules forbidding false claims in advertising. International politics is more nearly a realm in which anything goes.120International politics is structurally similar to a market economy insofar as the self-help principle is allowed to operate in the latter.In a micro-theory, whether of international politics or of economics, the motivation of the actors is assumed rather than realistically described. I assume that states seek to ensure their survival. The assumption is a radical simplification made for the sake of constructing a theory. The question to ask of the assumption, as ever, is not whether it is true but whether it is the most sensible and useful one that can be made. Whether it is a useful assumption depends on whether a theory based on the assumption can be contrived, a theory from which important consequences not otherwise obvious can be inferred. Whether it is a sensible assumption can be directly discussed.Beyond the survival motive, the aims of states may be endlessly varied; they may range from the ambition to conquer the world to the desire merely to be left alone. Survival is a pre-requisite to achieving any goals that states may have, other than the goal of promoting their own disappearance as political entities. The survival motive is taken as the ground of action in a world where the security of states is not assured, rather than as a realistic description of the impulse that lies behind every act of state. The assumption allows for the fact that no state always acts exclusively to ensure its survival. It allows for the fact that some states may persistently seek goals that they value more highly than survival; they may, for example, prefer amalgamation with other states to their own survival in form. It allows for the fact that in pursuit of its security no state will act with perfect knowledge and wisdom--if indeed we could know what those terms might mean. Some systems have high requirements for their functioning. Competitive economic and international-political systems work differently. Out of the interactions of their parts they develop structures that reward or punish behavior that conforms more or less nearly to the system's requirements. Recall my description of the constraints of the British parliamentary system. Why should a would-be Prime Minister not strike out on a bold course of his own? Why not behave in ways markedly different from those of typical British political leaders? Anyone can, of course, and some who aspire to become Prime Minister do so. They rarely come to the top. Except in deepest crisis, the system selects others to hold the highest office. One may behave as one likes to. Patterns of behavior nevertheless emerge, and they derive from the structural constraints of the system.Actors may perceive the structure that constrains them and understand how it serves to reward some kinds of behavior and to penalize others. But then again they either may not see it or, seeing it, may for any of many reasons fail to conform their actions to the patterns that are most often rewarded and least often punished. To say that “the structure selects” means simply that those who conform to ac-cepted and successful practices more often rise to the top and are likelier to stay there. The game one has to win is defined by the structure that determines the kind of player who is likely to prosper.121Where selection according to behavior occurs, no enforced standard of behavior is required for the system to operate, although either system may work better if some standards are enforced or accepted. Internationally, the environment of states' action, or the structure of their system, is set by the fact that some states prefer surviva1 over other ends obtainable in the short run and act with relative efficiency to achieve that end. States may alter their behavior because of the structure they form through interaction with other states. But in what ways and why? To answer these questions we must complete the definition of international structure.●Structures are defined, first, according to the principle by which a system is ordered. Systemsare transformed if one ordering principle replaces another. To move from an anarchic to a hierarchic realm is to move from one system to another.●Structures are defined, second, by the specification of functions of differentiated units.Hierarchic systems change if functions are differently defined and allotted. For anarchic Systems, the criterion of Systems change derived from the second part of the definition drops out since the system is composed of like units.●Structures are defined, third, by the distribution of capabilities across units. Changes in thisdistribution are changes of system whether the system be an anarchic or a hierarchic one.Anarchic Structures and Balance of PowerTo achieve their objectives and maintain their security, units in a condition of anarchy—be they people, corporations, states, or whatever—must rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves. Self-help is necessarily the principle of action in an anarchic order. A self-help situation is one of high risk—of bankruptcy in the economic realm and of war in world of free states. ……Wherever agents and agencies are coupled by force and competition rather than by authority and law, we expect to find behaviors and outcomes closely identified with the approach to politics suggested by the rubric, Realpolitik4.……Realpolitik indicates the methods by which foreign policy is conducted and provides a rationale for them. Structural constraints explain why the methods are repeatedly used despite differences in the persons and states who use them. Balance-of-power theory purports to explain the result that such methods produce. Rather, that is what the theory should do. If there is any distinctively political theory of international politics, balance-of-power theory is it. And yet one cannot find a statement of the theory that is generally accepted. Carefully surveying the copious balance-of-power literature, Ernst Haas5 discovered eight distinct meanings of the term,6 and Martin Wight found nine.7 Hans Morgenthau, in his profound historical and analytic treatment of the subject, makes use of four different definitions.8Balance of power is seen by some as being akin to a law of nature; by others, as simply an outrage. Some view it as a guide to statesmen; others as a122cloak that disguises their imperialist policies. Some believe that a balance of power is the best guarantee of the security of states and the peace of the world; others, that it has ruined states by causing most of the wars they have fought.To believe that one can cut through such confusion may seem quixotic. I shall nevertheless try. It will help to hark back to several basic propositions about theory. (l) A theory contains at least one theoretical assumption. Such assumptions are not factual. One therefore cannot legitimately ask if they are true, but only if they are useful. (2) Theories must be evaluated in terms of what they claim to explain. Balance-of-power theory claims to explain the results of states’ actions, under given conditions, and those result s may not be fore-shadowed in any of the actors’ motives or be contained as objectives in their po1icies.(3)Theory, as a general explanatory system, cannot account for particularities.Most of the confusions in balance-of-power theory, and criticisms of it, derive from misunderstanding these three points. A balance-of-power theory, properly stated, begins with assumptions about states: They are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination. States, or those who act for them, try in more or less sensible ways to use the means available in order to achieve the ends in view. Those means fall into two categories: internal efforts (moves to increase economic capability, to increase military strength, to develop clever strategies) and external efforts (moves to strengthen and enlarge one's own alliance or to weaken and shrink an opposing one). The external game of alignment and re-alignment requires three or more players, and it is usually said that balance-of-power systems require at least that number. The statement is false, for in a two-power system the politics of balance continue, but the way to compensate for an incipient external disequilibrium is primarily by intensifying one's internal efforts. To the assumptions of the theory we then add the condition for its operation: that two or more states coexist in a self-help system, one with no superior agent to come to the aid of states that may be weakening or to deny to any of them the use of whatever instruments they think wil1 serve their purposes. The theory, then, is built up from the assumed motivations of states and the actions that correspond to them. It describes the constraints that arise from the system that those actions produce, and it indicates the expected outcome: namely, the formation of balances of power. Balance-of-power theory is micro-theory precisely in the economist’s sense. The system, like a market in economics, is made by the actions and interactions of its units, and the theory is based on assumptions about their behavior.A self-help system is one in which those who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer. Fear of such unwanted consequences stimulates states to behave in ways that tend toward the creation of balances of power. Notice that the theory requires no assumptions of rationality or of constancy of will on the part of all of the actors. The theory says simply that123if some do relatively well, others will emulate them or fall by the wayside. Obviously the system won't work if all states lose interest in preserving themselves. It will, however, continue to work if some states do, while others do not, choose to lose their political identities, say, through amalgamation. Nor need it be assumed that all of the competing states are striving relentlessly to increase their power. The possibility that force may be used by some states to weaken or destroy others does, however, make it difficult for them to break out of the competitive system.The meaning and importance of the theory are made clear by examining prevalent misconceptions of it. Recall our first proposition about theory. A theory contains assumptions that are theoretical, not factual. One of the most common misunderstandings of balance-of -power theory centers on this point. The theory is criticized because its assumptions are erroneous. From previous discussion, we know that assumptions are neither true nor false and that they are essential for the construction of theory. We can freely admit that states are in fact not unitary, purposive actors. States pursue many goals, which are often vaguely formulated and inconsistent. They fluctuate with the changing currents of domestic politics, are prey to the vagaries of a shifting cast of political leaders, and are influenced by the outcomes of bureaucratic struggles. But all of this has always been known, and it tells us nothing about the merits of balance-of-power theory.A further confusion relates to our second proposition about theory. Balance-of-power theory c1aims to explain a result (the recurrent formation of balances of power), which may not accord with the intentions of any of the units whose actions combine to produce that result. To contrive and maintain a balance may be the aim of one or more states, but then again it may not be. According to the theory, balances of power tend to form whether some or all states consciously aim to establish and maintain a balance, or whether some or all states aim for universal domination. Yet many, and perhaps most, statements of balance-of-power theory attribute the maintenance of a balance to the separate states as a motive. David Hume, in his classic essay “Of the Balance of Power”,9 o ffers “the maxim of preserving the balance of power” as a constant rule of prudent politics. So it may be, but it has proved to be an unfortunately short step from the belief that a high regard for preserving a balance is at the heart of wise statesmanship to the belief that states must follow the maxim if a balance of power is to be maintained.The closely related errors that fall under our second proposition about theory are, as we have seen, twin traits of the field of international politics: namely, to assume a necessary correspondence of motile and result and to infer rules for the actors from the observed results of their action. What has gone wrong can be made clear by recalling the economic analogy. In a purely competitive economy, everyone’s strivin g to make a profit drives the profit rate downward. Let the competition continue long enough under static conditions, and everyone's profit will be zero. To infer from that result that everyone, or anyone, is124seeking to minimize profit, and that the competitors must adopt that goal as a rule in order for the system to work, would be absurd. And yet in international politics one frequently finds that rules inferred from the results of the interactions of states are prescribed to the actors and are said to be a condition of the system’s maintenance. Such errors, often made, are also often pointed out, though seemingly to no avail. S. F. Nadel10 has put the matter simply: “an orderliness abstracted from behaviour cannot guide behaviour”.11 Analytic reasoning applied where a systems approach is needed leads to the laying down of all sorts of conditions as prerequisites to balances of power forming and tending toward equilibrium and as general preconditions of world stability and peace. Some require that the number of great powers exceed two; others that a major power be willing to play the role of balancer. Some require that military technology not change radically or rapidly; others that the major states abide by arbitrarily specified rules. But balances of power form in the absence of the “necessary” conditions, and since l945 the world has been stable, and the world of major powers remarkably peaceful, even though international conditions have not conformed to theorists’ stipulations. Balance-of-power politics prevail wherever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive.Finally, and related to our third proposition about theory in general; balance-of-power theory is often criticized because it does not explain the particular policies of states. True, the theory does not tell us why state X made a certain move last Tuesday. To expect it to do so would be like expecting the theory of universal gravitation to explain the wayward path of a falling leaf. A theory at one level of generality cannot answer questions about matters at a different level of generality.Any theory covers some matters and leaves other matters aside. Balance-or-power theory is a theory about the results produced by the un-coordinated actions of states. The theory makes assumptions about the interests and motive of states, rather than explaining them. What it does explain are the constraints that confine all states. The clear perception of constraints provides many clues to the expected reactions of states, but by itself the theory cannot explain those reactions. They depend not only on international constraints but also on the characteristics of states. How will a particular state react? To answer that question we need not only a theory of the market, so to speak, but also a theory about the firms that compose it. What will a state have to react to? Balance-of-power theory can give general and useful answers to that question. The theory explains why a certain similarity of behavior is expected from similarly situated states. The expected behavior is similar, not identical. To explain the expected differences in national responses, a theory would have to show how the different internal structures of states affect their external policies and actions.A theory of foreign policy would not predict the detailed content of policy but instead would lead to different expectations about the tendencies and styles of different countries'125policies. Because the national and the international levels are linked, theories of both types, if they are any good, tell us some things, but not the same things, about behavior and outcomes at both levels.Quoted from Kenneth Waltz, A Theory of International Politics(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).1 Innocent III, 教皇英诺森三世，1198-1216年在位。